speedy trial claim in New Hampshire

2022Brooks, 162 N.H. at 581 .

2022Brooks, 162 N.H. at 581.

1990To determine whether a motion to dismiss for lack of speedy trial would have been successful had it been filed by the petitioner’s trial counsel, we analyze the petitioner’s speedy trial claim by applying the four-factor balancing test enunciated in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530-33 (1972).

1988Although the length of time prior to trial is never alone dispositive of a speedy trial claim, see State v. Weitzman, 121 N.H. 83, 86 , 427 A.2d 3, 5 (1981) (thirteen-month delay); see also Barker v. Wingo, supra at 523 (five-year delay), the superior court follows a policy of inquiring into the reasons for delay whenever a felony case remains untried nine months after indictment, State v. Perron, 122 N.H. 941, 951 , 454 A.2d 422, 428 (1982), and we will likewise assume that reaching the nine-month check point signals enough presumptive prejudice to warrant review under the remaining criteria.

2015The State may enter a nolle prosequi on a charge when the evidence will not sustain the charge as alleged, see id., and we have recognized that, for the purposes of a speedy trial analysis, “a valid reason, such as a missing witness, should serve to justify appropriate delay.” Humphrey v. Cunningham, Warden, 133 N.H. 727, 735 (1990) (quotation omitted).

2002These assertions do not amount to the prejudice required under the Barker analysis: the medical examiner testified that it is not uncommon to testify from the report of another medical examiner, and the “dimming of memories alone is insufficient to constitute prejudice for purposes of a speedy trial claim.” Humphrey, 133 N.H. at 736 .

2020The defendant argues that: (1) “excessive delay presumptively compromises the reliability of a trial in ways that neither party can prove or, for that matter, identify,” State v. Locke, 149 N.H. 1, 9 (2002) (addressing 55 month delay from arrest to start of trial); and (2) “the delays and piecemeal presentation of trial evidence [ ] caused [the] memories of parties, including the Court, to be detrimentally affected.” However, we typically require a defendant to demonstrate actual prejudice from a delay to prevail on a speedy trial claim.

2020Instead, he merely asserts a general impediment to memory, but “the dimming of memories alone is insufficient to constitute prejudice for purposes of a speedy trial claim.” Id. at 10 (quotation omitted).

1997See, e.g., State v. Tucker, 132 N.H. 31, 33 , 561 A.2d 1075, 1077-78 (1989).

1997See, e.g., State v. Tucker, 132 N.H. 31, 33 , 561 A.2d 1075, 1077-78 (1989).

1995State v. Quinlan, 122 N.H. 51, 53 , 440 A.2d 13,14 (1982).

1995State v. Quinlan, 122 N.H. 51, 53 , 440 A.2d 13,14 (1982).

1991See State v. Colbath, 130 N.H. 316, 319 , 540 A.2d 1212, 1213 (1988).

1991See State v. Colbath, 130 N.H. 316, 319 , 540 A.2d 1212, 1213 (1988).

1988Although the length of time prior to trial is never alone dispositive of a speedy trial claim, see State v. Weitzman, 121 N.H. 83, 86 , 427 A.2d 3, 5 (1981) (thirteen-month delay); see also Barker v. Wingo, supra at 523 (five-year delay), the superior court follows a policy of inquiring into the reasons for delay whenever a felony case remains untried nine months after indictment, State v. Perron, 122 N.H. 941, 951 , 454 A.2d 422, 428 (1982), and we will likewise assume that reaching the nine-month check point signals enough presumptive prejudice to warrant review under the remaining criteria.

1988Although the length of time prior to trial is never alone dispositive of a speedy trial claim, see State v. Weitzman, 121 N.H. 83, 86 , 427 A.2d 3, 5 (1981) (thirteen-month delay); see also Barker v. Wingo, supra at 523 (five-year delay), the superior court follows a policy of inquiring into the reasons for delay whenever a felony case remains untried nine months after indictment, State v. Perron, 122 N.H. 941, 951 , 454 A.2d 422, 428 (1982), and we will likewise assume that reaching the nine-month check point signals enough presumptive prejudice to warrant review under the remaining criteria.

1988Although the length of time prior to trial is never alone dispositive of a speedy trial claim, see State v. Weitzman, 121 N.H. 83, 86 , 427 A.2d 3, 5 (1981) (thirteen-month delay); see also Barker v. Wingo, supra at 523 (five-year delay), the superior court follows a policy of inquiring into the reasons for delay whenever a felony case remains untried nine months after indictment, State v. Perron, 122 N.H. 941, 951 , 454 A.2d 422, 428 (1982), and we will likewise assume that reaching the nine-month check point signals enough presumptive prejudice to warrant review under the remaining criteria.

1988Although the length of time prior to trial is never alone dispositive of a speedy trial claim, see State v. Weitzman, 121 N.H. 83, 86 , 427 A.2d 3, 5 (1981) (thirteen-month delay); see also Barker v. Wingo, supra at 523 (five-year delay), the superior court follows a policy of inquiring into the reasons for delay whenever a felony case remains untried nine months after indictment, State v. Perron, 122 N.H. 941, 951 , 454 A.2d 422, 428 (1982), and we will likewise assume that reaching the nine-month check point signals enough presumptive prejudice to warrant review under the remaining criteria.

2002Although we typically require a defendant to demonstrate actual prejudice from a delay to prevail on a speedy trial claim, “[w]hen a defendant does not — or cannot — articulate the particular harm caused by delay, we inquire whether the length and reason for the delay weigh so heavily in the defendant’s favor that prejudice need not be specifically demonstrated.” Paone, 142 N.H. at 220 .

