estoppel doctrine in Maryland

2009As set out in Croyle : “The very heart of *595 the doctrine of estoppel, through laches, is that the defendant’s alleged change of position for the worse must have been induced by, or resulted from, the conduct, misrepresentation or silence of the plaintiff” 184 Md. at 136 , 40 A.2d at 379 .

2009As set out in Croyle : “The very heart of *595 the doctrine of estoppel, through laches, is that the defendant’s alleged change of position for the worse must have been induced by, or resulted from, the conduct, misrepresentation or silence of the plaintiff” 184 Md. at 136 , 40 A.2d at 379 .

2004Serv., 344 Md. 85, 96 , 685 A.2d 435 (1996) (“Ordinarily, the doctrine of estoppel does not apply against the State----”); Alternatives Unlimited v. New Baltimore City Bd. of School Comm’rs., 155 Md.App. 415 , 843 A.2d 252 (2004); Marriott v. Cole, 115 Md.App. 493, 508 , 694 A.2d 123 , cert. denied, 347 Md. 254 , 700 A.2d 1215 (1997) (stating that the doctrine of estoppel “ordinarily does not apply against the State, or its agencies, with respect to performance of its governmental functions”).

2004Serv., 344 Md. 85, 96 , 685 A.2d 435 (1996) (“Ordinarily, the doctrine of estoppel does not apply against the State----”); Alternatives Unlimited v. New Baltimore City Bd. of School Comm’rs., 155 Md.App. 415 , 843 A.2d 252 (2004); Marriott v. Cole, 115 Md.App. 493, 508 , 694 A.2d 123 , cert. denied, 347 Md. 254 , 700 A.2d 1215 (1997) (stating that the doctrine of estoppel “ordinarily does not apply against the State, or its agencies, with respect to performance of its governmental functions”).

2022An estoppel claim may be supported when the “acts of one party cause a prejudicial change in the conduct of the other.” Bean v. Steuart Petroleum Co., 244 Md. 459, 469 (1966) (citing Harrison v. McCarty, 178 Md. 377 (1940)).

2022An estoppel claim may be supported when the “acts of one party cause a prejudicial change in the conduct of the other.” Bean v. Steuart Petroleum Co., 244 Md. 459, 469 (1966) (citing Harrison v. McCarty, 178 Md. 377 (1940)).

2022The Court of Appeals has reiterated this Court’s interpretation of “good faith” as “an intangible and abstract quality that encompasses . . . an honest belief, the absence of malice and the absence of design to defraud or to seek an unconscionable advantage.” See Rite Aid Corp. v. Hagley, 374 Md. 665 , 680–81 (2003) (citing Catterton v. Coale, 84 Md.

2022The Court of Appeals has reiterated this Court’s interpretation of “good faith” as “an intangible and abstract quality that encompasses . . . an honest belief, the absence of malice and the absence of design to defraud or to seek an unconscionable advantage.” See Rite Aid Corp. v. Hagley, 374 Md. 665 , 680–81 (2003) (citing Catterton v. Coale, 84 Md.

2004In contrast, in Berwyn Heights v. Rogers, 228 Md. 271, 279 , *371 179 A.2d 712 (1962), the Court recognized that equitable estoppel may apply “to municipal, as well as private, corporations and individuals.” See also City of Hagerstown v. Hagerstown Railway Co., 123 Md. 183, 194-95 , 91 A. 170 (1914).

2004In contrast, in Berwyn Heights v. Rogers, 228 Md. 271, 279 , *371 179 A.2d 712 (1962), the Court recognized that equitable estoppel may apply “to municipal, as well as private, corporations and individuals.” See also City of Hagerstown v. Hagerstown Railway Co., 123 Md. 183, 194-95 , 91 A. 170 (1914).

1976It has been held that the same conduct may constitute both an implied waiver and an estoppel, Sentinel Fire Ins. v. McRoberts, 179 S. E. 256 (Ga.); that a waiver may be based on, or arise from, an estoppel, Motz v. Root, 4 N. E. 2d 990 (Oh.), Kaller v. Spady, 24 P. 2d 351 (Or.); and that a waiver, when established may amount to, or operate as, an estoppel, or, stated just a little differently, there may be an estoppel by waiver.

1961It has been held that the same conduct may constitute both an implied waiver and an estoppel, Sentinel Fire Ins. v. McRoberts, 179 S. E. 256 (Ga.); that a waiver may be based on, or arise from, an estoppel, Motz v. Root, 4 N. E. 2d 990 (Oh.), Kaller v. Spady, 24 P. 2d 351 (Or.); and that a waiver, when established may amount to, or operate as, an estoppel, or, stated just a little differently, there may be an estoppel by waiver.

1976Lord Const. Co. v. Edison Portland Cement Co., 138 N. E. 39 (N. Y.), August v. Collins, 214 N. W. 951 (Mich.)”.

1961Lord Const. Co. v. Edison Portland Cement Co., 138 N. E. 39 (N. Y.), August v. Collins, 214 N. W. 951 (Mich.).

1976Lord Const. Co. v. Edison Portland Cement Co., 138 N. E. 39 (N. Y.), August v. Collins, 214 N. W. 951 (Mich.)”.

1961Lord Const. Co. v. Edison Portland Cement Co., 138 N. E. 39 (N. Y.), August v. Collins, 214 N. W. 951 (Mich.).

