speedy trial violation in Wisconsin

2026Prejudice and balancing ¶32 “We consider three interests in assessing whether a defendant suffered prejudice due to a prolonged delay before trial: oppressive pretrial incarceration; anxiety and concern; and the possibility the defense will be impaired.” Id., ¶51. “[A] defendant need not show prejudice in fact to evince a speedy trial violation.” Leighton, 237 Wis. 2d 709, ¶25 . ¶33 Helmueller argues that he was prejudiced by the delay in this case because he “endured prolonged pretrial incarceration and suffered extreme anxiety and distress while this case was pending.” It is true that imposi

2025Indeed, “any inquiry into a speedy trial claim necessitates a functional analysis of the right in the particular context of the case.” Barker, 407 U.S. at 522 .

2025“We consider (1) the length of delay; (2) the reason for the delay; (3) the defendant’s assertion of his right; and (4) prejudice to the defendant.” Id. ¶69 Any analysis of a speedy-trial claim is necessarily fact dependent.

2024In pleading this claim, the defendant conflates the McCallum standard for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence with a new factor, which would be grounds for sentencing modification (not resentencing).” 6 No. 2022AP1663-CR defendant.” Id. “[T]he test requires us to consider the totality of circumstances that exist in each specific case to determine if a speedy trial violation has occurred.” State v. Provost, 2020 WI App 21, ¶26 , 392 Wis. 2d 262 , 944 N.W.2d 23 . ¶18 Whether a defendant’s constitutional right to a speedy trial has been violated is a question of law that this court rev

2025At the outset, it functions as a trigger: Before a court conducts a speedy trial 3Because neither party develops an argument under the speedy trial clause of the Wisconsin Constitution, we do not consider it further. 8 STATE v. RAMIREZ Opinion of the Court analysis, the defendant “must allege that the interval between accusation and trial has crossed the threshold dividing ordinary from ‘presumptively prejudicial’ delay.” Doggett, 505 U.S. at 651–52.

2025Doggett, 505 U.S. at 652 (“This latter enquiry is significant to the speedy trial analysis because . . . the presumption that pretrial delay has prejudiced the accused intensifies over time.”). ¶33 In its analysis of the first Barker factor, the court of appeals emphasized the delay in this case was “the longest total delay reflected in any published constitutional speedy trial case from Wisconsin,” proceeded to characterize the total length of the delay as “extreme,” and weighed it “heavily against the State.” Ramirez, 412 Wis. 2d 55, ¶23 .

2024See State v. Harvey, 2006 WI App 26 , ¶20 n.7, 289 Wis. 2d 222 , 20 No. 2023AP2414-CR 710 N.W.2d 482 (“We may look to other jurisdictions for persuasive authority where there are no Wisconsin cases directly on point.”).14 ¶52 We begin by considering cases that address trial delays that were caused by other unprecedented events beyond the control of the government.15 In cases that addressed delays caused by the eruption of Mount St.

2024See State v. Harvey, 2006 WI App 26 , ¶20 n.7, 289 Wis. 2d 222 , 20 No. 2023AP2414-CR 710 N.W.2d 482 (“We may look to other jurisdictions for persuasive authority where there are no Wisconsin cases directly on point.”).14 ¶52 We begin by considering cases that address trial delays that were caused by other unprecedented events beyond the control of the government.15 In cases that addressed delays caused by the eruption of Mount St.

2005The Court first observed that in United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 313 (1971), it had held *489 that the speedy trial clause of the Sixth Amendment "does not apply to the period before the defendant is indicted, arrested or otherwise officially accused ...

1993We are persuaded by the holdings of other courts that have addressed the issue, and conclude that the speedy trial clause of the sixth amendment applies from the time an accused is arrested or criminally charged, United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 319-20 (1971), up through the sentencing phase of prosecution.

