speedy trial violation in New Jersey

2026See State v. Long, 119 N.J. 439, 470 (1990) ("Any delay that defendant caused or requested would not weigh in favor of finding a speedy trial violation" (quoting Gallegan, 117 N.J. at 355 )).

2025Moreover, it bears emphasis that "any delay that defendant caused or requested would not weigh in favor of finding a speedy trial violation." State v. Long, 119 N.J. 439, 470 (1990) (quoting State v. Gallegan, 117 N.J. 345, 355 (1989)).

2025The four factors courts must weigh in determining whether there was a Sixth Amendment violation, as announced in Barker, 407 U.S. 514 , are: (1) length of delay, (2) reasons for the delay, (3) assertion of a speedy trial claim, and (4) prejudice to the defendant.

2025Defendant argues the four- factor analysis articulated in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972) establishes a speedy trial violation based on: the twenty-four month delay; the absence of any evidence in the record as a reason for the delay; defendant did not waive her right to a speedy trial, notwithstanding her failure to assert that right; and defendant did not assert prejudice although the violation can be established without evidence of prejudice.

2026See State v. Long, 119 N.J. 439, 470 (1990) ("Any delay that defendant caused or requested would not weigh in favor of finding a speedy trial violation" (quoting Gallegan, 117 N.J. at 355 )).

2025Moreover, it bears emphasis that "any delay that defendant caused or requested would not weigh in favor of finding a speedy trial violation." State v. Long, 119 N.J. 439, 470 (1990) (quoting State v. Gallegan, 117 N.J. 345, 355 (1989)).

2023Doggett, 505 U.S. at 655 ; Cahill, 213 N.J. at 274-75 . "[I]f the other factors weigh heavily enough, a speedy trial violation can be established without an affirmative showing of prejudice to the defendant." Farrell, 320 N.J.

2021"Delay caused or requested by the defendant is not considered to weigh in favor of finding a speedy trial violation." State v. Farrell, 320 N.J.

2022See Szima, 70 N.J. at 202 (rejecting a speedy trial claim in part based on the fact a defendant was not incarcerated during the twenty-two- month delay, and he claimed "no impairment to his ability to defend").

2019Furthermore, although a defendant has no obligation to bring himself to trial, a defendant does have "some responsibility to assert a speedy trial claim" and "failure to assert the right would make it difficult for a defendant to prove that he was denied a speedy trial." Szima, 70 N.J. at 200; see Barker, 407 U.S. at 531-32 .

2022United States v. Claxton, 766 F.3d 280, 294 (3d Cir. 2014) (citing United States v. Battis, 589 F.3d 673, 680 (3d Cir. 2009)); see also State v. Long, 119 N.J. 439, 470 (1990) (holding that "[a]ny delay that defendant caused or requested would not weigh in favor of finding a speedy trial violation" (quoting State v. Gallegan, 117 N.J. 345, 355 (1989))).

2020United States v. Claxton, 766 F.3d 280, 294 (3d Cir. 2014) (citing United States v. Battis, 589 F.3d 673, 680 (3d Cir. 2009)); see also State v. Long, 119 N.J. 439, 470 (1990) (holding that "[a]ny delay that defendant caused or requested would not weigh in favor of finding a speedy trial violation" (quoting State v. Gallegan, 117 N.J. 345, 355 (1989))).

2022United States v. Claxton, 766 F.3d 280, 294 (3d Cir. 2014) (citing United States v. Battis, 589 F.3d 673, 680 (3d Cir. 2009)); see also State v. Long, 119 N.J. 439, 470 (1990) (holding that "[a]ny delay that defendant caused or requested would not weigh in favor of finding a speedy trial violation" (quoting State v. Gallegan, 117 N.J. 345, 355 (1989))).

2020United States v. Claxton, 766 F.3d 280, 294 (3d Cir. 2014) (citing United States v. Battis, 589 F.3d 673, 680 (3d Cir. 2009)); see also State v. Long, 119 N.J. 439, 470 (1990) (holding that "[a]ny delay that defendant caused or requested would not weigh in favor of finding a speedy trial violation" (quoting State v. Gallegan, 117 N.J. 345, 355 (1989))).

2025Turning to the third Barker factor, a defendant's "assertion of [his] right to a speedy trial is measured heavily in the speedy trial analysis." Cahill, 213 N.J. at 274 .

2023In Cahill, the New Jersey Supreme Court rejected the contention that a defendant's failure to inquire about the resolution of a remaining charge or demand disposition until receipt of a trial notice undercut the merits of a speedy trial claim. 213 N.J. at 274 .

2024A-3677-21 9 then moving to withdraw the plea in order to seek advice from an immigration attorney." See State v. Gallegan, 117 N.J. 345, 355 (1989) ("Any delay that defendant caused or requested would not weigh in favor of finding a speedy trial violation." (citing United States v. Loud Hawk, 474 U.S. 302, 316 (1986))).

