speedy trial rule in Iowa

2021Copenhaver claims his trial counsel should have moved for dismissal due to a speedy-trial violation. lowa Rule Criminal Procedure 2.33(2)(b) provides, “Ifa defendant indicted for a public offense has not waived the defendant’s right to speedy trial the defendant must be brought to trial within 90 days after indictment is found or the court must order the indictment to be dismissed unless good cause to the contrary be shown.” “Under this rule, a criminal charge must be dismissed if the trial does not commence within ninety days from the filing of the charging instrument ‘unless the State proves

2019Campbell, 714 N.W.2d at 628 ; see also State v. Winters, 690 N.W.2d 903, 909 (Iowa 2005) (“Our approach to good cause reveals that the determination of whether pretrial motions and pretrial discovery can excuse a failure to comply with the speedy-trial rule essentially rests on the strength of the underlying reasons for the delay in disposing of the motions or completing the discovery, not the mere existence of the motions or request for discovery.”).

2016Given these gaps in the record, combined with the law that even a single day of delay not supported by good cause is a basis for dismissal based upon speedy-trial grounds, see State v. Miller, 637 N.W.2d 201 , 205–06 (Iowa 2001), we are 11 unable to determine on direct appeal whether the State violated the speedy trial rule.

2015State v. Miller, 637 N.W.2d 201, 204 (Iowa 2001). 2 Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 2.33 (2)(b) (speedy trial) provides: If a defendant indicted for a public offense has not waived the defendant’s right to a speedy trial the defendant must be brought to trial within 90 days after indictment is found or the court must order the indictment to be dismissed unless good cause to the contrary be shown. 5 We agree with the district court the State has met its burden of showing “good cause” for an exception to the speedy trial rule.

2017State v. Allnutt, 261 Iowa 897, 901 , 156 N.W.2d 266, 268 (1968), overruled on other grounds in Gorham, 206 N.W.2d at 913 ; see also Penn- Kennedy, 862 N.W.2d at 387 (“As with all three segments of the speedy trial rule, the speedy indictment rule serves to ‘relieve an accused of the anxiety associated with’ the suspension of a prosecution, provide for the ‘reasonably prompt administration of justice,’ prevent the loss of evidence, and maintain a fair process.” (quoting Wing, 791 N.W.2d at 246–47)).

2017State v. Allnutt, 261 Iowa 897, 901 , 156 N.W.2d 266, 268 (1968), overruled on other grounds in Gorham, 206 N.W.2d at 913 ; see also Penn- Kennedy, 862 N.W.2d at 387 (“As with all three segments of the speedy trial rule, the speedy indictment rule serves to ‘relieve an accused of the anxiety associated with’ the suspension of a prosecution, provide for the ‘reasonably prompt administration of justice,’ prevent the loss of evidence, and maintain a fair process.” (quoting Wing, 791 N.W.2d at 246–47)).

2016The speedy-trial rule serves several purposes, including relieving “an accused of the anxiety associated with a suspended prosecution,” providing 4 We are also concerned that the substantial length of time between selecting jurors and beginning the presentation of evidence runs the risk of exposing those jurors to extrajudicial information about the case. 15 “reasonably prompt administration of justice,” and preventing the harm of “possible impairment of the accused’s defense due to diminished memories and loss of exculpatory evidence.” Id. at 703 (citation omitted).

2015See id. at 703–08 (evaluating the merits of appellant’s speedy-trial claim); State v. Dudley, 766 N.W.2d 606, 620 (Iowa 2009) (“[C]ounsel has no duty to raise issues that have no merit.”).

2017See 58 Taylor, 881 N.W.2d at 77; State v. Bond, 340 N.W.2d 276, 279 (Iowa 1983).

2017See 58 Taylor, 881 N.W.2d at 77; State v. Bond, 340 N.W.2d 276, 279 (Iowa 1983).

2016See Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 , 529–30 (1972) (rejecting the imposition of a fixed-time period test for determining if there is a speedy-trial violation in favor of a balancing test that weighs the conduct of both the prosecution and the defendant).

2010One cannot escape the effect of such statutes by showing they were only violated a little bit.” Nelson , 222 N.W.2d *191 at 449; see also Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 522 , 92 S.Ct. 2182, 2188 , 33 L.Ed.2d 101, 112 (1972) (stating that although dismissal is a serious consequence for a speedy trial violation, “it is the only possible remedy”).

2024“Delays attributable to the criminal justice system—including those occasioned by human disabilities and illness—have been found to constitute good cause for a speedy trial violation.” State v. Deases, 476 N.W.2d 91, 96 (Iowa Ct. App. 1991); see also State v. Newman, 257 N.W.2d 29, 31 (Iowa 1977) (finding good cause for delay when county attorney was unavailable due to his wife’s health); State v. Goff, 244 N.W.2d 579, 582 (Iowa 1976) (finding good cause for delay when illness and leave left “only two judges to serve ‘eight different courthouses each week’”).

