speedy trial violation in Arizona

2017See Granados, 172 Ariz. at 407 ; see also Garcia, 170 Ariz. at 248 (court must make a “reasoned finding” regarding the interests of justice); cf. State v. Vasko, 193 Ariz. 142, 147, ¶ 22 (App. 1998) (noting that, in the related context of a speedy trial violation, assessing prejudice turns on “whether defendant has shown that his defense has been harmed by the delay; it is not sufficient for a defendant to contend that the state may not have made its case had the trial proceeded without the continuance”). ¶25 The superior court’s only stated basis for its ruling was the State’s prior request t

2017A speedy trial violation is only prejudicial when the defendant can show “that his defense has been harmed by the delay.” Id.

2024We look at four factors to determine whether a speedy trial violation occurred: “[l]ength of delay, the reason for the delay, the defendant’s assertion of his right, and prejudice to the defendant.” Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 , 530–33 (1972); State v. Schaaf, 169 Ariz. 323, 327 (1991).

2021The right to a speedy trial is designed to “prevent oppressive pretrial incarceration,” “to minimize anxiety and concern of the accused,” and “to limit the possibility that the defense will be impaired.” Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 532 (1972). ¶9 We review the superior court’s denial of a motion to dismiss an indictment based on a speedy trial violation for an abuse of discretion.

2026“Simply to trigger a speedy trial analysis, an accused must allege that the interval between accusation and trial has crossed the threshold dividing ordinary from ‘presumptively prejudicial’ delay, since, by definition, he cannot complain that the government has denied him a ‘speedy’ trial if it has, in fact, prosecuted his case with customary promptness.” Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647 , 651–52 (1992) (citation modified).

2016Although we recognize that “uncertainty and anxiety” may be considered prejudicial in the context of a speedy trial violation, Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647, 654 (1992), Sales does not specify the uncertainty and anxiety that the delayed trial caused him to suffer.

2022State v. Vasko, 193 Ariz. 142, 143, ¶ 3 (App. 1998). ¶17 In contrast, neither the Arizona Constitution nor the United States Constitution impose a specific time limit, Spreitz, 190 Ariz. at 139 (citations omitted), and courts instead examine “(1) the length of the delay; (2) the reason for the delay; (3) whether the defendant has demanded a speedy trial; and (4) the prejudice to the defendant,” State v. Lukezic, 143 Ariz. 60, 69 (1984) (citing Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530 (1972)).

2020State v. Parker, 231 Ariz. 391 , 398 ¶ 9 (2013) (citing Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530 (1972)). “[T]he length of the delay is the least important 4 STATE v. COTA Decision of the Court [factor], while the prejudice to defendant is the most significant.” State v. Spreitz, 190 Ariz. 129, 139-40 (1997). ¶12 The State concedes the nearly three-and-a-half-year delay between the original indictment and trial, is “presumptive[ly] prejudice[ial],” triggering Barker.

2024See State v. Wassenaar, 215 Ariz. 565, 571, ¶ 18 (App. 2007) (including prejudice as the most important of four factors for a constitutional speedy trial violation).

2021State v. Wassenaar, 215 Ariz. 565, 571, ¶ 16 (App. 2007).

2024We look at four factors to determine whether a speedy trial violation occurred: “[l]ength of delay, the reason for the delay, the defendant’s assertion of his right, and prejudice to the defendant.” Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 , 530–33 (1972); State v. Schaaf, 169 Ariz. 323, 327 (1991).

1993See Burkett v. Fulcomer (Burkett II), 951 F.2d 1431, 1438 (3rd Cir.1991), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 3055 , 120 L.Ed.2d 921 (1992); Martinez, 837 F.2d at 867 ; Burkett I, 826 F.2d at 1219 ; Perez, 793 F.2d at 253-54 ; United States v. Williams, 782 F.2d 1462, 1465 (9th Cir.1985); see also State v. Schaaf, 169 Ariz. 323, 327 , 819 P.2d 909, 913 (1991) (Arizona Supreme Court applies the standard found in Barker v. Wingo to analyze a speedy trial claim). *115 The Barker test requires the court to consider: “[l]ength of delay, the reason for the delay, the defendant’s assertion of his right

2020State v. Parker, 231 Ariz. 391 , 398 ¶ 9 (2013) (citing Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530 (1972)). “[T]he length of the delay is the least important 4 STATE v. COTA Decision of the Court [factor], while the prejudice to defendant is the most significant.” State v. Spreitz, 190 Ariz. 129, 139-40 (1997). ¶12 The State concedes the nearly three-and-a-half-year delay between the original indictment and trial, is “presumptive[ly] prejudice[ial],” triggering Barker.

2017Parker, 231 Ariz. at 399, ¶ 16 . ¶29 As the pre-trial delay approaches one year, the delay is considered “presumptively prejudicial,” that is, unreasonable enough to trigger a speedy trial analysis.

2022Cf. Roe, 528 U.S. at 486 (evidence that a defendant expressed some interest in appealing “alone is insufficient to establish that, had the defendant received reasonable advice from counsel about the appeal, he would have instructed his counsel to file an appeal”).

