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519 Ohio opinions name it 9 courts 1978–2026 162 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Ohio courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
City of Brecksville v. Cookgreen2 sentences2024“Furthermore, when reviewing the legal issues presented in a speedy trial claim, we must strictly construe the relevant statutes against the state.” Id., citing Brecksville v. Cook, 75 Ohio St.3d 53, 57 (1996). 2021State v. Davis, 4th Dist. Ross No. 01CA2610, 2002-Ohio-2554 , ¶ 17, citing State v. Pachay, 64 Ohio St.2d 218 , 416 N.E.2d 589 (1980), syllabus. “[W]hen reviewing the legal issues presented in a speedy trial claim, we must strictly construe the relevant statutes against the state.” State v. Staffin, 4th Dist. Ross No. 07CA2967, 2008-Ohio- 338, ¶ 6, citing City of Brecksville v. Cook, 75 Ohio St.3d 53, 57 , 1996-Ohio-171 , 661 N.E.2d 706 . {¶28} As applicable here, R.C. 2945.71 provides that a defendant charged with a felony “[s]hall be brought to trial within two hundred seventy days after the | 50 | 144 |
State v. Butchergreen2 sentences2023Boyd relies on State v. Butcher, 27 Ohio St.3d 28 , 500 N.E.2d 1368 (1986), to allege that once a defendant makes a prima facie case of a speedy trial violation, the burden of production shifts to the -17- State to establish justification for the extension of speedy trial time. 2023Boyd relies on State v. Butcher, 27 Ohio St.3d 28 , 500 N.E.2d 1368 (1986), to allege that once a defendant makes a prima facie case of a speedy trial violation, the burden of production shifts to the -17- State to establish justification for the extension of speedy trial time. | 10 | 18 |
State v. Mastersgreen2 sentences2022No. 71). -3- Standard of Review {¶10} “Appellate review of a trial court’s decision on a motion to dismiss for a speedy-trial violation involves a mixed question of law and fact.” State v. Westerfield, 3d Dist. Crawford No. 3-17-15, 2018-Ohio-2139, ¶ 17 , citing State v. James, 4th Dist. Ross No. 13CA3393, 2014-Ohio-1702, ¶ 23 . “‘Accordingly, a reviewing court must give due deference to the trial court’s findings of fact if they are supported by competent, credible evidence but will independently review whether the trial court correctly applied the law to the facts of the case.’” State v. Gar 2022No. 71). -3- Standard of Review {¶10} “Appellate review of a trial court’s decision on a motion to dismiss for a speedy-trial violation involves a mixed question of law and fact.” State v. Westerfield, 3d Dist. Crawford No. 3-17-15, 2018-Ohio-2139, ¶ 17 , citing State v. James, 4th Dist. Ross No. 13CA3393, 2014-Ohio-1702, ¶ 23 . “‘Accordingly, a reviewing court must give due deference to the trial court’s findings of fact if they are supported by competent, credible evidence but will independently review whether the trial court correctly applied the law to the facts of the case.’” State v. Gar | 8 | 21 |
Barker v. Wingogreen2 sentences2025However, Appellant claims that the Ohio Supreme Court has created an exception when a defendant seeks to challenge a constitutional violation of speedy trial rights based in part on Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972). {¶9} Before engaging in a Barker analysis, we must determine whether Appellant waived her right to challenge an alleged speedy trial violation due to her guilty plea. 2023On appeal, the state argues that the trial court erred when it engaged in a full speedy-trial analysis pursuant to Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 , 92 S.Ct. 2182 , 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972), because it contends that the six-and-a-half-month delay was not sufficiently long to trigger such an analysis. | 6 | 29 |
