38 Minnesota opinions name it 2 courts 1894–2016 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Minnesota courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Tozer v. Ocean Accident & Guarantee Corp.green2 sentences1977This is merely an application of the doctrine of estoppel.” And, in Tozer v. Ocean Accident & Guaranty Corp., 94 Minn. 478, 485 , 103 N.W. 509, 511 (1905), this court quoting from Davis v. Wakelee, 156 U.S. 680 , 15 S.Ct. 555 , 39 L.Ed. 578 (1895), said: “* * * ‘It may be laid down as a general proposition that where a party assumes a certain position in a legal proceeding, and succeeds in maintaining that position,, he may not thereafter, simply because his interests have changed, assume a contrary position, especially if it be to the prejudice of the party who has acquiesced in the position 1977This is merely an application of the doctrine of estoppel.” And, in Tozer v. Ocean Accident & Guaranty Corp., 94 Minn. 478, 485 , 103 N.W. 509, 511 (1905), this court quoting from Davis v. Wakelee, 156 U.S. 680 , 15 S.Ct. 555 , 39 L.Ed. 578 (1895), said: “* * * ‘It may be laid down as a general proposition that where a party assumes a certain position in a legal proceeding, and succeeds in maintaining that position,, he may not thereafter, simply because his interests have changed, assume a contrary position, especially if it be to the prejudice of the party who has acquiesced in the position | 2 | 3 |
Neuberger v. Hennepin County Workhousegreen2 sentences2014Workhouse, 340 N.W.2d 330, 332 (Minn.1983) (concluding that despite the absence of an estoppel exception in the Workers’ Compensation Act, an employer was estopped from asserting the statutory time bar because it had erroneously told the employee that his disability benefits would last indefinitely). 1985While this court has adopted an estoppel analysis in other cases dealing with the Workers’ Compensation Act, see Neuberger v. Hennepin County Workhouse, 340 N.W.2d 330 (Minn.1983) (employer estopped from asserting statute of limitations by its representation to employee that he would receive equivalent benefits under a group disability policy); Kahn v. State, 289 N.W.2d 737 (Minn.1980) (employer estopped from raising delay in filing of formal notice to bar employee’s claim where delay was induced by employer’s agent), it has yet to consider the issue under section 176.021, subd. | 1 | 2 |
City of North Oaks v. Sarpalgreen1 sentence2014See 797 N.W.2d at 22-27 . | 1 | 1 |
In Re Application for PERA Retirement Benefits of McGuiregreen1 sentence2012Benefits of McGuire, 756 N.W.2d 517, 519 (Minn.App.2008), review denied (Minn. Dec. 16, 2008); see also Axelson v. Minneapolis Teachers’ Ret. | 1 | 1 |
Anthony D. Duke v. Joel Hoch, Home Indemnity Company, Garnishee-Appelleegreen1 sentence2012Other courts have held in similar circumstances that whenever an insurer has a duty to defend and is controlling the defense, the insurer has a duty to inform the insured of the insured’s interest in obtaining an allocated award and the insured is “entitled to make the decision whether to seek an allocated [award].” Duke v. Hoch, 468 F.2d 973, 979 (5th Cir.1972) (concluding that an insurer’s reservation of its right to contest coverage was not sufficient to advise its insured of the insured’s interest in an allocated verdict, and therefore the insured was relieved of the burden to prove alloca | 1 | 1 |
State Bank of New Prague v. American Surety Co.green2 sentences2010Id. at 143-44 , 288 N.W. at 10-11 (citations omitted). 2010Id. at 143-44 , 288 N.W. at 10-11 (citations omitted). | 1 | 1 |
Heine v. Simongreen1 sentence2004See, e.g., Heine v. Simon, 674 N.W.2d 411 (Minn.App.2004) (holding that collateral estoppel does not apply and an injured claimant is not precluded from recovering damages in a tort action for a claim for lost wages after a workers’ compensation determination that wage loss was not caused by the claimant’s accident). | 1 | 1 |
Oak Glen of Edina v. Brewingtongreen1 sentence2002See Oak Glen, 642 N.W.2d at 487 (stating that a landlord need only refuse the final payment to protect itself against a claim of waiver). | 1 | 1 |
Betcher v. Rinehartgreen1 sentence1995Id. at 1026-27. | 1 | 1 |
Thiele v. Stichgreen1 sentence1994See Thiele, 425 N.W.2d at 582 (party may not raise same general issue decided by district court under new theory on appeal). | 1 | 1 |
