speedy trial violation in Illinois

2026See Phipps, 238 Ill. 2d at 65 (“Counsel’s failure to assert a speedy-trial violation cannot establish 18 No. 1-23-1754 either prong of an ineffective assistance claim if there is no lawful basis for raising a speedy-trial objection.”).

2026“Counsel’s failure to assert a speedy-trial violation cannot establish either prong of an ineffective assistance claim if there is no lawful basis for raising a speedy-trial objection.” People v. Phipps, 238 Ill. 2d 54, 65 (2010).

2026Failure to satisfy either prong “precludes a finding of ineffective assistance of counsel.” Id. ¶ 65 “The failure of counsel to argue a speedy-trial violation cannot satisfy either prong of Strickland where there is no lawful basis for arguing a speedy-trial violation.” People v. Cordell, 223 Ill. 2d 380, 385 (2006).

2023“The failure of counsel to argue a speedy-trial violation cannot satisfy either prong of Strickland where there is no lawful basis for arguing a speedy-trial violation.” People v. Cordell, 223 Ill. 2d 380, 385 (2006).

2024Because “a certain amount of delay is inevitable and wholly justifiable [citation], a speedy-trial inquiry will not be triggered unless the complained-of delay crosses the threshold from ordinary to presumptively prejudicial.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Crane, 195 Ill. 2d at 52 .

2023Because “a certain amount of delay is ‘inevitable and wholly justifiable’ [citation], a speedy-trial inquiry will not be triggered unless the complained-of delay crosses the threshold from ordinary to ‘ “presumptively prejudicial.” ’ [Citations.]” Crane, 195 Ill. 2d at 52 .

2024People v. Staten, 159 Ill. 2d 419, 431 (1994). ¶ 33 “Counsel’s failure to assert a speedy-trial violation cannot establish either prong of an ineffective assistance claim if there is no lawful basis for raising a speedy-trial objection,” so “we must first determine whether defendant’s right to a speedy trial was violated.” People v. Phipps, 238 Ill. 2d 54, 65 (2010).

2024People v. Staten, 159 Ill. 2d 419, 431 (1994). ¶ 34 “Counsel’s failure to assert a speedy-trial violation cannot establish either prong of an ineffective assistance claim if there is no lawful basis for raising a speedy-trial objection,” so “we must first determine whether defendant’s right to a speedy trial was violated.” People v. Phipps, 238 Ill. 2d 54, 65 (2010).

2013App. 3d 632, 636 (2002)), and the defendant bears the burden of affirmatively establishing a speedy trial violation by showing that the delay was not attributable to him or her (People v. Cooksey, 309 Ill.

2004App. 3d 632, 636 (2002)), and the defendant bears the burden of affirmatively establishing a speedy-trial violation by showing that the delay was not attributable to his own conduct (Cooksey, 309 Ill.

2022The speedy trial rule provides, in pertinent part, that every defendant in custody in this State for an 8 alleged offense shall be tried by the court having jurisdiction within 120 days from the date he or she was taken into custody unless delay is occasioned by the defendant. 725 ILCS 5/103-5(a) (West 2018); People v. Hall, 194 Ill. 2d 305, 326 (2000).

2021“A defendant not tried within the statutory period must be released from custody and is entitled to have the charges dismissed.” People v. Hall, 194 Ill. 2d 305, 327 (2000); 725 ILCS 5/103-5(d) (West 2016). ¶ 13 Where defense counsel fails to bring a speedy trial violation to the attention of the court in the form of a motion to dismiss charges, counsel renders constitutionally ineffective assistance.

2025“Counsel's failure to assert a speedy-trial violation cannot establish either prong of an ineffective assistance claim if no speedy-trial violation occurred.” People v. Staake, 2017 IL 121755, ¶ 47 .

