speedy trial violation in Alaska

2024The Supreme Court ultimately concluded that the “amorphous quality” of the right to a speedy trial means that any inquiry into a speedy trial claim “necessitates a functional analysis of the right in the particular context of the case.” 8 It thus adopted a balancing test, identifying “some of the factors” which courts should assess in determining whether the defendant’s right to speedy trial has been violated. 9 These factors are: the length of delay, the reason for the delay, the defendant’s assertion of the right, and the prejudice to the defendant.10 Alaska’s appellate courts subsequently 6

2024The Supreme Court ultimately concluded that the “amorphous quality” of the right to a speedy trial means that any inquiry into a speedy trial claim “necessitates a functional analysis of the right in the particular context of the case.” 8 It thus adopted a balancing test, identifying “some of the factors” which courts should assess in determining whether the defendant’s right to speedy trial has been violated. 9 These factors are: the length of delay, the reason for the delay, the defendant’s assertion of the right, and the prejudice to the defendant.10 Alaska’s appellate courts subsequently 6

2025P. 45(b) (“A defendant charged with a felony, a misdemeanor, or a violation shall be tried within 120 days.”). 41 See, e.g., Glasgow v. State, 469 P.2d 682, 686-87 (Alaska 1970) (concluding court cannot infer generally waiver of constitutional speedy trial right from mere silence but defendant may “knowingly and intelligently waive[] such constitutional rights”); Rutherford v. State, 486 P.2d 946, 950 (Alaska 1971) (same); Conway v. State, 707 P.2d 930, 934 (Alaska App. 1985) (noting criminal defendant may “waive or under certain circumstances forfeit the right to assert a speedy trial violati

1990James v. State, 567 P.2d 298, 300 (Alaska 1977); Trudeau v. State, 714 P.2d 362, 365-66 (Alaska App.1986).

2024The court replied, “Denied.” Hernandez told the court that he was “putting this Court on notice, I’m 31 State v. Mouser, 806 P.2d 330 , 339 n.6 (Alaska App. 1991) (“The speedy trial rule, however, is also not determinative of the constitutional right to speedy trial.

2017In State v. Mouser, the court of appeals used this test in evaluating a speedy trial claim arising under the Alaska Constitution. 806 P.2d 330, 340 (Alaska App. 1991). 6 Wright v. State, 347 P.3d 1000 , 1005 & n.3 (Alaska App. 2015). -6- 7200 counts of sexual abuse of a minor involving M.C. and five counts involving K.A.

2025P. 45(b) (“A defendant charged with a felony, a misdemeanor, or a violation shall be tried within 120 days.”). 41 See, e.g., Glasgow v. State, 469 P.2d 682, 686-87 (Alaska 1970) (concluding court cannot infer generally waiver of constitutional speedy trial right from mere silence but defendant may “knowingly and intelligently waive[] such constitutional rights”); Rutherford v. State, 486 P.2d 946, 950 (Alaska 1971) (same); Conway v. State, 707 P.2d 930, 934 (Alaska App. 1985) (noting criminal defendant may “waive or under certain circumstances forfeit the right to assert a speedy trial violati

1990James v. State, 567 P.2d 298, 300 (Alaska 1977); Trudeau v. State, 714 P.2d 362, 365-66 (Alaska App.1986).

2017Under the due process standard, a defendant has the burden of proving both that the delay was unjustified and that the defendant suffered actual prejudice.94 Under the speedy trial standard, if the 89 Id. 90 Id. (quoting Commonwealth v. Gove, 320 N.E.2d 900, 905 (Mass. 1974)). 91 Id. 92 Id. (quoting Gove, 320 N.E.2d at 907 ). 93 Id. (quoting Jacobson v. Winter, 415 P.2d 297, 300 (Idaho 1966)). 94 State v. Mouser, 806 P.2d 330, 336 (Alaska App. 1991). -23- 7200 defendant can show a delay of sufficient duration to be presumptively prejudicial, the four-factor balancing test is triggered.95 Under