Board of Education of City of Minneapolis v. Sandgreen2 sentences1972See, e. g., Board of Education v. Sand, 227 Minn. 202 , 34 N. W. 2d 689 (1948); The Alexander Co. v. City of Owatonna, 222 Minn. 312 , 24 N. W. 2d 244 (1946). 1972See, e. g., Board of Education v. Sand, 227 Minn. 202 , 34 N. W. 2d 689 (1948); The Alexander Co. v. City of Owatonna, 222 Minn. 312 , 24 N. W. 2d 244 (1946). | 1 | 1 |
| Sassen v. Haeglegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Knight v. Schwandtgreen | 1 | 1 |
| McKinney v. Harviegreen | 1 | 1 |
| McClure v. Bradfordgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Minnesota. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Davis v. Wakelee
green
2 sentences1977This is merely an application of the doctrine of estoppel.” And, in Tozer v. Ocean Accident & Guaranty Corp., 94 Minn. 478, 485 , 103 N.W. 509, 511 (1905), this court quoting from Davis v. Wakelee, 156 U.S. 680 , 15 S.Ct. 555 , 39 L.Ed. 578 (1895), said: “* * * ‘It may be laid down as a general proposition that where a party assumes a certain position in a legal proceeding, and succeeds in maintaining that position,, he may not thereafter, simply because his interests have changed, assume a contrary position, especially if it be to the prejudice of the party who has acquiesced in the position 1977This is merely an application of the doctrine of estoppel.” And, in Tozer v. Ocean Accident & Guaranty Corp., 94 Minn. 478, 485 , 103 N.W. 509, 511 (1905), this court quoting from Davis v. Wakelee, 156 U.S. 680 , 15 S.Ct. 555 , 39 L.Ed. 578 (1895), said: “* * * ‘It may be laid down as a general proposition that where a party assumes a certain position in a legal proceeding, and succeeds in maintaining that position,, he may not thereafter, simply because his interests have changed, assume a contrary position, especially if it be to the prejudice of the party who has acquiesced in the position | 2 | 1977–1977 |
Rees v. Lowy
green
2 sentences1927In Rees v. Lowy, 57 Minn. 381 , 59 N. W. 310 , the court said: “A surrender by operation of law can only be built up by invoking and relying on the doctrine of estoppel, — upon a condition *371 of facts, voluntarily assumed, incompatible with the existence of the relation of landlord and tenant between parties who have occupied that position.” And the court added that nothing is better settled than that a surrender “is not to be implied from the mere facts that the lessor assented to the assignment of the lease, and accepted rent from the assignee.” The decisions to the effect that the lessee 1927In Rees v. Lowy, 57 Minn. 381 , 59 N. W. 310 , the court said: “A surrender by operation of law can only be built up by invoking and relying on the doctrine of estoppel, — upon a condition *371 of facts, voluntarily assumed, incompatible with the existence of the relation of landlord and tenant between parties who have occupied that position.” And the court added that nothing is better settled than that a surrender “is not to be implied from the mere facts that the lessor assented to the assignment of the lease, and accepted rent from the assignee.” The decisions to the effect that the lessee | 2 | 1927–1932 |
Indiana v. Milk
green
2 sentences1925C.) 11 F. 389 , 397: “Resolute good faith should characterize the conduct of the states in their dealings with individuals, and. there is no reason, in morals or law, that will exempt, them from the doctrine of estoppel.” The courts hold that this defense applies to the state “in a proper case” without making a more concrete declaration. 1902C.) 11 Fed. 389 : “Resolute good faith should characterize the conduct of states in their dealings with individuals, and there is no reason in morals or law that will exempt from the doctrine of estoppel;” a large number of cases being cited. | 2 | 1902–1925 |
Martin v. Elwood
green
2 sentences1915The facts do not bring the case within Brown v. Hoag, 35 Minn. 373 , 29 N. W. 135 , and other like cases cited by plaintiff. 3. 1915Jur. § 805; Brown v. Hoag, 35 Minn. 373 , 29 N. W. 135 . 4. | 2 | 1915–1915 |
Brown v. Hoag
green
2 sentences1915The facts do not bring the case within Brown v. Hoag, 35 Minn. 373 , 29 N. W. 135 , and other like cases cited by plaintiff. 3. 1915Jur. § 805; Brown v. Hoag, 35 Minn. 373 , 29 N. W. 135 . 4. | 2 | 1915–1915 |
Pomerenke v. Farmers Life Insurance Co.