2024The argument was raised in both People v. Staake, 2017 IL 121755 , and People v. Hartfield, 2022 IL 126729 , but this court found no error occurred in either case and, therefore, did not reach the issue. ¶ 31 This court did discuss section 103-5 in People v. Pearson, 88 Ill. 2d 210 (1981), in the context of whether a speedy trial violation may be raised for the first time in a posttrial motion.

2025However, a defendant bears the burden of affirmatively establishing a speedy-trial violation. 7 People v. Kliner, 185 Ill. 2d 81, 114 (1998).

2022Delay shall be considered to be agreed to by the defendant unless he or she objects to the delay by making a written demand for trial or an oral demand for trial on the record.” ¶ 49 The supreme court has explained section 103-5(a)’s concept of “delay” as follows: “A defense counsel’s express agreement to a continuance may be considered an affirmative act contributing to a delay which is attributable to the defendant. [Citation.] The defendant bears the burden of affirmatively establishing a speedy-trial violation, and in making his proof, the defendant must show that the delay was not attribu

2025Specifically, he argues “trial counsel was ineffective because, though he objected to each of the State’s motions to continue, he failed to 14 raise the speedy-trial violation in a posttrial motion.” To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must establish both deficient performance and prejudice under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).

2022Under the procedural posture of this case, defendant acknowledges that he did not properly preserve the speedy-trial issue for review but requests that we review the purported error as either ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to file a timely motion raising the speedy-trial violation or, alternatively, as second- prong plain error. ¶ 19 To determine whether a defendant was denied the effective assistance of counsel, we apply the two-pronged test developed by the United States Supreme Court in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), and adopted by this court in People v. Alba

2022The speedy-trial analysis “becomes more complicated when [the] defendant is charged with multiple, but factually related, offenses at different times.” People v. Williams, 204 Ill. 2d 191, 198 , 788 N.E.2d 1126, 1131 (2003).

2022The speedy-trial analysis “becomes more complicated when [the] defendant is charged with multiple, but factually related, offenses at different times.” People v. Williams, 204 Ill. 2d 191, 198 , 788 N.E.2d 1126, 1131 (2003).

2007Ineffective assistance will be found where counsel failed to move to dismiss based on a speedy trial violation when there is "at least a reasonable probability that the client would have been discharged had a timely motion been filed." People v. Garcia, 251 Ill.App.3d 473, 478-79 , 190 Ill.Dec. 582 , 621 N.E.2d 1035 (1993).

2007Ineffective assistance will be found where counsel failed to move to dismiss based on a speedy trial violation when there is “at least a reasonable probability that the client would have been discharged had a timely motion been filed.” People v. Garcia, 251 Ill.

2015People v. Williams, 299 Ill.

2014People v. Williams, 299 Ill.

2004"In reviewing a speedy-trial claim, examination of both the transcript of proceedings and the common law record is necessary to do justice to both the State and the defendant." Mayo, 198 Ill.2d at 536 , 261 Ill.Dec. 910 , 764 N.E.2d 525 , citing People v. Sojak, 273 Ill.App.3d 579, 582-83 , 210 Ill.Dec. 85 , 652 N.E.2d 1061 (1995).

2004“In reviewing a speedy-trial claim, examination of both the transcript of proceedings and the common law record is necessary to do justice to both the State and the defendant.” Mayo, 198 Ill. 2d at 536 , citing People v. Sojack, 273 Ill.

2025In rejecting the defendant’s argument, the Supreme Court found that “any inquiry into a speedy trial claim necessitates a functional analysis of the right in the particular context of the case.” Id. at 532 .

2023See Camacho, 534 P.3d at 507 (noting pretrial treatment of the mental disorder may facilitate the individual’s release before trial); cf. Barker, 407 U.S. at 532-33 (noting most “jails offer little or no recreational or 29 No. 1-22-0168 rehabilitative programs” and time spent there is “simply dead time”); In re Ellison, 385 P.3d 15 , 29-30 (Kan. 2016) (finding a speedy trial violation, where among other reasons, the respondent, who was jailed for four years while awaiting trial as a sexually violent predator, did not have the opportunity for treatment and release).

