speedy trial claim in California

2026The trial court issued a written order applying the Barker v. Wingo (1972) 407 U.S. 514 (Barker) factors to assess whether defendant suffered a speedy trial violation, as clarified by Camacho v. Superior Court (2023) 15 Cal.5th 354 , 379 (Camacho).

2025The Prosecution “Because alleged SVPs have no duty to bring themselves to trial, the government has a responsibility to ensure the case is moving forward in a manner that is consistent with due process.” (Camacho, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 388; see also Barker, supra, 407 U.S. at p. 527 [“A defendant has no duty to bring himself to trial; the State has that duty as well as the duty of insuring that the trial is consistent with due process” (fns. omitted).].) The prosecution’s “due process obligation in an SVPA proceeding cannot be defined with precision, as Barker recognized that a speedy trial

2025Length of the Delay The length-of-delay factor “is actually a double enquiry.” (Doggett v. United States (1992) 505 U.S. 647, 651 (Doggett).) “Simply to trigger a speedy trial analysis, an accused must allege that the interval between accusation and trial has crossed the threshold dividing ordinary from ‘presumptively prejudicial’ delay, since, by definition, he cannot complain that the government has denied him a ‘speedy’ trial if it has, in fact, prosecuted his case with customary promptness.” (Id. at pp. 651–652, citation omitted.) In this threshold context, “ ‘presumptive prejudice’ does n

2025Length of the Delay The length-of-delay factor “is actually a double enquiry.” (Doggett v. United States (1992) 505 U.S. 647, 651 (Doggett).) “Simply to trigger a speedy trial analysis, an accused must allege that the interval between accusation and trial has crossed the threshold dividing ordinary from ‘presumptively prejudicial’ delay, since, by definition, he cannot complain that the government has denied him a ‘speedy’ trial if it has, in fact, prosecuted his case with customary promptness.” (Id. at pp. 651–652, citation omitted.) In this threshold context, “ ‘presumptive prejudice’ does n

2023(Id. at p. 533.) “[T]hese factors have no talismanic qualities; courts must still engage in a difficult and sensitive balancing process.” (Ibid.) “The burden of demonstrating a speedy trial violation under Barker’s multifactor test lies with the defendant.” (People v. Williams (2013) 58 Cal.4th 197, 233 (Williams).) a.

2023If the accused makes this showing, the court must then consider, as one factor among several, the extent to which the delay stretches beyond the bare minimum needed to trigger judicial examination of the claim. [Citation.] This latter enquiry is significant to the speedy trial analysis because . . . the presumption that pretrial delay has prejudiced the accused intensifies over time.’ ” (Williams, supra, 58 Cal.4th at p. 234 .) As postaccusation delay approaches one year, courts treat it as “ ‘presumptively prejudicial.’ ” (Doggett v. United States (1992) 505 U.S. 647, 652, fn. 1 .) Here, Marm

2025It is true that a defendant asserting a speedy trial violation must “both object[] to the date set and thereafter file[] a timely 9 motion to dismiss.” (People v. Wilson (1963) 60 Cal.2d 139, 146 .) That is because “even after such an objection ‘[t]here is no duty incumbent on the court to order dismissal under said section 1382 unless the defendant demands it.’ ” (Id. at p. 147.) However, the People cite no authority that a defendant must immediately move for dismissal, where a defendant has properly objected to a continuance.

2023(Ibid.) And as relevant here, “[I]n a misdemeanor prosecution the erroneous denial of such a motion to dismiss would be rendered prejudicial by Penal Code section 1387, which provides in pertinent part that an order of dismissal (under § 1382) ‘is a bar to any other prosecution for the same offense if it is a misdemeanor. . . .’ [Citation.]” (People v. Wilson, supra, 60 Cal.2d at p. 153, fn. 5 .) Since Wilson, with one exception discussed below, appellate courts have consistently held that a defendant must establish prejudice on appeal to obtain relief for a speedy trial violation.