2010State v. Nelson, 222 N.W.2d 445 , 449–50 (Iowa 1974); see also State v. Goff, 244 N.W.2d 579, 582 (Iowa 1976).

2019Thus we reverse and remand for dismissal. 1 Ennenga v. State, 812 N.W.2d 696 , 702 n.5 (Iowa 2012); State v. Utter, 803 N.W.2d 647, 653 (Iowa 2011), overruled on other grounds by Schmidt v. State, 909 N.W.2d 778 (Iowa 2018). 2 Ehler faults counsel for not relying on State v. Campbell, 714 N.W.2d 622 (Iowa 2006).

2016See State v. Utter, 803 N.W.2d 647 (Iowa 2011).

2008A dismissal for failure to provide a speedy trial is an “absolute dismissal, a discharge with prejudice, prohibiting reinstatement or refiling of an information or indictment charging the same offense.” State v. Johnson, 217 N.W.2d 609, 612 (Iowa 1974) (stating that allowing the State to refile the same charges following a speedy trial violation would “drain [the speedy trial rule] of its effectiveness”) (citing Strunk v. United States, 412 U.S. 434, 438 , 93 S. Ct. 2260, 2263 , 37 L.

2008A dismissal for failure to provide a speedy trial is an “absolute dismissal, a discharge with prejudice, prohibiting reinstatement or refiling of an information or indictment charging the same offense.” State v. Johnson, 217 N.W.2d 609, 612 (Iowa 1974) (stating that allowing the State to refile the same charges following a speedy trial violation would “drain [the speedy trial rule] of its effectiveness”) (citing Strunk v. United States, 412 U.S. 434, 438 , 93 S. Ct. 2260, 2263 , 37 L.

2021Iowa courts recognize three exceptions to the speedy-trial requirement: “(1) defendant’s waiver of speedy trial, (2) delay attributable to the defendant, or (3) ‘good cause’ for the delay.” State v. Nelson, 600 N.W.2d 598, 600 (Iowa 1999). 8 The State has the burden to prove one of the exceptions applies.

2020We have recognized three exceptions to the speedy trial requirement, namely when “the State proves (1) defendant’s waiver of speedy trial, (2) delay attributable to the defendant, or (3) ‘good cause’ for the delay.” State v. Nelson, 600 N.W.2d 598, 600 (Iowa 1999).

2017Id.

2017Id.

2017State v. Petersen, 288 N.W.2d 332, 335 (Iowa 1980).

2017State v. Petersen, 288 N.W.2d 332, 335 (Iowa 1980).

2024“Delays attributable to the criminal justice system—including those occasioned by human disabilities and illness—have been found to constitute good cause for a speedy trial violation.” State v. Deases, 476 N.W.2d 91, 96 (Iowa Ct. App. 1991); see also State v. Newman, 257 N.W.2d 29, 31 (Iowa 1977) (finding good cause for delay when county attorney was unavailable due to his wife’s health); State v. Goff, 244 N.W.2d 579, 582 (Iowa 1976) (finding good cause for delay when illness and leave left “only two judges to serve ‘eight different courthouses each week’”).

2010State v. Cennon, 201 N.W.2d 715, 718 (Iowa 1972); State v. Deases, 476 N.W.2d 91, 95 (Iowa Ct.App.1991).

2024“Delays attributable to the criminal justice system—including those occasioned by human disabilities and illness—have been found to constitute good cause for a speedy trial violation.” State v. Deases, 476 N.W.2d 91, 96 (Iowa Ct. App. 1991); see also State v. Newman, 257 N.W.2d 29, 31 (Iowa 1977) (finding good cause for delay when county attorney was unavailable due to his wife’s health); State v. Goff, 244 N.W.2d 579, 582 (Iowa 1976) (finding good cause for delay when illness and leave left “only two judges to serve ‘eight different courthouses each week’”).

1991State v. Stanley, 351 N.W.2d 539 (Iowa App.1984); State v. Bond, 340 N.W.2d 276, 279 (Iowa 1983); State v. Newman, 257 N.W.2d 29, 31 (Iowa 1977); State v. Hathaway, 257 N.W.2d 735, 736 (Iowa 1977); State v. Thomas, 222 N.W.2d 488, 492 (Iowa 1974); State v. Jennings, 195 N.W.2d 351, 356 (Iowa 1972) (non-chronic “court congestion” arising out of unique, non-recurring events which result in only a short delay may constitute good cause), contrast State v. Hines, 225 N.W.2d 156 (Iowa 1975); State v. Goff, 244 N.W.2d 579 (Iowa 1976); State v. Leonard, 240 N.W.2d 690 (Iowa 1976); State v. Wright, 234

2020On appeal, Warmuth recognized the rule “that if a defendant enters a guilty plea, and subsequently withdraws the guilty plea, the State must try the case within ninety days after withdrawal of the guilty plea.” Id.; accord State v. Clark, 351 N.W.2d 532, 535 (Iowa 1984); State v. Belieu, 314 N.W.2d 382, 384 (Iowa 1982).