1998See State v. Hudson, 119 N.H. 963, 966 , 409 A.2d 1349, 1351 (1979). “[.W]e defer to the trial court’s factual findings unless those findings are clearly erroneous, and consider de novo the court’s conclusions of law in respect to those factual findings.” State v. Paone, 142 N.H. 216, 219 , 697 A.2d 1390, 1392 (1997).

2015The State may enter a nolle prosequi on a charge when the evidence will not sustain the charge as alleged, see id., and we have recognized that, for the purposes of a speedy trial analysis, “a valid reason, such as a missing witness, should serve to justify appropriate delay.” Humphrey v. Cunningham, Warden, 133 N.H. 727, 735 (1990) (quotation omitted).

2015See Allen, 150 N.H. at 292 . 3 Because the nolle prosequi was not entered in bad faith, the time between the 2008 nolle prosequi and the 2012 indictment is excluded from the length of delay for purposes of the speedy trial analysis.

2014Recognizing that the juvenile’s right to the expeditious resolution of alleged delinquency is analogous to an adult offender’s right to a speedy trial, id. at 160, we distinguished the speedy trial principle set forth in State v. Adams, 133 N.H. 818 (1991).

2002The Court noted that “there are important public interests in the process of appellate review,” id. at 313 , and “an interlocutory appeal by the Government ordinarily is a valid reason that justifies delay.” Id. at 815.

2002In United States v. Loud Hawk, 474 U.S. 302, 316 (1986), the United States Supreme Court concluded that delays resulting from interlocutory appeals may be weighed in assessing a speedy trial claim.

2000It is well established that “this court will not consider issues raised on appeal that were not presented in the lower court.” State v. Baird, 133 N.H. 637, 640 , 581 A.2d 1313, 1315 (1990) (quotations omitted).

2000It is well established that “this court will not consider issues raised on appeal that were not presented in the lower court.” State v. Baird, 133 N.H. 637, 640 , 581 A.2d 1313, 1315 (1990) (quotations omitted).

1998See State v. Hudson, 119 N.H. 963, 966 , 409 A.2d 1349, 1351 (1979). “[.W]e defer to the trial court’s factual findings unless those findings are clearly erroneous, and consider de novo the court’s conclusions of law in respect to those factual findings.” State v. Paone, 142 N.H. 216, 219 , 697 A.2d 1390, 1392 (1997).

1998See State v. Hudson, 119 N.H. 963, 966 , 409 A.2d 1349, 1351 (1979). “[.W]e defer to the trial court’s factual findings unless those findings are clearly erroneous, and consider de novo the court’s conclusions of law in respect to those factual findings.” State v. Paone, 142 N.H. 216, 219 , 697 A.2d 1390, 1392 (1997).

1995E.g., State v. Dillard, 718 P.2d 1272, 1281-83 (Idaho Ct. App.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 887 (1986); State v. Jones, 521 N.W.2d 662, 668 (S.D. 1994); see also In Interest of C.T.F., 316 N.W.2d 865, 868 (Iowa 1982).

1995E.g., State v. Dillard, 718 P.2d 1272, 1281-83 (Idaho Ct. App.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 887 (1986); State v. Jones, 521 N.W.2d 662, 668 (S.D. 1994); see also In Interest of C.T.F., 316 N.W.2d 865, 868 (Iowa 1982).

1995E.g., State v. Dillard, 718 P.2d 1272, 1281-83 (Idaho Ct. App.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 887 (1986); State v. Jones, 521 N.W.2d 662, 668 (S.D. 1994); see also In Interest of C.T.F., 316 N.W.2d 865, 868 (Iowa 1982).

1990See State v. Little, 121 N.H. 765, 773 , 435 A.2d 517, 522 (1981).

1990See State v. Little, 121 N.H. 765, 773 , 435 A.2d 517, 522 (1981).

1985That provision is the source of the State’s speedy trial requirement, State v. Langone, 127 N.H. 49, 51 , 498 A.2d 731, 733 (1985); State v. White, 116 N.H. 687, 688 , 366 A.2d 872, 873 (1976), and there are close analogies between considerations that underlie the guarantee of speedy trial and those that support the demand for speedy disposition.

1985That provision is the source of the State’s speedy trial requirement, State v. Langone, 127 N.H. 49, 51 , 498 A.2d 731, 733 (1985); State v. White, 116 N.H. 687, 688 , 366 A.2d 872, 873 (1976), and there are close analogies between considerations that underlie the guarantee of speedy trial and those that support the demand for speedy disposition.

1985That provision is the source of the State’s speedy trial requirement, State v. Langone, 127 N.H. 49, 51 , 498 A.2d 731, 733 (1985); State v. White, 116 N.H. 687, 688 , 366 A.2d 872, 873 (1976), and there are close analogies between considerations that underlie the guarantee of speedy trial and those that support the demand for speedy disposition.

1985That provision is the source of the State’s speedy trial requirement, State v. Langone, 127 N.H. 49, 51 , 498 A.2d 731, 733 (1985); State v. White, 116 N.H. 687, 688 , 366 A.2d 872, 873 (1976), and there are close analogies between considerations that underlie the guarantee of speedy trial and those that support the demand for speedy disposition.

1981When I dissented in State v. Dufield, 119 N.H. 28, 33 , 398 A.2d 818, 821 (1979), I recommended a speedy trial rule.

1981When I dissented in State v. Dufield, 119 N.H. 28, 33 , 398 A.2d 818, 821 (1979), I recommended a speedy trial rule.