speedy trial claim in New York

2026To determine whether a delay is outrageously arbitrary, the court adopted a modified version of the speedy trial test laid out in People v Taranovich (37 NY2d 442, 445-447 [1975]), weighing the length of the delay, he reason for the delay, whether the defendant was on notice of the SORA registration requirement, and whether the defendant was prejudiced by the delay (223 AD3d at 540-541).

2026To determine whether a delay is outrageously arbitrary, the court adopted a modified version of the speedy trial test laid out in People v Taranovich (37 NY2d 442, 445-447 [1975]), weighing the length of the delay, he reason for the delay, whether the defendant was on notice of the SORA registration requirement, and whether the defendant was prejudiced by the delay (223 AD3d at 540-541).

2011We are cognizant that in Blakley and Callahan , the Court of Appeals went beyond White’s case-specific analysis, holding in Blakley that “[b]ecause the criminal justice system should scrupulously avoid the possibility that a plea of guilty may be tainted by unfairness . . . , and because prosecutors should not be allowed to submerge speedy trial challenges, and the societal interests they represent, in plea bargains, ... a reduced plea conditioned upon a waiver of a speedy trial claim must be vacated” (Blakley, 34 NY2d at 315 ; see also Callahan, 80 NY2d at 279-282 ).

2011Here the prosecutor attempted, in effect, to deprive the defendant of his right to appeal the adverse determination of his speedy trial claim, by confronting him with a possibly unfair trial (because so tardy) on the one hand, and, on the other, offering him a reduced plea only if he would relinquish the speedy trial claim.” (Blakley, 34 NY2d at 314 [citations omitted and emphasis added].) Although Blakley held that a waiver of appeal is ineffective to the extent that it precludes appellate review of constitutional speedy trial claims and that such claims survive a guilty plea following the de

2025Excluding the date of filing of the Complaint [see People v. Stiles, 70 NY2d 765, 767 (1987)], the statutory time period applicable to this case for CPL §30.30 purposes would, ordinarily, be August 17, 2023 - February 17, 2024.

2025Excluding the date of filing of the Complaint [see People v. Stiles, 70 NY2d 765, 767 (1987)], the statutory time period applicable to this case for CPL §30.30 purposes would, ordinarily, be August 17, 2023 - February 17, 2024.

2018These factors are similar, but not identical, to the factors used in evaluating speedy trial claims under the Federal Constitution, which include the "[l]ength of delay, the reason for the delay, the defendant's assertion of his right, and prejudice to the defendant" ( Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 , 530, 92 S.Ct. 2182 , 33 L.Ed.2d 101 [1972] ). "[N]o one factor or combination of the factors ... is necessarily decisive or determinative of the speedy trial claim, but rather the particular case must be considered in light of all the factors as they apply to it" ( Taranovich, 37 N.Y.2d at 445 , 3

2018These factors are similar, but not identical, to the factors used in evaluating speedy trial claims under the Federal Constitution, which include the "[l]ength of delay, the reason for the delay, the defendant's assertion of his right, and prejudice to the defendant" ( Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 , 530, 92 S.Ct. 2182 , 33 L.Ed.2d 101 [1972] ). "[N]o one factor or combination of the factors ... is necessarily decisive or determinative of the speedy trial claim, but rather the particular case must be considered in light of all the factors as they apply to it" ( Taranovich, 37 N.Y.2d at 445 , 3

2011In any event, the period from August 3 to September 19, 2006 was properly excluded as a postreadiness delay primarily attributable to defense counsel’s impending vacation (see generally People v Anderson, 66 NY2d 529, 536 [1985]).

