speedy trial claim in Georgia

2020This second part of the speedy trial analysis “requires courts to engage in a difficult and sensitive balancing process and necessarily compels them to approach speedy trial cases on an ad hoc basis.” Ruffin v. State, 284 Ga. 52, 56 (2) (b) ( 663 SE2d 189 ) (2008) (citation and punctuation omitted).

2017We have noted in the context of a speedy trial challenge that a person convicted on one charge could still suffer harm from delayed prosecution on another because “the possibility that the defendant already in prison might receive a sentence at least partially concurrent with the one he is serving may be forever lost if trial of the pending charge is postponed.” Ruffin v. State, 284 Ga. 52, 58 (2) (b) (i), n.25 ( 663 SE2d 189 ) (2008) (quoting Smith v. Hooey, 393 U.S. 374, 378 ( 89 SCt 575 , 21 LE2d 607) (1969)).

2024Although we recognize that extraordinarily long pre- trial delays “simultaneously increase the degree of prejudice pre- sumed and decrease the expectation that the defendant can demon- strate tangible prejudice,” it remains true that “the passage of time is not alone sufficient to sustain a speedy trial claim.” Williams v. State, 277 Ga. 598, 601 (1) (d) (592 SE2d 848) (2004).

2024Although we recognize that extraordinarily long pre- trial delays “simultaneously increase the degree of prejudice pre- sumed and decrease the expectation that the defendant can demon- strate tangible prejudice,” it remains true that “the passage of time is not alone sufficient to sustain a speedy trial claim.” Williams v. State, 277 Ga. 598, 601 (1) (d) (592 SE2d 848) (2004).

2025Kitchens may raise them again in a renewed appeal if the trial court rejects the speedy-trial claim on remand. 2 the two-part framework set forth in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 ( 92 SCt 2182 , 33 LE2d 101) (1972), and refined in Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647 ( 112 SCt 2686 , 120 LE2d 520) (1992).

2025Kitchens may raise them again in a renewed appeal if the trial court rejects the speedy-trial claim on remand. 2 the two-part framework set forth in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 ( 92 SCt 2182 , 33 LE2d 101) (1972), and refined in Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647 ( 112 SCt 2686 , 120 LE2d 520) (1992).

2025Kitchens may raise them again in a renewed appeal if the trial court rejects the speedy-trial claim on remand. 2 the two-part framework set forth in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 ( 92 SCt 2182 , 33 LE2d 101) (1972), and refined in Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647 ( 112 SCt 2686 , 120 LE2d 520) (1992).

2025Kitchens may raise them again in a renewed appeal if the trial court rejects the speedy-trial claim on remand. 2 the two-part framework set forth in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 ( 92 SCt 2182 , 33 LE2d 101) (1972), and refined in Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647 ( 112 SCt 2686 , 120 LE2d 520) (1992).

2022See Labbee, 362 Ga. App. at 562-563 (1)-(2) (a), 565 (2) (b) (iv). 10 necessary analysis.6 See Johnson, 291 Ga. at 868 (3) (concluding that the trial court had erred in its consideration of the Barker-Doggett factors and remanding “for the trial court to correctly apply the pertinent legal principles” and reconsider the defendant’s speedy trial claim); Porter, 288 Ga. at 534 (2) (e) (holding that “the trial court could not properly balance the Barker factors” due to errors and omissions in its speedy trial analysis, which required a remand for the court “to exercise its discretion again using

2015In reviewing the trial court’s resolution of a speedy trial claim, we must accept the court’s findings of fact if the record contains any evidence to support them, and we will defer to the trial court’s “ultimate conclusion . . . unless it amounts to an abuse of discretion, even though we might have reached a different conclusion were the issue committed to our discretion.” State v. Buckner, 292 Ga. 390, 391 ( 738 SE2d 65 ) (2013). “[T]he trial court’s order must provide sufficient findings of fact and conclusions of law to permit this Court to determine if the trial court properly exercised i

