speedy trial claim in Pennsylvania

2020“Our scope of review is limited to the record evidence from the speedy trial hearing and the findings of the lower court, reviewed in the light most favorable to the prevailing party.” Commonwealth v. Selenski, 606 Pa. 51 , 994 A.2d 1083, 1088 (2010) (citing Solano, 906 A.2d at 1186 ).

2020“Our scope of review is limited to the record evidence from the speedy trial hearing and the findings of the lower court, reviewed in the light most favorable to the prevailing party.” Commonwealth v. Selenski, 606 Pa. 51 , 994 A.2d 1083, 1088 (2010) (citing Solano, 906 A.2d at 1186 ).

2025It is important to note that a speedy trial violation does not necessarily occur when a court finds in favor of the defendant on any one of the four factors; “[r]ather, each of the four factors are related and each must be weighed carefully in the court's evaluation of a criminal defendant's claim that his speedy trial rights were violated.” DeBlase, 542 Pa. at 32 , 665 A.2d at 432 (citing Barker, 407 U.S. at 533 , 92 S.Ct. at 2193-94 ). - 29 - Appellant argues that the twenty-one year delay between filing of the initial complaint and his arrest was presumptively prejudicial.

2025It is important to note that a speedy trial violation does not necessarily occur when a court finds in favor of the defendant on any one of the four factors; “[r]ather, each of the four factors are related and each must be weighed carefully in the court's evaluation of a criminal defendant's claim that his speedy trial rights were violated.” DeBlase, 542 Pa. at 32 , 665 A.2d at 432 (citing Barker, 407 U.S. at 533 , 92 S.Ct. at 2193-94 ). - 29 - Appellant argues that the twenty-one year delay between filing of the initial complaint and his arrest was presumptively prejudicial.

2025It is important to note that a speedy trial violation does not necessarily occur when a court finds in favor of the defendant on any one of the four factors; “[r]ather, each of the four factors are related and each must be weighed carefully in the court's evaluation of a criminal defendant's claim that his speedy trial rights were violated.” DeBlase, 542 Pa. at 32 , 665 A.2d at 432 (citing Barker, 407 U.S. at 533 , 92 S.Ct. at 2193-94 ). - 29 - Appellant argues that the twenty-one year delay between filing of the initial complaint and his arrest was presumptively prejudicial.

2025It is important to note that a speedy trial violation does not necessarily occur when a court finds in favor of the defendant on any one of the four factors; “[r]ather, each of the four factors are related and each must be weighed carefully in the court's evaluation of a criminal defendant's claim that his speedy trial rights were violated.” DeBlase, 542 Pa. at 32 , 665 A.2d at 432 (citing Barker, 407 U.S. at 533 , 92 S.Ct. at 2193-94 ). - 29 - Appellant argues that the twenty-one year delay between filing of the initial complaint and his arrest was presumptively prejudicial.

2025“Our scope of review is limited to the record evidence from the speedy trial hearing and the findings of the lower court, reviewed in the light most favorable to the prevailing party.” Commonwealth v. Burno, 154 A.3d 764, 793 (Pa. 2017) (citation omitted).

2024“Our scope of review is limited to the record evidence from the speedy trial hearing and the findings of the lower court, reviewed in the light most favorable to the prevailing party.” Commonwealth v. Burno, 638 Pa. 264, 313 , 154 A.3d 764, 793 (2017). [Rule 600] establishes a careful matrix protecting a defendant’s rights to be free from prolonged pretrial incarceration and to a speedy trial, while maintaining the Commonwealth’s ability to seek confinement of dangerous individuals and those posing a risk of flight, and to bring its cases in an orderly fashion.

2009See id. at 355 , 392 A.2d at 1331 (“Where the defendant is on bail and has notice of his obligation to appear and fails to do so, a concept of due diligence in apprehending the fugitive is misplaced in a speedy trial analysis.”).

2009See id. at 355 , 392 A.2d at 1331 (“Where the defendant is on bail and has notice of his obligation to appear and fails to do so, a concept of due diligence in apprehending the fugitive is misplaced in a speedy trial analysis.”).