2026Prejudice and balancing ¶32 “We consider three interests in assessing whether a defendant suffered prejudice due to a prolonged delay before trial: oppressive pretrial incarceration; anxiety and concern; and the possibility the defense will be impaired.” Id., ¶51. “[A] defendant need not show prejudice in fact to evince a speedy trial violation.” Leighton, 237 Wis. 2d 709, ¶25 . ¶33 Helmueller argues that he was prejudiced by the delay in this case because he “endured prolonged pretrial incarceration and suffered extreme anxiety and distress while this case was pending.” It is true that imposi

2023Although a defendant need not show actual prejudice to prevail on a speedy trial claim, see Leighton, 237 Wis. 2d 709, ¶25 , 7 No. 2021AP926-CR the absence or scarcity of prejudice strongly weighs against finding a speedy trial violation, see, e.g., Barker, 407 U.S. at 534 .

2024By contrast, a defendant’s complete failure or delay in demanding a speedy trial will undermine the defendant’s speedy trial claim if the evidence shows that the defendant was deliberately delaying the trial to “avoid the day of reckoning.” See id. at 361 ; Ziegenhagen, 73 Wis. 2d at 673 . ¶77 As noted, Ramirez asserted his right to a speedy trial twice in pro se filings to the circuit court: once in a September 26, 2018 informal demand that was filed more than 31 months after charges were filed, and again on April 15, 2019, in the form of a motion to dismiss the charges on speedy trial ground

2024Defendants who are already incarcerated on unrelated charges may also experience special forms of prejudice, including the elimination of the possibility of being sentenced to and serving concurrent sentences, see Hadley, 66 Wis. 2d at 364-65 , and “the possible impact that pending 35 No. 2022AP959-CR charges might have on [a defendant’s] prospects for parole and meaningful rehabilitation,” see Moore v. Arizona, 414 U.S. 25, 27 (1973). ¶85 Although “prejudice is an important factor in the analysis, it is not necessary that a defendant show prejudice in fact in order to establish a speedy trial

2025The “test requires us to consider the totality of circumstances that exist in each specific case to determine if a speedy trial violation has occurred.” Id. ¶45 The State concedes, and we agree, that the length of the delay in this case was presumptively prejudicial because the State charged Hatcher in February 2019 and the trial did not commence until May 2021.

2024In pleading this claim, the defendant conflates the McCallum standard for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence with a new factor, which would be grounds for sentencing modification (not resentencing).” 6 No. 2022AP1663-CR defendant.” Id. “[T]he test requires us to consider the totality of circumstances that exist in each specific case to determine if a speedy trial violation has occurred.” State v. Provost, 2020 WI App 21, ¶26 , 392 Wis. 2d 262 , 944 N.W.2d 23 . ¶18 Whether a defendant’s constitutional right to a speedy trial has been violated is a question of law that this court rev

2025Doggett, 505 U.S. at 652 (“This latter enquiry is significant to the speedy trial analysis because . . . the presumption that pretrial delay has prejudiced the accused intensifies over time.”). ¶33 In its analysis of the first Barker factor, the court of appeals emphasized the delay in this case was “the longest total delay reflected in any published constitutional speedy trial case from Wisconsin,” proceeded to characterize the total length of the delay as “extreme,” and weighed it “heavily against the State.” Ramirez, 412 Wis. 2d 55, ¶23 .

2024By contrast, a failure to demand a speedy trial undermines a speedy trial claim “if the evidence shows that the defendant was deliberately delaying the trial to avoid the day of reckoning.” See Ramirez, 412 Wis. 2d 55, ¶76 (citing Hadley, 66 Wis. 2d at 361 ). ¶65 As noted, Coleman did not assert his right to a speedy trial during the nearly 32 months his case was pending.

2026See United States v. Lewis, 116 F.4th 1144, 1167 (10th Cir. 2024) (concluding that a defendant had failed to show for purposes of a speedy trial violation claim that he experienced “‘concern and anxiety over his impending trial’ any different ‘from that of any other arrestee awaiting trial’” (citation omitted)); United States v. Chavez, 979 F.2d 1350, 1354-55 (9th Cir.1992) (reaching a similar conclusion in a challenge to delay in processing an appeal). 14 No. 2024AP561-CR ¶35 Helmueller further contends that his defense was impaired by the delay in this case because by the time his trial comm