1990We have held that “[a]ny delay that defendant caused or requested would not weigh in favor of finding a speedy trial violation.” Gallegan, supra, 117 N.J. at 355 , 567 A.2d 204 (citing United States v. Loud Hawk, 474 U.S. 302, 316 , 106 S.Ct. 648, 656 , 88 L.Ed.2d 640, 655 (1986); Barker v. Wingo, supra, 407 U.S. at 529 , 92 S.Ct. at 2191 , 33 L.Ed.2d at 116 ); see also United States v. Jones, 524 F.2d 834, 850 (D.C.Cir.1975) (“A defendant should not be able to take advantage of a delay substantially attributable' to his own trial motions when the court acts upon them within a reasonable perio

2026Determinations regarding an allegation of a speedy trial violation are typically upheld insofar as the PCR court's decision was not "clearly erroneous." Tsetsekas, 411 N.J. Super. at 10 (citing Merlino, 153 N.J. Super. at 17 ).

2019We have held that, in evaluating a speedy trial claim, "[t]here is no set length of time that fixes the point at which delay is excessive." Tsetsekas, 411 N.J.

2009In an analysis of a speedy trial challenge, a trial court must weigh the "`societal right to have the accused tried and punished'" and a defendant's right to be prosecuted "`fairly and not oppressively.'" State v. Dunns, 266 N.J.Super. 349, 380 , 629 A. 2d 922 (App.Div.) (quoting State v. Farmer, 48 N.J. 145, 175 , 224 A. 2d 481 , cert. denied, 386 U.S. 991 , 87 S.Ct. 1305 , 18 L.Ed. 2d 335 (1967)), certif. denied, 134 N.J. 567 , 636 A. 2d 524 (1993).

2009In an analysis of a speedy trial challenge, a trial court must weigh the "`societal right to have the accused tried and punished'" and a defendant's right to be prosecuted "`fairly and not oppressively.'" State v. Dunns, 266 N.J.Super. 349, 380 , 629 A. 2d 922 (App.Div.) (quoting State v. Farmer, 48 N.J. 145, 175 , 224 A. 2d 481 , cert. denied, 386 U.S. 991 , 87 S.Ct. 1305 , 18 L.Ed. 2d 335 (1967)), certif. denied, 134 N.J. 567 , 636 A. 2d 524 (1993).

2024In an analysis of a speedy trial challenge, a trial court must weigh the "societal right to have the accused tried and punished" and a defendant's right "to be prosecuted fairly and not A-0164-23 7 oppressively." State v. Dunns, 266 N.J.

2022In an analysis of a speedy trial challenge, a trial court must weigh the "'societal right to have the accused tried and punished'" and a defendant's right "'to be prosecuted fairly and not oppressively.'" State v. Dunns, 266 N.J.

2020See State v. Szima, 70 N.J. 196 , 201 (1976); State v. Smith, 131 N.J.

1999See State v. Smith, 131 N.J.Super. 354 , 368 n. 2, 330 A. 2d 29 (App.Div.1974), aff'd o.b., 70 N.J. 213 , 358 A. 2d 782 (1976).

2024The length of the delay is a double inquiry. "[T]o trigger a speedy trial analysis, an accused must allege that the interval between accusation and trial has crossed the threshold dividing ordinary from 'presumptively prejudicial' delay," Doggett, 505 U.S. at 651-52 , since an accused cannot allege a constitutional violation if the State has, in fact, prosecuted his case with "customary promptness." Id. at 652 .

2024The length of the delay is a double inquiry. "[T]o trigger a speedy trial analysis, an accused must allege that the interval between accusation and trial has crossed the threshold dividing ordinary from 'presumptively prejudicial' delay," Doggett, 505 U.S. at 651-52 , since an accused cannot allege a constitutional violation if the State has, in fact, prosecuted his case with "customary promptness." Id. at 652 .

2026Determinations regarding an allegation of a speedy trial violation are typically upheld insofar as the PCR court's decision was not "clearly erroneous." Tsetsekas, 411 N.J. Super. at 10 (citing Merlino, 153 N.J. Super. at 17 ).

2025Nonetheless, "[a] defendant has no duty to bring himself to trial; A-3169-23 18 the State has that duty." State v. Merlino, 153 N.J.

2021See State v. Forchion, 451 N.J. Super. 474, 479-80 (App. Div. 2017) (discussing 17 The Court Rule implements the Act, so "[i]n determining what time is excludable, courts must consider both the speedy trial statute and the speedy trial rule." State v. Washington, 453 N.J. Super 164, 195 (App. Div. 2018). 12 A-2220-20 the motion-practice excludable time).

2018Those excludable periods are also discussed in the speedy trial rule, Rule 3:25-4(i). *195 Forchion , 451 N.J.Super. at 479 , 168 A.3d 1222 .

2021See State v. Fisher, 156 N.J. 494, 501 (1998) 5 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984). 6 Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530 (1972). 10 A-0187-19 (explaining a defendant arguing his counsel was ineffective for failure to file a motion must prove the motion is meritorious).

2020Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694 .

2018Super. 425, 446 (App. Div. 1999) (first citing State v. Gallegan, 117 N.J. 345, 355 (1989) and then citing State v. Marcus, 294 N.J.

