speedy trial rule in Florida

2018Applying the rule as it is written would have allowed Born-Suniaga to secure a trial within two weeks of the day he first learned of the charges pending against him -charges that were filed within 175 days of his initial arrest as required by State v. Agee , 622 So.2d 473 , 475 (Fla. 1993). 4 This is, after all, the speedy trial rule, not the speedy discharge rule.

2015This holding was grounded firmly upon a concern éxpressly addressed in subsection (h)(2) of rule 3.191, which provides that the “intent and effect” of the speedy trial rule “shall not be avoided by the State by entering a nolle prosequi to a crime charged and by prosecuting a new crime grounded on the same conduct or criminal episode, or otherwise by prosecuting new and different charges based on the same conduct or criminal episode....” The Court in Agee explained that allowing the state to “unilaterally toll the running of the speedy trial period by entering a nolle pros would eviscerate” th

2008The State's brief in this appeal discussed representative cases as follows: Pursuant to State v. Del Gaudio, 445 So.2d 605 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984): Where material discovery is furnished at a time which will not enable the defendant to make use of it in the preparation of his defense before the expiration of the speedy trial time limits, the court may properly continue the case to a date beyond those limits, charge the continuance to the State, and thereafter grant the defendant's motion for discharge based on the speedy trial violation.

2008The State’s brief in this appeal discussed representative cases as follows: Pursuant to State v. Del Gaudio, 445 So.2d 605 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984): Where material discovery is furnished at a time which will not enable the defendant to make use of it in the preparation of his defense before the expiration of the speedy trial time limits, the court may properly continue the case to a date beyond those limits, charge the continuance to the State, and thereafter grant the defendant’s motion for discharge based on the speedy trial violation.

2024The word “arrest” means different things in different circumstances. “[A] person may be ‘in custody’ for purposes of requiring Miranda warnings, yet not have been arrested for purposes of the speedy trial rule.” Davis, 253 So. 3d at 1238 (citing Williams v. State, 757 So. 2d 597, 599 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000)).

2024See Williams v. State, 757 So. 2d 597, 601 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000) (Sharp, J., concurring) (stating that “the speedy trial rule as interpreted by case law, has drastically shortened the statute of limitations for prosecution of crimes, and as such it has become the defendant’s best defense and ally”).

2018An en banc Fourth District agreed with the State, finding support for its conclusion in rule 3.191(p) -which provides that trial within a recapture period is the remedy for the State's failure to try a defendant within the time specified by the speedy trial rule-and this Court's decisions in State v. Nelson , 26 So.3d 570 (Fla. 2010) (reaffirming that the defendant has a right to a speedy trial, not the right to a speedy discharge), and State v. Naveira , 873 So.2d 300 (Fla. 2004) (holding the State was entitled to the recapture period where it charged the defendant on the last possible day un

2017See id. at 576 ; see also McClover v. State, 217 So.3d 96, 99 (Fla. 4th DCA 2017) (holding that the defendant’s speedy trial waiver at docket call shortly after her arrest for retail theft at one retail store applied to new charges for retail theft at a second store, which were filed more than 175 days after the initial arrest, where the charges arose from that same arrest); Wallace v. State, 189 So.3d 1022, 1026-28 (Fla. 3d DCA 2016) (holding that the defendant-wife waived her speedy trial rights prior to the superseding indictment and continuation of the prosecution did not violate her right

2016P. 3.191(J)(2); State v. Guzman, 697 So.2d 1263, 1264 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997) (holding that “a successful defense motion for continuance waives the right to discharge under the speedy trial rule”). .

2008The dissenting opinion cites the 1997 opinion in State v. Guzman, 697 So.2d 1263 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997), as saying: “[W]e hold that the rule that a successful defense motion for continuance waives the right to discharge under the speedy trial rule applies notwithstanding that the motion follows alleged discovery violations by the state.” Id. at 1264 (citations omitted).

2025See State v. Beach, 393 So. 3d 779 , 782 (Fla. 3d DCA 2024) (“While the State maintains the right to amend an information outside the speedy trial period, it ‘may not circumvent the intent and effect of the speedy trial rule by lying in wait until the speedy trial time expires and then amending an existing information in such a way that results in the levying of new charges’ that arise from the same facts and circumstances from the initial charge” (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted) (quoting Pezzo v. State, 903 So. 2d 960, 962 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005))).

2017This Court has explainéd that “although the state may amend an information after the speedy trial time expires, the state may not circumvent the intent and effect of the speedy trial rule by lying in wait until the speedy trial time expires and then amending an existing information in such a way that results in the levying of new charges (if those new charges arise from the same facts and circumstances giving rise to the original charge).” Pezzo v. State, 903 So.2d 960, 962 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005) (emphasis in original).

2017See Sherrod v. Franza, 427 So.2d 161, 163 (Fla. 1983) (‘‘[P]rohibition (which is the remedy sought here) may properly be used in. the context of a speedy trial violation,”); Smart v. State, 179 So.3d 477, 478 (Fla. 4th DCA 2015). .