Brecksville v. Cookgreen2 sentences2021State v. Davis, 4th Dist. Ross No. 01CA2610, 2002-Ohio-2554 , ¶ 17, citing State v. Pachay, 64 Ohio St.2d 218 , 416 N.E.2d 589 (1980), syllabus. “[W]hen reviewing the legal issues presented in a speedy trial claim, we must strictly construe the relevant statutes against the state.” State v. Staffin, 4th Dist. Ross No. 07CA2967, 2008-Ohio- 338, ¶ 6, citing City of Brecksville v. Cook, 75 Ohio St.3d 53, 57 , 1996-Ohio-171 , 661 N.E.2d 706 . {¶28} As applicable here, R.C. 2945.71 provides that a defendant charged with a felony “[s]hall be brought to trial within two hundred seventy days after the 2011“Furthermore, when reviewing the legal issues presented in a speedy trial claim, we must strictly construe the relevant statutes against the state.” Id. citing Brecksville v. Cook, 75 Ohio St.3d 53, 57 , 1996-Ohio-171 . | 6 | 28 |
Doggett v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2026“The factors include: (1) the length of the delay ‘between accusation and trial’; (2) the reason for the delay; (3) the defendant’s assertion, if any, of his right to a speedy trial; and (4) the prejudice, if any, to the defendant.” Id., citing Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647, 651 (1992), and State v. Adams, 2015- Ohio-3954, ¶ 88. {¶ 15} “None of the factors is controlling because a ‘balancing test necessarily compels’ a court to evaluate an alleged speedy trial violation ‘on an ad hoc basis,’ meaning that the court must consider the totality of the circumstances.” Id. at ¶ 15, quoting 2026“The factors include: (1) the length of the delay ‘between accusation and trial’; (2) the reason for the delay; (3) the defendant’s assertion, if any, of his right to a speedy trial; and (4) the prejudice, if any, to the defendant.” Id., citing Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647, 651 (1992), and State v. Adams, 2015-Ohio-3954 , ¶ 88. {¶ 12} “None of the factors is controlling because a ‘balancing test necessarily compels’ a court to evaluate an alleged speedy trial violation ‘on an ad hoc basis,’ meaning that the court must consider the totality of the circumstances.” Id. at ¶ 15, quoting | 5 | 27 |
State v. Leegreen2 sentences2026However, “the length of the delay is a particularly important factor as it ‘is to some extent a triggering mechanism.’” State v. Lee, 2024-Ohio-1802, ¶ 9 (2d Dist.), quoting Barker at 530 . 2026However, “the length of the delay is a particularly important factor as it ‘is to some extent a triggering mechanism.’” State v. Lee, 2024-Ohio-1802, ¶ 9 (2d Dist.), quoting Barker at 530 . | 5 | 5 |
State v. Pachaygreen2 sentences2023"The statutory speedy trial provisions, R.C. 2945.71 et seq., constitute a rational effort to enforce the constitutional right to a public speedy trial of an accused charged with the commission of a felony or a misdemeanor and shall be strictly enforced by the courts of this state." State v. Pachay, 64 Ohio St.2d 218 , 416 N.E.2d 589 , syllabus (1980). {¶ 8} A speedy-trial claim involves a mixed question of law and fact. 2023"The statutory speedy trial provisions, R.C. 2945.71 et seq., constitute a rational effort to enforce the constitutional right to a public speedy trial of an accused charged with the commission of a felony or a misdemeanor and shall be strictly enforced by the courts of this state." State v. Pachay, 64 Ohio St.2d 218 , 416 N.E.2d 589 , syllabus (1980). {¶ 8} A speedy-trial claim involves a mixed question of law and fact. | 4 | 21 |
State v. Larkin, Unpublished Decision (6-21-2005)green2 sentences2024Id. {¶19} When reviewing the legal issues presented in a speedy-trial claim, we must strictly construe the relevant statutes against appellee. 2023Id. {¶32} When reviewing the legal issues presented in a speedy trial claim, we must strictly construe the relevant statutes against the State. | 3 | 23 |
State v. Barnes, 90847 (10-23-2008)green2 sentences2011Appellant was denied speedy trial rights due the unreasonable delay by State to respond to the discovery request.” {¶ 42} When an appellate court reviews an allegation of a speedy trial violation, it “should apply a de novo standard of review to the legal issues but afford great deference to any findings of fact made by the trial court.” State v. Barnes, Cuyahoga App. No. 90847, 2008-Ohio-5472, ¶17 . {¶ 43} R.C. 2945.71(C)(2) requires the state to bring a defendant accused of committing a felony to trial within 270 days after his arrest. “[E]ach day during which the accused is held in jail in 2011Speedy Trial {¶ 18} In the first assigned error, Shabazz argues the trial court erred when it denied his motion to dismiss for a violation of his right to a speedy trial. {¶ 19} When an appellate court reviews an allegation of a speedy trial violation, it “should apply a de novo standard of review to the legal issues but afford great deference to any findings of fact made by the trial court.” State v. Barnes, Cuyahoga App. No. 90847, 2008-Ohio-5472, ¶17 . {¶ 20} The Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, and Section 10, Article I of the Ohio Constitution, guarantee | 3 | 10 |
