speedy trial claim in Louisiana

2017As the juvenile court noted in its judgment, “time passes faster for a youth than an adult,” and “[j]uvenile court proceedings are intended to afford swift resolution of alleged juvenile misconduct free of the lengthy delays that seem to ensnare adult criminal matters.” In order to determine if there has been a speedy trial violation, the Louisiana Supreme Court has adopted a four-part test set out by the United States | ^Supreme Court in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 , 92 S.Ct. 2182 , 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972).

2017As the juvenile court noted in its judgment, “time passes faster for a youth than an adult,” and “[j]uvenile court proceedings are intended to afford swift resolution of alleged juvenile misconduct free of the lengthy delays that seem to ensnare adult criminal matters.” In order to determine if there has been a speedy trial violation, the Louisiana Supreme Court has adopted a four-part test set out by the United States | ^Supreme Court in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 , 92 S.Ct. 2182 , 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972).

2014Id. 2000-3347, p. 16, 847 So.2d at 1210 (citing United States v. Avalos, 541 F.2d 1100, 1111 (5th Cir.1976)).

2012Love , 00-3347, p. 16, 847 So.2d at 1210 .

2009Thus, as we recognized in Beavers v. Haubert, ... [ 198 U.S. 77 , 25 S.Ct. 573 , 49 L.Ed. 950 (1905)], any inquiry into a speedy trial claim necessitates a functional analysis of the right in the particular context of the case: “The right of a speedy trial is necessarily relative.

2009Thus, as we recognized in Beavers v. Haubert, ... [ 198 U.S. 77 , 25 S.Ct. 573 , 49 L.Ed. 950 (1905)], any inquiry into a speedy trial claim necessitates a functional analysis of the right in the particular context of the case: “The right of a speedy trial is necessarily relative.

2025This Court has further explained that “[t]he two are not equivalent; ‘the question of whether a speedy trial violation is statutory or constitutional involves wholly separate inquiries.” Id. (quoting Sorden, 2009-1416, p. 7, 45 So.3d at 186 ).

2025This Court has further explained that “[t]he two are not equivalent; ‘the question of whether a speedy trial violation is statutory or constitutional involves wholly separate inquiries.” Id. (quoting Sorden, 2009-1416, p. 7, 45 So.3d at 186 ).

2025Id., 2010-2638, p. 8, 60 So. 3d at 620 . 8 In State v. Batiste, the State dismissed and reinstituted the charges without seeking a continuance when the victim did not appear for trial. 2005-1571, p. 8 (La. 10/17/06), 939 So. 2d 1245, 1251 .

2025Under the circumstances presented in Batiste, this court found that “there was a legitimate reason for the nolle prosequi in this case,” and “the record reveals no intentional delay on the State’s part for the purpose of gaining a tactical advantage.” Batiste, 05-1571, p. 6-7, 939 So.2d at 1249-50 .

2012In Alfred, 337 So.2d at 1057 , the supreme court discussed the remedy for a speedy trial violation as follows: The amorphous quality of the right to a speedy trial leads to the unsatisfactorily severe remedy of dismissal of the indictment when the right has been deprived.

1983In State v. Alfred, 337 So.2d 1049 (La.1976), the Supreme Court adopted the flexible approach espoused in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 , 92 S.Ct. 2182 , 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972) to examine a speedy trial claim.

2025Id., 2010-2638, p. 8, 60 So. 3d at 620 . 8 In State v. Batiste, the State dismissed and reinstituted the charges without seeking a continuance when the victim did not appear for trial. 2005-1571, p. 8 (La. 10/17/06), 939 So. 2d 1245, 1251 .

2012The State further argues that Ms. Brown failed to establish a speedy trial violation. |flThe district court’s first reason for granting the motion to quash was its dislike of the State’s exercise of its dismissal-reinstitution authority to grant itself a continuance: “the idea the State can give itself a continuance, but the Defense can’t.” The Louisiana Supreme Court in King, supra, rejected similar reasoning given by the district court as its basis for granting a motion to quash.

2019C.Cr.P. art. 701(D)(3) ; State v. Green , 01-3358, p. 5 (La. 2/1/02), 808 So.2d 318 , 321 ("[T]here is a day for day reduction of the statutory period for a speedy trial when the defense acquiesces to time delays.").

2019C.Cr.P. art. 701(D)(3) ; State v. Green , 01-3358, p. 5 (La. 2/1/02), 808 So.2d 318 , 321 ("[T]here is a day for day reduction of the statutory period for a speedy trial when the defense acquiesces to time delays.").