2024Commonwealth v. Morgan, 239 A.3d 1132, 1137 (Pa.Super. 2020) (cleaned up).

2023Commonwealth v. Morgan, 239 A.3d 1132, 1137 (Pa.Super. 2020) (cleaned up).

2024Reading the speedy trial rule and the joinder rule together, the plurality found that they “make clear that the 180[-]day speedy trial period set forth by Rule 1100 begins to run on all charges arising out of a criminal transaction upon the initiation of criminal proceedings charging the defendant with any offense arising out of that transaction.” Id.

1981Moreover, in Earp , this Court expressly declined to reach the issue squarely presented here: "We need not decide the effect of a complete dismissal on all charges arising out of a criminal transaction upon the speedy trial rule." 476 Pa. at 374, n.4 , 382 A.2d at 1217, n.4 .

2024Rule 600 has dual purposes: the protection of the defendant’s speedy trial right and “the efficient administration of justice.” Commonwealth v. Harth, 252 A.3d 600 , 615 (Pa. 2021) (citing Commonwealth v. Hamilton, 297 A.2d 127, 133 (Pa. 1972) (referring to the Criminal Procedural Rules Committee the issue of the promulgation of a speedy trial rule setting a fixed time limit “in order to more effectively protect the right of criminal defendants to a to the appropriate prosecuting officer at the time of the commencement of the first trial and occurred within the same judicial district as the fo

2012In Commonwealth v. Hamilton, 449 Pa. 297 , 297 A.2d 127, 130-33 (1972), we referred the matter to the Criminal Rules Committee to establish a definitive period of time for a speedy trial violation: “The theory behind this type of rule is that it eliminates the inherent vagueness encompassed in any balancing process and it avoids the necessity of a court determining a violation of this constitutional right on a case-by-case basis.” Id. at 132-33.

2008On further review, our supreme court agreed that Barker provided the appropriate framework for analyzing whether West was entitled to relief based on a claim his right to due process was violated: “‘the same considerations applicable in the context of a speedy trial claim are applicable to a claimed due process violation based on delays in proceedings.’ ” Id. at 500, 938 A.2d at 1045 , quoting Glass, supra at 338 , 586 A.2d at 373 , in turn quoting Commonwealth v. Pounds, 490 Pa. 621, 630 , 417 A.2d 597, 601 (1980).

2008On further review, our supreme court agreed that Barker provided the appropriate framework for analyzing whether West was entitled to relief based on a claim his right to due process was violated: “‘the same considerations applicable in the context of a speedy trial claim are applicable to a claimed due process violation based on delays in proceedings.’ ” Id. at 500, 938 A.2d at 1045 , quoting Glass, supra at 338 , 586 A.2d at 373 , in turn quoting Commonwealth v. Pounds, 490 Pa. 621, 630 , 417 A.2d 597, 601 (1980).

1978See also Commonwealth v. Williams, 457 Pa. 502 , 327 A.2d 15 (1974) (motion to dismiss indictment); Pa.R.Crim.P. 304 (revised and replaced effective January 1, 1978, by Pa.R.Crim.P. 306), Comment. .

1978See also Commonwealth v. Williams, 457 Pa. 502 , 327 A.2d 15 (1974) (motion to dismiss indictment); Pa.R.Crim.P. 304 (revised and replaced effective January 1, 1978, by Pa.R.Crim.P. 306), Comment. .

2023In response to Barker, and because of the "inherent vagueness" resulting from the Barker balancing test, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court adopted Pa.R.Crim.P. 1100, later renumbered Rule 600, "to establish a definite period of time for a speedy trial violation." Bradford, 46 A.3d at 701 quoting Commonwealth v. Whitaker, 359 A.2d 174, 176 (Pa. 1976) ("the (the balancing test announced in Barker provides only the minimum standards guaranteed by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments, and ... such minimum standards are not adequate to provide Pennsylvania criminal defendants the protection guaranteed

