46 Georgia opinions name it 2 courts 1914–2021 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Georgia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Lynch v. Poolegreen2 sentences1951See Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. Nisbet, 119 Ga. 316 ( 46 S. E. 444 ); Lynch v. Poole, 138 Ga. 303, 305 (supra); As kew v. Amos, 147 Ga. 613 ( 95 S. E. 5 ); DeVore v. Baxter, 155 Ga. 109 ( 116 S. E. 610 ); National Land &c. 1923Trice v. Rose, 80 Ga. 408 ( 7 S. E. 109 ); Tuells v. Torras, 113 Ga. 691, 698 ( 39 S. E. 455 ); Askew v. Amos, 147 Ga. 613 ( 95 S. E. 5 ); Irvine v. Wiley, 145 Ga. 867 (3), 868 ( 90 S. E. 69 ); Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. Nisbet, 119 Ga. 316 (7) ( 46 S. E. 444 ); Lynch v. Poole, 138 Ga. 303, 304 ( 75 S. E. 158 ). | 2 | 2 |
Hood v. Durengreen2 sentences1986Hood v. Duren, 33 Ga. App. 203 ( 125 SE 787 ) (1924). [Appellant] apparently misunderstands the nature of the equitable doctrine of estoppel. 1986Hood v. Duren, 33 Ga. App. 203 ( 125 SE 787 ) (1924). [Appellant] apparently misunderstands the nature of the equitable doctrine of estoppel. | 1 | 2 |
Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. Nisbetgreen2 sentences1951See Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. Nisbet, 119 Ga. 316 ( 46 S. E. 444 ); Lynch v. Poole, 138 Ga. 303, 305 (supra); As kew v. Amos, 147 Ga. 613 ( 95 S. E. 5 ); DeVore v. Baxter, 155 Ga. 109 ( 116 S. E. 610 ); National Land &c. 1951See Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. Nisbet, 119 Ga. 316 ( 46 S. E. 444 ); Lynch v. Poole, 138 Ga. 303, 305 (supra); As kew v. Amos, 147 Ga. 613 ( 95 S. E. 5 ); DeVore v. Baxter, 155 Ga. 109 ( 116 S. E. 610 ); National Land &c. | 1 | 2 |
Wilhelm v. Houston Countygreen1 sentence2021Esener, 240 Ga. App. at 23 ; see also Wilhelm, 310 Ga. App. at 509 (1) (c) (“[A] defendant may be equitably estopped from raising the defense of the statute of repose if the plaintiff reasonably relied on a fraudulent act or statement by the defendant that occurred after the plaintiff’s injury accrued and, as a result of that fraud, the plaintiff did not file suit until after the repose period expired.”) (emphasis omitted). | 1 | 1 |
Coley v. Coleygreen2 sentences2007See Coley v. Coley, 128 Ga. 654, 656 (1), 58 S.E. 205 (1907). 2007See Coley v. Coley, 128 Ga. 654, 656 (1), 58 S.E. 205 (1907). | 1 | 1 |
Liming v. Liminggreen2 sentences2007See Liming v. Liming, 272 Neb. 534 , 723 N.W.2d 89, 96-97 (2006) (no waiver of right to appeal where spouse's right to benefits accepted is conceded by other spouse; spouse entitled as matter of right to benefits accepted such that outcome of appeal could have no effect on right to those benefits; or benefits accepted pursuant to severable award not subject to appellate review); 5 Am.Jur.2d, Appellate Review, § 636 (rule precluding appeal by party who has accepted benefits of judgment applied less strictly in divorce cases, depending on factors such as whether amount received was small portion 2007See Liming v. Liming, 272 Neb. 534 , 723 N.W.2d 89, 96-97 (2006) (no waiver of right to appeal where spouse's right to benefits accepted is conceded by other spouse; spouse entitled as matter of right to benefits accepted such that outcome of appeal could have no effect on right to those benefits; or benefits accepted pursuant to severable award not subject to appellate review); 5 Am.Jur.2d, Appellate Review, § 636 (rule precluding appeal by party who has accepted benefits of judgment applied less strictly in divorce cases, depending on factors such as whether amount received was small portion | 1 | 1 |
Adler's Package Shop, Inc. v. Parkergreen2 sentences2000Co. v. Sapp, 223 Ga. App. 443, 445 ( 477 SE2d 869 ) (1996) ("Estoppel requires justifiable reliance on the opposing party’s representations or conduct and a change in position to one’s detriment.”); Adler’s Package Shop v. Parker, 190 Ga. App. 68, 73 (2) ( 378 SE2d 323 ) (1989) (“doctrine of estoppel . . . applies only where the representations of one party cause another to act in reliance thereon to the latter’s detriment”). 2000Co. v. Sapp, 223 Ga. App. 443, 445 ( 477 SE2d 869 ) (1996) ("Estoppel requires justifiable reliance on the opposing party’s representations or conduct and a change in position to one’s detriment.”); Adler’s Package Shop v. Parker, 190 Ga. App. 68, 73 (2) ( 378 SE2d 323 ) (1989) (“doctrine of estoppel . . . applies only where the representations of one party cause another to act in reliance thereon to the latter’s detriment”). | 1 | 1 |