green
2 sentences2016Co. to conclude that Selective must provide Huynh with coverage. 228 Minn. 256 , 36 N.W.2d 703 (1949). 2016Co. to conclude that Selective must provide Huynh with coverage. 228 Minn. 256 , 36 N.W.2d 703 (1949). | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Yeh v. County of Cass
green
2 sentences2007Estoppel The estoppel doctrine may be applied “where justice demands” in order to prevent a local government from inappropriately “exercising its zoning powers.” Yeh, 696 N.W.2d at 131 . 2007Thus, “estoppel is available as a defense against the government if the government’s wrongful conduct threatens to work a serious injustice and if the public’s interest would not be unduly damaged by the imposition of es-toppel.” Id. (quotation omitted). | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Morton International, Inc. v. General Accident Insurance
green
2 sentences1994Id. 1994Id. | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Kahn v. State
green
1 sentence1985While this court has adopted an estoppel analysis in other cases dealing with the Workers’ Compensation Act, see Neuberger v. Hennepin County Workhouse, 340 N.W.2d 330 (Minn.1983) (employer estopped from asserting statute of limitations by its representation to employee that he would receive equivalent benefits under a group disability policy); Kahn v. State, 289 N.W.2d 737 (Minn.1980) (employer estopped from raising delay in filing of formal notice to bar employee’s claim where delay was induced by employer’s agent), it has yet to consider the issue under section 176.021, subd. | 1 | 1985–1985 |
State v. Johnson
green
2 sentences1977While it is true that in appropriate cases an estoppel or waiver may arise when a taxpayer idly refuses to raise his objections to a proposed special assessment at the time of the hearing (see, State v. Johnson, 111 Minn. 255 , 126 N. W. 1074 [1910]; 13A Dunnell, Dig. [3 ed.] § 6887a), we believe that in the present case plaintiffs adequately apprised the town board of their objections through the letter written by their attorney, which allowed the board to “hear and pass upon all objections to the proposed assessment, whether presented orally or in writing.” Minn. St. 429.061, subd. 2. 1977While it is true that in appropriate cases an estoppel or waiver may arise when a taxpayer idly refuses to raise his objections to a proposed special assessment at the time of the hearing (see, State v. Johnson, 111 Minn. 255 , 126 N. W. 1074 [1910]; 13A Dunnell, Dig. [3 ed.] § 6887a), we believe that in the present case plaintiffs adequately apprised the town board of their objections through the letter written by their attorney, which allowed the board to “hear and pass upon all objections to the proposed assessment, whether presented orally or in writing.” Minn. St. 429.061, subd. 2. | 1 | 1977–1977 |
Connor v. Great Western Savings & Loan Ass'n
green
2 sentences1974In Connor v. Conejo Valley Development Co. 61 Cal. Rptr. 333 (1967), and in Connor v. Great Western Savings & Loan Assn. 69 Cal. 2d 850 , 73 Cal. Rptr. 369 , 447 P. 2d 609 (1968), the lender of a construction loan was held under a duty to prospective purchasers and potentially liable with the developer for substantial structural defects of homes built on shifting-clay terrain. 1974In Connor v. Conejo Valley Development Co. 61 Cal. Rptr. 333 (1967), and in Connor v. Great Western Savings & Loan Assn. 69 Cal. 2d 850 , 73 Cal. Rptr. 369 , 447 P. 2d 609 (1968), the lender of a construction loan was held under a duty to prospective purchasers and potentially liable with the developer for substantial structural defects of homes built on shifting-clay terrain. | 1 | 1974–1974 |
The Alexander Co. v. City of Owatonna
green