2014Rule 1100, later renumbered Rule 600, “to establish a definitive period of time for a speedy trial violation.” Bradford, 46 A.3d at 701 quoting Commonwealth v. Whitaker, 467 Pa. 436 , 359 A.2d 174, 176 (1976) (“the balancing test announced in Barker provides only the minimum standards guaranteed by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments, and ... such minimum standards are not adequate to provide Pennsylvania criminal defendants the protection guaranteed by the constitution of this Commonwealth”). “[A] speedy trial analysis [thus] mandates a two-step inquiry: (1) whether the delay violated Pennsyl

2015Nevertheless, consistent with our Supreme Court’s perspective in Hill, supra and our application of those principles in the cases previously discussed, a technical violation of the speedy-trial rule does not warrant discharge where the record reveals that the Commonwealth exercised due diligence.

2015Thereafter, the Supreme Court reviewed the reasons for the various delays and determined that the Commonwealth exercised due diligence in its effort to comply with the speedy-trial rule and “that the delay in commencing trial was occasioned by circumstances beyond the control of the Commonwealth.” Id. at 592 .

2008On further review, our supreme court agreed that Barker provided the appropriate framework for analyzing whether West was entitled to relief based on a claim his right to due process was violated: “‘the same considerations applicable in the context of a speedy trial claim are applicable to a claimed due process violation based on delays in proceedings.’ ” Id. at 500, 938 A.2d at 1045 , quoting Glass, supra at 338 , 586 A.2d at 373 , in turn quoting Commonwealth v. Pounds, 490 Pa. 621, 630 , 417 A.2d 597, 601 (1980).

2008On further review, our supreme court agreed that Barker provided the appropriate framework for analyzing whether West was entitled to relief based on a claim his right to due process was violated: “‘the same considerations applicable in the context of a speedy trial claim are applicable to a claimed due process violation based on delays in proceedings.’ ” Id. at 500, 938 A.2d at 1045 , quoting Glass, supra at 338 , 586 A.2d at 373 , in turn quoting Commonwealth v. Pounds, 490 Pa. 621, 630 , 417 A.2d 597, 601 (1980).

2023In response to Barker, and because of the "inherent vagueness" resulting from the Barker balancing test, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court adopted Pa.R.Crim.P. 1100, later renumbered Rule 600, "to establish a definite period of time for a speedy trial violation." Bradford, 46 A.3d at 701 quoting Commonwealth v. Whitaker, 359 A.2d 174, 176 (Pa. 1976) ("the (the balancing test announced in Barker provides only the minimum standards guaranteed by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments, and ... such minimum standards are not adequate to provide Pennsylvania criminal defendants the protection guaranteed

2014Rule 1100, later renumbered Rule 600, “to establish a definitive period of time for a speedy trial violation.” Bradford, 46 A.3d at 701 quoting Commonwealth v. Whitaker, 467 Pa. 436 , 359 A.2d 174, 176 (1976) (“the balancing test announced in Barker provides only the minimum standards guaranteed by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments, and ... such minimum standards are not adequate to provide Pennsylvania criminal defendants the protection guaranteed by the constitution of this Commonwealth”). “[A] speedy trial analysis [thus] mandates a two-step inquiry: (1) whether the delay violated Pennsyl

2023In response to Barker, and because of the "inherent vagueness" resulting from the Barker balancing test, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court adopted Pa.R.Crim.P. 1100, later renumbered Rule 600, "to establish a definite period of time for a speedy trial violation." Bradford, 46 A.3d at 701 quoting Commonwealth v. Whitaker, 359 A.2d 174, 176 (Pa. 1976) ("the (the balancing test announced in Barker provides only the minimum standards guaranteed by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments, and ... such minimum standards are not adequate to provide Pennsylvania criminal defendants the protection guaranteed

2016Commonwealth v. Bradford, 46 A.3d 693 (Pa. 2012) “In the absence of actual misconduct on the part of the Commonwealth specifically calculated to evade the fundamental speedy trial rights of an accused, - 23 - J-A28002-15 the applicable speedy trial rule must be construed in a manner ‘consistent with society’s right to punish and deter crime.’” Preston, [supra at 10 .] At the outset of the hearing on [Appellant’s] motion, the [c]ourt queried: “Let’s put it this way, 600(G) has built into it Commonwealth’s due diligence, right?” … It is clear that throughout the protracted progression of the mat

2023Commonwealth v. Martz, 232 A.3d 801 , 812 (Pa. Super. 2020). “[O]ur scope of review is limited to the trial court’s findings and the evidence on the record, viewed in the light most favorable to the prevailing party.” Id., quoting Commonwealth v. Miskovitch, 64 A.3d 672, 677 (Pa. Super. 2013) (citation and quotation marks omitted).

