speedy trial violation in Delaware

2026Defendant’s Assertion of the Right to a Speedy Trial A defendant’s failure to assert the right to a speedy trial will make it difficult '4 Barker, 407 U.S. at 531 (emphasis added). 'S Harris v. State, 956 A.2d 1273, 1277 (Del. 2008). 5 to prove that the Court denied a defendant a speedy trial!® because the failure to assert carries significant weight in the third Barker factor analysis.'’ A defendant has some responsibility to assert speedy trial rights in a timely manner.’® A defendant’s failure to demand a speedy trial does not bar the defendant from eventually raising it, but acquiescence i

2023Finally, McGriff does not identify the evidence that he claims the police failed to preserve or how this evidence would be material to his guilt or innocence. (18) To determine if there is a speedy trial violation, we use the four-factor balancing test set forth in Barker v. Wingo.7 The four factors are the length of the delay, the reason for the delay, the defendant’s assertion of his right, and the prejudice to the defendant.8 The factors are related and no one factor is conclusive.9 6 438 U.S. at 155-56 . 7 407 U.S. 514 (1972).

2023Unless ‘there is some delay which is presumptively prejudicial,’ there is no reason to review the other factors.” (quoting Scott, 521 A.2d at 239 )); see also Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647 , 651–52 (1992) (“Simply to trigger a speedy trial analysis, an accused must allege that the interval between accusation and trial has crossed the threshold dividing ordinary from presumptively prejudicial delay, since, by definition, he cannot complain that the government has denied him a speedy trial if it has, in fact, prosecuted his case with customary promptness.” (internal quotations and citat

2014July 21, 2011) (citing Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530 (1972)). 9 Id. (citing Middlebrook v. State, 802 A.2d 268, 273-74 (Del. 2002). 5 on January 7, 2013.10 It further appears that Davis was released on bail on November 29, 2012 and remained out on bail until his conviction on September 5, 2013.11 Under these circumstances, we do not find the delay in this case to be presumptively prejudicial and conclude without further analysis that Davis’ claim of a speedy trial violation is without merit.12 (12) In his third point on appeal, Davis claims that the prosecutor misrepresented the evidence

2023See also Johnson v. State, 305 A.2d 622, 623 (Del. 1973) (adopting Barker test)). 8 Barker, 407 U.S. at 530 . 9 Id. at 533 . 7 (19) A defendant’s right to a speedy trial “attaches as soon as the defendant is accused of a crime through arrest or indictment whichever occurs first.”10 Unless the length of delay is determined to be “presumptively prejudicial,” it is not necessary to consider the additional Barker factors.11 This Court has held that if the delay between arrest or indictment and trial approaches one year, then the Court will generally consider the additional factors.12 (20) More tha

1983However, it contends that Key caused part of the alleged delay, and in any event, he suffered no prejudice. *636 When this Court considered a speedy trial challenge to an alleged sentencing delay in Johnson v. State, Del.Supr., 305 A.2d 622 (1973), there was no definitive decision on that subject from the Supreme Court of the United States.

2023Unless ‘there is some delay which is presumptively prejudicial,’ there is no reason to review the other factors.” (quoting Scott, 521 A.2d at 239 )); see also Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647 , 651–52 (1992) (“Simply to trigger a speedy trial analysis, an accused must allege that the interval between accusation and trial has crossed the threshold dividing ordinary from presumptively prejudicial delay, since, by definition, he cannot complain that the government has denied him a speedy trial if it has, in fact, prosecuted his case with customary promptness.” (internal quotations and citat

2023Unless ‘there is some delay which is presumptively prejudicial,’ there is no reason to review the other factors.” (quoting Scott, 521 A.2d at 239 )); see also Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647 , 651–52 (1992) (“Simply to trigger a speedy trial analysis, an accused must allege that the interval between accusation and trial has crossed the threshold dividing ordinary from presumptively prejudicial delay, since, by definition, he cannot complain that the government has denied him a speedy trial if it has, in fact, prosecuted his case with customary promptness.” (internal quotations and citat

2021Length of the Delay The threshold question is the length of the delay.15 Unless there is some delay which is presumptively prejudicial, there is no reason to review the other factors.16 The length of delay that “will provoke such an inquiry is necessarily dependent on the particular circumstances.17 Generally, a delay in excess of one year between the time the right to a speedy trial attaches and the defendant’s trial is presumptively 11 Middlebrook v. State, 802 A.2d 268, 273 (Del. 2002). 12 Middlebrook, 802 A.2d at 273 . 13 Id.; see also Barker, 407 U.S. at 533 , 92 S.Ct. 2182 . 14 Middlebro

2015Skinner v. State, 575 A.2d 1108, 1116 (Del. 1990).