2017Under the due process standard, a defendant has the burden of proving both that the delay was unjustified and that the defendant suffered actual prejudice.94 Under the speedy trial standard, if the 89 Id. 90 Id. (quoting Commonwealth v. Gove, 320 N.E.2d 900, 905 (Mass. 1974)). 91 Id. 92 Id. (quoting Gove, 320 N.E.2d at 907 ). 93 Id. (quoting Jacobson v. Winter, 415 P.2d 297, 300 (Idaho 1966)). 94 State v. Mouser, 806 P.2d 330, 336 (Alaska App. 1991). -23- 7200 defendant can show a delay of sufficient duration to be presumptively prejudicial, the four-factor balancing test is triggered.95 Under

2017Under the due process standard, a defendant has the burden of proving both that the delay was unjustified and that the defendant suffered actual prejudice.94 Under the speedy trial standard, if the 89 Id. 90 Id. (quoting Commonwealth v. Gove, 320 N.E.2d 900, 905 (Mass. 1974)). 91 Id. 92 Id. (quoting Gove, 320 N.E.2d at 907 ). 93 Id. (quoting Jacobson v. Winter, 415 P.2d 297, 300 (Idaho 1966)). 94 State v. Mouser, 806 P.2d 330, 336 (Alaska App. 1991). -23- 7200 defendant can show a delay of sufficient duration to be presumptively prejudicial, the four-factor balancing test is triggered.95 Under

2017Under the due process standard, a defendant has the burden of proving both that the delay was unjustified and that the defendant suffered actual prejudice.94 Under the speedy trial standard, if the 89 Id. 90 Id. (quoting Commonwealth v. Gove, 320 N.E.2d 900, 905 (Mass. 1974)). 91 Id. 92 Id. (quoting Gove, 320 N.E.2d at 907 ). 93 Id. (quoting Jacobson v. Winter, 415 P.2d 297, 300 (Idaho 1966)). 94 State v. Mouser, 806 P.2d 330, 336 (Alaska App. 1991). -23- 7200 defendant can show a delay of sufficient duration to be presumptively prejudicial, the four-factor balancing test is triggered.95 Under

2017I would reverse the court of appeals’ decision because a prosecutor’s information in a felony case is not a formal charge for purposes of the speedy trial clause. 39 State v. Gonzales, 156 P.3d 407, 411-12 (Alaska 2007). 40 Under this test, “the defendant must prove both that the delay was not reasonable and that the defendant suffered actual prejudice from the delay.” Id. at 411 (footnote omitted) (citing State v. Mouser, 806 P.2d 330, 336 (Alaska App. 1991)). 41 Id. at 409 . 42 Id. at 409-10 . 43 Id. at 410 . 44 Id. at 412-15 . 45 Id. at 415 . -44- 7200 CARNEY, Justice, concurring in part an

2017I would reverse the court of appeals’ decision because a prosecutor’s information in a felony case is not a formal charge for purposes of the speedy trial clause. 39 State v. Gonzales, 156 P.3d 407, 411-12 (Alaska 2007). 40 Under this test, “the defendant must prove both that the delay was not reasonable and that the defendant suffered actual prejudice from the delay.” Id. at 411 (footnote omitted) (citing State v. Mouser, 806 P.2d 330, 336 (Alaska App. 1991)). 41 Id. at 409 . 42 Id. at 409-10 . 43 Id. at 410 . 44 Id. at 412-15 . 45 Id. at 415 . -44- 7200 CARNEY, Justice, concurring in part an

2017The speedy trial 31 (...continued) it is only of limited analytical importance whether the right is one of a ‘speedy trial’ or of ‘due process of law.’ ” (quoting People v. Winfrey, 228 N.E.2d 808, 812 (N.Y. 1967))). 32 People v. Vernace, 756 N.E.2d 66, 67 (N.Y. 2001) (citing People v. Staley, 364 N.E.2d 1111 , 1113 (N.Y. 1977)); see also id. (“In this State, ‘we have never drawn a fine distinction between due process and speedy trial standards’ when dealing with delays in prosecution.” (quoting People v. Singer, 376 N.E.2d 179 , 186 (N.Y. 1978))).

2017The speedy trial 31 (...continued) it is only of limited analytical importance whether the right is one of a ‘speedy trial’ or of ‘due process of law.’ ” (quoting People v. Winfrey, 228 N.E.2d 808, 812 (N.Y. 1967))). 32 People v. Vernace, 756 N.E.2d 66, 67 (N.Y. 2001) (citing People v. Staley, 364 N.E.2d 1111 , 1113 (N.Y. 1977)); see also id. (“In this State, ‘we have never drawn a fine distinction between due process and speedy trial standards’ when dealing with delays in prosecution.” (quoting People v. Singer, 376 N.E.2d 179 , 186 (N.Y. 1978))).