2022See Commonwealth v. Miskovitch, 64 A.3d 672, 677 (Pa.Super. 2013). “[O]ur scope of review is limited to the trial court’s findings and the evidence on the record, viewed in the light most favorable to the prevailing party.” Id. (citation and quotation omitted).

2020See Commonwealth’s brief at 10 (citing Commonwealth v. Polsky, 426 A.2d 610, 613 (Pa. 1981) (“[I]f the unavailability of the defendant causes a delay at an initial stage, the period of delay is excluded from the period set by [the speedy trial rule], regardless of what happens later.”)).

2020See Commonwealth’s brief at 10 (citing Commonwealth v. Polsky, 426 A.2d 610, 613 (Pa. 1981) (“[I]f the unavailability of the defendant causes a delay at an initial stage, the period of delay is excluded from the period set by [the speedy trial rule], regardless of what happens later.”)).

2016See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Booze, 953 A.2d 1263, 1277 (Pa. Super. 2008); Commonwealth v. Hyland, 875 A.2d 1175, 1191 (Pa. Super. 2005); Commonwealth v. Williams, 726 A.2d 389, 392 (Pa. Super. 1999) (“The period of time between a defendant’s motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule [600] and the trial court’s rendering a decision on the motion is excludable time under Rule [600].”).16 Thus, the delay resulting from Appellees’ motions to dismiss under Rule 600 is also excludable.17 ____________________________________________ 16 For purposes of the speedy trial rule, the relevant excludable period att

2008Upon waiving any claim under Rule 600, the date for trial thereafter must be “at the reasonable convenience of the court and the prosecuting authorities.” Williams, 726 A.2d at 392 (internal quotation omitted). ¶ 10 At the evidentiary Rule 600 hearing conducted on February 5, 2007, the Commonwealth did not argue that Williams had waived his claims under Rule 600.

2014It noted that the speedy trial rule was fashioned to prevent prose-cutorial delay, and that when a defendant “deliberately fails to appear in court on the day his case is listed for trial, these concerns simply are not implicated.” Id. at 1022.

2014Rule 600 (formerly Rule 1100) entitled “Prompt Trial” was adopted by our Supreme Court “to prevent unnecessary prosecutorial delay in bringing a defendant to trial.” Commonwealth v. Brock, 619 Pa. 278 , 61 A.3d 1015, 1021 (2013).

2011Prior to Meadius , Pennsylvania law held that the Rule 1100 run date in cases involving two complaints began with the second complaint where there was no intent by the Commonwealth to evade the speedy-trial rule. [5] Commonwealth v. Simms, 509 Pa. 11 , 500 A.2d 801 (1985) and Commonwealth v. Whiting, 509 Pa. 20 , 500 A.2d 806 (1985); see also Commonwealth v. Genovese, 493 Pa. 65 , 425 A.2d 367 (1981); Commonwealth v. Sires, 284 Pa.Super. 50 , 424 A.2d 1386 (1981).

2011Prior to Meadius , Pennsylvania law held that the Rule 1100 run date in cases involving two complaints began with the second complaint where there was no intent by the Commonwealth to evade the speedy-trial rule. [5] Commonwealth v. Simms, 509 Pa. 11 , 500 A.2d 801 (1985) and Commonwealth v. Whiting, 509 Pa. 20 , 500 A.2d 806 (1985); see also Commonwealth v. Genovese, 493 Pa. 65 , 425 A.2d 367 (1981); Commonwealth v. Sires, 284 Pa.Super. 50 , 424 A.2d 1386 (1981).

