speedy trial violation in Kansas

1998In Bryson , the Hawaii Supreme Court found that where a defendant originally claimed a speedy trial violation and alleged prejudice from preindictment delay, an evidentiary hearing was needed to determine if the delay prejudiced the defendant under United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307 , 30 L.

1998In Bryson , the Hawaii Supreme Court found that where a defendant originally claimed a speedy trial violation and alleged prejudice from preindictment delay, an evidentiary hearing was needed to determine if the delay prejudiced the defendant under United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307 , 30 L.

2021The second judge held the reset trial fell within the 30-day extension allowed by the crowded docket exception and the record showed the first judge had implicitly relied on the exception because the first judge had another trial set that day. 42 Kan.

2021The second judge held the reset trial fell within the 30-day extension allowed by the crowded docket exception and the record showed the first judge had implicitly relied on the exception because the first judge had another trial set that day. 42 Kan.

1998Such conduct includes requesting . . . the grant of a continuance.”); State v. *546 Brown, 249 Kan 698, 704, 823 P.2d 190 (1991) (“[I]n determining a speedy trial violation pursuant to K.S.A. 22-3402, ‘any period of delay resulting from a continuance granted at the request of the defendant is to be excluded in computing the time for trial under the statute.’ ”) (Quoting State v. Porter, Green & Smith, 228 Kan. 345, 353 , 615 P.2d 146 [1980]).

1998Such conduct includes requesting . . . the grant of a continuance.”); State v. *546 Brown, 249 Kan 698, 704, 823 P.2d 190 (1991) (“[I]n determining a speedy trial violation pursuant to K.S.A. 22-3402, ‘any period of delay resulting from a continuance granted at the request of the defendant is to be excluded in computing the time for trial under the statute.’ ”) (Quoting State v. Porter, Green & Smith, 228 Kan. 345, 353 , 615 P.2d 146 [1980]).

2022The Court in Doggett found that the durational requirement for relief without specific prejudice was met where the delay attributable to the government's negligence was six years, an amount that "far exceeds the [one-year] threshold needed to state a speedy trial claim." 505 U.S. at 658 .

2022The defendant was entitled to relief because the presumption of general prejudice was not "persuasively rebutted." 505 U.S. at 658 .

2022See, e.g., State v. Cotton, 306 Kan. 156 , 159, 392 P.3d 116 (2017); State v. Ford, 302 Kan. 455, 464, 467 , 353 P.3d 1143 (2015). 3 State v. Taylor, 299 Kan. 5 , Syl. ¶ 1, 319 P.3d 1256 (2014) is even clearer: "A speedy trial claim is not properly raised in a motion to correct an illegal sentence under K.S.A. 22-3504." Even assuming the district court violated Adkins' speedy trial rights, such a claim would not divest the district court of jurisdiction to convict him of rape and to sentence him for that crime.

2022See, e.g., State v. Cotton, 306 Kan. 156 , 159, 392 P.3d 116 (2017); State v. Ford, 302 Kan. 455, 464, 467 , 353 P.3d 1143 (2015). 3 State v. Taylor, 299 Kan. 5 , Syl. ¶ 1, 319 P.3d 1256 (2014) is even clearer: "A speedy trial claim is not properly raised in a motion to correct an illegal sentence under K.S.A. 22-3504." Even assuming the district court violated Adkins' speedy trial rights, such a claim would not divest the district court of jurisdiction to convict him of rape and to sentence him for that crime.

2022Rowland, 289 Kan. at 1087 . 12 In an attempt to meet his burden, he argues his appellate counsel "stated that she planned to raise the speedy trial claim on direct appeal but failed to raise the issue." However, as discussed above, Baskin did not call his appellate counsel to testify at the K.S.A. 60-1507 hearing.

2021App. 2d 560, 561 , 105 P.3d 727 (2005), where the Court of Appeals determined that a speedy trial waiver was not unconditional when it was made in connection with an agreed continuance that would bring the matter before the court again on a date certain.

2020State v. Owens, 310 Kan. 865 , 868, 451 P.3d 467 (2019).

2020Calderon, 233 Kan. at 96 ; Brooks, 206 Kan. 418 , Syl. ¶ 2.

2020Calderon, 233 Kan. at 96 ; Brooks, 206 Kan. 418 , Syl. ¶ 2.