1976It has been held that the same conduct may constitute both an implied waiver and an estoppel, Sentinel Fire Ins. v. McRoberts, 179 S. E. 256 (Ga.); that a waiver may be based on, or arise from, an estoppel, Motz v. Root, 4 N. E. 2d 990 (Oh.), Kaller v. Spady, 24 P. 2d 351 (Or.); and that a waiver, when established may amount to, or operate as, an estoppel, or, stated just a little differently, there may be an estoppel by waiver.

1961It has been held that the same conduct may constitute both an implied waiver and an estoppel, Sentinel Fire Ins. v. McRoberts, 179 S. E. 256 (Ga.); that a waiver may be based on, or arise from, an estoppel, Motz v. Root, 4 N. E. 2d 990 (Oh.), Kaller v. Spady, 24 P. 2d 351 (Or.); and that a waiver, when established may amount to, or operate as, an estoppel, or, stated just a little differently, there may be an estoppel by waiver.

1976It has been held that the same conduct may constitute both an implied waiver and an estoppel, Sentinel Fire Ins. v. McRoberts, 179 S. E. 256 (Ga.); that a waiver may be based on, or arise from, an estoppel, Motz v. Root, 4 N. E. 2d 990 (Oh.), Kaller v. Spady, 24 P. 2d 351 (Or.); and that a waiver, when established may amount to, or operate as, an estoppel, or, stated just a little differently, there may be an estoppel by waiver.

1961It has been held that the same conduct may constitute both an implied waiver and an estoppel, Sentinel Fire Ins. v. McRoberts, 179 S. E. 256 (Ga.); that a waiver may be based on, or arise from, an estoppel, Motz v. Root, 4 N. E. 2d 990 (Oh.), Kaller v. Spady, 24 P. 2d 351 (Or.); and that a waiver, when established may amount to, or operate as, an estoppel, or, stated just a little differently, there may be an estoppel by waiver.

1973C. v. Chesapeake, 233 Md. 559 , 197 A. 2d 821 (1964), it does not apply here for the simple reason that there is no showing of reliance or change of position on the part of McBride, Rockville Fuel v. Gaithersburg, supra; Savonis v. Burke, 241 Md. 316 , 216 A. 2d 521 (1966).

1972Savonis v. Burke, supra. “Even if we consider the estoppel claim merely within the narrow framework of the Plaintiff’s efforts to secure the special exception in reliance upon the conduct of Gaithersburg, as distinguished from the purchase of the real estate, we remain confined to the proposition that the inducement consisted of mere silence on the Defendant’s part.

1970In view of this, the doctrine of laches is frequently invoked to bar the questioning of a divorce decree after any considerable period of time by one who has knowledge thereof but who failed to act with reasonable promptitude.’ ” “In Croyle v. Croyle, supra, Judge Melvin, speaking for the Court defined laches as follows: “ ‘The very heart of the doctrine of estoppel, through laches, is that the defendant’s alleged change of position for the worse must have been induced by, or resulted from, the conduct, misrepresentation or silence of the plaintiff.’ (Page 136 of 184 Md.; page 379 of 40 A. 2d)

1970In view of this, the doctrine of laches is frequently invoked to bar the questioning of a divorce decree after any considerable period of time by one who has knowledge thereof but who failed to act with reasonable promptitude.’ ” “In Croyle v. Croyle, supra, Judge Melvin, speaking for the Court defined laches as follows: “ ‘The very heart of the doctrine of estoppel, through laches, is that the defendant’s alleged change of position for the worse must have been induced by, or resulted from, the conduct, misrepresentation or silence of the plaintiff.’ (Page 136 of 184 Md.; page 379 of 40 A. 2d)

1955The appellees contend that this was an acquiescence, under the rule applied in Hagan v. Dundore, 187 Md. 430, 441 , or raised an estoppel under the rule stated in Price v. Adalman, 183 Md. 320, 325 , and Hamlin Mach.

1950One of the outstanding elements lying at the basis of the doctrine, as set out in Pomeroy’s Equity Jurisprudence, 5th Ed., Vol. 3, paragraph 805, pages 191, 192, is that the party claiming the estoppel “must in fact act upon it in such a manner as to change his position for the worse.” The case of Rodgers v. John, 131 Md. 455, 462 , 102 A. 549, 551 , quotes Pomeroy in the following words: “The cases all agree that there can be no estoppel, unless the party who alleges it relied upon the representation, was induced to act by it, and, thus relying and induced, did take some action.” The Court th

2019Id.

2009(Citing Staley v. Staley, 251 Md. 701, 703 , 248 A.2d 655 (1968) (citations omitted) (emphasis added)).

2009(Citing Staley v. Staley, 251 Md. 701, 703 , 248 A.2d 655 (1968) (citations omitted) (emphasis added)).

2009In Schaller, we stated that “[t]he very heart of the doctrine of estoppel, through laches, is that the defendant’s alleged change of position for the worse must have been induced by, or resulted from, the conduct, misrepresentation or silence of the plaintiff.” Id. (citing Croyle, 184 Md. at 136 , 40 A.2d 374 ) (emphasis added); see also Parker, 230 Md. 126 , 186 A.2d 195 .

2008In so holding, we followed the standard of review for decisions of the Commission set forth in Kelly; however, we then stated that Griggs "could not rely upon the Commission’s decision to create a material factual dispute on [the issue of the estoppel defense], because the Commission did not consider or decide whether [the] appellee[ is] estopped to invoke the bar of limitations.” Id. at 573, 905 A.2d 402 .