State v. Sanchezgreen2 sentences2022See also State v. Sanchez, 110 Ohio St.3d 274 , 2006-Ohio-4478 , 853 N.E.2d 283 , ¶ 8. {¶ 18} When the trial court sua sponte grants a continuance under R.C. 2945.72(H), the court “must enter the order of continuance and the reasons therefor by journal entry prior to the expiration of the time limit prescribed in R.C. 2945.71 for bringing a defendant to trial.” State v. Mincy, 2 Ohio St.3d 6 , 441 N.E.2d 571 (1982), syllabus. {¶ 19} “When an accused demonstrates a prima facie case of a speedy trial violation by showing that the trial was held beyond the time limit set by the statute, the burde 2022See also State v. Sanchez, 110 Ohio St.3d 274 , 2006-Ohio-4478 , 853 N.E.2d 283 , ¶ 8. {¶ 18} When the trial court sua sponte grants a continuance under R.C. 2945.72(H), the court “must enter the order of continuance and the reasons therefor by journal entry prior to the expiration of the time limit prescribed in R.C. 2945.71 for bringing a defendant to trial.” State v. Mincy, 2 Ohio St.3d 6 , 441 N.E.2d 571 (1982), syllabus. {¶ 19} “When an accused demonstrates a prima facie case of a speedy trial violation by showing that the trial was held beyond the time limit set by the statute, the burde | 3 | 8 |
State v. Rileygreen2 sentences2007The Ohio General Assembly enacted the provisions in R.C. 2945.71 et seq. in an effort to prescribe “ ‘reasonable speedy trial periods consistent with these constitutional provisions.’ ” Riley at 735, 2005-Ohio-4337 , 834 N.E.2d 887 , quoting State v. O’Brien (1987), 34 Ohio St.3d 7, 8 , 516 N.E.2d 218 . {¶ 34} When reviewing the legal issues presented in a speedy-trial claim, we must strictly construe the relevant statutes against the state. 2007The Ohio General Assembly enacted the provisions in R.C. 2945.71 et seq. in an effort to prescribe “ ‘reasonable speedy trial periods consistent with these constitutional provisions.’ ” Riley at 735, 2005-Ohio-4337 , 834 N.E.2d 887 , quoting State v. O’Brien (1987), 34 Ohio St.3d 7, 8 , 516 N.E.2d 218 . {¶ 34} When reviewing the legal issues presented in a speedy-trial claim, we must strictly construe the relevant statutes against the state. | 3 | 7 |
| State v. Dankworthgreen | 3 | 4 |
| State v. Maischgreen | 3 | 4 |
| State v. Smithgreen | 3 | 3 |
| State v. Knottgreen | 3 | 3 |
| State v. Gray, 20980 (8-31-2007)green | 3 | 3 |
| State v. Harrisgreen | 3 | 3 |
State v. Long (Slip Opinion)green2 sentences2025“If the defendant can make this showing, the burden shifts to the State to establish that some exception[s] applied to toll the time and to make the trial timely.” Gray at ¶ 15, citing State v. Price, 122 Ohio App.3d 65, 68 (10th Dist. 1997). {¶ 21} “Review of a speedy-trial claim involves a mixed question of law and fact.” State v. Long, 2020-Ohio-5363, ¶ 15 . 2025R.C. 2945.71(E). ”Review of a speedy-trial claim involves a mixed question of law and fact.” State v. Long, 2020-Ohio-5363, ¶ 15 . | 2 | 39 |
State v. O'Briengreen2 sentences2026O'Brien, 34 Ohio St.3d at 9-10 . {¶67} Accordingly, where there is a proper revocation of a time waiver, the statutory speedy trial time does not then reactivate; instead, the question for a speedy trial claim becomes whether the delay post-revocation was constitutionally unreasonable considering the length of delay, the reason for the delay, the defendant's assertion of his right, and the prejudice to the defendant. 2023After making an express written speedy trial waiver, the defendant cannot assert a speedy trial violation unless he “files a formal written objection to any further continuances and makes a demand for trial, following which the state must bring him to trial within a reasonable time.” Id. | 2 | 19 |