1995State v. Clark, 351 N.W.2d 532, 534 (Iowa 1984).

2020On appeal, Warmuth recognized the rule “that if a defendant enters a guilty plea, and subsequently withdraws the guilty plea, the State must try the case within ninety days after withdrawal of the guilty plea.” Id.; accord State v. Clark, 351 N.W.2d 532, 535 (Iowa 1984); State v. Belieu, 314 N.W.2d 382, 384 (Iowa 1982).

1984Although an appeal and remand were involved, we dealt with the effect of a guilty plea on the speedy trial requirement in State v. Belieu, 314 N.W.2d 382, 384 (Iowa 1982): Trial originally was scheduled within ninety days of our remand.

2017State v. Allnutt, 261 Iowa 897, 901 , 156 N.W.2d 266, 268 (1968), overruled on other grounds in Gorham, 206 N.W.2d at 913 ; see also Penn- Kennedy, 862 N.W.2d at 387 (“As with all three segments of the speedy trial rule, the speedy indictment rule serves to ‘relieve an accused of the anxiety associated with’ the suspension of a prosecution, provide for the ‘reasonably prompt administration of justice,’ prevent the loss of evidence, and maintain a fair process.” (quoting Wing, 791 N.W.2d at 246–47)).

2017State v. Allnutt, 261 Iowa 897, 901 , 156 N.W.2d 266, 268 (1968), overruled on other grounds in Gorham, 206 N.W.2d at 913 ; see also Penn- Kennedy, 862 N.W.2d at 387 (“As with all three segments of the speedy trial rule, the speedy indictment rule serves to ‘relieve an accused of the anxiety associated with’ the suspension of a prosecution, provide for the ‘reasonably prompt administration of justice,’ prevent the loss of evidence, and maintain a fair process.” (quoting Wing, 791 N.W.2d at 246–47)).

2017State v. Allnutt, 261 Iowa 897, 901 , 156 N.W.2d 266, 268 (1968), overruled on other grounds in Gorham, 206 N.W.2d at 913 ; see also Penn- Kennedy, 862 N.W.2d at 387 (“As with all three segments of the speedy trial rule, the speedy indictment rule serves to ‘relieve an accused of the anxiety associated with’ the suspension of a prosecution, provide for the ‘reasonably prompt administration of justice,’ prevent the loss of evidence, and maintain a fair process.” (quoting Wing, 791 N.W.2d at 246–47)).

2017State v. Allnutt, 261 Iowa 897, 901 , 156 N.W.2d 266, 268 (1968), overruled on other grounds in Gorham, 206 N.W.2d at 913 ; see also Penn- Kennedy, 862 N.W.2d at 387 (“As with all three segments of the speedy trial rule, the speedy indictment rule serves to ‘relieve an accused of the anxiety associated with’ the suspension of a prosecution, provide for the ‘reasonably prompt administration of justice,’ prevent the loss of evidence, and maintain a fair process.” (quoting Wing, 791 N.W.2d at 246–47)).

2015Wing, 791 N.W.2d at 246 -47 (quoting State v. Delockroy, 559 N.W.2d 43, 46 (Iowa Ct.App.1996)).

2015Wing, 791 N.W.2d at 246–47 (quoting State v. Delockroy, 559 N.W.2d 43, 46 (Iowa Ct. App. 1996)).

2008A dismissal for failure to provide a speedy trial is an “absolute dismissal, a discharge with prejudice, prohibiting reinstatement or refiling of an information or indictment charging the same offense.” State v. Johnson, 217 N.W.2d 609, 612 (Iowa 1974) (stating that allowing the State to refile the same charges following a speedy trial violation would “drain [the speedy trial rule] of its effectiveness”) (citing Strunk v. United States, 412 U.S. 434, 438 , 93 S. Ct. 2260, 2263 , 37 L.

2008A dismissal for failure to provide a speedy trial is an “absolute dismissal, a discharge with prejudice, prohibiting reinstatement or refiling of an information or indictment charging the same offense.” State v. Johnson, 217 N.W.2d 609, 612 (Iowa 1974) (stating that allowing the State to refile the same charges following a speedy trial violation would “drain [the speedy trial rule] of its effectiveness”) (citing Strunk v. United States, 412 U.S. 434, 438 , 93 S. Ct. 2260, 2263 , 37 L.