1990Unless criminal accusations are promptly tried, those disposed to crime can always hope to beat the system by pleading to a lesser offense, those indicted for crimes are left at large for long periods perhaps to further menace the community and those convicted of crimes are often sent to correctional institutions long after the time for meaningful rehabilitation has passed. * * * Thus the speedy trial requirement not only ensures fair and humane treatment of the accused, but serves, as well, to promote the efficiency of the criminal justice system.” (People v Johnson, 38 NY2d 271, 276 [1975];

1990Unless criminal accusations are promptly tried, those disposed to crime can always hope to beat the system by pleading to a lesser offense, those indicted for crimes are left at large for long periods perhaps to further menace the community and those convicted of crimes are often sent to correctional institutions long after the time for meaningful rehabilitation has passed. * * * Thus the speedy trial requirement not only ensures fair and humane treatment of the accused, but serves, as well, to promote the efficiency of the criminal justice system.” (People v Johnson, 38 NY2d 271, 276 [1975];

1989A court’s inability to schedule matters promptly has been considered "to 'weigh less heavily’ on the State” in evaluating a defendant’s speedy trial claim (People v Watts, 57 NY2d 299, 303 , quoting People v Johnson, 38 NY2d 271, 278 ).

2019Here, although, as noted, defense counsel made a speedy trial claim, we conclude that there was no strategic or legitimate explanation for defense counsel's failure to alert the court that it had inaccurately calculated that only five months and seven days had passed between the commencement of the action and the People's statement of readiness and that, instead, more than six months had elapsed ( see generally People v Pavone , 26 NY3d 629, 646-647 [2015]; People v Caban , 5 NY3d 143, 152 [2005]).

2018The record before us does not support defendant's contention that there was a speedy trial violation ( see People v Cooper , 134 AD3d 1583, 1585-1586 [4th Dept 2015]), and it is well settled that "[t]here can be no denial of effective assistance of trial counsel from counsel's failure to make a motion or argument that has little or no chance of success' " ( People v Caban , 5 NY3d 143, 152 [2005]; see People v Jackson , 132 AD3d 1304, 1305 [4th Dept 2015], lv denied 27 NY3d 999 [2016]).

2008In applying CPL 30.20, the court must look to the factors laid out in People v Taranovich, ( 37 NY2d 442 [1975]): (1) the extent of the delay, (2) the reason for the delay, (3) the nature of the underlying charge, (4) whether there has been an extended period of pretrial incarceration, and (5) whether there is any indication that the defense has been impaired by reason of the delay. “[N]o one factor or combination of the factors ... is necessarily decisive or determinative of the speedy trial claim, but rather the particular case must be considered in light of all the factors as they apply to

1975(People v Blas, 81 Misc 2d 1085 .) As to the failure of the relator to request a revocation hearing, the speedy trial factors in Barker give way on this point to the governing rule in New York first pronounced in People v Prosser ( 309 NY 353 ) and restated in People v Minicone ( 28 NY2d 279 ).

2026Finally, to the extent that defendant asserted arguments before County Court (Brown, J.) about missing discovery in his posttrial CPL 330.30 motion, doing so was improper as an assertion of a speedy trial violation must be made "prior to the commencement of trial" (CPL 210.20 [*8] [2]; see People v Brown , 217 AD3d 681, 682 [2d Dept 2023], lv denied 40 NY3d 950 [2023]; People v Bond , 110 AD3d 1366, 1366-1367 [3d Dept 2013], lv denied 22 NY3d 1197 [2014]).

2026Finally, to the extent that defendant asserted arguments before County Court (Brown, J.) about missing discovery in his posttrial CPL 330.30 motion, doing so was improper as an assertion of a speedy trial violation must be made "prior to the commencement of trial" (CPL 210.20 [*8] [2]; see People v Brown , 217 AD3d 681, 682 [2d Dept 2023], lv denied 40 NY3d 950 [2023]; People v Bond , 110 AD3d 1366, 1366-1367 [3d Dept 2013], lv denied 22 NY3d 1197 [2014]).

2023The Court of Appeals has consistently emphasized that a trial court is not required to follow "any particular litany when apprising a defendant pleading guilty of the individual rights abandoned" ( People v Lopez , 6 NY3d 248, 256 [2006]; see People v Thomas , 34 NY3d 545 , 559 [2019]; People v Sanders , 25 NY3d 337, 341 [2015]; People v Bradshaw , 18 NY3d 257, 265 [2011]).