State v. Wagnergreen2 sentences2026“The factors include: (1) the length of the delay ‘between accusation and trial’; (2) the reason for the delay; (3) the defendant’s assertion, if any, of his right to a speedy trial; and (4) the prejudice, if any, to the defendant.” Id., citing Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647, 651 (1992), and State v. Adams, 2015- Ohio-3954, ¶ 88. {¶ 15} “None of the factors is controlling because a ‘balancing test necessarily compels’ a court to evaluate an alleged speedy trial violation ‘on an ad hoc basis,’ meaning that the court must consider the totality of the circumstances.” Id. at ¶ 15, quoting 2026“The factors include: (1) the length of the delay ‘between accusation and trial’; (2) the reason for the delay; (3) the defendant’s assertion, if any, of his right to a speedy trial; and (4) the prejudice, if any, to the defendant.” Id., citing Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647, 651 (1992), and State v. Adams, 2015-Ohio-3954 , ¶ 88. {¶ 12} “None of the factors is controlling because a ‘balancing test necessarily compels’ a court to evaluate an alleged speedy trial violation ‘on an ad hoc basis,’ meaning that the court must consider the totality of the circumstances.” Id. at ¶ 15, quoting | 2 | 5 |
State v. Adams (Slip Opinion)green2 sentences2026“The factors include: (1) the length of the delay ‘between accusation and trial’; (2) the reason for the delay; (3) the defendant’s assertion, if any, of his right to a speedy trial; and (4) the prejudice, if any, to the defendant.” Id., citing Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647, 651 (1992), and State v. Adams, 2015-Ohio-3954 , ¶ 88. {¶ 12} “None of the factors is controlling because a ‘balancing test necessarily compels’ a court to evaluate an alleged speedy trial violation ‘on an ad hoc basis,’ meaning that the court must consider the totality of the circumstances.” Id. at ¶ 15, quoting 2025“The factors include: (1) the length of the delay ‘between accusation and trial’; (2) the reason for the delay; (3) the 20 defendant’s assertion, if any, of his right to a speedy trial; and (4) the prejudice, if any, to the defendant.” Id., citing Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647, 651 (1992), and State v. Adams, 2015-Ohio-3954 , ¶ 88. {¶ 58} “None of the factors is controlling because a ‘balancing test necessarily compels’ a court to evaluate an alleged speedy trial violation ‘on an ad hoc basis,’ meaning that the court must consider the totality of the circumstances.” Id. at ¶ 15, quoti | 2 | 5 |
| State v. Turnergreen | 2 | 4 |
| State v. Kerbygreen | 2 | 3 |
| State v. Lovettgreen | 2 | 2 |
| State v. Conkright, Unpublished Decision (9-28-2007)green | 2 | 2 |
| State v. Smithgreen | 2 | 2 |
| State v. Blackgreen | 2 | 2 |
| State v. Wilsongreen | 2 | 2 |
| State v. Kendallgreen | 2 | 2 |
| State v. Madrigalgreen | 2 | 2 |
| State v. Searsgreen | 2 | 2 |
State v. Highgreen2 sentences2007Furthermore, when reviewing the legal issues presented in a speedy trial claim, an appellate court must strictly construe the relevant statutes against the state." (Internal citations omitted.) Id. at 241-242 . 2003Furthermore, when reviewing the legal issues presented in a speedy trial claim, an appellate court must strictly construe the relevant statutes against the state.” (Internal citations omitted.) Id. at 241-242 , 757 N.E.2d 1176 . {¶ 10} R.C. 2945.71(C)(2) requires that anyone charged with a felony be brought to trial within 270 days of arrest. | 1 | 13 |
State v. Browngreen2 sentences2024“Furthermore, when reviewing the legal issues presented in a speedy trial claim, we must strictly construe the relevant statutes against the state.” Id., citing Brecksville v. Cook, 75 Ohio St.3d 53, 57 (1996). 2021“Furthermore, when reviewing the legal issues presented in a speedy trial claim, we must strictly construe the relevant statutes against the state.” Id., citing Brecksville v. Cook, 75 Ohio St.3d 53, 57 , 661 N.E.2d 706 (1996). {¶12} Here, the trial court initially issued a judgment entry simply granting the motion to dismiss, without including any findings of facts. | 1 | 10 |
