speedy trial analysis in Maryland

2019Doggett , 505 U.S. at 652 n.1, 112 S.Ct. 2686 (noting that, generally, delays approaching twelve months are "presumptively prejudicial" ); see also Divver v. State , 356 Md. 379 , 389, 739 A.2d 71 (1999) ( delay of one year and sixteen days raised a "presumption of prejudice" ); Brady v. State , 291 Md. 261 , 265, 434 A.2d 574 (1981) ("[T]he State candidly admits that the fourteen month delay ... gives rise to a speedy trial claim of prima facie merit. "); Epps v. State , 276 Md. 96 , 111, 345 A.2d 62 (1975) ( delay of one year and fourteen days was "presumptively prejudicial" ).

2019Doggett , 505 U.S. at 652 n.1, 112 S.Ct. 2686 (noting that, generally, delays approaching twelve months are "presumptively prejudicial" ); see also Divver v. State , 356 Md. 379 , 389, 739 A.2d 71 (1999) ( delay of one year and sixteen days raised a "presumption of prejudice" ); Brady v. State , 291 Md. 261 , 265, 434 A.2d 574 (1981) ("[T]he State candidly admits that the fourteen month delay ... gives rise to a speedy trial claim of prima facie merit. "); Epps v. State , 276 Md. 96 , 111, 345 A.2d 62 (1975) ( delay of one year and fourteen days was "presumptively prejudicial" ).

2018In addressing a speedy trial claim, we apply the four-factor balancing test articulated by the Supreme Court in Barker v. Wingo , 407 U.S. 514 , 92 S.Ct. 2182 , 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972), "in which the conduct of both the prosecution and the defendant are weighed." *627 Kanneh , 403 Md. at 687 -88 , 944 A.2d 516 (quoting Barker , 407 U.S. at 530 , 92 S.Ct. 2182 ).

2018In addressing a speedy trial claim, we apply the four-factor balancing test articulated by the Supreme Court in Barker v. Wingo , 407 U.S. 514 , 92 S.Ct. 2182 , 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972), "in which the conduct of both the prosecution and the defendant are weighed." *627 Kanneh , 403 Md. at 687 -88 , 944 A.2d 516 (quoting Barker , 407 U.S. at 530 , 92 S.Ct. 2182 ).

2024(Emphasis supplied.) 49 Justice Souter’s opinion in Doggett, 505 U.S. at 652 n. 1, stressed the distinctive feature that the phrase “presumptively prejudicial” does not refer to the final four-factored weighing of a speedy trial violation on its ultimate merits but only refers to the purely threshold question of whether a Barker inquiry should even be conducted in the first place: We note that, as the term is used in this threshold context, “presumptive prejudice” does not necessarily indicate a statistical probability of prejudice; it simply marks the point at which courts deem the delay unre

2019Doggett , 505 U.S. at 652 n.1, 112 S.Ct. 2686 (noting that, generally, delays approaching twelve months are "presumptively prejudicial" ); see also Divver v. State , 356 Md. 379 , 389, 739 A.2d 71 (1999) ( delay of one year and sixteen days raised a "presumption of prejudice" ); Brady v. State , 291 Md. 261 , 265, 434 A.2d 574 (1981) ("[T]he State candidly admits that the fourteen month delay ... gives rise to a speedy trial claim of prima facie merit. "); Epps v. State , 276 Md. 96 , 111, 345 A.2d 62 (1975) ( delay of one year and fourteen days was "presumptively prejudicial" ).

2019Doggett , 505 U.S. at 652 n.1, 112 S.Ct. 2686 (noting that, generally, delays approaching twelve months are "presumptively prejudicial" ); see also Divver v. State , 356 Md. 379 , 389, 739 A.2d 71 (1999) ( delay of one year and sixteen days raised a "presumption of prejudice" ); Brady v. State , 291 Md. 261 , 265, 434 A.2d 574 (1981) ("[T]he State candidly admits that the fourteen month delay ... gives rise to a speedy trial claim of prima facie merit. "); Epps v. State , 276 Md. 96 , 111, 345 A.2d 62 (1975) ( delay of one year and fourteen days was "presumptively prejudicial" ).

2019Doggett , 505 U.S. at 652 n.1, 112 S.Ct. 2686 (noting that, generally, delays approaching twelve months are "presumptively prejudicial" ); see also Divver v. State , 356 Md. 379 , 389, 739 A.2d 71 (1999) ( delay of one year and sixteen days raised a "presumption of prejudice" ); Brady v. State , 291 Md. 261 , 265, 434 A.2d 574 (1981) ("[T]he State candidly admits that the fourteen month delay ... gives rise to a speedy trial claim of prima facie merit. "); Epps v. State , 276 Md. 96 , 111, 345 A.2d 62 (1975) ( delay of one year and fourteen days was "presumptively prejudicial" ).