2024VI, § 13.) Our Supreme Court has explained that “[a]lthough a defendant seeking pretrial relief for a speedy trial violation is not required to make an affirmative showing of prejudice [citation], the situation is different after judgment. [Citations.] ‘Upon appellate review following conviction, . . . a defendant who seeks to predicate reversal of a conviction upon denial of his right to speedy trial must show that the delay caused prejudice: this court, in reviewing the judgment of conviction, must “weigh the effect of the delay in bringing defendant to trial 8 or the fairness of the subsequ

2022(See Johnson, supra, 26 Cal.3d at p. 574 [“Upon appellate review following conviction, . . . a defendant who seeks to predicate reversal of a conviction upon denial of his right to speedy trial must show that the delay caused prejudice”]: People v. Wilson (1963) 60 Cal.2d 139, 151-152 (Wilson) [defendant raising violation of § 1382 on appeal “must show that the error was a prejudicial one”]; Avila v. Municipal Court, supra, 148 Cal.App.3d at p. 812 [“Reversal of a felony conviction on appeal because of a speedy trial error requires a showing of prejudice”].) Smith makes no attempt to show prej

2025(Dews, supra, 223 Cal.App.4th at p. 669 [Court issued a writ of mandate directing the trial court to vacate its order on the defendant’s motion to dismiss for a speedy trial violation with directions to conduct a new hearing expressly applying the requisite balancing test and making appropriate factual findings.]; accord Serna, supra, 40 Cal.3d at p. 263 [Court issued writ directing lower court to vacate its order and conduct a new hearing to weigh “the interests of the defendant and the prosecution to determine whether the right was violated . . . .”].) 12 D.

2025(Dews, supra, 223 Cal.App.4th at p. 669 [Court issued a writ of mandate directing the trial court to vacate its order on the defendant’s motion to dismiss for a speedy trial violation with directions to conduct a new hearing expressly applying the requisite balancing test and making appropriate factual findings.]; accord Serna, supra, 40 Cal.3d at p. 263 [Court issued writ directing lower court to vacate its order and conduct a new hearing to weigh “the interests of the defendant and the prosecution to determine whether the right was violated . . . .”].) 12 D.

1986(Scherling v. Superior Court (1978) 22 Cal.3d 493, 504 [ 149 Cal.Rptr. 597 , 585 P.2d 219 ]; People v. Lawson (1979) 94 Cal.App.3d 194, 198 [ 156 Cal.Rptr. 226 ].) Abdel-Malak was brought to trial within the statutory 90-day period (§ 1381); therefore, he must establish prejudice to prove a speedy trial violation.

1986(Scherling v. Superior Court (1978) 22 Cal.3d 493, 504 [ 149 Cal.Rptr. 597 , 585 P.2d 219 ]; People v. Lawson (1979) 94 Cal.App.3d 194, 198 [ 156 Cal.Rptr. 226 ].) Abdel-Malak was brought to trial within the statutory 90-day period (§ 1381); therefore, he must establish prejudice to prove a speedy trial violation.

2024To determine whether there has been a federal violation, we consider the four-part balancing test established in Barker v. Wingo (1972) 407 U.S. 514 : “ ‘whether delay before trial was uncommonly long, whether the government or the criminal defendant is more to blame for that delay, whether, in due course, the defendant asserted his right to a speedy trial, and whether he suffered prejudice as the delay’s result.’ ” (People v. Williams, supra, 58 Cal.4th at p. 233 .) Wilson has not carried his burden of demonstrating a speedy trial violation under this test. 12 We have explained that “a defend