2026Defendant’s Assertion of the Right to a Speedy Trial A defendant’s failure to assert the right to a speedy trial will make it difficult '4 Barker, 407 U.S. at 531 (emphasis added). 'S Harris v. State, 956 A.2d 1273, 1277 (Del. 2008). 5 to prove that the Court denied a defendant a speedy trial!® because the failure to assert carries significant weight in the third Barker factor analysis.'’ A defendant has some responsibility to assert speedy trial rights in a timely manner.’® A defendant’s failure to demand a speedy trial does not bar the defendant from eventually raising it, but acquiescence i

2026It is unclear exactly what Cosme is alleging since he had a preliminary hearing and his attorney cross-examined the 34 Dawson v. State, 673 A.2d 1186, 1196 (Del. 1996). 35 Strickland, 446 U.S. at 689. 36 Id. at 694. 37 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697 ; Ploof v. State, 75 A.3d 811, 825 (Del. 2013) (“Strickland is a two-pronged test, and there is no need to examine whether an attorney performed deficiently if the deficiency did not prejudice the defendant.”). 8 State’s witness.38 In any event, Cosme’s guilty plea waived any right to challenge any errors or defects before the plea.39 Furthermore, any

2026It is unclear exactly what Cosme is alleging since he had a preliminary hearing and his attorney cross-examined the 34 Dawson v. State, 673 A.2d 1186, 1196 (Del. 1996). 35 Strickland, 446 U.S. at 689. 36 Id. at 694. 37 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697 ; Ploof v. State, 75 A.3d 811, 825 (Del. 2013) (“Strickland is a two-pronged test, and there is no need to examine whether an attorney performed deficiently if the deficiency did not prejudice the defendant.”). 8 State’s witness.38 In any event, Cosme’s guilty plea waived any right to challenge any errors or defects before the plea.39 Furthermore, any

2026The States apply this right through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.’ The Delaware Constitution provides the same rights to criminal defendants under Article I, Section 7.° In Barker, the United States Supreme Court established a totality-of- the-circumstances balancing test for Courts to determine whether a speedy-trial violation has occurred.° Under the Barker test, the Court weighs the conduct of both the prosecution and the defendant by considering the following factors: “(1) the length of delay; (2) the reason for the delay; (3) the defendant’s assertion of the right to

2023Unless ‘there is some delay which is presumptively prejudicial,’ there is no reason to review the other factors.” (quoting Scott, 521 A.2d at 239 )); see also Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647 , 651–52 (1992) (“Simply to trigger a speedy trial analysis, an accused must allege that the interval between accusation and trial has crossed the threshold dividing ordinary from presumptively prejudicial delay, since, by definition, he cannot complain that the government has denied him a speedy trial if it has, in fact, prosecuted his case with customary promptness.” (internal quotations and citat

2020Ct. R. 8; Page v. State, 934 A.2d 891, 896 (Del. 2007). 10 407 U.S. 514 (1972).

2016Finally, Brown’s arguments do not implicate the Court’s conclusion that the fourth Barker factor_prejudice resulting from the delay_weighs heavily in 22 Mzdalebm@k v. s¢are, 802 A.zd 268, 275 (Dei. 2002). 23 Douglas v. Cathel, 456 F.3d 403, 418 (3d Cir. 2006) (explaining that a pro se defendant "does not have to make a procedurally perfect assertion of his speedy trial rights, but must make a ‘reasonable assertion’ of the right so as to put authorities on notice of his Sixth Amendment claim." (citing G0v ’t of the Virgz'n Is. v. Pemberlon, 813 F.2d 626, 629 (3d Cir. l987))). 24 Dippola', 1992

2016Finally, Brown’s arguments do not implicate the Court’s conclusion that the fourth Barker factor_prejudice resulting from the delay_weighs heavily in 22 Mzdalebm@k v. s¢are, 802 A.zd 268, 275 (Dei. 2002). 23 Douglas v. Cathel, 456 F.3d 403, 418 (3d Cir. 2006) (explaining that a pro se defendant "does not have to make a procedurally perfect assertion of his speedy trial rights, but must make a ‘reasonable assertion’ of the right so as to put authorities on notice of his Sixth Amendment claim." (citing G0v ’t of the Virgz'n Is. v. Pemberlon, 813 F.2d 626, 629 (3d Cir. l987))). 24 Dippola', 1992

2016Finally, Brown’s arguments do not implicate the Court’s conclusion that the fourth Barker factor_prejudice resulting from the delay_weighs heavily in 22 Mzdalebm@k v. s¢are, 802 A.zd 268, 275 (Dei. 2002). 23 Douglas v. Cathel, 456 F.3d 403, 418 (3d Cir. 2006) (explaining that a pro se defendant "does not have to make a procedurally perfect assertion of his speedy trial rights, but must make a ‘reasonable assertion’ of the right so as to put authorities on notice of his Sixth Amendment claim." (citing G0v ’t of the Virgz'n Is. v. Pemberlon, 813 F.2d 626, 629 (3d Cir. l987))). 24 Dippola', 1992

2014Ct. R. 8. 6 Wainwright v. State, 504 A.2d 1096, 1100 (Del. 1986) (citations omitted). 4 (9) Contrary to Davis’ claim on appeal, Delaware law does not require that the State perform any specific testing on the physical evidence that it gathers.7 In the absence of any indication that Davis requested DNA testing or that DNA testing would have affirmatively proven that he did not possess the gun, Davis has not demonstrated that he was prejudiced by the State’s decision not to submit his DNA sample for testing and not to present any DNA evidence at trial. (10) Davis’ second point on appeal alleges

2014Mar. 18, 1999) (citing Deberry v. State, 457 A.2d 744, 751 (Del. 1983)). 8 Hicks v. State, 2011 WL 2937393 , *2 (Del.

1987See, e.g., Whalen v. State, Del.Supr., 492 A.2d 552, 568-69 (1985).

1987United States v. Loud Hawk, 474 U.S. 302 , -, 106 S.Ct. 648, 655 , 88 L.Ed.2d 640, 654 (1986).

1987United States v. Loud Hawk, 474 U.S. 302 , -, 106 S.Ct. 648, 655 , 88 L.Ed.2d 640, 654 (1986).