2022Nevertheless, the merits of Neidig’s speedy-trial claim are relevant to determining prejudice because the viability of the claim informs whether it was “rational” for him to reject the plea offer, Padilla, 559 U.S. at 372 , after receiving “reasonable advice from counsel” about the speedy-trial issue, Roe, 528 U.S. at 486 . ¶16 Here, the superior court analyzed Neidig’s potential speedy- trial claim under both Rule 8 and constitutional precedents and concluded it lacked validity.

2022State v. Vasko, 193 Ariz. 142, 143, ¶ 3 (App. 1998). ¶17 In contrast, neither the Arizona Constitution nor the United States Constitution impose a specific time limit, Spreitz, 190 Ariz. at 139 (citations omitted), and courts instead examine “(1) the length of the delay; (2) the reason for the delay; (3) whether the defendant has demanded a speedy trial; and (4) the prejudice to the defendant,” State v. Lukezic, 143 Ariz. 60, 69 (1984) (citing Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530 (1972)).

2020Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530 (1972); see State v. Burkett, 179 Ariz. 109, 114 (App. 1993) (holding that the Barker factors apply equally to a speedy trial claim under the Arizona Constitution).

2017See State v. Henderson, 210 Ariz. 561, 567 , ¶¶ 19–20 (2005). ¶19 Culver has not established that the court abused its discretion by denying his asserted speedy trial violation, and there was no fundamental error from that point forward, particularly in light of Culver’s failure to alert the court to any asserted speedy trial violation.

2017See Granados, 172 Ariz. at 407 ; see also Garcia, 170 Ariz. at 248 (court must make a “reasoned finding” regarding the interests of justice); cf. State v. Vasko, 193 Ariz. 142, 147, ¶ 22 (App. 1998) (noting that, in the related context of a speedy trial violation, assessing prejudice turns on “whether defendant has shown that his defense has been harmed by the delay; it is not sufficient for a defendant to contend that the state may not have made its case had the trial proceeded without the continuance”). ¶25 The superior court’s only stated basis for its ruling was the State’s prior request t

2017See Granados, 172 Ariz. at 407 ; see also Garcia, 170 Ariz. at 248 (court must make a “reasoned finding” regarding the interests of justice); cf. State v. Vasko, 193 Ariz. 142, 147, ¶ 22 (App. 1998) (noting that, in the related context of a speedy trial violation, assessing prejudice turns on “whether defendant has shown that his defense has been harmed by the delay; it is not sufficient for a defendant to contend that the state may not have made its case had the trial proceeded without the continuance”). ¶25 The superior court’s only stated basis for its ruling was the State’s prior request t

2014Cf. State v. Renner, 177 Ariz. 395, 397 , 868 P.2d 978, 980 (App. 1993) (under Rule 1.3, notice of appeal filed 21 days after sentencing was timely because the 20th day fell on a Sunday); State v. Brown, 134 Ariz. 400, 402 , 656 P.2d 1261, 1263 (App. 1982) (relying on Rule 1.3 to hold that where the last day under the speedy trial rule fell on a Saturday, commencing trial the following Monday was appropriate).

2014Cf. State v. Renner, 177 Ariz. 395, 397 , 868 P.2d 978, 980 (App. 1993) (under Rule 1.3, notice of appeal filed 21 days after sentencing was timely because the 20th day fell on a Sunday); State v. Brown, 134 Ariz. 400, 402 , 656 P.2d 1261, 1263 (App. 1982) (relying on Rule 1.3 to hold that where the last day under the speedy trial rule fell on a Saturday, commencing trial the following Monday was appropriate).

2014Cf. State v. Renner, 177 Ariz. 395, 397 , 868 P.2d 978, 980 (App. 1993) (under Rule 1.3, notice of appeal filed 21 days after sentencing was timely because the 20th day fell on a Sunday); State v. Brown, 134 Ariz. 400, 402 , 656 P.2d 1261, 1263 (App. 1982) (relying on Rule 1.3 to hold that where the last day under the speedy trial rule fell on a Saturday, commencing trial the following Monday was appropriate).

2014Cf. State v. Renner, 177 Ariz. 395, 397 , 868 P.2d 978, 980 (App. 1993) (under Rule 1.3, notice of appeal filed 21 days after sentencing was timely because the 20th day fell on a Sunday); State v. Brown, 134 Ariz. 400, 402 , 656 P.2d 1261, 1263 (App. 1982) (relying on Rule 1.3 to hold that where the last day under the speedy trial rule fell on a Saturday, commencing trial the following Monday was appropriate).

2013State v. Smith, 215 Ariz. 221, 233, ¶ 57 , 159 P.3d 531, 543 (2007). ¶ 9 The Sixth Amendment’s guarantee of a speedy trial protects a defendant’s right to be brought to trial without undue delay.

2013State v. Smith, 215 Ariz. 221, 233, ¶ 57 , 159 P.3d 531, 543 (2007). ¶ 9 The Sixth Amendment’s guarantee of a speedy trial protects a defendant’s right to be brought to trial without undue delay.