2019Doggett , 505 U.S. at 652 n.1, 112 S.Ct. 2686 (noting that, generally, delays approaching twelve months are "presumptively prejudicial" ); see also Divver v. State , 356 Md. 379 , 389, 739 A.2d 71 (1999) ( delay of one year and sixteen days raised a "presumption of prejudice" ); Brady v. State , 291 Md. 261 , 265, 434 A.2d 574 (1981) ("[T]he State candidly admits that the fourteen month delay ... gives rise to a speedy trial claim of prima facie merit. "); Epps v. State , 276 Md. 96 , 111, 345 A.2d 62 (1975) ( delay of one year and fourteen days was "presumptively prejudicial" ).

2019Doggett , 505 U.S. at 652 n.1, 112 S.Ct. 2686 (noting that, generally, delays approaching twelve months are "presumptively prejudicial" ); see also Divver v. State , 356 Md. 379 , 389, 739 A.2d 71 (1999) ( delay of one year and sixteen days raised a "presumption of prejudice" ); Brady v. State , 291 Md. 261 , 265, 434 A.2d 574 (1981) ("[T]he State candidly admits that the fourteen month delay ... gives rise to a speedy trial claim of prima facie merit. "); Epps v. State , 276 Md. 96 , 111, 345 A.2d 62 (1975) ( delay of one year and fourteen days was "presumptively prejudicial" ).

1990As we noted in State v. Lawless, 13 Md.App. at 241, 283 A.2d 160 , Hunter recognizes that the court’s authority to dismiss criminal charges for speedy trial violations does not extend its power to dismiss for “ ‘mere unnecessary delay’ or ‘in furtherance of justice.’ ” We ultimately held in In re Darryl D. that: [T]he circuit court, sitting as a juvenile court, may not under our juvenile code or under our rules governing juvenile proceedings dismiss summarily a valid petition alleging delinquency, over the State’s Attorney’s objection and prior to an adjudicatory hearing, upon the ground that

1990As we noted in State v. Lawless, 13 Md.App. at 241, 283 A.2d 160 , Hunter recognizes that the court’s authority to dismiss criminal charges for speedy trial violations does not extend its power to dismiss for “ ‘mere unnecessary delay’ or ‘in furtherance of justice.’ ” We ultimately held in In re Darryl D. that: [T]he circuit court, sitting as a juvenile court, may not under our juvenile code or under our rules governing juvenile proceedings dismiss summarily a valid petition alleging delinquency, over the State’s Attorney’s objection and prior to an adjudicatory hearing, upon the ground that

2020We have explained that “[t]he arrest of a defendant, or formal charges, whichever first occurs, activates the speedy trial right.” Wheeler v. State, 88 Md.

2013See, e.g., Wheeler v. State, 88 Md.App. 512, 517-26 , 596 A.2d 78 (1991) (twenty-three month delay not a violation); Marks v. State, 84 Md.App. 269, 281-86 , 578 A.2d 828 (1990) (twenty-two month delay not a violation).

2020The Court observed that, “[d]uring the intervening period, MacDonald was not under arrest, not in custody, and not subject to any ‘criminal prosecution.’” Id. at 10. “[O]nce the charges instituted by the Army were dismissed, MacDonald was legally and constitutionally in the same posture as though no charges had been made.” Id.12 In State v. Henson, 335 Md. 326 (1994), the Court of Appeals recognized that “the period between [a] good faith termination of a prosecution and the reinstitution of that prosecution . . . will not be considered in the speedy trial analysis.” Id. at 336 .

2020The Court observed that, “[d]uring the intervening period, MacDonald was not under arrest, not in custody, and not subject to any ‘criminal prosecution.’” Id. at 10. “[O]nce the charges instituted by the Army were dismissed, MacDonald was legally and constitutionally in the same posture as though no charges had been made.” Id.12 In State v. Henson, 335 Md. 326 (1994), the Court of Appeals recognized that “the period between [a] good faith termination of a prosecution and the reinstitution of that prosecution . . . will not be considered in the speedy trial analysis.” Id. at 336 .

2016United States v. MacDonald, 456 U.S. 1, 7 , 102 S.Ct. 1497 , 71 L.Ed.2d 696 (1982), held that "the Speedy Trial Clause has no application after the Government, acting in good faith, formally drops charges.” That decision did not directly address whether the time from a defendant's initial arrest until the dismissal of charges should be counted in a speedy trial claim raised after a new indictment is issued.