2020See Timley, 255 Kan. at 294 ; Lawrence, 38 Kan.

2019For instance, in In re McMicken, Petitioner , 39 Kan. 406 , 408, 18 P. 473 (1888), the court opined that there was "no question that the petitioner was entitled to his discharge" for a speedy trial violation and "[t]he only serious question in the case [was] whether habeas corpus is the proper remedy." A majority of the McMicken court held habeas corpus relief was proper because "that proceeding is the only one which affords him a speedy remedy." 39 Kan. at 409 , 18 P. 473 .

2019For instance, in In re McMicken, Petitioner , 39 Kan. 406 , 408, 18 P. 473 (1888), the court opined that there was "no question that the petitioner was entitled to his discharge" for a speedy trial violation and "[t]he only serious question in the case [was] whether habeas corpus is the proper remedy." A majority of the McMicken court held habeas corpus relief was proper because "that proceeding is the only one which affords him a speedy remedy." 39 Kan. at 409 , 18 P. 473 .

2018At the status hearings, Snyder consistently objected to continuances of the criminal case on the grounds that he suffered a speedy trial violation under Barker v. Wingo , 407 U.S. 514 , 92 S.Ct. 2182 , 33 L.Ed. 2d 101 (1972), and a due process violation under Jackson v. Indiana , 406 U.S. 715 , 92 S.Ct. 1845 , 32 L.Ed. 2d 435 (1972).

2018At the status hearings, Snyder consistently objected to continuances of the criminal case on the grounds that he suffered a speedy trial violation under Barker v. Wingo , 407 U.S. 514 , 92 S.Ct. 2182 , 33 L.Ed. 2d 101 (1972), and a due process violation under Jackson v. Indiana , 406 U.S. 715 , 92 S.Ct. 1845 , 32 L.Ed. 2d 435 (1972).

2016App. 2d 401, 408-09 , 262 P.3d 1070 (2011) (recognizing that a speedy trial claim is waived if not raised before the district court).

2016See United States v. Ghailani, 733 F.3d 29 , 30 44 (2d Cir. 2013) (recognizing that although other panels in the Second Circuit had previously used an abuse of discretion standard, "a district court is in no better position than a reviewing court to undertake the required balancing"); People v. Crane, 195 Ill. 2d 42, 51-52 , 743 N.E.2d 555 (2001) (reasoning that because the trial court is in no better position than the reviewing court to apply the Barker factors, appellate courts should review a defendant's constitutional speedy trial challenge de novo); see also Hurst v. State, 195 So. 3d 736

2016See United States v. Ghailani, 733 F.3d 29 , 30 44 (2d Cir. 2013) (recognizing that although other panels in the Second Circuit had previously used an abuse of discretion standard, "a district court is in no better position than a reviewing court to undertake the required balancing"); People v. Crane, 195 Ill. 2d 42, 51-52 , 743 N.E.2d 555 (2001) (reasoning that because the trial court is in no better position than the reviewing court to apply the Barker factors, appellate courts should review a defendant's constitutional speedy trial challenge de novo); see also Hurst v. State, 195 So. 3d 736

2011The State appealed therefrom, arguing that because the defendant had appealed his case to district court prior to sentencing by the magistrate judge, the district court never acquired jurisdiction and could not dismiss the case on a speedy trial violation. 266 Kan. at 104 .

2011On appeal, the defendant argued that the district court had jurisdiction to dismiss because K.S.A. 1997 Supp. 22-3609a(1) permitted an appeal of “any judgment,” and a finding of guilt by a magistrate judge constituted a judgment. 266 Kan. at 105 .

2008The Bloom court stated that the defendant was required to revoke his waiver before he could allege a speedy trial violation. 273 Kan. at 310 .

2007The State relies on State v. Fitch, 249 Kan. 562 , 819 P.2d 1225 (1991), and State v. Sherman, 217 Kan. 326 , 536 P.2d 1373 (1974), for the proposition that Adams’ failure to object to the trial setting waived his statutory right to a speedy trial.

2007The State relies on State v. Fitch, 249 Kan. 562 , 819 P.2d 1225 (1991), and State v. Sherman, 217 Kan. 326 , 536 P.2d 1373 (1974), for the proposition that Adams’ failure to object to the trial setting waived his statutory right to a speedy trial.