2012Cf. State v. Brady, 105 Ariz. 190, 196 , 461 P.2d 488, 494 (1969) (in a speedy trial analysis in a criminal ease, the threshold test for proving prejudice is whether there was reasonable probability that a different result might have occurred had there been no inappropriate delay). ¶ 26 Father asserts that the dependency action caused “trauma” based on the “forced separation” of parent and child.

2012Cf. State v. Brady, 105 Ariz. 190, 196 , 461 P.2d 488, 494 (1969) (in a speedy trial analysis in a criminal ease, the threshold test for proving prejudice is whether there was reasonable probability that a different result might have occurred had there been no inappropriate delay). ¶ 26 Father asserts that the dependency action caused “trauma” based on the “forced separation” of parent and child.

2007Once there has been a conviction, the defendant has been sentenced, and he has appealed, the trial court has no need or authority to proceed any further. *234 Id. at 415-16 , 586 P.2d at 976-77 (quoting State v. Ames, 249 La. 685 , 190 So.2d 223, 227 (1966)).

2007Once there has been a conviction, the defendant has been sentenced, and he has appealed, the trial court has no need or authority to proceed any further. *234 Id. at 415-16 , 586 P.2d at 976-77 (quoting State v. Ames, 249 La. 685 , 190 So.2d 223, 227 (1966)).

2007B ¶ 60 We reject Smith’s argument that the relevant delay, for purposes of the speedy trial analysis, is twenty-seven years. “[W]e ... do not believe that the period of time between notice of appeal and retrial upon reversal can be counted as part of the time to be considered in a constitutional denial of a defendant’s right to speedy trial.” State v. Ward, 120 Ariz. 413, 416 , 586 P.2d 974, 977 (1978).

2007B ¶ 60 We reject Smith’s argument that the relevant delay, for purposes of the speedy trial analysis, is twenty-seven years. “[W]e ... do not believe that the period of time between notice of appeal and retrial upon reversal can be counted as part of the time to be considered in a constitutional denial of a defendant’s right to speedy trial.” State v. Ward, 120 Ariz. 413, 416 , 586 P.2d 974, 977 (1978).

2007We do the same today. ¶ 59 In addressing Smith’s speedy trial claim we must assess the “[l]ength of delay, the reason for the delay, the defendant’s assertion of his right, and prejudice to the defendant.” Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530 , 92 S.Ct. 2182 , 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972); see also State v. Brannin, 109 Ariz. 525, 528-29 , 514 P.2d 446, 449-50 (1973) (applying the Barker factors to analyze a speedy trial claim).

2007We do the same today. ¶ 59 In addressing Smith’s speedy trial claim we must assess the “[l]ength of delay, the reason for the delay, the defendant’s assertion of his right, and prejudice to the defendant.” Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530 , 92 S.Ct. 2182 , 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972); see also State v. Brannin, 109 Ariz. 525, 528-29 , 514 P.2d 446, 449-50 (1973) (applying the Barker factors to analyze a speedy trial claim).

2005This speedy trial exception was “intended by Congress to be ‘rarely used,’ and ... is ‘not a general exclusion for every delay.’ ” United States v. Clymer, 25 F.3d 824, 828 (9th Cir.1994) (quoting United States v. Jordan, 915 F.2d 563, 565 (9th Cir.1990)).

2005It “is not to be routinely applied, and ... it may not be invoked in such a way as to circumvent the time limitations set forth in the Act.” Clymer, 25 F.3d at 829 .

2005This speedy trial exception was “intended by Congress to be ‘rarely used,’ and ... is ‘not a general exclusion for every delay.’ ” United States v. Clymer, 25 F.3d 824, 828 (9th Cir.1994) (quoting United States v. Jordan, 915 F.2d 563, 565 (9th Cir.1990)).

1998However, as our supreme court has recently stated, in cases "where an appeal makes no sense," "a party must seek relief by special action," to be entitled to relief from an error involving "a rule-driven `matter *195 of grace.'" Taliaferro v. Taliaferro, 186 Ariz. 221, 223 , 921 P.2d 21, 23 (1996). ¶ 25 We emphasize that the purpose of Rule 8.6 is to afford a defendant relief from a speedy trial violation before his untimely trial.

1998However, as our supreme court has recently stated, in cases "where an appeal makes no sense," "a party must seek relief by special action," to be entitled to relief from an error involving "a rule-driven `matter *195 of grace.'" Taliaferro v. Taliaferro, 186 Ariz. 221, 223 , 921 P.2d 21, 23 (1996). ¶ 25 We emphasize that the purpose of Rule 8.6 is to afford a defendant relief from a speedy trial violation before his untimely trial.

1998State v. Kasten, 170 Ariz. 224, 226-27 , 823 P.2d 91, 93-94 (App.1991); State v. Zuck, 134 Ariz. 509, 514-15 , 658 P.2d 162, 167-68 (1982).

1998State v. Kasten, 170 Ariz. 224, 226-27 , 823 P.2d 91, 93-94 (App.1991); State v. Zuck, 134 Ariz. 509, 514-15 , 658 P.2d 162, 167-68 (1982).