2008Our decision in Moritz noted the “same offense” test applied in the speedy trial context focuses on whether the “ ‘two offenses are in substance the same, or of the same nature, or same species, so that the evidence which proves one would prove the other.’” 293 N.W.2d at 238 -39 (quoting State v. Stewart, 223 N.W.2d 250, 251 (Iowa 1974)).

2008Our decision in Moritz noted the “same offense” test applied in the speedy trial context focuses on whether the “ ‘two offenses are in substance the same, or of the same nature, or same species, so that the evidence which proves one would prove the other.’ ” 293 N.W.2d at 238–39 (quoting State v. Stewart, 223 N.W.2d 250, 251 (Iowa 1974)).

2022See id. at 273 (“Under rule 2.33(1), after a dismissal in the furtherance of justice, the same felony or aggravated misdemeanor charges may be refiled.

2021Lastly, in State v. Abrahamson, we discussed the relationship between the speedy trial rule, rule 2.33, and the rule permitting amendment of trial informations, rule 2.4(8)(a). 746 N.W.2d 270 , 274–77 (Iowa 2008).

2026Contrast State v. Hamilton, 309 N.W.2d 471 , 475–76 (Iowa 1981) (holding that waiver made before interlocutory appeal continued to apply on remand until the defendant withdrew the waiver), with State v. Lovan, No. 17-0729, 2020 WL 2972137 , at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. June 3, 2020) (declining to follow Hamilton for a speedy- trial waiver made before mistrial and instead analyzing whether the defendant waived the reset ninety-day deadline after the mistrial). “[M]ere acquiescence in the setting of a trial date beyond the period for speedy trial does not constitute waiver” of a defendant’s speedy-trial

2021And in instances where a defendant waives speedy trial and then withdraws that waiver, “the defendant must be tried within ninety days from the date of the withdrawal unless good cause to the contrary be shown.” State v Hamilton, 309 N.W.2d 471, 475 (lowa 1981).

2016Contrary to the State’s position on appeal, we do not find the length of the recess to be insubstantial.4 See State v. Hines, 225 N.W.2d 156, 159 (Iowa 1975) (“[W]e are unimpressed that the [then sixty]-day limitation was exceeded by only [fifteen] days.”); see also State v. Miller, 637 N.W.2d 201, 205 (Iowa 2001) (“[A] procedural deadline cannot be escaped merely by showing it has been violated ‘only a little bit.’” (citation omitted)).

1991State v. Stanley, 351 N.W.2d 539 (Iowa App.1984); State v. Bond, 340 N.W.2d 276, 279 (Iowa 1983); State v. Newman, 257 N.W.2d 29, 31 (Iowa 1977); State v. Hathaway, 257 N.W.2d 735, 736 (Iowa 1977); State v. Thomas, 222 N.W.2d 488, 492 (Iowa 1974); State v. Jennings, 195 N.W.2d 351, 356 (Iowa 1972) (non-chronic “court congestion” arising out of unique, non-recurring events which result in only a short delay may constitute good cause), contrast State v. Hines, 225 N.W.2d 156 (Iowa 1975); State v. Goff, 244 N.W.2d 579 (Iowa 1976); State v. Leonard, 240 N.W.2d 690 (Iowa 1976); State v. Wright, 234

2010State v. Nelson, 222 N.W.2d 445, 449-50 (Iowa 1974); see also State v. Goff, 244 N.W.2d 579, 582 (Iowa 1976).

2010State v. Nelson, 222 N.W.2d 445 , 449–50 (Iowa 1974); see also State v. Goff, 244 N.W.2d 579, 582 (Iowa 1976).

1999See id. at 899 (reversing conviction when “inordinate and unexplained delay” in issuance of rulings violated defendant’s speedy-trial right); Olson, 528 N.W.2d at 654-55 (reversal warranted where prejudice presumed by eight-month delay and reasons fall far short of “good cause”); State v. Leonard, 240 N.W.2d 690, 692-93 (Iowa 1976) (neither docket congestion, “complexity” of case, pending motions, or busy schedule of counsel justified delay of trial on court’s own motion under former speedy-trial statute, Iowa Code § 795.2 (1973)).

1991State v. Stanley, 351 N.W.2d 539 (Iowa App.1984); State v. Bond, 340 N.W.2d 276, 279 (Iowa 1983); State v. Newman, 257 N.W.2d 29, 31 (Iowa 1977); State v. Hathaway, 257 N.W.2d 735, 736 (Iowa 1977); State v. Thomas, 222 N.W.2d 488, 492 (Iowa 1974); State v. Jennings, 195 N.W.2d 351, 356 (Iowa 1972) (non-chronic “court congestion” arising out of unique, non-recurring events which result in only a short delay may constitute good cause), contrast State v. Hines, 225 N.W.2d 156 (Iowa 1975); State v. Goff, 244 N.W.2d 579 (Iowa 1976); State v. Leonard, 240 N.W.2d 690 (Iowa 1976); State v. Wright, 234