speedy trial violation in Minnesota

2016Accordingly, “the length of the delay only serves as a starting point for a speedy trial analysis.” State v. Johnson, 498 N.W.2d 10, 15 (Minn. 1993).

2016Even so, “the length of the delay only serves as a starting point for a speedy trial analysis.” State v. Johnson, 498 N.W.2d 10, 15 (Minn. 1993).

2025State v. Windish, 590 N.W.2d 311, 315 (Minn. 1999).

2024“The test provides that a court must consider: (1) the length of the delay; (2) the reason for the delay; (3) whether the defendant asserted his or her right to a speedy trial; and (4) whether the delay prejudiced the defendant.” State v. Windish, 590 N.W.2d 311, 315 (Minn. 1999) (citing Barker, 407 U.S. at 530-33 ).

2016“A speedy-trial challenge presents a constitutional question subject to de novo review.” State v. Griffin, 760 N.W.2d 336, 339 (Minn. App. 2009).

2016“A speedy- trial challenge presents a constitutional question subject to de novo review.” State v. Griffin, 760 N.W.2d 336, 339 (Minn. App. 2009).

2025When assessing a speedy-trial claim, we apply the four-factor balancing test first articulated in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972).

2024In Barker v. Wingo, the United States Supreme Court articulated four factors for determining whether reversal is warranted for a speedy-trial violation. 407 U.S. 514, 530 (1972).

2023Those factors include: “(1) the length of the delay; (2) the reason for the delay; (3) whether the defendant asserted his or her right to a speedy trial; and (4) whether the delay prejudiced the defendant.” State v. Windish, 590 N.W.2d 311, 315 (Minn. 1999); see also State v. Widell, 258 N.W.2d 795, 796 (Minn. 1977) (adopting the Barker factors in Minnesota).

2017Taylor, 869 N.W.2d at 19 ; State v. Widell, 258 N.W.2d 795, 796 (Minn. 1977).

2016Length of delay For purposes of a speedy-trial challenge, the delay is calculated based on the date “when a formal indictment or information is issued against a person or when a person is arrested and held to answer a criminal charge.” State v. Jones, 392 N.W.2d 224, 235 (Minn. 1986).

2015See State v. Jones, 392 N.W.2d 224 , 235–36 (Minn. 1986) (concluding that defendant’s right to speedy trial was not violated, despite seven-month delay attributable to state, because “[n]o unfair prejudice [wa]s evident”).

2011State v. Cham, 680 N.W.2d 121, 124 (Minn.App.2004), review denied (Minn. July 20, 2004).

2009State v. Cham, 680 N.W.2d 121, 124 (Minn.App.2004), review denied (Minn. July 20, 2004).

2024See Taylor, 869 N.W.2d at 19-20 (noting that both parties were responsible for a delay but determining that “[b]ecause both continuances were for good cause, this factor weighs against a speedy-trial violation”); Osorio, 891 N.W.2d at 632-33 (holding that a delay caused by the state’s negligence weighs against the state, but less heavily than if the delay was intentional).

2023Taylor, 869 N.W.2d at 19 - 20 (noting that both parties were responsible for a delay but determining “[b]ecause both continuances were for good cause, this factor weighs against a speedy-trial violation); Osorio, 891 N.W.2d at 628, 632-33 (holding that a delay caused by the state’s negligence 4 weighs against the state, but less heavily than if the delay were intentional).

2024See Taylor, 869 N.W.2d at 19-20 (noting that both parties were responsible for a delay but determining that “[b]ecause both continuances were for good cause, this factor weighs against a speedy-trial violation”); Osorio, 891 N.W.2d at 632-33 (holding that a delay caused by the state’s negligence weighs against the state, but less heavily than if the delay was intentional).

2023“To determine whether a speedy-trial violation has occurred, we apply the four-factor balancing test set forth by the Supreme Court of the United States in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 , 92 S. Ct. 2182 [(1972)].” Osorio, 891 N.W.2d at 627 .

2024State v. DeRosier, 695 N.W.2d 97, 109 (Minn. 2005).

2015In determining whether an accused was deprived of the right to a speedy trial, we consider the four-factor balancing test announced in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 , 530- 33, 92 S. Ct. 2182, 2191-93 (1972): “(1) the length of the delay, (2) the reason for the delay, (3) whether the defendant asserted his or her right to a speedy trial, and (4) whether the delay prejudiced the defendant.” DeRosier, 695 N.W.2d at 109 .

2016State v. Johnson, 811 N.W.2d 136, 144 (Minn. App. 2012), review denied (Minn. Mar. 28, 2012).