2020See, e.g., Heard, 295 Ga. at 563 (explaining that when this Court reviews a speedy trial claim, “[w]e must accept the [trial] court’s findings of fact if the record contains any evidence to support them, and we will defer to the court’s ‘ultimate conclusion . . . unless it amounts to an abuse of discretion’” (citation omitted)); State v. Buckner, 292 Ga. 390, 393 ( 738 SE2d 65 ) (2013) (explaining that the weighing of the Barker-Doggett factors “is committed to the substantial discretion of the trial court, and ‘its ultimate judgment is reviewed on appeal only for an abuse of that discretion’”

2020See, e.g., Heard, 295 Ga. at 563 (explaining that when this Court reviews a speedy trial claim, “[w]e must accept the [trial] court’s findings of fact if the record contains any evidence to support them, and we will defer to the court’s ‘ultimate conclusion . . . unless it amounts to an abuse of discretion’” (citation omitted)); State v. Buckner, 292 Ga. 390, 393 ( 738 SE2d 65 ) (2013) (explaining that the weighing of the Barker-Doggett factors “is committed to the substantial discretion of the trial court, and ‘its ultimate judgment is reviewed on appeal only for an abuse of that discretion’”

2012See Brewington v. State, 288 Ga. 520, 522-523 (3) (b) (i) ( 705 SE2d 660 ) (2011) (holding that, where the trial court had denied the speedy trial claim, its error in the defendant’s favor could not have affected its ultimate judgment, allowing the judgment to be affirmed).

2012See Brewington v. State, 288 Ga. 520, 522-523 (3) (b) (i) ( 705 SE2d 660 ) (2011) (holding that, where the trial court had denied the speedy trial claim, its error in the defendant’s favor could not have affected its ultimate judgment, allowing the judgment to be affirmed).

2012Although a statutory demand for speedy trial pursuant to OCGA § 17-7-170 is not required in order to prevail on a speedy trial claim on constitutional grounds, see State v. White, 282 Ga. 859, 862 (2) (c) ( 655 SE2d 575 ) (2008), our courts have held that “[a] defendant’s pre-indictment silence can weigh heavily against him.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) State v. Auerswald, 198 Ga. App. 183, 185 (3) ( 401 SE2d 27 ) (1990).

2012Although a statutory demand for speedy trial pursuant to OCGA § 17-7-170 is not required in order to prevail on a speedy trial claim on constitutional grounds, see State v. White, 282 Ga. 859, 862 (2) (c) ( 655 SE2d 575 ) (2008), our courts have held that “[a] defendant’s pre-indictment silence can weigh heavily against him.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) State v. Auerswald, 198 Ga. App. 183, 185 (3) ( 401 SE2d 27 ) (1990).

2012“The length of the delay ‘actually figures into the speedy trial analysis in two respects.’ [Cit.]” Scandrett v. State, 279 Ga. 632, 633 (1) (a) ( 619 SE2d 603 ) (2005).

2012“The length of the delay ‘actually figures into the speedy trial analysis in two respects.’ [Cit.]” Scandrett v. State, 279 Ga. 632, 633 (1) (a) ( 619 SE2d 603 ) (2005).

2010It is true that "[a] trial court's findings of fact and weighing of those facts in a speedy trial claim generally are reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard." Williams v. State, 277 Ga. 598, 601 , 592 S.E.2d 848 (2004) (citing State v. Redding, 274 Ga. 831, 832 , 561 S.E.2d 79 (2002)).

2010It is true that "[a] trial court's findings of fact and weighing of those facts in a speedy trial claim generally are reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard." Williams v. State, 277 Ga. 598, 601 , 592 S.E.2d 848 (2004) (citing State v. Redding, 274 Ga. 831, 832 , 561 S.E.2d 79 (2002)).

2019Accordingly, we must vacate the trial court's order and remand the case "for the entry of an order containing appropriate findings of fact and conclusions of law [on the speedy trial claim]." Johnson , 300 Ga. at 252 , 794 S.E.2d 60 .

2019Accordingly, we must vacate the trial court's order and remand the case "for the entry of an order containing appropriate findings of fact and conclusions of law [on the speedy trial claim]." Johnson , 300 Ga. at 252 , 794 S.E.2d 60 .