State v. Pricegreen2 sentences2025“If the defendant can make this showing, the burden shifts to the State to establish that some exception[s] applied to toll the time and to make the trial timely.” Gray at ¶ 15, citing State v. Price, 122 Ohio App.3d 65, 68 (10th Dist. 1997). {¶ 21} “Review of a speedy-trial claim involves a mixed question of law and fact.” State v. Long, 2020-Ohio-5363, ¶ 15 . 2025“If the defendant can make this showing, the burden shifts to the State to establish that some exception[s] applied to toll the time and to make the trial timely.” Gray at ¶ 15, citing State v. Price, 122 Ohio App.3d 65, 68 (10th Dist. 1997). {¶ 21} “Review of a speedy-trial claim involves a mixed question of law and fact.” State v. Long, 2020-Ohio-5363, ¶ 15 . | 1 | 8 |
State v. Hansengreen2 sentences2025According to Walker’s calculation, “the required date to be brought to trial would be December 20, 2023.” (Appellant’s Brief at 6). 1 The trial court filed its judgment entry of sentence on June 25, 2024. -4- Standard of Review {¶14} “Appellate review of a trial court’s decision on a motion to dismiss for a speedy-trial violation involves a mixed question of law and fact.” State v. Westerfield, 2018-Ohio-2139, ¶ 17 (3d Dist.). “‘Accordingly, a reviewing court must give due deference to the trial court’s findings of fact if they are supported by competent, credible evidence but will independent 2024Standard of Review {¶28} “Appellate review of a trial court’s decision on a motion to dismiss for a speedy-trial violation involves a mixed question of law and fact.” State v. Westerfield, 3d Dist. Crawford No. 3-17-15, 2018-Ohio-2139, ¶ 17 . “‘Accordingly, a reviewing court must give due deference to the trial court’s findings of fact if they are supported by competent, credible evidence but will independently review whether the trial court correctly applied the law to the facts of the case.’” State v. Gartrell, 3d Dist. Marion No. 9-14-02, 2014-Ohio-5203, ¶ 104 , quoting State v. -13- Case N | 1 | 8 |
Strickland v. Washingtongreen2 sentences2025Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984); State v. Lloyd, 2022-Ohio-4259, ¶ 15 . “[I]n order to demonstrate that counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to file a motion to dismiss for speedy trial violations, the defendant must show that the motion would have been successful and the case would likely have been dismissed.” Mango at ¶ 18 , citing White at ¶ 7 . “ ‘Counsel cannot be [ineffective] for failing to file a fruitless motion.’ ” Id., quoting State v. Cottrell, 2012-Ohio-4583, ¶ 8 (4th Dist.). -6- {¶ 13} Because Jacks claims that her trial counsel was ineffect 2023Ineffective Assistance {¶21} Mitchell argues that he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel on the basis that counsel: (1) permitted him to enter a guilty plea to a nonexistent charge; (2) failed to ensure that he understood the charge to which he pled; (3) failed to pursue his claim of a speedy-trial violation; (4) waived time without his permission; and (5) failed to have his misdemeanor charges bound over from municipal court to the court of common pleas. {¶22} In order to reverse a conviction for ineffective assistance of counsel, “the defendant must demonstrate that (1) counsel’ | 1 | 7 |
State v. Westerfieldgreen2 sentences2025According to Walker’s calculation, “the required date to be brought to trial would be December 20, 2023.” (Appellant’s Brief at 6). 1 The trial court filed its judgment entry of sentence on June 25, 2024. -4- Standard of Review {¶14} “Appellate review of a trial court’s decision on a motion to dismiss for a speedy-trial violation involves a mixed question of law and fact.” State v. Westerfield, 2018-Ohio-2139, ¶ 17 (3d Dist.). “‘Accordingly, a reviewing court must give due deference to the trial court’s findings of fact if they are supported by competent, credible evidence but will independent 2024Standard of Review {¶6} “Appellate review of a trial court’s decision on a motion to dismiss for a speedy-trial violation involves a mixed question of law and fact.” State v. Westerfield, 3d Dist. Crawford No. 3-17-15, 2018-Ohio-2139, ¶ 17 . | 1 | 5 |