2022I, § 15, cl. 1.) Additionally, “ ‘[t]o implement an accused’s constitutional right to a speedy trial, the Legislature enacted section 1382.’ ” (Burgos v. Superior Court (2012) 206 Cal.App.4th 817, 825 ; see also People v. Martinez, supra, at p. 766 [section 1382 is 5 The underlying facts are irrelevant to the issue on appeal. 4 “ ‘supplementary to and a construction of’ the state constitutional speedy trial guarantee”].) To determine whether a speedy trial violation has occurred under the Sixth Amendment, we apply the balancing test set forth in Barker v. Wingo (1972) 407 U.S. 514, 530 (Barker

2026While not compelling relief in every case where bad-faith delay would make relief virtually automatic, neither is negligence automatically tolerable.’ ” (Id. at p. 388.) “Because trial courts ultimately control when trial will be held, they bear particular responsibility for preserving an alleged [sexually violent predator]’s constitutional right to a timely trial.” (Id. at p. 389.) “By contrast, ‘if delay is attributable to the defendant, then his[, her, or their] waiver [of the right to a speedy trial] may be given effect under standard waiver doctrine.’ ” (Camacho, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 3

2025“In general, delays sought by the defendant’s counsel weigh against the defendant’s claim of a speedy trial violation.” (Id. at p. 385; accord, Vermont v. Brillon (2009) 556 U.S. 81, 92-93 .) Both the United States Supreme Court and our Supreme Court have “noted that the analysis might be different if . . . the delay was shown to result from ‘a systemic “breakdown in the public defender system.” ’ ” (Camacho, at p. 385.) Our Supreme Court further permitted consideration of whether defense counsel acted against defendant’s express wishes or defendant’s time waiver was involuntary.

2023(People v. Buchanan (2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 186 , 191.) The “ ‘deference [this standard] calls for varies according to the aspect of a trial court’s ruling under review.’ ” (Ibid., brackets in original.) “Under an abuse of discretion standard, ‘ “[t]he trial court’s findings of fact are reviewed for substantial evidence, its conclusions of law are reviewed de novo, and its application of the law to the facts is reversible only if arbitrary and 5 capricious.” ’ ”5 (People v. Superior Court (Vasquez) (2018) 27 Cal.App.5th 36, 55 , disapproved on other grounds in Camacho v. Superior Court (2023) 15

2023“The [Sexually Violent Predator Act (SVPA)] does not establish a deadline by which a trial on an SVP petition must be held after the trial court finds probable cause to believe the inmate is an SVP.” (People v. Superior Court (Vasquez) (2018) 27 Cal.App.5th 36, 57 (Vasquez).) “Nevertheless, ‘[b]ecause civil commitment involves a significant deprivation of liberty, a defendant in an SVP proceeding is entitled to due process protections.’ [Citation.] This includes the due process right to a timely trial.” (People v. Tran (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 330 , 347 (Tran).) In assessing an SVP defendant’s sp

2014(See People v. Alvarado (1997) 60 Cal.App.4th Supp. 1 , 4-5 [ 72 Cal.Rptr.2d 209 ] [trial court erred in dismissing charges based on prosecution’s failure to justify delay when delay was not “ ‘ “great” ’ ” and defendant did not show actual prejudice]; U.S. v. Beamon (9th Cir. 1993) 992 F.2d 1009, 1014-1015 [governmental negligence/lack of justification insufficient to show speedy trial violation when showing of actual prejudice was “tenuous,” though delay was long enough to trigger presumption of prejudice].) Unlike the standard for showing a speedy trial violation under the state Constitutio

1997The trial court found the delays were presumptively prejudicial, since they were “well over one year.” (Id. at p. 1013.) However, the court there held that the defendants still had to show actual prejudice to establish they were denied the right to a speedy trial, since “the delays in this case [were] not ‘great.’ Seventeen and 20 months are only five to eight months longer than the one-year benchmark which triggers the speedy trial inquiry under Barker v. Wingo.” (Id. at p. 1014.) “[W]hile the government’s negligence caused a delay long enough to trigger a speedy trial inquiry under Barker ,

2020(Protect Our Water v. County of Merced (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 362, 364 [“if it is not in the record, it did not happen”].) 10 Landau, supra, 214 Cal.App.4th at pp. 34–35 [“ ‘ “ ‘The rule that contentions not raised in the trial court will not be considered on appeal is founded on considerations of fairness to the court and opposing party.’ ” ’ ”].) Nevertheless, in People v. Williams (2013) 58 Cal.4th 197 (Williams), our high court considered a defendant’s speedy trial claim even though he did not move to dismiss the case in the trial court.