2011Sherrod v. Franza, 427 So.2d 161, 163 (Fla.1983) ("[PJrohibition (which is the remedy sought here) may properly be used in the context of a speedy trial violation.”); Winter v. State, 865 So.2d 555, 556-57 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003) (reversing conviction on appeal for denial of speedy trial and ordering that the defendant be discharged from the crimes); McKinney v. Yawn, 625 So.2d 885, 886 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993) (reviewing order denying discharge for speedy trial violation under writ of prohibition, citing Sherrod, 427 So.2d at 163 ). .

2013Because of the amorphous quality of this right, “any inquiry into a speedy trial claim necessitates a functional analysis of the right in the particular context of the case.” Id. at 522 .

2005See Barker, 407 U.S. at 522 , 92 S.Ct. 2182 ("[A]ny inquiry into a speedy trial claim necessitates a functional analysis of the right in the particular context of the case...."). [2] However, here the State makes no claim that the prosecutions or trials were otherwise delayed because of some action of the defendants beyond their cooperation with the police.

2021The speedy trial rule “does not address the deadline for filing the charging document itself,” and, notwithstanding the procedure delineated in subdivision (p), the Florida Supreme Court has “held that the State cannot wait until after the speedy trial period to charge a defendant.” Naveira, 873 So. 2d at 305 (citing State v. Williams, 791 So. 2d 1088, 1091 (Fla. 2001)).

2018An en banc Fourth District agreed with the State, finding support for its conclusion in rule 3.191(p) -which provides that trial within a recapture period is the remedy for the State's failure to try a defendant within the time specified by the speedy trial rule-and this Court's decisions in State v. Nelson , 26 So.3d 570 (Fla. 2010) (reaffirming that the defendant has a right to a speedy trial, not the right to a speedy discharge), and State v. Naveira , 873 So.2d 300 (Fla. 2004) (holding the State was entitled to the recapture period where it charged the defendant on the last possible day un

2020A person may be deemed to be “in custody” for purposes of his Miranda rights yet not “in custody” for purposes of the application of the speedy trial rule. 442 So. 2d at 989 .75.

2020“A person may be deemed to be ‘in custody’ for purposes of his Miranda rights yet not be ‘in custody’ for purposes of the application of the speedy trial rule.” State v. Christian, 442 So. 2d 988, 989 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983), citing State ex rel.

2021The speedy trial rule “does not address the deadline for filing the charging document itself,” and, notwithstanding the procedure delineated in subdivision (p), the Florida Supreme Court has “held that the State cannot wait until after the speedy trial period to charge a defendant.” Naveira, 873 So. 2d at 305 (citing State v. Williams, 791 So. 2d 1088, 1091 (Fla. 2001)).

2006State v. Williams, 791 So.2d 1088, 1091 (Fla.2001); see also, State v. Naveira, 873 So.2d 300, 305 (Fla.2004). 3 In this case, D.A. did not waive his rights under the speedy trial rule, and the speedy trial period had expired.

2001Butterworth v. Fluellen 389 So.2d 968 (Fla.1980); Banks v. State, 691 So.2d 490 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997); Blackstock v. Newman, 461 So.2d 1021, 1022 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985) ("The speedy trial rule is a procedural device only and not a constitutional right.

1984See Butterworth, In and For Broward County v. Fluellen, 389 So.2d 968, 970 (Fla.1980) (speedy trial issues not arising under the speedy trial rule “must be determined in the light of the circumstances of the particular case as a matter of judicial discretion”).

2016See State v. Naveira, 873, So.2d 300, 308 (Fla.2004) (“Once the speedy trial rule has been waived, it is supplanted by the constitutional speedy trial period which is measured in tests of reasonableness and prejudice, not specific numbers of days.” (quoting Blackstock v. Newman, 461 So.2d 1021, 1022 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985))); Gamble v. State, 996 So.2d 946, 947 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008) (citing Naveira, 873 So.2d at 308).

2008Unlike the speedy trial rule, the constitutional speedy trial right "is measured in tests of reasonableness and prejudice, not specific numbers of days." State v. Naveira, 873 So.2d 300, 308 (Fla.2004) (quoting Blackstock v. Newman, 461 So.2d 1021, 1022 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985)).

2001Once the speedy trial rule has been waived, it is supplanted by the constitutional speedy trial period which is measured by tests of reasonableness and prejudice, not specific numbers of days.") (citing Brownlee v. State, 427 So.2d 1106 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983); Gallego v. Purdy, 415 So.2d 166 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982)); Daniels .

1987"A defense continuance constitutes a specific waiver of the speedy trial rule (or, more properly, an estoppel precluding reliance on the rule) as to all charges which emanate from a single criminal episode." Gallego v. Purdy, 415 So.2d 166, 167 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982) (citing State v. DeSimone, 386 So.2d 283 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980); State v. Corlew, 382 So.2d 787 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980)).