2005Ed. 2d at 479 , 92 S. Ct. at 463-64 ; People v. Lawson , 67 Ill. 2d 449, 458 (1977)), it cannot give rise to a speedy-trial claim.

2005Ed. 2d at 479 , 92 S. Ct. at 463-64 ; People v. Lawson, 67 Ill. 2d 449, 458 (1977)), it cannot give rise to a speedy-trial claim.

2025The remedy for a speedy trial violation is the “outright reversal of the conviction or convictions in question.” People v. Isbell, 2020 IL App (3d) 180279, ¶ 13 (citing People v. Beyah, 67 Ill. 2d 423, 429 (1977)); see also 735 ILCS 5/103-5(d) (West 2020) (providing that a defendant not tried in accordance with the statute “shall be discharged from custody or released from the obligations of his bail or recognizance”). ¶ 55 Here, Ms. Plascencia was released on bond pending her trial in this matter.

2023Mooney relied on People v. Beyah, 67 Ill. 2d 423, 426, 428-29 (1977)—which outright reversed a defendant’s conviction where the court improperly attributed a continuance to defendant resulting in a speedy trial violation—to come to the same conclusion regarding an ineffectiveness claim based on the failure to protect defendant’s speedy trial right.

2019The failure of counsel to move for discharge on the basis of a speedy trial violation will constitute ineffective assistance of counsel ‘when there is at least a reasonable probability that the client would have been discharged had a timely motion been -3- 2019 IL App (2d) 170114-U filed and there was no justification for the attorney’s decision not to file a motion.’ ” Id. (quoting People v. Peco, 345 Ill.

2012The failure of counsel to move for discharge on the basis of a speedy trial violation will constitute ineffective assistance of counsel “when there is at least a reasonable probability that the client would have been discharged had a timely motion been filed and there was no justification for the attorney’s decision not to file a motion.” Peco, 345 Ill.

2021Without any limiting principle, defendant’s argument thus amounts to a wholesale abandonment of, rather than a reasoned exception to, the default forfeiture principles that our supreme court has instructed us to enforce. ¶ 82 Defendant also argues that the constitutional issue exception to forfeiture first recognized in Enoch, 122 Ill. 2d at 190 , applies here.

2019Without any limiting principle, defendant’s argument thus amounts to a wholesale abandonment of, rather than a reasoned exception to, the default forfeiture principles that our supreme court has instructed us to enforce. ¶ 82 Defendant also argues that the constitutional-issue exception to forfeiture first recognized in Enoch, 122 Ill. 2d at 190 , applies here.

2001Ed. 2d 520, 531 , 112 S. Ct. 2686, 2693 (1992)), a speedy-trial inquiry will not be triggered unless the complained-of delay crosses the threshold from ordinary to “ ‘presumptively prejudicial.’ ” Doggett, 505 U.S. at 651-52 , 120 L.

2001Ed. 2d 520, 531 , 112 S. Ct. 2686, 2693 (1992)), a speedy-trial inquiry will not be triggered unless the complained-of delay crosses the threshold from ordinary to “ ‘presumptively prejudicial.’ ” Doggett, 505 U.S. at 651-52 , 120 L.

2004"In reviewing a speedy-trial claim, examination of both the transcript of proceedings and the common law record is necessary to do justice to both the State and the defendant." Mayo, 198 Ill.2d at 536 , 261 Ill.Dec. 910 , 764 N.E.2d 525 , citing People v. Sojak, 273 Ill.App.3d 579, 582-83 , 210 Ill.Dec. 85 , 652 N.E.2d 1061 (1995).

2004“In reviewing a speedy-trial claim, examination of both the transcript of proceedings and the common law record is necessary to do justice to both the State and the defendant.” Mayo, 198 Ill. 2d at 536 , citing People v. Sojack, 273 Ill.