State v. Gartrellgreen2 sentences2024Standard of Review {¶28} “Appellate review of a trial court’s decision on a motion to dismiss for a speedy-trial violation involves a mixed question of law and fact.” State v. Westerfield, 3d Dist. Crawford No. 3-17-15, 2018-Ohio-2139, ¶ 17 . “‘Accordingly, a reviewing court must give due deference to the trial court’s findings of fact if they are supported by competent, credible evidence but will independently review whether the trial court correctly applied the law to the facts of the case.’” State v. Gartrell, 3d Dist. Marion No. 9-14-02, 2014-Ohio-5203, ¶ 104 , quoting State v. -13- Case N 2022No. 71). -3- Standard of Review {¶10} “Appellate review of a trial court’s decision on a motion to dismiss for a speedy-trial violation involves a mixed question of law and fact.” State v. Westerfield, 3d Dist. Crawford No. 3-17-15, 2018-Ohio-2139, ¶ 17 , citing State v. James, 4th Dist. Ross No. 13CA3393, 2014-Ohio-1702, ¶ 23 . “‘Accordingly, a reviewing court must give due deference to the trial court’s findings of fact if they are supported by competent, credible evidence but will independently review whether the trial court correctly applied the law to the facts of the case.’” State v. Gar | 1 | 5 |
| State v. Kinggreen | 1 | 5 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| State v. Turnergreen | 1 | 4 |
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
City of Oregon v. Kohne
green
2 sentences2014City of Oregon v. Kohne, 117 Ohio App.3d 179 , 690 N.E.2d 66 (1997). {¶24} Appellant was served with the arrest warrant on January 23, 2012. 2014City of Oregon v. Kohne, 117 Ohio App.3d 179 , 690 N.E.2d 66 (1997). {¶24} Appellant was served with the arrest warrant on January 23, 2012. | 16 | 2002–2014 |
State v. Adams
green
2 sentences2022He cites State v. Adams, 43 Ohio St.3d 67, 70 , 538 N.E.2d 1025 (1989), where the Ohio Supreme Court held that a defendant’s speedy trial waiver as to an initial charge does not apply to additional charges stemming from the same set of facts brought subsequent to the execution of the waiver. {¶22} He also cites to our decision in State v. Carter, 7th Dist. Mahoning No. 03- MA-245, 2005-Ohio-1347 , where we held that a defendant’s speedy trial rights were violated when the State originally indicted him on four counts of felonious assault with four firearm specifications and then re-indicted him 2022He cites State v. Adams, 43 Ohio St.3d 67, 70 , 538 N.E.2d 1025 (1989), where the Ohio Supreme Court held that a defendant’s speedy trial waiver as to an initial charge does not apply to additional charges stemming from the same set of facts brought subsequent to the execution of the waiver. {¶22} He also cites to our decision in State v. Carter, 7th Dist. Mahoning No. 03- MA-245, 2005-Ohio-1347 , where we held that a defendant’s speedy trial rights were violated when the State originally indicted him on four counts of felonious assault with four firearm specifications and then re-indicted him | 12 | 1995–2022 |
State v. Miller
green
2 sentences2018In Brecksville v. Cook, 75 Ohio St.3d 53, 57 , 661 N.E.2d 706 (1996), the court referred to its prior admonition “to strictly construe speedy trial statutes against the state.” See, also, State v. Miller, 113 Ohio App.3d 606, 608 , 681 N.E.2d 970 (11th Dist.1996). 2018In Brecksville v. Cook, 75 Ohio St.3d 53, 57 , 661 N.E.2d 706 (1996), the court referred to its prior admonition “to strictly construe speedy trial statutes against the state.” See, also, State v. Miller, 113 Ohio App.3d 606, 608 , 681 N.E.2d 970 (11th Dist.1996). | 12 | 1998–2018 |
State v. Taylor
green
2 sentences2021Clark No. 02-CA-85, 2003-Ohio-2825 , ¶ 17, and State v. Taylor, 98 Ohio St.3d 27 , 2002-Ohio-7071 , 781 N.E.2d 72, ¶ 37 . {¶ 56} To avoid this barrier, Lammers now contends that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to raise a speedy trial violation in the trial court. 2021Clark No. 02-CA-85, 2003-Ohio-2825 , ¶ 17, and State v. Taylor, 98 Ohio St.3d 27 , 2002-Ohio-7071 , 781 N.E.2d 72, ¶ 37 . {¶ 56} To avoid this barrier, Lammers now contends that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to raise a speedy trial violation in the trial court. | 10 | 2007–2026 |