2017The speedy trial 31 (...continued) it is only of limited analytical importance whether the right is one of a ‘speedy trial’ or of ‘due process of law.’ ” (quoting People v. Winfrey, 228 N.E.2d 808, 812 (N.Y. 1967))). 32 People v. Vernace, 756 N.E.2d 66, 67 (N.Y. 2001) (citing People v. Staley, 364 N.E.2d 1111 , 1113 (N.Y. 1977)); see also id. (“In this State, ‘we have never drawn a fine distinction between due process and speedy trial standards’ when dealing with delays in prosecution.” (quoting People v. Singer, 376 N.E.2d 179 , 186 (N.Y. 1978))).

2017The speedy trial 31 (...continued) it is only of limited analytical importance whether the right is one of a ‘speedy trial’ or of ‘due process of law.’ ” (quoting People v. Winfrey, 228 N.E.2d 808, 812 (N.Y. 1967))). 32 People v. Vernace, 756 N.E.2d 66, 67 (N.Y. 2001) (citing People v. Staley, 364 N.E.2d 1111 , 1113 (N.Y. 1977)); see also id. (“In this State, ‘we have never drawn a fine distinction between due process and speedy trial standards’ when dealing with delays in prosecution.” (quoting People v. Singer, 376 N.E.2d 179 , 186 (N.Y. 1978))).

2025P. 45(b) (“A defendant charged with a felony, a misdemeanor, or a violation shall be tried within 120 days.”). 41 See, e.g., Glasgow v. State, 469 P.2d 682, 686-87 (Alaska 1970) (concluding court cannot infer generally waiver of constitutional speedy trial right from mere silence but defendant may “knowingly and intelligently waive[] such constitutional rights”); Rutherford v. State, 486 P.2d 946, 950 (Alaska 1971) (same); Conway v. State, 707 P.2d 930, 934 (Alaska App. 1985) (noting criminal defendant may “waive or under certain circumstances forfeit the right to assert a speedy trial violati

1973In Tarnef v. State, 492 P.2d 109 (Alaska 1971) and Nickerson v. State, 492 P.2d 118 (Alaska 1971), this court built on the teaching of Glasgow v. State, 469 P.2d 682 (Alaska 1970), and Rutherford v. State, 486 P.2d 946 (Alaska 1971), and held that in determining whether a speedy trial violation had occurred the court would consider three factors — the source of the delay, the reasons for the delay, and whether the delay prejudiced interests protected by the speedy trial guarantee. 15 These protected interests spring from the three main purposes of the speedy trial guarantee: (1) to prevent the

2025P. 45(b) (“A defendant charged with a felony, a misdemeanor, or a violation shall be tried within 120 days.”). 41 See, e.g., Glasgow v. State, 469 P.2d 682, 686-87 (Alaska 1970) (concluding court cannot infer generally waiver of constitutional speedy trial right from mere silence but defendant may “knowingly and intelligently waive[] such constitutional rights”); Rutherford v. State, 486 P.2d 946, 950 (Alaska 1971) (same); Conway v. State, 707 P.2d 930, 934 (Alaska App. 1985) (noting criminal defendant may “waive or under certain circumstances forfeit the right to assert a speedy trial violati

1973In Tarnef v. State, 492 P.2d 109 (Alaska 1971) and Nickerson v. State, 492 P.2d 118 (Alaska 1971), this court built on the teaching of Glasgow v. State, 469 P.2d 682 (Alaska 1970), and Rutherford v. State, 486 P.2d 946 (Alaska 1971), and held that in determining whether a speedy trial violation had occurred the court would consider three factors — the source of the delay, the reasons for the delay, and whether the delay prejudiced interests protected by the speedy trial guarantee. 15 These protected interests spring from the three main purposes of the speedy trial guarantee: (1) to prevent the

1997See Rule *139 45(f); see also Minch v. State, 934 P.2d 764, 767 (Alaska App.1997); Morris v. State, 734 P.2d 1012, 1014 (Alaska App.1987) (holding that Rule 45 is a speedy trial rule, not a speedy sentencing rule).

1997As this court declared in Morris, 734 P.2d at 1014 , Rule 45 “is a speedy-trial rule, not a speedy sentencing rule”.