2026See United States v. Lewis, 116 F.4th 1144, 1167 (10th Cir. 2024) (concluding that a defendant had failed to show for purposes of a speedy trial violation claim that he experienced “‘concern and anxiety over his impending trial’ any different ‘from that of any other arrestee awaiting trial’” (citation omitted)); United States v. Chavez, 979 F.2d 1350, 1354-55 (9th Cir.1992) (reaching a similar conclusion in a challenge to delay in processing an appeal). 14 No. 2024AP561-CR ¶35 Helmueller further contends that his defense was impaired by the delay in this case because by the time his trial comm

2025See State v. Ariegwe, 167 P.3d 815, 848 (Mont. 2007) (providing that in a speedy trial analysis the court “first identifies each period of delay in bringing the accused to trial” and then “attributes each period of delay to the appropriate party”); Jones v. State, 367 A.2d 1, 4 (Md. 1976) (setting forth that “[i]n the resolution of the speedy trial issue in this case we, of course, must carefully scrutinize all occurrences between Jones’ arrest and trial”); State v. Valencia, 224 P.3d 659 , 665–66 (N.M.

2025See State v. Ariegwe, 167 P.3d 815, 848 (Mont. 2007) (providing that in a speedy trial analysis the court “first identifies each period of delay in bringing the accused to trial” and then “attributes each period of delay to the appropriate party”); Jones v. State, 367 A.2d 1, 4 (Md. 1976) (setting forth that “[i]n the resolution of the speedy trial issue in this case we, of course, must carefully scrutinize all occurrences between Jones’ arrest and trial”); State v. Valencia, 224 P.3d 659 , 665–66 (N.M.

2024Defendants who are already incarcerated on unrelated charges may also experience special forms of prejudice, including the elimination of the possibility of being sentenced to and serving concurrent sentences, see Hadley, 66 Wis. 2d at 364-65 , and “the possible impact that pending 35 No. 2022AP959-CR charges might have on [a defendant’s] prospects for parole and meaningful rehabilitation,” see Moore v. Arizona, 414 U.S. 25, 27 (1973). ¶85 Although “prejudice is an important factor in the analysis, it is not necessary that a defendant show prejudice in fact in order to establish a speedy trial

2024Indeed, the United States Supreme Court has expressly rejected the notion that “an affirmative demonstration of prejudice” is necessary “to prove the denial of the constitutional right to a speedy trial.” Moore, 414 U.S. at 26 .

2024See Green v. State, 75 Wis. 2d 631, 637 , 250 N.W.2d 305 (1977) (concluding defendant’s motion to dismiss on constitutional speedy trial grounds counted as an assertion of his right to a speedy trial because it put the circuit court and the prosecution on notice of his desire for a speedy trial).

2024See Green v. State, 75 Wis. 2d 631, 637 , 250 N.W.2d 305 (1977) (concluding defendant’s motion to dismiss on constitutional speedy trial grounds counted as an assertion of his right to a speedy trial because it put the circuit court and the prosecution on notice of his desire for a speedy trial).

2023See State v. Poveda, 166 Wis. 2d 19, 25 , 479 N.W.2d 175 (Ct. App. 1991) (explaining the various circumstances in which double jeopardy attaches), nor was there a speedy trial violation.

2023See State v. Poveda, 166 Wis. 2d 19, 25 , 479 N.W.2d 175 (Ct. App. 1991) (explaining the various circumstances in which double jeopardy attaches), nor was there a speedy trial violation.

2021See Norwood, 74 Wis. 2d at 354 . 11 The relief Tatum received from the Seventh Circuit is typical of that granted in federal habeas corpus litigation.

2021Loud Hawk therefore does not support Tatum’s claims that the time he spent attacking his convictions is relevant to the speedy trial analysis. ¶29 The Supreme Court in Betterman expressly did not decide whether the right to a speedy trial “reattaches upon renewed prosecution following a defendant’s successful appeal, when he again enjoys the presumption of innocence.” See id., 136 S. Ct. at 1613 n.2.

2021Loud Hawk therefore does not support Tatum’s claims that the time he spent attacking his convictions is relevant to the speedy trial analysis. ¶29 The Supreme Court in Betterman expressly did not decide whether the right to a speedy trial “reattaches upon renewed prosecution following a defendant’s successful appeal, when he again enjoys the presumption of innocence.” See id., 136 S. Ct. at 1613 n.2.