State v. Cloud
green
2 sentences2012Skinner, at ¶8; Brecksville v. Cook, 75 Ohio St.3d 53, 57 , 1996-Ohio-171 , 661 N.E.2d 706 ; State v. Miller, 113 Ohio App.3d 606, 608 , 681 N.E.2d 90 (1996); State v. Cloud, 122 Ohio App.3d 626 , 702 N.E.2d 500 (1997). 2012Skinner, at ¶8; Brecksville v. Cook, 75 Ohio St.3d 53, 57 , 1996-Ohio-171 , 661 N.E.2d 706 ; State v. Miller, 113 Ohio App.3d 606, 608 , 681 N.E.2d 90 (1996); State v. Cloud, 122 Ohio App.3d 626 , 702 N.E.2d 500 (1997). | 9 | 1998–2012 |
State v. Depue
green
2 sentences2008Id., citing Brecksville v. Cook (1996), 75 Ohio St.3d 53 , 57 , 661 N.E.2d 706 , 708-709." See, also, State v. Sanchez , 110 Ohio St.3d 274 , 2006-Ohio-4478 , 853 N.E.2d 283 , at ¶ 8. {¶ 132} Although Moore argues that his speedy trial right was violated, he offers no timeline explaining tolling dates and starting dates for speedy trial purposes. {¶ 133} The juvenile court relinquished jurisdiction over Moore and transferred him to the general division of the common pleas court by judgment entry of April 8, 2004. 2008Id., citing Brecksville v. Cook (1996), 75 Ohio St.3d 53 , 57 , 661 N.E.2d 706 , 708-709." See, also, State v. Sanchez , 110 Ohio St.3d 274 , 2006-Ohio-4478 , 853 N.E.2d 283 , at ¶ 8. {¶ 21} Here, the triple-count provision is applicable because Mitchell was held *Page 4 solely on the pending charges listed above and was held in jail in lieu of bail. | 9 | 2003–2008 |
State v. Bradley
green
2 sentences2023Ineffective Assistance {¶21} Mitchell argues that he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel on the basis that counsel: (1) permitted him to enter a guilty plea to a nonexistent charge; (2) failed to ensure that he understood the charge to which he pled; (3) failed to pursue his claim of a speedy-trial violation; (4) waived time without his permission; and (5) failed to have his misdemeanor charges bound over from municipal court to the court of common pleas. {¶22} In order to reverse a conviction for ineffective assistance of counsel, “the defendant must demonstrate that (1) counsel’ 2023Ineffective Assistance {¶21} Mitchell argues that he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel on the basis that counsel: (1) permitted him to enter a guilty plea to a nonexistent charge; (2) failed to ensure that he understood the charge to which he pled; (3) failed to pursue his claim of a speedy-trial violation; (4) waived time without his permission; and (5) failed to have his misdemeanor charges bound over from municipal court to the court of common pleas. {¶22} In order to reverse a conviction for ineffective assistance of counsel, “the defendant must demonstrate that (1) counsel’ | 5 | 2006–2026 |
| State v. Selvage green | 5 | 1998–2018 |
| State v. Morgan, 07ca0124-M (10-27-2008) green | 4 | 2009–2023 |
| State v. Sinkovitz neutral | 4 | 2016–2018 |
| Moore v. Arizona green | 4 | 1990–2013 |
| State v. Brown green | 4 | 2005–2012 |
| Village of Montpelier v. Greeno green | 3 | 1990–2025 |
| State v. Snyder, Unpublished Decision (6-25-2004) neutral | 3 | 2020–2024 |
| State v. Bias green | 3 | 2023–2024 |
| State v. James green | 3 | 2021–2022 |
| State v. Burgess, Unpublished Decision (8-20-2004) green | 3 | 2007–2019 |
| State v. Easley, Unpublished Decision (2-22-2005) green | 3 | 2018–2019 |
| State v. Baker green | 3 | 2001–2018 |
| State v. McBreen green | 3 | 1999–2017 |
| State v. Thieshen green | 3 | 2013–2014 |
| State v. Steiner green | 3 | 2013–2014 |
| State v. Bauer green | 3 | 2007–2011 |
| State v. Stewart, Unpublished Decision (2-23-2006) green | 3 | 2007–2008 |
| State v. Moreland green | 3 | 2002–2006 |
| State v. Chiles green | 2 | 2020–2024 |
| State v. Mango green | 2 | 2022–2024 |
| State v. Burks green | 2 | 2022–2024 |
| State v. McKinney green | 2 | 2022–2023 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.