2019See Darling v. McLaughlin , 299 Ga. 106 , 108, 786 S.E.2d 657 (2016) (remanding the case to the habeas court because that court analyzed only one of the two possible legal grounds for voluntary dismissal); State v. Pickett , 288 Ga. 674 , 680, 706 S.E.2d 561 (2011) (concluding that because the trial court made significant legal errors and some factual errors in its order ruling on a speedy trial claim, "[t]he Court of Appeals ... erred in affirming rather than vacating the trial court's judgment and remanding the case for the court to exercise its discretion again using properly-supported fact

2019See Darling v. McLaughlin , 299 Ga. 106 , 108, 786 S.E.2d 657 (2016) (remanding the case to the habeas court because that court analyzed only one of the two possible legal grounds for voluntary dismissal); State v. Pickett , 288 Ga. 674 , 680, 706 S.E.2d 561 (2011) (concluding that because the trial court made significant legal errors and some factual errors in its order ruling on a speedy trial claim, "[t]he Court of Appeals ... erred in affirming rather than vacating the trial court's judgment and remanding the case for the court to exercise its discretion again using properly-supported fact

2012See Wilkie v. State, 290 Ga. 450, 451 ( 721 SE2d 830 ) (2012) (calculating length of delay from arrest to the denial of the motion for discharge and acquittal); Scandrett, 279 Ga. at 633 (1) (a) (speedy trial right attaches “ ‘at the time of arrest or when formal charges are brought, whichever is earlier’ ”); Williams, 277 Ga. at 599 (“The relevant time period in a speedy trial claim begins with the earlier of the date of indictment and the date of arrest”) (emphasis in original); Boseman v. State, 263 Ga. 730, 731 (1) ( 438 SE2d 626 ) (1994).

2012See Wilkie v. State, 290 Ga. 450, 451 ( 721 SE2d 830 ) (2012) (calculating length of delay from arrest to the denial of the motion for discharge and acquittal); Scandrett, 279 Ga. at 633 (1) (a) (speedy trial right attaches “ ‘at the time of arrest or when formal charges are brought, whichever is earlier’ ”); Williams, 277 Ga. at 599 (“The relevant time period in a speedy trial claim begins with the earlier of the date of indictment and the date of arrest”) (emphasis in original); Boseman v. State, 263 Ga. 730, 731 (1) ( 438 SE2d 626 ) (1994).

2025Because “it is ‘imperative’ that ‘the trial court enter findings of fact and conclusions of law consistent with Barker,’” Goins v. State, 306 Ga. 55, 57-58 ( 829 SE2d 89 ) (2019) (citation omitted), and because “‘[i]t is not the role of an appellate court to weigh the Barker factors in the first instance,’” Nelson, 321 Ga. at 466 (citation omitted), we vacate in part the trial court’s order denying Kitchens’s motion for new trial and remand the case for the court to address the speedy- trial claim in a manner consistent with this opinion.

2025Because “it is ‘imperative’ that ‘the trial court enter findings of fact and conclusions of law consistent with Barker,’” Goins v. State, 306 Ga. 55, 57-58 ( 829 SE2d 89 ) (2019) (citation omitted), and because “‘[i]t is not the role of an appellate court to weigh the Barker factors in the first instance,’” Nelson, 321 Ga. at 466 (citation omitted), we vacate in part the trial court’s order denying Kitchens’s motion for new trial and remand the case for the court to address the speedy- trial claim in a manner consistent with this opinion.

2014See also Singleton v. State, 317 Ga. App. 637, 638 ( 732 SE2d 312 ) (2012). “[N]o single factor is necessary or sufficient to sustain a speedy trial claim,” as the factors are considered together in the balancing test of the conduct of the prosecution and the defendant.

2014See also Singleton v. State, 317 Ga. App. 637, 638 ( 732 SE2d 312 ) (2012). “[N]o single factor is necessary or sufficient to sustain a speedy trial claim,” as the factors are considered together in the balancing test of the conduct of the prosecution and the defendant.

