speedy trial claim in Michigan

2026And while anxiety caused by a lengthy delay can -4- occur, anxiety alone cannot establish a speedy-trial violation. [Smith, ___ Mich App at ___; slip op at 6 (quotation marks, citations, and alterations omitted).] Regarding a speedy-trial claim, “impairment of defense is the most serious form of prejudice . . . because the inability of a defendant adequately to prepare his case skews the fairness of the entire system.” Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted).

2026And while anxiety caused by a lengthy delay can -4- occur, anxiety alone cannot establish a speedy-trial violation. [Smith, ___ Mich App at ___; slip op at 6 (quotation marks, citations, and alterations omitted).] Regarding a speedy-trial claim, “impairment of defense is the most serious form of prejudice . . . because the inability of a defendant adequately to prepare his case skews the fairness of the entire system.” Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted).

2025“A delay of more than eighteen months is presumed to be prejudicial and the burden is on the prosecution to prove lack of prejudice.” People v Simpson, 207 Mich App 560, 563 ; 526 NW2d 33 (1994). “[T]here is no set number of days between a defendant’s arrest and trial that is determinative of a speedy trial claim.” Waclawski, 286 Mich App at 665 .

2025“Under the Barker test, ‘the presumptively prejudicial delay triggers an inquiry into the other factors to be considered in the balancing of the competing interests to determine whether a defendant has been deprived of the right to a speedy trial.’ ” Williams, 475 Mich at 262 , quoting People v Wickham, 200 Mich App 106, 109-110 ; 503 NW2d 701 (1993). “[T]here is no set number of days between a defendant’s arrest and trial that is determinative of a speedy trial claim.” Waclawski, 286 Mich App at 665 .

2026The right was designed “(i) to prevent oppressive pretrial incarceration; (ii) to minimize anxiety and concern of the accused; and (iii) to limit the possibility that the defense will be impaired.” Id. at 532 . “[A]nxiety alone cannot establish a speedy-trial violation.” Smith, ___ Mich App at ___; slip op at 6, citing People v Gilmore, 222 Mich App at 442, 462; 564 NW2d 158 (1997).

2026However, “anxiety alone cannot establish a speedy-trial violation.” Smith, ___ Mich App at ___; slip op at 6, citing People v Gilmore, 222 Mich App 442, 462 ; 564 NW2d 158 (1997).

2025It is the latter prejudice that is the more crucial in assessing a speedy-trial claim “because the inability of a defendant adequately to prepare his case skews the fairness of the entire system.” Id. (citation omitted).

2024“The time for judging whether the right to a speedy trial has been violated runs from the date of the defendant’s arrest.” Williams, 475 Mich at 261 . “[T]he length of delay is not determinative of a speedy trial claim . . . .” Cain, 238 Mich App at 112 (quotation marks and citation omitted).

2025See Ericksen, 288 Mich App at 201 .

2024See Strickland v Washington, 466 US 668, 688 ; 104 S Ct 2052 ; 80 L Ed 2d 674 (1984); see also Ericksen, 288 Mich App at 201 (indicting that “[f]ailing to advance a meritless argument . . . does not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel”).

2026“Pretrial incarceration necessarily results in a degree of prejudice to the person.” Smith, ___ Mich App at ___; slip op at 6 (cleaned up). “[W]hile anxiety caused by a lengthy delay can occur, anxiety alone cannot establish a speedy-trial violation.” Id. at ___; slip op at 6.

2026But “impairment of defense is the most serious form of prejudice in the context of a speedy-trial claim because the inability of a defendant adequately to prepare his case skews the fairness of the entire system.” Id. at ___; slip op at 6 (cleaned up).

2000Nevertheless, we note that People v Missouri, 100 Mich App 310, 319-320 ; 299 NW2d 346 (1980), instructs that “[t]he length of delay is not determinative of a speedy trial claim” and the delay in this case does not approach the outer limits of other delays we have addressed.

2000Nevertheless, we note that People v Missouri, 100 Mich App 310, 319-320 ; 299 NW2d 346 (1980), instructs that “[t]he length of delay is not determinative of a speedy trial claim” and the delay in this case does not approach the outer limits of other delays we have addressed.

2024“Although delays inherent in the court system, e.g., docket congestion, are technically attributable to the prosecution, they are given a neutral tint and are assigned only minimal weight in determining whether a defendant was denied a speedy trial.” Williams, 475 Mich at 263 (quotation marks and citation omitted). “[D]elays caused by the COVID-19 pandemic are not attributable to the prosecution when evaluating a speedy-trial claim.” Smith, ___ Mich App at ___; slip op at 1. “ ‘The government simply cannot be faulted for a highly contagious and mutating virus.’ ” Id., quoting United States v P

2024“The government simply cannot be faulted for a highly contagious and mutating virus.” United States v Pair, 84 F4th 577, 589 (CA 4, 2023).

2026The right was designed “(i) to prevent oppressive pretrial incarceration; (ii) to minimize anxiety and concern of the accused; and (iii) to limit the possibility that the defense will be impaired.” Id. at 532 . “[A]nxiety alone cannot establish a speedy-trial violation.” Smith, ___ Mich App at ___; slip op at 6, citing People v Gilmore, 222 Mich App at 442, 462; 564 NW2d 158 (1997).