2025Given “the inherent vagueness resulting from the Barker balancing test, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court adopted Pa.R.Crim.P. . . . 1100, later renumbered [as] Rule 600, to establish a definitive period of time for a speedy trial violation.” Colon, 87 A.3d at 356 (cleaned up).

2024While both Rule 600 and the Sixth Amendment address the right to a speedy trial, they provide separate grounds for asserting a claim of undue delay, as Rule 600 “establish[ed] a [more] definitive period of time for a speedy trial violation[;]” and, additionally, where an appellant fails to raise or abandons the separate constitutional issue, “there is no need for the [Sixth Amendment] test to be examined.” Commonwealth v. Colon, 87 A.3d 352, 356-58 , 357 n.2 (Pa. Super. 2014) (citations omitted).

1976I, § 9, supra); Commonwealth v. Roundtree, 458 Pa. 351 , 326 A.2d 285 (1974) (waiver of an alleged speedy trial claim, U.S. Const, amend.

1976I, § 9, supra); Commonwealth v. Roundtree, 458 Pa. 351 , 326 A.2d 285 (1974) (waiver of an alleged speedy trial claim, U.S. Const, amend.

1976Even prior to Barker , this Court acknowledged the weakness of the demand — waiver rule in Commonwealth v. Clark, 443 Pa. 318, 326 , 279 A.2d 41, 46 (1971): “. . . the necessity of a demand for trial as a prerequisite to the successful assertion of a speedy trial claim ... is highly suspect.” 11 The Commonwealth cannot place the burden on the accused to bring himself to trial.

1976Even prior to Barker , this Court acknowledged the weakness of the demand — waiver rule in Commonwealth v. Clark, 443 Pa. 318, 326 , 279 A.2d 41, 46 (1971): “. . . the necessity of a demand for trial as a prerequisite to the successful assertion of a speedy trial claim ... is highly suspect.” 11 The Commonwealth cannot place the burden on the accused to bring himself to trial.

2024Commonwealth v. Johnson, 852 A.2d 315, 318 (Pa. Super. 2004).

2014Commonwealthv.lohnson, 2004 PA Super 155 , 852 A.2d 351, 317 (pa.

1977Permitting defendants to appeal asserted double jeopardy claims will have the salutary effect of delaying federal court intervention and increases the likelihood that errors will be rectified by the state system. [31] Commonwealth v. Myers, 457 Pa. 317 , 322 A.2d 131 (1974), which held that an order denying a defendant's speedy trial claim is interlocutory and not appealable, is not inconsistent with today's result.

1977Permitting defendants to appeal asserted double jeopardy claims will have the salutary effect of delaying federal court intervention and increases the likelihood that errors will be rectified by the state system. [31] Commonwealth v. Myers, 457 Pa. 317 , 322 A.2d 131 (1974), which held that an order denying a defendant's speedy trial claim is interlocutory and not appealable, is not inconsistent with today's result.

1989See Pollard v. United States, 352 U.S. 354 , 77 S.Ct. 481 , 1 L.Ed.2d 393 (1957) (lead case applying the assumption that the Speedy Trial clause applies to sentencing); Burkett v. Cunningham, 826 F.2d at 1220 (“We now make explicit what we have assumed in our previous cases, that the Speedy Trial clause of the Sixth Amendment applies from the time the accused is arrested or criminally charged ... up through the sentencing phase of prosecution ...”); Perez v. Sullivan, 793 F.2d 249, 253 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 936 , 107 S.Ct. 413 , 93 L.Ed.2d 364 (1986) (Since Pollard, all courts ad

1989See Pollard v. United States, 352 U.S. 354 , 77 S.Ct. 481 , 1 L.Ed.2d 393 (1957) (lead case applying the assumption that the Speedy Trial clause applies to sentencing); Burkett v. Cunningham, 826 F.2d at 1220 (“We now make explicit what we have assumed in our previous cases, that the Speedy Trial clause of the Sixth Amendment applies from the time the accused is arrested or criminally charged ... up through the sentencing phase of prosecution ...”); Perez v. Sullivan, 793 F.2d 249, 253 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 936 , 107 S.Ct. 413 , 93 L.Ed.2d 364 (1986) (Since Pollard, all courts ad