2024See also Jenkins v. State, 294 Ga. 506, 513 (2) (c) ( 755 SE2d 138 ) (2014) (“This test compels the examining court to consider and weigh all four factors in the context of the particular circumstances of the case at issue.”) “This second part of the speedy-trial analysis requires courts to engage in a difficult and sensitive balancing process and necessarily compels them to approach speedy-trial cases on an ad hoc basis.” Redding, 313 Ga. at 732 (2) (Citation and punctuation omitted.) In applying this test, courts must be aware that “no single factor is necessary 8 or sufficient to sustain a

2024See also Jenkins v. State, 294 Ga. 506, 513 (2) (c) ( 755 SE2d 138 ) (2014) (“This test compels the examining court to consider and weigh all four factors in the context of the particular circumstances of the case at issue.”) “This second part of the speedy-trial analysis requires courts to engage in a difficult and sensitive balancing process and necessarily compels them to approach speedy-trial cases on an ad hoc basis.” Redding, 313 Ga. at 732 (2) (Citation and punctuation omitted.) In applying this test, courts must be aware that “no single factor is necessary 8 or sufficient to sustain a

2013See Chalk, supra, 318 Ga. App. at 50 (1) (c) (v); Nealy, supra, 246 Ga. App. at 755 (3).

2013See Chalk, supra, 318 Ga. App. at 50 (1) (c) (v); Nealy, supra, 246 Ga. App. at 755 (3).

2012(Citation omitted.) Brown v. State, 287 Ga. 892, 894 (1) ( 700 SE2d 407 ) (2010).

2012(Citation omitted.) Brown v. State, 287 Ga. 892, 894 (1) ( 700 SE2d 407 ) (2010).

2012When evaluating the prejudice factor in the speedy trial analysis, courts must consider the “three interests which the speedy trial right is designed to protect: preventing oppressive pretrial incarceration, minimizing anxiety and concern of the defendant, and, most importantly, limiting the possibility that the defense will be impaired.” (Citation omitted.) Nelloms v. State, 274 Ga. 179, 181 ( 549 SE2d 381 ) (2001).

2012When evaluating the prejudice factor in the speedy trial analysis, courts must consider the “three interests which the speedy trial right is designed to protect: preventing oppressive pretrial incarceration, minimizing anxiety and concern of the defendant, and, most importantly, limiting the possibility that the defense will be impaired.” (Citation omitted.) Nelloms v. State, 274 Ga. 179, 181 ( 549 SE2d 381 ) (2001).

2005As defense counsel testified, “I never lose one that I don’t try.” Thus the third factor in the Barker analysis weighs against the defendant. “[W]hile the state has a duty to bring [the defendant] to speedy trial, the defendant has a responsibility to assert that right.” State v. Lively, 155 Ga. App. 402, 405 ( 270 SE2d 812 ) (1980); see also Collingsworth v. State, 224 Ga. App. 363, 366 (1) ( 480 SE2d 370 ) (1997) (balancing test is highly subjective because the defendant has a responsibility to assert a speedy trial claim and may have a potential interest in delaying any trial). 4.

2005As defense counsel testified, “I never lose one that I don’t try.” Thus the third factor in the Barker analysis weighs against the defendant. “[W]hile the state has a duty to bring [the defendant] to speedy trial, the defendant has a responsibility to assert that right.” State v. Lively, 155 Ga. App. 402, 405 ( 270 SE2d 812 ) (1980); see also Collingsworth v. State, 224 Ga. App. 363, 366 (1) ( 480 SE2d 370 ) (1997) (balancing test is highly subjective because the defendant has a responsibility to assert a speedy trial claim and may have a potential interest in delaying any trial). 4.

2024“First, the court must determine whether the [delay] is sufficiently long to 5 be considered ‘presumptively prejudicial.’ If not, the speedy trial claim fails at the threshold.” (Citation omitted.) Id.

2020This second part of the speedy trial analysis “requires courts to engage in a difficult and sensitive balancing process and necessarily compels them to approach speedy trial cases on an ad hoc basis.” Ruffin v. State, 284 Ga. 52, 56 (2) (b) ( 663 SE2d 189 ) (2008) (citation and punctuation omitted).

2023In Jackson, the prosecution delayed the appellant’s trial in order to try the appellant and his co-defendants together, and in opposing the appellant’s speedy trial claim, the State argued that “because th[e] 30 delay was not intentional, it is of no consequence.” Id.

2023In Jackson, the prosecution delayed the appellant’s trial in order to try the appellant and his co-defendants together, and in opposing the appellant’s speedy trial claim, the State argued that “because th[e] delay was not intentional, it is of no consequence.” Id.