1999Gallegan, supra, 117 N.J. at 355 , 567 A. 2d 204 ; Marcus, supra, 294 N.J.Super. at 293 , 683 A. 2d 221 .

2024However, after applying the factors identified in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972), to evaluate a speedy trial claim, 3 the judge concluded "[d]efendant provide[d] no facts to support his argument that had plea counsel filed a motion to dismiss on speedy trial grounds it would have been successful." See State v. O'Neal, 190 N.J. 601, 619 (2007) ("It is not ineffective assistance of counsel for defense counsel not to file a meritless motion . . . .").

2024If the defendant makes that initial showing, then the court must consider, "as one factor among several, the extent to which the delay stretches beyond the bare minimum needed to trigger judicial examination of the claim." Ibid.; Hakeem v. Beyer, 990 F.2d 750, 759-60 (3d Cir. 1993), aff'd after remand, 27 F.3d 557 (3d Cir. 1994).

2021See, e.g., Gravitt v. United States, 523 F.2d 1211, 1216-17 (5th Cir. 1975) (holding that the trial court's failure to consider prejudice from an identified period of delay required remand for an evidentiary hearing); United States v. Anderson, 621 F.2d 292, 294 (8th Cir. 1980) (in a direct appeal of conviction, remanding for an evidentiary hearing on a speedy trial claim, where "evidence concerning the reason for the delay and the prejudice the delay may have caused [the] appellant [was] lacking"); Tucker v. Wolff, 581 F.2d 235, 238 (9th Cir. 1978) (in an appeal from the denial of a habeas co

2021See, e.g., Gravitt v. United States, 523 F.2d 1211, 1216-17 (5th Cir. 1975) (holding that the trial court's failure to consider prejudice from an identified period of delay required remand for an evidentiary hearing); United States v. Anderson, 621 F.2d 292, 294 (8th Cir. 1980) (in a direct appeal of conviction, remanding for an evidentiary hearing on a speedy trial claim, where "evidence concerning the reason for the delay and the prejudice the delay may have caused [the] appellant [was] lacking"); Tucker v. Wolff, 581 F.2d 235, 238 (9th Cir. 1978) (in an appeal from the denial of a habeas co

2021See, e.g., Gravitt v. United States, 523 F.2d 1211, 1216-17 (5th Cir. 1975) (holding that the trial court's failure to consider prejudice from an identified period of delay required remand for an evidentiary hearing); United States v. Anderson, 621 F.2d 292, 294 (8th Cir. 1980) (in a direct appeal of conviction, remanding for an evidentiary hearing on a speedy trial claim, where "evidence concerning the reason for the delay and the prejudice the delay may have caused [the] appellant [was] lacking"); Tucker v. Wolff, 581 F.2d 235, 238 (9th Cir. 1978) (in an appeal from the denial of a habeas co

2021Generally, the defendant bears the burden of demonstrating "actual prejudice." See, e.g., State v. McNamara, 212 N.J. Super. 102, 105-06 (App. Div. 1986) (finding no prejudice when the defendant could not explain how his A-2904-18 28 defense would have been impaired by the delay); United States v. Duran-Gomez, 984 F.3d 366, 379 (5th Cir. 2020) (stating "[t]he burden is ordinarily on the defendant to demonstrate actual prejudice"), cert. denied, ___ S. Ct. ___ (2021); United States v. Perez-Cubertier, 958 F.3d 81, 92 (1st Cir.) (stating that defendants generally bear the burden to show the dela

2021See State v. Fisher, 156 N.J. 494, 501 (1998) 5 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984). 6 Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530 (1972). 10 A-0187-19 (explaining a defendant arguing his counsel was ineffective for failure to file a motion must prove the motion is meritorious).

2021See, e.g., Gravitt v. United States, 523 F.2d 1211, 1216-17 (5th Cir. 1975) (holding that the trial court's failure to consider prejudice from an identified period of delay required remand for an evidentiary hearing); United States v. Anderson, 621 F.2d 292, 294 (8th Cir. 1980) (in a direct appeal of conviction, remanding for an evidentiary hearing on a speedy trial claim, where "evidence concerning the reason for the delay and the prejudice the delay may have caused [the] appellant [was] lacking"); Tucker v. Wolff, 581 F.2d 235, 238 (9th Cir. 1978) (in an appeal from the denial of a habeas co

2021Generally, the defendant bears the burden of demonstrating "actual prejudice." See, e.g., State v. McNamara, 212 N.J. Super. 102, 105-06 (App. Div. 1986) (finding no prejudice when the defendant could not explain how his A-2904-18 28 defense would have been impaired by the delay); United States v. Duran-Gomez, 984 F.3d 366, 379 (5th Cir. 2020) (stating "[t]he burden is ordinarily on the defendant to demonstrate actual prejudice"), cert. denied, ___ S. Ct. ___ (2021); United States v. Perez-Cubertier, 958 F.3d 81, 92 (1st Cir.) (stating that defendants generally bear the burden to show the dela