2023The Court of Appeals has consistently emphasized that a trial court is not required to follow "any particular litany when apprising a defendant pleading guilty of the individual rights abandoned" ( People v Lopez , 6 NY3d 248, 256 [2006]; see People v Thomas , 34 NY3d 545 , 559 [2019]; People v Sanders , 25 NY3d 337, 341 [2015]; People v Bradshaw , 18 NY3d 257, 265 [2011]).

2023The Court of Appeals has consistently emphasized that a trial court is not required to follow "any particular litany when apprising a defendant pleading guilty of the individual rights abandoned" ( People v Lopez , 6 NY3d 248, 256 [2006]; see People v Thomas , 34 NY3d 545 , 559 [2019]; People v Sanders , 25 NY3d 337, 341 [2015]; People v Bradshaw , 18 NY3d 257, 265 [2011]).

2023The Court of Appeals has consistently emphasized that a trial court is not required to follow "any particular litany when apprising a defendant pleading guilty of the individual rights abandoned" ( People v Lopez , 6 NY3d 248, 256 [2006]; see People v Thomas , 34 NY3d 545 , 559 [2019]; People v Sanders , 25 NY3d 337, 341 [2015]; People v Bradshaw , 18 NY3d 257, 265 [2011]).

2023"The Taranovich framework is a holistic one—that is, 'no one factor or combination of the factors . . . is necessarily decisive or determinative of the speedy trial claim' " ( People v Johnson , 39 NY3d 92 , 96 [2022]; see Wiggins , 31 NY3d at 10 ; People v Romeo , 12 NY3d 51, 55 [2009], cert denied 558 US 817 [2009]). "[T]he factors must be evaluated 'on an ad hoc basis,' " which "mean[s] that the analysis must be tailored to the facts of each case" ( Johnson , 39 NY3d at 96; see Romeo , 12 NY3d at 55 ).

2018In assessing whether a defendant's constitutional right to a speedy trial has been violated by alleged preindictment delay, courts must consider the extent of the delay, the reason for the delay, the nature of the charges against the defendant, whether there has been an extended period of pretrial incarceration and whether the defense has been impaired by reason of the delay ( see People v Taranovich , 37 NY2d 442, 445 [1975]; People v Chaplin , 134 AD3d 1148, 1149 [2015], lv denied 27 NY3d 1067 [2016]; People v Lanfranco , 124 AD3d 1144, 1145 [2015], lv denied 25 NY3d 1203 [2015]). "[N]o one

2023The Court of Appeals has consistently emphasized that a trial court is not required to follow "any particular litany when apprising a defendant pleading guilty of the individual rights abandoned" ( People v Lopez , 6 NY3d 248, 256 [2006]; see People v Thomas , 34 NY3d 545 , 559 [2019]; People v Sanders , 25 NY3d 337, 341 [2015]; People v Bradshaw , 18 NY3d 257, 265 [2011]).

2023The Court of Appeals has consistently emphasized that a trial court is not required to follow "any particular litany when apprising a defendant pleading guilty of the individual rights abandoned" ( People v Lopez , 6 NY3d 248, 256 [2006]; see People v Thomas , 34 NY3d 545 , 559 [2019]; People v Sanders , 25 NY3d 337, 341 [2015]; People v Bradshaw , 18 NY3d 257, 265 [2011]).

2023"The Taranovich framework is a holistic one—that is, 'no one factor or combination of the factors . . . is necessarily decisive or determinative of the speedy trial claim' " ( People v Johnson , 39 NY3d 92 , 96 [2022]; see Wiggins , 31 NY3d at 10 ; People v Romeo , 12 NY3d 51, 55 [2009], cert denied 558 US 817 [2009]). "[T]he factors must be evaluated 'on an ad hoc basis,' " which "mean[s] that the analysis must be tailored to the facts of each case" ( Johnson , 39 NY3d at 96; see Romeo , 12 NY3d at 55 ).