2018In sum, these factors have no talismanic qualities; courts must still engage in a difficult and sensitive balancing process.' [Citation.] The burden of demonstrating a speedy trial violation under Barker 's multifactor test lies with the defendant." ( Id. at p. 233, 165 Cal.Rptr.3d 717 , 315 P.3d 1 .) California courts have also analyzed a defendant's due process right to a speedy trial under Mathews , in which the United States Supreme Court applied a balancing test to determine whether due process under the Fourteenth Amendment required a hearing prior to the initial termination of Social Se

2022To show prejudice, “a defendant claiming a speedy trial violation under the California Constitution must show that the delay has impaired the ability to defend against the charged crime because, for instance, a witness has become unavailable, 10 evidence has disappeared, or the memory of a potential witness has faded.” (People v. Lowe, supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 945 , fn. omitted.) But “speculation about prejudice . . . because witnesses and evidence are now unavailable is insufficient to discharge defendant’s burden. [Citation.] A particular factual context must be established in which a specifi

2022Third, the court balances the harm against the justification.” (People v. Dunn-Gonzalez (1996) 47 Cal.App.4th 899, 911 .) “Prejudice may be shown by ‘ “loss of material witnesses due to lapse of time [citation] or loss of evidence because of fading memory attributable to the delay.” ’ ” (People v. Cowan (2010) 50 Cal.4th 401, 430 (Cowan), quoting People v. Catlin (2001) 26 Cal.4th 81 , 107 & People v. Morris (1988) 46 Cal.3d 1, 37 ; accord, People v. Lowe (2007) 40 Cal.4th 937, 946 , fn. omitted [“we hold that a defendant claiming a speedy trial violation under the California Constitution must

2018If the accused makes this showing, the court must then consider, as one factor among several, the extent to which the delay stretches beyond the bare minimum needed to trigger judicial examination of the claim. [Citation.] This latter enquiry is significant to the speedy trial analysis because ... the presumption that pretrial delay has prejudiced the accused intensifies over time.' " ( Williams , supra , 58 Cal.4th at p. 234 , 165 Cal.Rptr.3d 717 , 315 P.3d 1 .) In Williams , the court concluded that "even considering the gravity of the charges, a delay of seven years is 'extraordinary.' " (

2018If the accused makes this showing, the court must then consider, as one factor among several, the extent to which the delay stretches beyond the bare minimum needed to trigger judicial examination of the claim. [Citation.] This latter enquiry is significant to the speedy trial analysis because ... the presumption that pretrial delay has prejudiced the accused intensifies over time.' " ( Williams , supra , 58 Cal.4th at p. 234 , 165 Cal.Rptr.3d 717 , 315 P.3d 1 .) In Williams , the court concluded that "even considering the gravity of the charges, a delay of seven years is 'extraordinary.' " (

2022Third, the court balances the harm against the justification.” (People v. Dunn-Gonzalez (1996) 47 Cal.App.4th 899, 911 .) “Prejudice may be shown by ‘ “loss of material witnesses due to lapse of time [citation] or loss of evidence because of fading memory attributable to the delay.” ’ ” (People v. Cowan (2010) 50 Cal.4th 401, 430 (Cowan), quoting People v. Catlin (2001) 26 Cal.4th 81 , 107 & People v. Morris (1988) 46 Cal.3d 1, 37 ; accord, People v. Lowe (2007) 40 Cal.4th 937, 946 , fn. omitted [“we hold that a defendant claiming a speedy trial violation under the California Constitution must

2013(People v. Catlin (2001) 26 Cal.4th 81, 107 (Catlin); People v. Boysen (2007) 165 Cal.App.4th 761, 772 (Boysen).) Prejudice, under both the speedy trial standard and the due process standard, may be shown from the loss of evidence, whether from the loss of material witnesses or from fading memory attributable to the delay, sufficient to hinder the defendant in preparing a defense.