2021(Even less did he file a motion to dismiss and a motion to reconsider the denial of that motion, as in People v. Patterson, 392 Ill.

2011Id. at 467-68 . ¶ 19 We, therefore, conclude the trial court erred in finding a speedy trial violation and dismissing defendant’s case. ¶ 20 CONCLUSION ¶ 21 Because we conclude that the speedy trial statute was not violated, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand the cause with instructions to reinstate the charges against defendant and proceed with trial. ¶ 22 Reversed and remanded. -6-

2026People v. Hartfield, 2022 IL 126729, ¶ 96 . ¶5 Following remand, defendant filed a motion to dismiss, alleging a speedy trial violation.

2024The argument was raised in both People v. Staake, 2017 IL 121755 , and People v. Hartfield, 2022 IL 126729 , but this court found no error occurred in either case and, therefore, did not reach the issue. ¶ 31 This court did discuss section 103-5 in People v. Pearson, 88 Ill. 2d 210 (1981), in the context of whether a speedy trial violation may be raised for the first time in a posttrial motion.

2025The remedy for a speedy trial violation is the “outright reversal of the conviction or convictions in question.” People v. Isbell, 2020 IL App (3d) 180279, ¶ 13 (citing People v. Beyah, 67 Ill. 2d 423, 429 (1977)); see also 735 ILCS 5/103-5(d) (West 2020) (providing that a defendant not tried in accordance with the statute “shall be discharged from custody or released from the obligations of his bail or recognizance”). ¶ 55 Here, Ms. Plascencia was released on bond pending her trial in this matter.

2024“The remedy for ineffective assistance in this regard is the same as the remedy for any speedy trial violation found on appeal: outright reversal of the conviction or convictions in question.” People v. Isbell, 2020 IL App (3d) 180279 , ¶ 13. ¶ 26 Section 103-5(a) of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (725 ILCS 5/103-5(a) (West 2022)) says that a defendant who is detained continuously must be tried within 120 days of being taken into custody.

2007My reading of our supreme court’s holdings in People v. Quigley, 183 Ill. 2d 1 , 697 N.E.2d 735 (1998), and People v. Williams, 204 Ill. 2d 191 , is that our analysis of a claim of a speedy trial violation involving charges not pending against the defendant at the time of his arrest or the filing of his written demand for trial must include consideration of “compulsory joinder principles.” At oral argument the State conceded, as it must, that the original charge and the enhanced charge had to be tried jointly.

2007My reading of our supreme court’s holdings in People v. Quigley, 183 Ill. 2d 1 , 697 N.E.2d 735 (1998), and People v. Williams, 204 Ill. 2d 191 , is that our analysis of a claim of a speedy trial violation involving charges not pending against the defendant at the time of his arrest or the filing of his written demand for trial must include consideration of “compulsory joinder principles.” At oral argument the State conceded, as it must, that the original charge and the enhanced charge had to be tried jointly.

2023There also was no ruling on a second pro se motion for appointment of a “ ‘bar association attorney.’ ” Id. at 299 . ¶ 38 When addressing the third factor of the constitutional test for a speedy trial violation— defendant’s assertion of his speedy trial right—the court stated, “a defendant is bound by the actions of his attorney, unless the defendant clearly and convincingly asserts his right to discharge his attorney.” Id. at 297 .

2023There also was no ruling on a second pro se motion for appointment of a “ ‘bar association attorney.’ ” Id. at 299 . ¶ 38 When addressing the third factor of the constitutional test for a speedy trial violation— defendant’s assertion of his speedy trial right—the court stated, “a defendant is bound by the actions of his attorney, unless the defendant clearly and convincingly asserts his right to discharge his attorney.” Id. at 297 .

2021Id. ¶ 77 Here, defendant did not file a motion to dismiss based on the speedy-trial violation he now alleges on appeal.

2019Id. ¶ 77 Here, defendant did not file a motion to dismiss based on the speedy-trial violation he now alleges on appeal.