2016United States v. MacDonald, 456 U.S. 1, 7 , 102 S.Ct. 1497 , 71 L.Ed.2d 696 (1982), held that "the Speedy Trial Clause has no application after the Government, acting in good faith, formally drops charges.” That decision did not directly address whether the time from a defendant's initial arrest until the dismissal of charges should be counted in a speedy trial claim raised after a new indictment is issued.

2020The Court held, “therefore, that where the State terminates a prosecution in good faith, i.e. it does not intend to circumvent the speedy trial right, and the termination does not have that effect, the period preceding the earlier dismissal is not counted in the speedy trial analysis.” Id. at 338 .13 In the present case, the parties disagree about which date should be the starting point of the speedy trial analysis.

1978However, in the decade since the Supreme Court of the United States declared in Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U. S. 213, 222-226 , 87 S. Ct. 988 (1967), that the speedy trial clause of the Sixth Amendment applies to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, that guarantee has spawned some 144 decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States and the appellate courts of this State. 1 The reason for the plethora of cases on the issue is readily apparent.

2015Length of Delay The “length of delay” factor is “a term of art that serves two separate and distinct functions in a speedy trial analysis.” Ratchford v. State, 141 Md.

2015Length of Delay The “length of delay” factor is “a term of art that serves two separate and distinct functions in a speedy trial analysis.” Ratchford v. State, 141 Md.App. 354, 358 , 785 A.2d 826 (2001).

2015The Supreme Court has clarified, however, that presumptive prejudice alone cannot establish a speedy-trial violation; “it is a part of the mix of relevant facts, and its importance increases with the length of the delay.” Id. at 656 , 112 S.Ct. 2686 (emphasis added) (citing United States v. Loud Hawk, 474 U.S. 302, 315 , 106 S.Ct. 648 , 88 L.Ed.2d 640 (1986)).

2015The Supreme Court has clarified, however, that presumptive prejudice alone cannot establish a speedy-trial violation; “it is a part of the mix of relevant facts, and its importance increases with the length of the delay.” Id. at 656 , 112 S.Ct. 2686 (emphasis added) (citing United States v. Loud Hawk, 474 U.S. 302, 315 , 106 S.Ct. 648 , 88 L.Ed.2d 640 (1986)).

2011See Stewart v. State, 282 Md. 557, 571-72 , 386 A.2d 1206, 1213 (1978) (applying MacDonald to hold that no immediate appeal will lie from an order denying a Maryland defendant’s motion to dismiss for a speedy trial violation, under either the federal Constitution or Article 21 of the Maryland Constitution).

2011See Stewart v. State, 282 Md. 557, 571-72 , 386 A.2d 1206, 1213 (1978) (applying MacDonald to hold that no immediate appeal will lie from an order denying a Maryland defendant’s motion to dismiss for a speedy trial violation, under either the federal Constitution or Article 21 of the Maryland Constitution).

1993See also Brady v. State, 36 Md.App. 283, 290-91 , 374 A.2d 613 (1977). 4 .

1993See also Brady v. State, 36 Md.App. 283, 290-91 , 374 A.2d 613 (1977). 4 .

1984See United States v. MacDonald, 456 U.S. 1, 6-8 , 102 S.Ct. 1497, 1501-02 , 71 L.Ed.2d 696 (1982); United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783, 788-792 , 97 S.Ct. 2044, 2048-50 , 52 L.Ed.2d 752 , reh. den., 434 U.S. 881 , 98 S.Ct. 242 , 54 L.Ed.2d 164 (1977); Dillingham v. United States, 423 U.S. 64, 64-65 , 96 S.Ct. 303, 303 , 46 L.Ed.2d 205 *569 (1975); Moore v. Arizona, 414 U.S. 25, 26-27 , 94 S.Ct. 188, 189-90 , 38 L.Ed.2d 183 (1973); Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 689-690 , 92 S.Ct. 1877, 1882 , 32 L.Ed.2d 411 (1972).

1984See United States v. MacDonald, 456 U.S. 1, 6-8 , 102 S.Ct. 1497, 1501-02 , 71 L.Ed.2d 696 (1982); United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783, 788-792 , 97 S.Ct. 2044, 2048-50 , 52 L.Ed.2d 752 , reh. den., 434 U.S. 881 , 98 S.Ct. 242 , 54 L.Ed.2d 164 (1977); Dillingham v. United States, 423 U.S. 64, 64-65 , 96 S.Ct. 303, 303 , 46 L.Ed.2d 205 *569 (1975); Moore v. Arizona, 414 U.S. 25, 26-27 , 94 S.Ct. 188, 189-90 , 38 L.Ed.2d 183 (1973); Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 689-690 , 92 S.Ct. 1877, 1882 , 32 L.Ed.2d 411 (1972).