2013(See United States v. Marion (1971) 404 U.S. 307, 325 [ 30 L.Ed.2d 468 , 92 S.Ct. 455 ] [6th Amend, speedy trial right attaches when the defendant is “accused,” i.e., when he is “arrested, charged, or otherwise subjected to formal restraint prior to indictment”].) This delay of nearly seven years clearly qualifies as “ ‘presumptively prejudicial’ ” within the meaning of Barker .

2013(See United States v. Marion (1971) 404 U.S. 307, 325 [Sixth Amendment speedy trial right attaches when the defendant is “accused,” i.e., when he is “arrested, charged, or otherwise subjected to formal restraint prior to indictment”].) This delay of nearly seven years clearly qualifies as “ ‘presumptively prejudicial’ ” within the meaning of Barker.

1980In People v. Kirkpatrick (1972) 7 Cal.3d 480, 485-486 [ 102 Cal.Rptr. 744 , 498 P.2d 992 ] for instance, we rejected a speedy trial claim despite the fact that the defendant had personally refused to waive time.

1980In People v. Kirkpatrick (1972) 7 Cal.3d 480, 485-486 .. .for instance, we rejected a speedy trial claim despite the fact that the defendant had personally refused to waive time.

1980Citing People v. Merkouris ( (1956) 46 Cal.2d 540, 554 [ 297 P.2d 999 ], we held that counsel’s consent to delays beyond 60 days is sufficient, at least where the continuances are reasonable.

1980Citing People v. Merkouris (1956) 46 Cal.2d 540, 554 .. ., we held that counsel’s consent to delays beyond 60 days is sufficient, at least where the continuances are reasonable.

2022As discussed, Lopez initially stated he did not move to Mexico for years, but he later admitted he moved to Mexico within a couple of weeks after the detectives interviewed 5 Some courts have held a “‘defendant who flees the jurisdiction of a court for the purpose of avoiding prosecution waives the right to a speedy trial.’” (People v. Garcia, supra, 223 Cal.App.4th at p. 1178 ; see People v. Perez (1991) 229 Cal.App.3d 302, 308 .) Other courts, however, “have found that a defendant’s flight is simply one of several pertinent factors which must be considered as part of the court’s speedy trial

2015(People v. Perez (1991) 229 Cal.App.3d 302, 308 [though not an absolute bar to a speedy trial claim, flight to avoid prosecution is a factor to be considered].) 13 Defendant argues the delay was unjustified, because California authorities knew his whereabouts in the Virginia prison, and he even urged them to bring him to trial.

2024VI, § 13.) Our Supreme Court has explained that “[a]lthough a defendant seeking pretrial relief for a speedy trial violation is not required to make an affirmative showing of prejudice [citation], the situation is different after judgment. [Citations.] ‘Upon appellate review following conviction, . . . a defendant who seeks to predicate reversal of a conviction upon denial of his right to speedy trial must show that the delay caused prejudice: this court, in reviewing the judgment of conviction, must “weigh the effect of the delay in bringing defendant to trial 8 or the fairness of the subsequ

2022“Although a defendant seeking pretrial relief for a speedy trial violation is not required to make an affirmative showing of prejudice [citation], the situation is different after judgment. [Citations.] ‘Upon appellate review following conviction, . . . a defendant who seeks to predicate reversal of a conviction upon denial of his right to speedy trial must show that the delay caused prejudice: this court, in reviewing the judgment of conviction, must “weigh the effect of the delay in bringing defendant to trial or the fairness of the subsequent trial itself.” ’ ” (People v. Lomax (2010) 49 Ca

