speedy trial claim in Indiana

2024See Brown v. State, 725 N.E.2d 823, 825 (Ind. 2000) (noting defendants must object to a Criminal Rule 4 violation to “facilitate[] compliance by trial courts with the speedy trial requirement”).

2002In Brown v. State, 725 N.E.2d 823, 825 (Ind.2000), our supreme court explained: "[The requirement that a defendant object to a trial date set after a Criminal Rule 4 deadline and move for discharge facilitates compliance by trial courts with the speedy trial requirement.

2020The first Barker factor, the length of delay, involves a dual inquiry and acts as the gateway to a full speedy trial analysis. 407 U.S. at 530–31.

2020While “a defendant has some responsibility to assert a speedy trial claim,” we do not look solely for a “pro forma objection.” Id. at 529 .

2015To trigger a speedy trial analysis, he must allege that the time between the charge and the trial “crossed the threshold dividing ordinary from ‘presumptively prejudicial’ delay . . . .” Doggett v. U.S., 505 U.S. 647, 651-52 (1992). “[W]hen length of delay is Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 30A05-1408-CR-372 | July 17, 2015 Page 11 of 18 considered as a factor in the Barker analysis, this court determines ‘the extent to which the delay stretches beyond the bare minimum needed to trigger judicial examination of the claim.’” Davis v. State, 819 N.E.2d 91, 96 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004

2015To trigger a speedy trial analysis, he must allege that the time between the charge and the trial “crossed the threshold dividing ordinary from ‘presumptively prejudicial’ delay . . . .” Doggett v. U.S., 505 U.S. 647, 651-52 (1992). “[W]hen length of delay is Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 30A05-1408-CR-372 | July 17, 2015 Page 11 of 18 considered as a factor in the Barker analysis, this court determines ‘the extent to which the delay stretches beyond the bare minimum needed to trigger judicial examination of the claim.’” Davis v. State, 819 N.E.2d 91, 96 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004

2014Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530 , 92 S.Ct. 2182 , 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972); Vermillion v. State, 719 N.E.2d 1201 (Ind.1999).

2013Bramley v. Tipton Circuit Court, 835 N.E.2d 479, 481 (Ind. 2005) (citing Vermillion v. State, 719 N.E.2d 1201, 1204 (Ind. 1999), reh’g denied); see also Brown, 725 N.E.2d at 825 (explaining that “if the time period provided by the rule has not expired and a trial date is set for a date beyond that period, a timely objection must be made”).

2013Bramley v. Tipton Circuit Court, 835 N.E.2d 479, 481 (Ind. 2005) (citing Vermillion v. State, 719 N.E.2d 1201, 1204 (Ind. 1999), reh’g denied); see also Brown, 725 N.E.2d at 825 (explaining that “if the time period provided by the rule has not expired and a trial date is set for a date beyond that period, a timely objection must be made”).

2012Bramley v. Tipton Circuit Court, 835 N.E.2d 479, 481 (Ind.2005) (citing Vermillion v. State, 719 N.E.2d 1201, 1204 (Ind.1999)).

2014Thus, even if the delay is presumptively prejudicial because it exceeded one year, a defendant must “specify precisely how the delay affected his ability to defend himself against the charges in order to succeed on a speedy trial claim.” Id. (citing Gilmore v. State, 655 N.E.2d 1225 , 1227– 28 (Ind.1995)).

2012Thus, even if the delay is presumptively prejudicial because it exceeded one year, a defendant must “specify precisely how the delay affected his ability to defend himself against the charges in order to succeed on a speedy trial claim.” Id. (citing Gilmore v. State, 655 N.E.2d 1225, 1227-28 (Ind.1995)).

2015To trigger a speedy trial analysis, he must allege that the time between the charge and the trial “crossed the threshold dividing ordinary from ‘presumptively prejudicial’ delay . . . .” Doggett v. U.S., 505 U.S. 647, 651-52 (1992). “[W]hen length of delay is Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 30A05-1408-CR-372 | July 17, 2015 Page 11 of 18 considered as a factor in the Barker analysis, this court determines ‘the extent to which the delay stretches beyond the bare minimum needed to trigger judicial examination of the claim.’” Davis v. State, 819 N.E.2d 91, 96 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004

2010Compare Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. at 658 , 112 S.Ct. 2686 (six-year delay "far exceed[ed]" the one-year threshold to raise a speedy trial claim) and Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. at 533 , 92 S.Ct. 2182 (five-year delay between arrest and trial was "extraordinary") with Davis v. State, 819 N.E.2d 91, 100 (Ind.Ct.App.2004) (six-month delay was "relatively short"), trans. denied.

2012See id. 7 “In Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 , 92 S.Ct. 2182 , 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972), the United States Supreme Court articulated a balancing test to be used when evaluating a speedy trial claim under the United States Constitution.” Sturgeon v. State, 683 N.E.2d 612, 616 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997), trans. denied.