2012That is, “[i]f such a presumption is not warranted, the analysis need go no farther because the accused’s speedy trial claim fails [.]” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Higgenbottom v. State, 290 Ga. 198, 200 (1) ( 719 SE2d 482 ) (2011).

2012That is, “[i]f such a presumption is not warranted, the analysis need go no farther because the accused’s speedy trial claim fails [.]” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Higgenbottom v. State, 290 Ga. 198, 200 (1) ( 719 SE2d 482 ) (2011).

2012See Wilkie v. State, 290 Ga. 450, 451 ( 721 SE2d 830 ) (2012) (calculating length of delay from arrest to the denial of the motion for discharge and acquittal); Scandrett, 279 Ga. at 633 (1) (a) (speedy trial right attaches “ ‘at the time of arrest or when formal charges are brought, whichever is earlier’ ”); Williams, 277 Ga. at 599 (“The relevant time period in a speedy trial claim begins with the earlier of the date of indictment and the date of arrest”) (emphasis in original); Boseman v. State, 263 Ga. 730, 731 (1) ( 438 SE2d 626 ) (1994).

2012See Wilkie v. State, 290 Ga. 450, 451 ( 721 SE2d 830 ) (2012) (calculating length of delay from arrest to the denial of the motion for discharge and acquittal); Scandrett, 279 Ga. at 633 (1) (a) (speedy trial right attaches “ ‘at the time of arrest or when formal charges are brought, whichever is earlier’ ”); Williams, 277 Ga. at 599 (“The relevant time period in a speedy trial claim begins with the earlier of the date of indictment and the date of arrest”) (emphasis in original); Boseman v. State, 263 Ga. 730, 731 (1) ( 438 SE2d 626 ) (1994).

2015Cf. Sosniak, 292 Ga. at 38 (2) (“[Pjretrial denial of a speedy trial claim can never be considered a complete, formal, and final rejection by the trial court of the defendant’s contention; rather, the question at stake in the motion to dismiss necessarily remains open, unfinished and inconclusive until the trial court has pronounced judgment.”) (citation and punctuation omitted). 29 As a general rule, “[t]he constitutional right to a speedy trial attaches either at the time of the defendant’s arrest or at the time of his indictment, whichever occurs earlier,” and “[a] delay of more than one ye

2012See Vermont v. Britton, supra, 556 U. S. at 94 (III) (C) (citation omitted).

2025However, in a speedy appeal claim, unlike a speedy trial claim, the failure to show actual prejudice from the delay is fatal to the claim, even when the other three factors weigh in the appellant’s favor.” Harper v. State, 318 Ga. 185 , 188 (1) ( 897 SE2d 818 ) (2024) (citation and punctuation omitted).

2025However, in a speedy appeal claim, unlike a speedy trial claim, the failure to show actual prejudice from the delay is fatal to the claim, even when the other three factors weigh in the appellant’s favor.” Harper v. State, 318 Ga. 185 , 188 (1) ( 897 SE2d 818 ) (2024) (citation and punctuation omitted).

2024Thus, on appeal from a ruling on a speedy trial claim, we accept the trial court’s factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous, and we review the trial court’s evaluation of each factor and its “balancing of [the] factors – its ultimate judgment” – “only for abuse of discretion.” Williams v. State, 314 Ga. 671, 678 (878 SE2d 553) (2022). (a) Length of the Delay and Presumptive Prejudice. (i) The Sixth Amendment speedy trial right “does not attach until . . . a defendant is arrested or formally accused.” Betterman v. Montana, 578 U.S. 437, 441 (136 SCt 1609, 194 LE2d 723) (2016) (citing

2024Thus, on appeal from a ruling on a speedy trial claim, we accept the trial court’s factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous, and we review the trial court’s evaluation of each factor and its “balancing of [the] factors – its ultimate judgment” – “only for abuse of discretion.” Williams v. State, 314 Ga. 671, 678 (878 SE2d 553) (2022). (a) Length of the Delay and Presumptive Prejudice. (i) The Sixth Amendment speedy trial right “does not attach until . . . a defendant is arrested or formally accused.” Betterman v. Montana, 578 U.S. 437, 441 (136 SCt 1609, 194 LE2d 723) (2016) (citing