1996As the state points out, however, Johnson’s argument ignores the supreme court’s ruling in State v. Williams, 681 P.2d 313, 321 (Alaska 1984), which held: An event which suspends the 120-day period for one charge suspends it for all charges arising out of the same conduct, whether or not they have been filed when the event takes place.

1985The supreme court reversed that decision, and remanded the case to us. 681 P.2d at 321 .

1985"To hold otherwise would tend to transform the speedy trial rule into a hyper-technical device to be manipulated by an accused in order to escape the administration of justice." Cooksey v. State, 524 P.2d 1251, 1259-60 (Alaska 1974).

1985“To hold otherwise would tend to transform the speedy trial rule into a hyper-technical device to be manipulated by an accused in order to escape the administration of justice.” Cooksey v. State, 524 P.2d 1251, 1259-60 (Alaska 1974).

2025P. 45(b) (“A defendant charged with a felony, a misdemeanor, or a violation shall be tried within 120 days.”). 41 See, e.g., Glasgow v. State, 469 P.2d 682, 686-87 (Alaska 1970) (concluding court cannot infer generally waiver of constitutional speedy trial right from mere silence but defendant may “knowingly and intelligently waive[] such constitutional rights”); Rutherford v. State, 486 P.2d 946, 950 (Alaska 1971) (same); Conway v. State, 707 P.2d 930, 934 (Alaska App. 1985) (noting criminal defendant may “waive or under certain circumstances forfeit the right to assert a speedy trial violati

2024Judd v. State, 482 P.2d 273, 280 (Alaska 1971), overruled on unrelated grounds, Charles v. State, 326 P.3d 978 (Alaska 2014). 2 Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530 (1972). – 27 – 2772 systemic ramifications of the majority’s view that trial courts must address a represented defendant’s pro se speedy trial motion whenever the length of time since arrest or charging is sufficient to trigger a speedy trial analysis if a speedy trial motion had been filed by counsel.

2024The first factor, length of delay, is a triggering factor in the sense that a defendant has no potentially viable speedy trial claim unless the delay at issue exceeds a certain threshold length.27 Under federal Sixth Amendment speedy trial analysis, the period of delay measures from the date the defendant is arrested or charged until the start of trial.28 Here, the relevant delay — slightly over seven years — is indisputably sufficient to warrant examination of the other speedy trial factors.29 25 See Judd v. State, 482 P.2d 273, 280 (Alaska 1971); State v. Gutierrez-Fuentes, 508 P.3d 378 , 38

2024Oral argument was conducted on November 16, 2022 and the case was taken under advisement by this Court at that time. – 18 – 2772 In my view, courts should distinguish between those delays Hernandez did not object to and those to which his counsel assented on his behalf and against his clear wishes.8 In Vermont v. Brillon, the United States Supreme Court held that delays sought by the defendant’s counsel weigh against the defendant’s claim of a speedy trial violation.9 This rule flows from the ordinary principle that an “attorney is the [defendant’s] agent when acting, or failing to act, in fur

2024Oral argument was conducted on November 16, 2022 and the case was taken under advisement by this Court at that time. – 18 – 2772 In my view, courts should distinguish between those delays Hernandez did not object to and those to which his counsel assented on his behalf and against his clear wishes.8 In Vermont v. Brillon, the United States Supreme Court held that delays sought by the defendant’s counsel weigh against the defendant’s claim of a speedy trial violation.9 This rule flows from the ordinary principle that an “attorney is the [defendant’s] agent when acting, or failing to act, in fur

2024Therefore, if the defendant in the course of asserting a speedy trial claim raises claims regarding representation that warrant further review of the defendant’s representation, the court should review that, even if it declines to review the speedy trial claim. 4 Thomas v. State, 382 P.3d 1206, 1208 (Alaska App. 2016) (collecting cases). 5 See, e.g., United States v. Muhtorov, 20 F.4th 558 , 652 n.79 (10th Cir. 2021); Gaston v. State, 265 So.3d 387, 406-07 (Ala. Crim.

2024See, e.g., United States v. Muhtorov, 20 F.4th 558 , 652 (10th Cir. 2021); State v. Ambriz, 880 S.E.2d 449 , 472-73 (N.C.