2009Here, that delay is from September 16, 2004, until May 13, 2008. 1 *520 "In Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 , 92 S.Ct. 2182 , 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972), the United States Supreme Court articulated a balancing test to be used when evaluating a speedy trial claim under the United States Constitution." Sturgeon v. State, 683 N.E.2d 612, 616 (Ind.Ct.App.1997), trans. denied.

2017VI, cl. 1 (“the speedy trial clause”); Kloper v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213, 223 (1967) (incorporating speedy trial clause against Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 29A02-1612-CR-2955 | July 13, 2017 Page 3 of 8 states).1 Whether an accused has been denied his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial is tested by balancing the factors set out in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972).

2008In another decision, Justice Harlan, in a separate opinion reversing a conviction on grounds of a speedy trial violation, declared, "I would rest *288 decision of this case not on the 'speedy trial’ provision of the Sixth Amendment, but on the ground that this unusual [State] procedure, which in effect allows state prosecuting officials to put a person under the cloud of an unliquidated criminal charge for an indeterminate period, violates the requirement of fundamental fairness assured by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.” Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213, 226-27 , 87

1998United States v. Ewell , 383 U.S. 116, 120 (1966).

1997United States v. Ewell, 383 U.S. 116, 120 , 86 S.Ct. 773, 776-77 , 15 L.Ed.2d 627 (1966).

2024In Clark v. State, this Court created a simple burden- shifting test for determining whether a defendant is entitled to discharge for a speedy-trial violation: When a trial court invokes congestion, without further explanation, as a reason for continuing trial, the defendant may challenge that decision by making an initial, prima facie showing that, “at the time” the court ordered the continuance, its finding was “factually or legally inaccurate.” 659 N.E.2d 548, 552 (Ind. 1995).

2024In analyzing the defendant’s speedy-trial claim, this Court noted the long- held rule that “delays attributable to a defendant’s claim of incompetency are charged against the defendant for Rule 4(C) purposes.” Id. at 1150 (citing Baldwin v. State, 274 Ind. 269, 271 , 411 N.E.2d 605, 606 (1980)).

2024In analyzing the defendant’s speedy-trial claim, this Court noted the long- held rule that “delays attributable to a defendant’s claim of incompetency are charged against the defendant for Rule 4(C) purposes.” Id. at 1150 (citing Baldwin v. State, 274 Ind. 269, 271 , 411 N.E.2d 605, 606 (1980)).

2020See, e.g., Sweeney v. State, 704 N.E.2d 86, 102 (Ind. 1998).

2019Montgomery v. State, 14 N.E.3d 76, 78 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014). [9] The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides, in relevant part, that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial.” Similarly, Article 1, Section 12 of the Indiana Constitution provides, in relevant part, that “[j]ustice shall be administered freely, and without purchase; completely, and without denial; speedily, and Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-1902 | July 19, 2019 Page 5 of 15 without delay.” Our analysis of an alleged speedy trial v

2019Logan v. State, 16 N.E.3d 953, 961 (Ind. 2014).

2018See Lowrance v. State, 64 N.E.3d 935, 938 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016) (noting that this court may not become an advocate for pro se litigants or develop arguments on their behalf), trans. denied; see also Keller v. State, 549 N.E.2d 372, 373 (Ind. 1990) (noting that “a court which must search the record and make up its own arguments because for the State’s failure to disclose certain evidence during discovery; and (17) failing to raise a claim of a speedy trial violation.

2018See Lowrance v. State, 64 N.E.3d 935, 938 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016) (noting that this court may not become an advocate for pro se litigants or develop arguments on their behalf), trans. denied; see also Keller v. State, 549 N.E.2d 372, 373 (Ind. 1990) (noting that “a court which must search the record and make up its own arguments because for the State’s failure to disclose certain evidence during discovery; and (17) failing to raise a claim of a speedy trial violation.

2017See generally Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 782 (1973) (no constitutional distinction between probation revocation and parole revocation); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 480-81 (1972) (“We begin with the proposition that the revocation of parole is not part of a criminal prosecution and thus the full panoply of rights due a defendant in such a proceeding does not apply to parole revocations. . . .

2017See generally Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 782 (1973) (no constitutional distinction between probation revocation and parole revocation); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 480-81 (1972) (“We begin with the proposition that the revocation of parole is not part of a criminal prosecution and thus the full panoply of rights due a defendant in such a proceeding does not apply to parole revocations. . . .

2014P. 4(B)(1)”); Jacobs v. State, 454 N.E.2d 894, 898 (Ind. Ct. App. 1983) (holding that the assertion of a speedy trial violation was untimely when it was raised three days after the court rescheduled the trial date).

2012See id. 7 “In Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 , 92 S.Ct. 2182 , 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972), the United States Supreme Court articulated a balancing test to be used when evaluating a speedy trial claim under the United States Constitution.” Sturgeon v. State, 683 N.E.2d 612, 616 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997), trans. denied.

2011Although "Indiana Criminal Rule 4 generally implements the constitutional right of a criminal defendant to a speedy trial,” Bridwell v. State, 659 N.E.2d 552, 553 (Ind.1995), a speedy-trial claim under Rule 4(C) and a speedy-trial claim under either the federal or state constitution must be asserted separately and distinctly.