2 sentences1972See, e. g., Board of Education v. Sand, 227 Minn. 202 , 34 N. W. 2d 689 (1948); The Alexander Co. v. City of Owatonna, 222 Minn. 312 , 24 N. W. 2d 244 (1946). 1972See, e. g., Board of Education v. Sand, 227 Minn. 202 , 34 N. W. 2d 689 (1948); The Alexander Co. v. City of Owatonna, 222 Minn. 312 , 24 N. W. 2d 244 (1946). | 1 | 1972–1972 |
Martha K. Butler Trust v. Commissioner of Taxation
neutral
2 sentences1956The decision in the Bremer case was followed in Butler Trust v. Commr. of Taxation, 246 Minn. 456 , 75 N. W. (2d) 476 , and in Jevne v. Commr. of Taxation, 246 Minn. 457 , 75 N. W. (2d) 477 . 1956The decision in the Bremer case was followed in Butler Trust v. Commr. of Taxation, 246 Minn. 456 , 75 N. W. (2d) 476 , and in Jevne v. Commr. of Taxation, 246 Minn. 457 , 75 N. W. (2d) 477 . | 1 | 1956–1956 |
Jevne v. Commissioner of Taxation
neutral
2 sentences1956The decision in the Bremer case was followed in Butler Trust v. Commr. of Taxation, 246 Minn. 456 , 75 N. W. (2d) 476 , and in Jevne v. Commr. of Taxation, 246 Minn. 457 , 75 N. W. (2d) 477 . 1956The decision in the Bremer case was followed in Butler Trust v. Commr. of Taxation, 246 Minn. 456 , 75 N. W. (2d) 476 , and in Jevne v. Commr. of Taxation, 246 Minn. 457 , 75 N. W. (2d) 477 . | 1 | 1956–1956 |
R. H. Stearns Co. v. United States
green
2 sentences1942Stearns Co. v. United States, 291 U. S. 54, 61 , 54 S. Ct. 325, 328 , 78 L. ed. 647, the court said: “We think it an unreasonable construction that would view the prohibition of the statute [of limitations] as overriding the doctrine of estoppel.” (Parenthetical matter supplied.) The authorities cited supra amply support that view. 1942Stearns Co. v. United States, 291 U. S. 54, 61 , 54 S. Ct. 325, 328 , 78 L. ed. 647, the court said: “We think it an unreasonable construction that would view the prohibition of the statute [of limitations] as overriding the doctrine of estoppel.” (Parenthetical matter supplied.) The authorities cited supra amply support that view. | 1 | 1942–1942 |
Shapley v. . Abbott
green
1 sentence1942We adopt and follow the rule that a party may be estopped to set up the statute of limitations as a defense by an oral agreement performed by the other party to his prejudice notwithstanding the requirement of § 9204 that such an agreement be in writing. *368 There are some cases to the contrary, of which the principal one is Shapley v. Abbott, 42 N. Y. 443 , 1 Am. | 1 | 1942–1942 |
Robbins v. Chicago City
green
1 sentence1939Robbins v. Chicago City, 4 Wall. 657 , 18 L. ed. 427. | 1 | 1939–1939 |
White v. Hill
green
2 sentences1934The Alabama case of White v. Hill, 176 Ala. 480 , 58 So. 444 , ivas a collateral attack in another suit on an order or decree of the probate court or court having probate jurisdiction. 1934The Alabama case of White v. Hill, 176 Ala. 480 , 58 So. 444 , ivas a collateral attack in another suit on an order or decree of the probate court or court having probate jurisdiction. | 1 | 1934–1934 |
Hilzinger, Jr. v. Novak
neutral
2 sentences1932Rees v. Lowy, 57 Minn. 381 , 59 N. W. 310 ; Hilzinger v. Novak, 172 Minn. 369 , 215 N. W. 515 . 1932Rees v. Lowy, 57 Minn. 381 , 59 N. W. 310 ; Hilzinger v. Novak, 172 Minn. 369 , 215 N. W. 515 . | 1 | 1932–1932 |
| Robertson v. Burton green | 1 | 1930–1930 |
| Soderberg v. Crosier neutral | 1 | 1930–1930 |
| Foley v. Smith neutral | 1 | 1924–1924 |
| Ham v. Wheaton green | 1 | 1915–1915 |
| Dimond v. Manheim green | 1 | 1915–1915 |
| Gregg v. Von Phul green | 1 | 1915–1915 |
| Baker v. Humphrey green | 1 | 1915–1915 |
| Barteau v. Merriam neutral | 1 | 1914–1914 |
| Abraham v. Holloway green | 1 | 1907–1907 |
| Dobbin v. Cordiner green | 1 | 1907–1907 |
| Jorgenson v. Jorgenson green | 1 | 1905–1905 |
| Stern v. Thayer neutral | 1 | 1894–1894 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.