2022(See Johnson, supra, 26 Cal.3d at p. 574 [“Upon appellate review following conviction, . . . a defendant who seeks to predicate reversal of a conviction upon denial of his right to speedy trial must show that the delay caused prejudice”]: People v. Wilson (1963) 60 Cal.2d 139, 151-152 (Wilson) [defendant raising violation of § 1382 on appeal “must show that the error was a prejudicial one”]; Avila v. Municipal Court, supra, 148 Cal.App.3d at p. 812 [“Reversal of a felony conviction on appeal because of a speedy trial error requires a showing of prejudice”].) Smith makes no attempt to show prej

1998Discussion We begin with a quote from Avila: “[A] petition for a pretrial writ is the preferred method to address a speedy trial claim. [Citation.]” (Avila v. Municipal Court, supra, 148 Cal.App.3d at p. 811.) The reason for this is explained in Serna v. Superior Court, supra, 40 Cal.3d at page 264: “Extraordinary writ review of a misdemeanor defendant’s motion to dismiss made on speedy trial grounds is . . . necessary because appeal does not afford an adequate remedy for redress of these violations.

2023“The [Sexually Violent Predator Act (SVPA)] does not establish a deadline by which a trial on an SVP petition must be held after the trial court finds probable cause to believe the inmate is an SVP.” (People v. Superior Court (Vasquez) (2018) 27 Cal.App.5th 36, 57 (Vasquez).) “Nevertheless, ‘[b]ecause civil commitment involves a significant deprivation of liberty, a defendant in an SVP proceeding is entitled to due process protections.’ [Citation.] This includes the due process right to a timely trial.” (People v. Tran (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 330 , 347 (Tran).) In assessing an SVP defendant’s sp

2023“The [Sexually Violent Predator Act (SVPA)] does not establish a deadline by which a trial on an SVP petition must be held after the trial court finds probable cause to believe the inmate is an SVP.” (People v. Superior Court (Vasquez) (2018) 27 Cal.App.5th 36, 57 (Vasquez).) “Nevertheless, ‘[b]ecause civil commitment involves a significant deprivation of liberty, a defendant in an SVP proceeding is entitled to due process protections.’ [Citation.] This includes the due process right to a timely trial.” (People v. Tran (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 330 , 347 (Tran).) In assessing an SVP defendant’s sp

2022Third, the court balances the harm against the justification.” (People v. Dunn-Gonzalez (1996) 47 Cal.App.4th 899, 911 .) “Prejudice may be shown by ‘ “loss of material witnesses due to lapse of time [citation] or loss of evidence because of fading memory attributable to the delay.” ’ ” (People v. Cowan (2010) 50 Cal.4th 401, 430 (Cowan), quoting People v. Catlin (2001) 26 Cal.4th 81 , 107 & People v. Morris (1988) 46 Cal.3d 1, 37 ; accord, People v. Lowe (2007) 40 Cal.4th 937, 946 , fn. omitted [“we hold that a defendant claiming a speedy trial violation under the California Constitution must

1997(Serna v. Superior Court, supra, 40 Cal.3d at pp. 249, 252; Crockett v. Superior Court (1975) 14 Cal.3d 433, 440 [ 121 Cal.Rptr. 457 , 535 P.2d 321 ].) “If defendant fails to show prejudice, the court need not inquire into the justification for the delay since there is nothing to ‘weigh’ such justification against.” (People v. Dunn-Gonzalez (1996) 47 Cal.App.4th 899, 911 [ 55 Cal.Rptr.2d 404 ].) Although the initial burden with respect to prejudice differs slightly depending on whether the speedy trial claim is based on the federal or California Constitution, the final analysis is the same: Fo