speedy trial violation in Missouri

2025For his part, Williams relies on Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647, 655-8 (1992), for the notion that a speedy trial violation may exist even when specific prejudice is not shown.

2020The United States Supreme Court, in Doggett v. U.S., 505 U.S. 647, 656 (1992), states that if the government uses "reasonable diligence," the defendant's speedy-trial claim should fail "so long as [the defendant] could not show specific prejudice to his defense." An extraordinarily long delay due to the government's negligence, however, did not require a showing of particularized prejudice by the defendant.

2023Because he failed to do both, he is 2 asking this Court to find that the trial court plainly erred in failing to sua sponte dismiss with prejudice the amended information. “[A] trial judge does not have the inherent authority to dismiss a case with prejudice for failure to prosecute in the absence of a speedy trial violation.” State v. Jones, 530 S.W.3d 525, 533 (Mo.App. 2017) (quoting State v. Honeycutt, 96 S.W.3d 85, 89 (Mo. banc 2003)).

2017See State v. Honeycutt, 96 S.W.3d 85, 89 (Mo. banc 2003) (“[A] trial judge does not have the inherent authority to dismiss a ease with, prejudice for failure to prosecute in the absence of:a speedy trial violation.”) (emphasis in original).

2012“Thus, if [a defendant] fails to meet the speedy trial standard of the Sixth Amendment, then a fortiori, he would be unable to meet the more stringent requirements under the Due Process Clause.” Id.) See also State v. Allen, 641 S.W.2d 471, 475 (Mo.App.

1983“In reviewing the defendant’s speedy trial claim, we count only those days after arraignment on the final charge; we do not consider the time that elapsed in connection with the nolle pressed charge.” State v. Jackson, 645 S.W.2d at 729 , (emphasis added). 1 See also State v. Allen, 641 S.W.2d 471, 475 (Mo.App.1982).

2022“To require reversal, any claimed prejudice resulting from delay must be actual prejudice apparent on the record or by reasonable inference.” Id. (quoting State v. Darnell, 858 S.W.2d 739, 746 (Mo. App. W.D. 1993)).

1994Referring to this factor as “the most important factor in the speedy trial analysis”, the court, in State v. Darnell, 858 S.W.2d at 745-746 , said: “This factor is assessed in light of the interests protected by the speedy trial right: (1) prevention of oppressive pretrial imprisonment, (2) minimization of the defendant’s anxiety and concern, and (3) limitation of the possible impairment of the de-fense_ The most important of these interests is the last — whether the delay has prejudiced the defendant’s ability to make a defense.” “The failure to present evidence of actual prejudice weighs hea

2007Bolin, 643 S.W.2d at 813 (“the protections of the speedy trial provisions attach when there is a formal indictment or information or when actual restraints [are] imposed by arrest and holding to answer a criminal charge”) (internal quotations omitted); United States v. MacDonald, 456 U.S. 1, 6 , 102 S.Ct. 1497 , 71 L.Ed.2d 696 (1982) (“In addition to the period after indictment, the period between arrest and indictment must be considered in evaluating a Speedy Trial Clause claim”).

2007Bolin, 643 S.W.2d at 813 (“the protections of the speedy trial provisions attach when there is a formal indictment or information or when actual restraints [are] imposed by arrest and holding to answer a criminal charge”) (internal quotations omitted); United States v. MacDonald, 456 U.S. 1, 6 , 102 S.Ct. 1497 , 71 L.Ed.2d 696 (1982) (“In addition to the period after indictment, the period between arrest and indictment must be considered in evaluating a Speedy Trial Clause claim”).

2023State v. Greenlee, 327 S.W.3d 602, 612 (Mo. App. E.D. 2010) (internal citation omitted). 15 Delays attributable to the defendant weigh heavily against the defendant in a speedy trial analysis.

2023Id. (internal quotation omitted).

2013The speedy-trial analysis is a balancing process that involves weighing the following four factors: “ ‘length of delay, the reason for the delay, the defendant’s assertion of his right, and prejudice to the defendant.’ ” State v. Buchli, 152 S.W.3d 289, 307 (Mo.App.

2008See US. v. MacDonald, 456 U.S. 1, 8-11 , 102 S.Ct. 1497 , 71 L.Ed.2d 696 (1982); State v. Buchli, 152 S.W.3d 289, 308 (Mo.App.2004). 6 .

2023Movant is correct, “no one factor, including actual prejudice, is necessary to find a speedy trial violation.” Sisco, 458 S.W.3d at 318 (quoting Barker, 407 U.S. at 533 ).

2022After subtracting the 86 days attributable to continuances requested by Summers, the overall delay was approximately eleven months, which is sufficient to trigger a full speedy trial analysis. 7 “Closely related to length of delay is the reason the government assigns to justify the delay.” Barker, 407 U.S. at 531 .

2023Movant is correct, “no one factor, including actual prejudice, is necessary to find a speedy trial violation.” Sisco, 458 S.W.3d at 318 (quoting Barker, 407 U.S. at 533 ).