Allstate Insurance v. Sappgreen2 sentences2000Co. v. Sapp, 223 Ga. App. 443, 445 ( 477 SE2d 869 ) (1996) ("Estoppel requires justifiable reliance on the opposing party’s representations or conduct and a change in position to one’s detriment.”); Adler’s Package Shop v. Parker, 190 Ga. App. 68, 73 (2) ( 378 SE2d 323 ) (1989) (“doctrine of estoppel . . . applies only where the representations of one party cause another to act in reliance thereon to the latter’s detriment”). 2000Co. v. Sapp, 223 Ga. App. 443, 445 ( 477 SE2d 869 ) (1996) ("Estoppel requires justifiable reliance on the opposing party’s representations or conduct and a change in position to one’s detriment.”); Adler’s Package Shop v. Parker, 190 Ga. App. 68, 73 (2) ( 378 SE2d 323 ) (1989) (“doctrine of estoppel . . . applies only where the representations of one party cause another to act in reliance thereon to the latter’s detriment”). | 1 | 1 |
Matheson v. DeKalb Countygreen2 sentences1998Matheson v. DeKalb County, 257 Ga. 48, 49 (3) ( 354 SE2d 121 ) (1987). 1998Matheson v. DeKalb County, 257 Ga. 48, 49 (3) ( 354 SE2d 121 ) (1987). | 1 | 1 |
Eiberger v. Westgreen2 sentences1996Eiberger v. West, 247 Ga. 767, 769-770 ( 281 SE2d 148 ) (1981). 3. 1996Eiberger v. West, 247 Ga. 767, 769-770 ( 281 SE2d 148 ) (1981). 3. | 1 | 1 |
Gainesville Glass Co. v. Don Hammond, Inc.green2 sentences1995See Gainesville Glass Co. v. Don Hammond, Inc., 157 Ga. App. 640, 644-645 (2) ( 278 SE2d 182 ) (1981). 1995See Gainesville Glass Co. v. Don Hammond, Inc., 157 Ga. App. 640, 644-645 (2) ( 278 SE2d 182 ) (1981). | 1 | 1 |
Mimms v. Sisk Decorating Co.green2 sentences1984See Woods v. Delta Air Lines, 237 Ga. 332 , supra; Mimms v. Sisk Decorating Co., 156 Ga. App. 572, 574 (2) ( 275 SE2d 148 ). *432 Again we look to the evidence as to whether or not all or any of the questions involved in the bankruptcy court have been answered so as to bar this action. 1984See Woods v. Delta Air Lines, 237 Ga. 332 , supra; Mimms v. Sisk Decorating Co., 156 Ga. App. 572, 574 (2) ( 275 SE2d 148 ). *432 Again we look to the evidence as to whether or not all or any of the questions involved in the bankruptcy court have been answered so as to bar this action. | 1 | 1 |
Woods v. Delta Air Lines, Inc.green1 sentence1984See Woods v. Delta Air Lines, 237 Ga. 332 , supra; Mimms v. Sisk Decorating Co., 156 Ga. App. 572, 574 (2) ( 275 SE2d 148 ). *432 Again we look to the evidence as to whether or not all or any of the questions involved in the bankruptcy court have been answered so as to bar this action. | 1 | 1 |
Westwood Place, Ltd. v. Greengreen2 sentences1983The quoted code sections and rule make it clear that while the attorney has authority to do many things by virtue of his general retention, he may not compromise the client’s claim unless the same is specially authorized in writing or ratified (Westwood Place v. Green, 153 Ga. App. 595, 596 (2) ( 266 SE2d 242 )) or unless the doctrine of estoppel, or some other special equity, intervenes. 1983The quoted code sections and rule make it clear that while the attorney has authority to do many things by virtue of his general retention, he may not compromise the client’s claim unless the same is specially authorized in writing or ratified (Westwood Place v. Green, 153 Ga. App. 595, 596 (2) ( 266 SE2d 242 )) or unless the doctrine of estoppel, or some other special equity, intervenes. | 1 | 1 |
| Central Bank & Trust Corp. v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Jackson v. Smithgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Brown v. Globe & Rutgers Fire Insurancegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Morrison v. Whitesidegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Dailey v. Springfieldgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Southern Manufacturing Co. v. R. L. Moss Manufacturing Co.green | 1 | 1 |
| Forbes v. Hallgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Alston v. Phenix Insurancegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Wilkins v. McGeheegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Tuells v. Torrasgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Smith v. Davisgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Georgia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Askew v. Amos
green
2 sentences1951See Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. Nisbet, 119 Ga. 316 ( 46 S. E. 444 ); Lynch v. Poole, 138 Ga. 303, 305 (supra); As kew v. Amos, 147 Ga. 613 ( 95 S. E. 5 ); DeVore v. Baxter, 155 Ga. 109 ( 116 S. E. 610 ); National Land &c. 1951See Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. Nisbet, 119 Ga. 316 ( 46 S. E. 444 ); Lynch v. Poole, 138 Ga. 303, 305 (supra); As kew v. Amos, 147 Ga. 613 ( 95 S. E. 5 ); DeVore v. Baxter, 155 Ga. 109 ( 116 S. E. 610 ); National Land &c. | 3 | 1923–1951 |
Republic Title Co. v. Freeport Title & Guaranty, Inc.