2015“A speedy-trial challenge presents a constitutional question subject to de novo review.” State v. Johnson, 811 N.W.2d 136, 144 (Minn. App. 2012), review denied (Minn. Mar. 28, 2012). 4 To determine whether a delay violates a defendant’s constitutional right to a speedy trial, we consider the four-factor balancing test announced in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 , 92 S. Ct. 2182 (1972).

2017Though we review de novo whether a defendant has been denied a speedy trial, see Taylor, 869 N.W.2d at 19 , we “give ‘great deference to the district court’s findings of fact and will not set them aside unless clearly erroneous,’ ” id. at 21 (quoting State v. Andersen, 784 N.W.2d 320, 334 (Minn. 2010)); see Doggett, 505 U.S. at 652-53, 112 S.Ct. 2686 (upholding a district court’s factual finding of negligence in a speedy-trial analysis).

2017Though we review de novo whether a defendant has been denied a speedy trial, see Taylor, 869 N.W.2d at 19 , we “give ‘great deference to the district court’s findings of fact and will not set them aside unless clearly erroneous,’ ” id. at 21 (quoting State v. Andersen, 784 N.W.2d 320, 334 (Minn. 2010)); see Doggett, 505 U.S. at 652-53, 112 S.Ct. 2686 (upholding a district court’s factual finding of negligence in a speedy-trial analysis).

1978In United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307 , 92 S.Ct. 455 , 30 L.Ed.2d 468 (1971), the United States Supreme Court held that the speedy-trial clause protects a defendant only against unfair prejudice resulting from delays following the arrest of defendant or the filing of charges.

1978In United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307 , 92 S.Ct. 455 , 30 L.Ed.2d 468 (1971), the United States Supreme Court held that the speedy-trial clause protects a defendant only against unfair prejudice resulting from delays following the arrest of defendant or the filing of charges.

2015“A speedy-trial challenge presents a constitutional question subject to de novo review.” State v. Hahn, 799 N.W.2d 25, 29 (Minn. App. 2011), review denied (Minn. Aug. 24, 2011).

2012“A speedy-trial challenge presents a constitutional question subject to de novo review.” Hahn, 799 N.W.2d at 29 .

2024“Application of the Strickland test involves a mixed question of law and fact, which we review de novo.” State v. Mouelle, 922 N.W.2d 706, 715 (Minn. 2019). 19 Murray argues that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to: (1) perform an independent investigation, (2) properly impeach P.G.’s testimony, (3) hire expert witnesses, (4) call a police officer to testify regarding Murray’s gun charge, (5) assert a speedy-trial violation, (6) challenge the legality of his arrest, (7) challenge the “malice aforethought” element of the crime, (8) present evidence of mitigating circ

2017Though we review de novo whether a defendant has been denied a speedy trial, see Taylor, 869 N.W.2d at 19 , we “give ‘great deference to the district court’s findings of fact and will not set them aside unless clearly erroneous,’ ” id. at 21 (quoting State v. Andersen, 784 N.W.2d 320, 334 (Minn. 2010)); see Doggett, 505 U.S. at 652-53, 112 S.Ct. 2686 (upholding a district court’s factual finding of negligence in a speedy-trial analysis).

2016Following the analysis in Kasper, MacDonald, and Pajari, we concluded in In re Welfare of G.D., that the time period between dismissal of a juvenile-delinquency petition and refiling is not relevant to a speedy-trial analysis. 473 N.W.2d 878, 882 (Minn. App. 1991).

2016See G.D., 473 N.W.2d at 882 .

2015See Thomas v. United States, 737 F.3d 1202, 1209 (8th Cir. 2013) (“[T]he decision whether to move to dismiss for a speedy trial violation is a tactical decision of trial strategy.”).

2012“Any material delay is a ‘triggering mechanism’ that requires further review of whether the speedy-trial claim was violated.” State v. Rhoads, 802 N.W.2d 794, 806 (Min.App.2011), review granted on other grounds (Minn. Oct. 18, 2011).

2004See State v. Corarito, 268 N.W.2d 79, 80 (Minn.1978) (concluding that delay of six months is sufficient to trigger further inquiry in the speedy trial analysis). 2.The reason for delay We next consider the reasons for the delay.

2004See e.g., Sap, 408 N.W.2d at 640 (concluding that Sap’s failure to move for a speedy trial, but instead for a dismissal, did not favor Sap in the speedy trial analysis). 4.

1993See State v. Friberg, 435 N.W.2d 509, 515 (Minn.1989); State v. Jones, 392 N.W.2d 224, 235 (Minn.1986); State v. Helenbolt, 334 N.W.2d 400, 405 (Minn.1983).

1993See State v. Friberg, 435 N.W.2d 509, 515 (Minn.1989); State v. Jones, 392 N.W.2d 224, 235 (Minn.1986); State v. Helenbolt, 334 N.W.2d 400, 405 (Minn.1983).