2019State v. Sisco, 458 S.W.3d 304, 312-313 (Mo. banc 2015).4 We therefore review 3 The constitutional right to a speedy trial is also codified in section 545.780. 4 Sisco acknowledged that prior cases have held that the standard of review of a trial court's ruling on a motion to dismiss alleging a speedy trial violation is for an abuse of discretion, but ultimately found that as with other constitutional rights, determining whether there has been a speedy trial violation is an issue of law entitled to de novo review. 458 S.W.3d at 312-13 . 5 the trial court's decision to deny Juniel's motion to d

2019"The right to a speedy trial is provided by the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution and article I, section 18(a) of the Missouri Constitution." Id. at 313 (citing State v. Taylor, 298 S.W.3d 482, 504 (Mo. banc 2009)).

2012The State’s brief points out that “the appellate courts have applied the various factors in the speedy trial analysis without setting forth any standard of review.” See, e.g., Taylor, 298 S.W.3d at 504 ; State v. Atchison, 258 S.W.3d 914, 919-20 (Mo.App.

2011See also Harrison, 392 U.S. at 221 n. 4, 88 S.Ct. 2008 .

1979Cases such as Harrison v. United States, 392 U.S. 219 , 88 S.Ct. 2008 , 20 L.Ed.2d 1047 (1968) (eight years from indictment to trial) are not in point for there had been an earlier trial.

2011State v. Nelson, 719 S.W.2d 13, 19 (Mo.App.1986) (citing Barker, 407 U.S. at 526 , 92 S.Ct. 2182 ).

1993Id.

1989State v. Jackson, 645 S.W.2d 725, 728 (Mo.App., E.D.1982); State v. Allen, 641 S.W.2d 471, 475 (Mo.App., E.D.1982).

1983“In reviewing the defendant’s speedy trial claim, we count only those days after arraignment on the final charge; we do not consider the time that elapsed in connection with the nolle pressed charge.” State v. Jackson, 645 S.W.2d at 729 , (emphasis added). 1 See also State v. Allen, 641 S.W.2d 471, 475 (Mo.App.1982).

1983He points to the language in Avalos that “[t]o fail to measure the speedy trial period from initial arrest would allow the government to circumvent the speedy trial requirement by successively dismissing and reinstituting a complaint or indictment for the same offense,” id., which he argues occurred in the present case.

1979Those Courts who have included the period between a dismissal and a second arrest as part of the protected period have done so for the stated reason that failure to include this period “would allow the government to circumvent the speedy trial requirement by successively dismissing and reinstituting a complaint or indictment for the same offense”, United States v. Avalos, 541 F.2d 1100, 1108-1109, fn.13 , (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 970 , 97 S.Ct. 1656 , 52 L.Ed.2d 363 (1977), or that during this intervening quiescent period, the defendant may still suffer from the harms protected

2023See also State v. Oliver, 655 S.W.3d 407 , 412 (Mo.App. 2022) (“In cases where the defendant has failed to preserve the speedy trial issue by failing to file a motion to dismiss or failing to include the speedy trial issue in a motion for new trial, and where the argument on appeal is that the trial court failed to sua sponte dismiss the charges, we have found plain error review appropriate.”) (citing Jones, 530 S.W.3d at 533 ; State v. Drudge, 296 S.W.3d 37, 42 (Mo.App. 2009)).

2023Because he failed to do both, he is 2 asking this Court to find that the trial court plainly erred in failing to sua sponte dismiss with prejudice the amended information. “[A] trial judge does not have the inherent authority to dismiss a case with prejudice for failure to prosecute in the absence of a speedy trial violation.” State v. Jones, 530 S.W.3d 525, 533 (Mo.App. 2017) (quoting State v. Honeycutt, 96 S.W.3d 85, 89 (Mo. banc 2003)).

2023See also State v. Oliver, 655 S.W.3d 407 , 412 (Mo.App. 2022) (“In cases where the defendant has failed to preserve the speedy trial issue by failing to file a motion to dismiss or failing to include the speedy trial issue in a motion for new trial, and where the argument on appeal is that the trial court failed to sua sponte dismiss the charges, we have found plain error review appropriate.”) (citing Jones, 530 S.W.3d at 533 ; State v. Drudge, 296 S.W.3d 37, 42 (Mo.App. 2009)).

2022As to the final factor, “[w]hether defendant was prejudiced by any delay in going to trial is the most important factor in the speedy trial analysis.” State v. Williams, 34 S.W.3d 440, 447 (Mo. App. S.D. 2001).

2022“To require reversal, any claimed prejudice resulting from delay must be actual prejudice apparent on the record or by reasonable inference.” Id. (quoting State v. Darnell, 858 S.W.2d 739, 746 (Mo. App. W.D. 1993)).

2022This latter inquiry ‘“is significant to the speedy trial analysis because, as we discuss below, the presumption that pretrial delay has prejudiced the accused intensifies over time.”’ State v. Fisher, 509 S.W.3d 747, 752 (Mo.App.

2018See State v. Pate , 469 S.W.3d 904 , 909 (Mo.App. 2015).

2017Cf. Litherland, 477 S.W.3d at 164-65 (stating that the trial court abused its discretion by denying the defendant’s request for a continuance when a key witness was temporarily unavailable); State v. Simino, 397 S.W.3d 11, 22 (Mo. App. S.D. 2013) (stating that, in the context of a speedy-trial analysis, “a delay due to an unavailable witness is a valid delay” justifying a continuance).