2023This fourth element, prejudice, is critical to the analysis. [Quotation marks and citations omitted.] Although the actual length of delay itself is not determinative of a speedy-trial violation, “[a] delay that is under eighteen months requires a defendant to prove that the defendant suffered prejudice. 4 Plaintiff asserts in its brief on appeal that the trial court accounted for 60 days, but we have not located any notation supporting that assertion. -5- However, a delay of eighteen months or more . . . is presumed prejudicial and places a burden on the prosecutor to rebut that presumption.”

2025“Under the Barker test, ‘the presumptively prejudicial delay triggers an inquiry into the other factors to be considered in the balancing of the competing interests to determine whether a defendant has been deprived of the right to a speedy trial.’ ” Williams, 475 Mich at 262 , quoting People v Wickham, 200 Mich App 106, 109-110 ; 503 NW2d 701 (1993). “[T]here is no set number of days between a defendant’s arrest and trial that is determinative of a speedy trial claim.” Waclawski, 286 Mich App at 665 .

2025“Under the Barker test, ‘the presumptively prejudicial delay triggers an inquiry into the other factors to be considered in the balancing of the competing interests to determine whether a defendant has been deprived of the right to a speedy trial.’ ” Williams, 475 Mich at 262 , quoting People v Wickham, 200 Mich App 106, 109-110 ; 503 NW2d 701 (1993). “[T]here is no set number of days between a defendant’s arrest and trial that is determinative of a speedy trial claim.” Waclawski, 286 Mich App at 665 .

2017On remand, the Court of Appeals shall consider: (1) whether a speedy-trial claim is “nonjurisdictional” as defined by People v New, 427 Mich 482 (1986); (2) if not, whether, by entering a plea of no-contest, the defendant waived his right to argue that his counsel was ineffective for failing to assert his constitutional right to a speedy trial before he entered his plea, see e.g., Washington v Sobina, 475 F3d 162, 166 (CA 3, 2007); United States v Pickett, 941 F2d 411, 416-417 (CA 6, 1991); and (3) whether the defendant’s no-contest plea was involuntarily entered based on his claim that his co

2017On remand, the Court of Appeals shall consider: (1) whether a speedy-trial claim is “nonjurisdictional” as defined by People v New, 427 Mich 482 (1986); (2) if not, whether, by entering a plea of no-contest, the defendant waived his right to argue that his counsel was ineffective for failing to assert his constitutional right to a speedy trial before he entered his plea, see e.g., Washington v Sobina, 475 F3d 162, 166 (CA 3, 2007); United States v Pickett, 941 F2d 411, 416-417 (CA 6, 1991); and (3) whether the defendant’s no-contest plea was involuntarily entered based on his claim that his co

1989Relying upon People v Parshay, 104 Mich App 411 ; 304 NW2d 593 (1981), lv den 411 Mich 1081 (1981), People v Williams, 145 Mich App 614 ; 378 NW2d 769 (1985), United States v Freed, 688 F2d 24 (CA 6, 1982), and United States v Lee, 500 F2d 586 (CA 8, 1974), cert den 419 US 1003 ; 95 S Ct 322 ; 42 L Ed 2d 279 (1974), we held that a speedy trial claim is nonjurisdictional and, thus, waived by a defendant’s plea of guilty or nolo contendere.

1989Relying upon People v Parshay, 104 Mich App 411 ; 304 NW2d 593 (1981), lv den 411 Mich 1081 (1981), People v Williams, 145 Mich App 614 ; 378 NW2d 769 (1985), United States v Freed, 688 F2d 24 (CA 6, 1982), and United States v Lee, 500 F2d 586 (CA 8, 1974), cert den 419 US 1003 ; 95 S Ct 322 ; 42 L Ed 2d 279 (1974), we held that a speedy trial claim is nonjurisdictional and, thus, waived by a defendant’s plea of guilty or nolo contendere.

2026In Lowenstein, 118 Mich App at 489 , this Court declined to follow People v Wimbley, 108 Mich App 527 ; 310 NW2d 449 (1981), which held “merely filing a motion to dismiss does not constitute an assertion of the right to speedy trial.” This Court deviated from this holding based 1 One of defendant’s disputed requests for an adjournment occurred after this date, arguably reducing the delay attributable to the City. -5- on Chism, 390 Mich at 114 , in which the defendant moved to dismiss for a speedy trial violation about eight months after his arrest and raised that issue several more times befor

1993See People v Lowenstein, 118 Mich App 475 ; 325 NW2d 462 (1982) (this Court implicitly considered such time in determining the length of delay under a speedy-trial analysis).

2025“A delay of more than eighteen months is presumed to be prejudicial and the burden is on the prosecution to prove lack of prejudice.” People v Simpson, 207 Mich App 560, 563 ; 526 NW2d 33 (1994). “[T]here is no set number of days between a defendant’s arrest and trial that is determinative of a speedy trial claim.” Waclawski, 286 Mich App at 665 .

2025“A delay of more than eighteen months is presumed to be prejudicial and the burden is on the prosecution to prove lack of prejudice.” People v Simpson, 207 Mich App 560, 563 ; 526 NW2d 33 (1994). “[T]here is no set number of days between a defendant’s arrest and trial that is determinative of a speedy trial claim.” Waclawski, 286 Mich App at 665 .