2024“Where a person is arrested 12 pursuant to a warrant issued by a magistrate, numerous cases have held that the person is in ‘custody’ within the meaning of the speedy trial rule.” Id. at 1284 (quoting Singletary v. State, 322 So. 2d 551, 554 (Fla. 1975)).

1988The Florida Supreme Court, in Weed v. State, 411 So.2d 863, 865 (Fla.1982), approved the trial court’s analysis of applicable precedent, noting that the state had “justified the harsher treatment in a way which negated the possibility of vindictiveness.” (The supreme court reversed the first district’s final decision, however, which rested on misapplication of the speedy trial rule.) Subsequent to Weed the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals further refined the rule dealing with the amendment by enhancement of charges after a mistrial resulting from a deadlocked jury.

2017In other words, “the [S]tate may not circumvent the purpose and intent of the speedy trial rule by ... taking no action after the defendant is arrested and waiting until after the speedy trial period has expired to file formal charges.” Clifton, 905 So.2d at 176 .

2017As explained by the court in State v. Clifton, 905 So.2d 172, 176 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005), the rationale behind the rule adopted in Agee and extended to Genden and Williams is “based on fairness to the accused and preservation of the integrity of the speedy trial rule.” To allow the state to proceed with prosecution in cases in which it announces a nolle prosequi or no action or where it does nothing to initiate prosecution before a defendant can exercise his speedy trial rights, would circumvent the purpose of the speedy trial rule.

2016Butler v. Cullen, 253 So.2d 861, 863 (Fla.1971) (holding that when a defense continuance is granted, the time limitations under the speedy trial rule are no longer applicable).

1997The court held that the periods prescribed by the speedy trial rule were no longer applicable because the defendants moved for a continuance to obtain additional time to prepare their defense. 253 So.2d at 863 ("It appears on the face of the petition that petitioners requested a continuance so that they would have additional time within which to prepare their defense.").

1982The court in State v. Robbins, 359 So.2d 39 (Fla.2d DCA 1978), a factually similar case, held that where the defendant was stopped by the police, momentarily handcuffed, taken to a hospital, allowed to leave the hospital after examination and treatment, and was never arrested or detained, the defendant-driver was not “in custody” for purposes of the application of the speedy trial rule to charges arising out of the stop by the police.

1982The court in State v. Robbins, 359 So.2d 39 (Fla.2d DCA 1978), a factually similar case, held that where the defendant was stopped by the police, momentarily handcuffed, taken to a hospital, allowed to leave the hospital after examination and treatment, and was never arrested or detained, the defendant-driver was not "in custody" for purposes of the application of the speedy trial rule to charges arising out of the stop by the police.

2007Such a result is "contrary to the spirit of the speedy trial rule." Genden, 648 So.2d at 1185 (quoting Agee, 622 So.2d at 475 ).

2000The court observed that "[t]he State would be able to avoid the speedy trial rule by waiting to formally charge an arrestee." Id.

2015In 1980, following the decisions in Stuart and Moore , the Florida Supreme Court added the following emphasized language to the speedy trial rule, which is practically identical to that in the current rule: “The trial is deemed to have commenced when the trial jury panel (for that specific trial) is sworn for voir dire examination.” The Fla. Bar In re Rules of Criminal Procedure, 389 So.2d 610, 612 (Fla.1980) (emphasis added).

1981The 1980 amendment to the speedy trial rule [effective January 1, 1981, In Re Rules of Criminal Procedure, 389 So.2d 610 (Fla.1980)] changed the “one-year” rule.

2003As pointed out by Justice Overton in his dissent in Reed v. State, 649 So.2d 227, 229 (Fla.1995), this Court's application of the speedy trial rule has made the rule substantive law, rather than procedural, because a speedy trial rule dismissal is with prejudice to the refiling of the charges.

2001This Court's interpretation of the speedy trial rule in Reed v. State, 649 So.2d 227 (Fla.1995), in Genden, and in State v. Agee, 622 So.2d 473 (Fla.1993), created a judicial statute of limitation without foundation in the language of the rule.

1983See, e.g., State v. Jenkins, 389 So.2d 971 (Fla.1980) (discharge of defendant under speedy trial rule approved when trial was not held within six-month extension granted by trial court when case was on interlocutory appeal in district court during extension); State v. Barnett, 366 So.2d 411 (Fla.1978) (trial court improperly granted the defendant’s motion for discharge because speedy trial time period should have been tolled from the date the state filed its motion for extension of the pending appeal); State v. Williams, 350 So.2d 81 (Fla.1977) (discharge of defendant approved when speedy tria

1982In State v. Jenkins, 389 So.2d 971 (Fla. 1980), we distinguished between a stay and an extension of the right to a speedy trial, stating that "[t]hey each concern different matters." We emphasize the difference between the tolling of the speedy trial time by the trial court under the speedy trial rule and the entry of a stay of mandate by an appellate court.