2016Id. at 652 , 112 S.Ct. at 2691 . .

2016Id. at 652 , 112 S.Ct. at 2691 . .

2025Moreover, we do not find that the State’s behavior rises to the level of tactical manipulation 4 Mr. Smith stated in his Motion to Quash, “[i]f trial had proceeded on November 20, 2023, the State of Louisiana would not have entered a Certified Conviction Packet into evidence [and] would not have been able to elicit testimony and evidence necessary to prove their case.” 5 The Hayes court reasoned, “[t]hat alone suggests that Mr. Hayes’ pretrial incarceration has not been oppressively lengthy to cause prejudice to his defense which would result in dismissal with prejudice.” 2010-1538, p. 16, 75

2023App. 4 Cir. 3/19/14), 138 So. 3d 92, 97 .

2020Id. 10 We have previously discussed that Rachal’s allegation of a speedy trial violation lacks merit.

2017State v. James, 394 So.2d 1197 (La. 1981); State v. Reaves, 376 So.2d 136 (La. 1979).

2015Gordon, 896 So.2d at 1062 .

2013Accordingly, the defendant has not demonstrated specific prejudice to his defense pursuant to Ervin , 08-1078, p. 8, 9 So.3d at 309 . .

2013Additionally, |sthe state addressed the merits of a speedy trial claim in its appellate brief. 2 See Mathews, 12-0182, pp. 9-10, 109 So.3d at 991 .

2013Therefore, as in Mathews , we find that the state “waived any claim it may have that the trial court could not consider [the speedy trial] issue.” Id.

2012State v. Cyrex, 97-2520 (La.App. 1 Cir. 9/25/98) , 746 So.2d 1 .

2012State v. Cyrex, 97-2520 (La.App. 1 Cir. 9/25/98) , 746 So.2d 1 .

2010Although the Supreme Court has stated that assigned counsel is not generally considered a state actor for purposes of a speedy-trial claim, the Court also held that “the general rule attributing to the defendant delay caused by assigned counsel is not absolute.” Brillon, 129 S.Ct. at 1292 .

2009State v. Muhammad, supra. In determining whether habitual offender proceedings are timely, in addition to consideration of the facts and circumstances of the instant case, the relevant speedy trial factors set forth in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 , 92 S.Ct. 2182 , 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972), may also be a consideration: length of the delay, reasons for the delay, defendant’s request for a speedy trial, and prejudice to the accused.

2009State v. Muhammad, supra. In the instant case, defendant was initially sentenced on September 22, 2006, to 10 years at hard labor following the jury’s verdict.

2007In State v. Barnes, 94-1411 (La.App. 4 Cir. 12/28/94) , 648 So.2d 480, 482 , we reasoned as follows: Denial of the right to a speedy trial is not one of the grounds listed in C.Cr.P. art. 532 for a motion to quash.

2006State v. Thomas, 04-2805 (La.App. 1st Cir.2/15/06), 928 So.2d 649 (Whipple, J., dissenting).

1996In State v. White, 247 La. 19 , 169 So.2d 894 (La.1964), the supreme court held that a motion to quash was not the proper method for alleging a speedy trial violation.

1996In State v. White, 247 La. 19 , 169 So.2d 894 (La.1964), the supreme court held that a motion to quash was not the proper method for alleging a speedy trial violation.

1991Barker v. Wingo, supra; State v. Foat, supra. The principles to be considered in an analysis of the speedy trial right were quoted by this court in State v. Foat, supra at 1149: In the first place, "[t]he amorphous quality of the right ... leads to the unsatisfactorily severe remedy of dismissal of the indictment when the right has been deprived.

1991Barker v. Wingo, supra; State v. Foat, supra. The principles to be considered in an analysis of the speedy trial right were quoted by this court in State v. Foat, supra at 1149: In the first place, "[t]he amorphous quality of the right ... leads to the unsatisfactorily severe remedy of dismissal of the indictment when the right has been deprived.

1988United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307 , 92 S.Ct. 445 , 30 L.Ed.2d 468 (1971); United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783 , 97 S.Ct. 2044 , 52 L.Ed.2d 752 (1977).

1988United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307 , 92 S.Ct. 445 , 30 L.Ed.2d 468 (1971); United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783 , 97 S.Ct. 2044 , 52 L.Ed.2d 752 (1977).