2024App. 2018); Monts v. Lessenberry, 806 S.W.2d 379, 381 (Ark. 1991); State v. Gibbs, 758 A.2d 327, 347-48 (Conn. 2000); Ferguson v. United States, 977 A.2d 993, 999 (D.C. 2009); Cornelius v. State, 223 So.3d 398, 401 (Fla. App. 2017); Watson v. State, 155 N.E.3d 608 , 619 (Ind. 2020); State v. Nixon, 222 So.3d 123, 133-34 (La.

2024Although it may “appear” to the dissent that the majority of the delay was caused by Hernandez, there are still issues to resolve regarding the underlying reasons for the delay, Hernandez’s assertion of his right to a speedy trial, and the prejudice Hernandez suffered as a result 38 See Camacho v. Superior Court, 534 P.3d 484 , 502 (Cal. 2023) (noting that a court may consider if counsel waives time against defendant’s objection). 39 See Vermont v. Brillon, 556 U.S. 81, 94 (2009) (holding that a defense counsel’s actions can generally be attributed to the defendant but recognizing that “[d]ela

2024Oral argument was conducted on November 16, 2022 and the case was taken under advisement by this Court at that time. – 18 – 2772 In my view, courts should distinguish between those delays Hernandez did not object to and those to which his counsel assented on his behalf and against his clear wishes.8 In Vermont v. Brillon, the United States Supreme Court held that delays sought by the defendant’s counsel weigh against the defendant’s claim of a speedy trial violation.9 This rule flows from the ordinary principle that an “attorney is the [defendant’s] agent when acting, or failing to act, in fur

2024Delay may be necessary to ensure that defense counsel has sufficient time to prepare to try the case, and defendants frequently fail to understand what is required to properly prepare a case for trial or the competing demands on the time of their attorneys. 2000); State v. Williams, 686 S.E.2d 493, 500-01 (N.C. 2009); State v. Oliveira, 127 A.3d 65, 76, 80 (R.I. 2015); Cerf v. State, 366 S.W.3d 778 , 788 n.3 (Tex. App. 2012). 6 Thomas v. United States, 737 F.3d 1202, 1208 (8th Cir. 2013) (quoting Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751 (1983)). 7 Id. 8 Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 522 (1972). – 2

2024Therefore, if the defendant in the course of asserting a speedy trial claim raises claims regarding representation that warrant further review of the defendant’s representation, the court should review that, even if it declines to review the speedy trial claim. 4 Thomas v. State, 382 P.3d 1206, 1208 (Alaska App. 2016) (collecting cases). 5 See, e.g., United States v. Muhtorov, 20 F.4th 558 , 652 n.79 (10th Cir. 2021); Gaston v. State, 265 So.3d 387, 406-07 (Ala. Crim.

2024The first time Hernandez raised speedy trial concerns in open court was approximately two years into the case, after Hernandez had served around twenty-two months in jail.29 On July 9, 2014, Hernandez wishes to raise an issue on appeal must show that the issue was adequately preserved in the lower court — which means not only that the litigant presented the issue to the lower court, but also that the lower court ruled on that issue.”); see also Ivy v. Calais Co., Inc., 397 P.3d 267, 275 (Alaska 2017) (“An argument is ordinarily not preserved for appeal if it was not raised below.”); Johnson v.

2024The first time Hernandez raised speedy trial concerns in open court was approximately two years into the case, after Hernandez had served around twenty-two months in jail.29 On July 9, 2014, Hernandez wishes to raise an issue on appeal must show that the issue was adequately preserved in the lower court — which means not only that the litigant presented the issue to the lower court, but also that the lower court ruled on that issue.”); see also Ivy v. Calais Co., Inc., 397 P.3d 267, 275 (Alaska 2017) (“An argument is ordinarily not preserved for appeal if it was not raised below.”); Johnson v.

2024The first factor, length of delay, is a triggering factor in the sense that a defendant has no potentially viable speedy trial claim unless the delay at issue exceeds a certain threshold length.27 Under federal Sixth Amendment speedy trial analysis, the period of delay measures from the date the defendant is arrested or charged until the start of trial.28 Here, the relevant delay — slightly over seven years — is indisputably sufficient to warrant examination of the other speedy trial factors.29 25 See Judd v. State, 482 P.2d 273, 280 (Alaska 1971); State v. Gutierrez-Fuentes, 508 P.3d 378 , 38