2023"The Taranovich framework is a holistic one—that is, 'no one factor or combination of the factors . . . is necessarily decisive or determinative of the speedy trial claim' " ( People v Johnson , 39 NY3d 92 , 96 [2022]; see Wiggins , 31 NY3d at 10 ; People v Romeo , 12 NY3d 51, 55 [2009], cert denied 558 US 817 [2009]). "[T]he factors must be evaluated 'on an ad hoc basis,' " which "mean[s] that the analysis must be tailored to the facts of each case" ( Johnson , 39 NY3d at 96; see Romeo , 12 NY3d at 55 ).

1990Unless criminal accusations are promptly tried, those disposed to crime can always hope to beat the system by pleading to a lesser offense, those indicted for crimes are left at large for long periods perhaps to further menace the community and those convicted of crimes are often sent to correctional institutions long after the time for meaningful rehabilitation has passed. * * * Thus the speedy trial requirement not only ensures fair and humane treatment of the accused, but serves, as well, to promote the efficiency of the criminal justice system.” (People v Johnson, 38 NY2d 271, 276 [1975];

1975(People v Blas, 81 Misc 2d 1085 .) As to the failure of the relator to request a revocation hearing, the speedy trial factors in Barker give way on this point to the governing rule in New York first pronounced in People v Prosser ( 309 NY 353 ) and restated in People v Minicone ( 28 NY2d 279 ).

2025We conclude that the evidence, the law, and the circumstances of this case, viewed in totality and as of the time of the representation, reveal that defendant received meaningful representation ( see People v Gross , 26 NY3d 689, 696 [2016]; People v Baldi , 54 NY2d 137, 147 [1981]).

1999Furthermore, our review of the speedy trial hearing, as well as the entire record in this matter, reveals that defendant received meaningful representation throughout the entire proceeding (see, People v Baldi, 54 NY2d 137 ).

2022At the time of the guilty plea in this matter in 2019, it was the case that, "by pleading guilty, the defendant forfeited [her] right to review the speedy trial claim" ( People v Zeigler , 128 AD3d 737, 738 [2015]; see People v Kidd , 100 AD3d 779 , 779 [2012]; People v Holland , 44 AD3d 874, 874 [2007]).

2015Moreover, by pleading guilty, the defendant forfeited his right to review the speedy trial claim (see People v Kidd, 100 AD3d at 779 ).

2021Nevertheless, "no one factor or combination of the factors is necessarily decisive or determinative of the speedy trial claim" ( People v Acevedo , 179 AD3d at 1400 [internal quotation marks, ellipsis and citation omitted]).

2021Rather, we must consider all of the factors [*2]as they apply to the case at hand ( see id. at 445 ; People v Acevedo , 179 AD3d at 1400 ; People v Williams , 163 AD3d at 1285).

2011We are cognizant that in Blakley and Callahan , the Court of Appeals went beyond White’s case-specific analysis, holding in Blakley that “[b]ecause the criminal justice system should scrupulously avoid the possibility that a plea of guilty may be tainted by unfairness . . . , and because prosecutors should not be allowed to submerge speedy trial challenges, and the societal interests they represent, in plea bargains, ... a reduced plea conditioned upon a waiver of a speedy trial claim must be vacated” (Blakley, 34 NY2d at 315 ; see also Callahan, 80 NY2d at 279-282 ).

2011In People v Callahan, as in Blakley , the defendant pleaded guilty after the court had denied his motion to dismiss on constitutional speedy trial grounds ( 80 NY2d at 278 ).

2002These actions resulted in a violation of respondent's speedy trial rights pursuant to Family Court Act § 340.1 as the unjustifiably protracted suppression hearing had the effect of eliminating the good cause that had existed and delaying the commencement of the fact-finding hearing for at least an additional 47 days to allow Alvarez to testify. [3] The appropriate remedy for a speedy trial violation is dismissal of the petition ( see Matter of Frank C., 70 NY2d at 414 ).

2002These actions resulted in a violation of respondent’s speedy trial rights pursuant to Family Court Act § 340.1 as the unjustifiably protracted suppression hearing had the effect of eliminating the good cause that had existed and delaying the commencement of the fact-finding hearing for at least an additional 47 days to allow Alvarez to testify. 3 The appropriate remedy for a speedy trial violation is'dismissal of the petition (see Matter of Frank C., 70 NY2d at 414 ).