neutral
1 sentence2021“Once the trial court adopts the special master’s findings and enters judgment, the court’s decision is upheld by the appellate court unless clearly erroneous but conclusions of law are reviewed de novo.” Republic Title Co., LLC v. Freeport Title and Guar., 351 Ga. App. 408 , 409 ( 829 SE2d 172 ) (2019) (citation and punctuation omitted). 5 1. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Esener v. Kinsey
green
1 sentence2021Esener, 240 Ga. App. at 23 ; see also Wilhelm, 310 Ga. App. at 509 (1) (c) (“[A] defendant may be equitably estopped from raising the defense of the statute of repose if the plaintiff reasonably relied on a fraudulent act or statement by the defendant that occurred after the plaintiff’s injury accrued and, as a result of that fraud, the plaintiff did not file suit until after the repose period expired.”) (emphasis omitted). | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Bowden v. the Medical Center, Inc.
green
2 sentences2020Ctr., Inc., 297 Ga. 285 ( 773 SE2d 692 ) (2015); see also OCGA §§ 44-14-470, 44-14-471. 2020Ctr., Inc., 297 Ga. 285 ( 773 SE2d 692 ) (2015); see also OCGA §§ 44-14-470, 44-14-471. | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Quillian v. Employees' Retirement System
green
2 sentences2006The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the board. [2] Dukes urges that his case is controlled in his favor by the estoppel doctrine espoused in Quillian v. Employees' Retirement System of Ga., 259 Ga. 253 , 379 S.E.2d 515 (1989), but although factually very similar, a critical distinguishing factor makes Quillian inapplicable. 2006The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the board. [2] Dukes urges that his case is controlled in his favor by the estoppel doctrine espoused in Quillian v. Employees' Retirement System of Ga., 259 Ga. 253 , 379 S.E.2d 515 (1989), but although factually very similar, a critical distinguishing factor makes Quillian inapplicable. | 1 | 2006–2006 |
D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v. Federal Deposit Insurance
green
2 sentences1990The trial court allowed the appellee, Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation (FSLIC) to intervene and held that the estoppel rule established in D’Oench, Duhme & Co. v. FDIC, 315 U. S. 447 (62 SC 676, 86 LE 956) (1942), applied and barred certain defenses raised by the appellants. 1990Since the FSLIC is the real party in interest and a federal corporation, the estoppel rule established in D’Oench, Duhme & Co., supra, 315 U. S. at 459 , controls this case. | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Horkan v. City of Moultrie
green
2 sentences1989At issue in Horkan v. City of Moultrie, 136 Ga. 561 ( 71 SE 785 ) (1911), was whether the estoppel doctrine could be applied in such a manner as to bind the city to contin *844 ued compliance with an agreement to supply free water service to a property owner for an indefinite period of time. 1989At issue in Horkan v. City of Moultrie, 136 Ga. 561 ( 71 SE 785 ) (1911), was whether the estoppel doctrine could be applied in such a manner as to bind the city to contin *844 ued compliance with an agreement to supply free water service to a property owner for an indefinite period of time. | 1 | 1989–1989 |
City of Jonesboro v. Shaw-Lightcap, Inc.
green
2 sentences1989Similarly distinguishable are such cases as City of Calhoun v. Holland, supra, 222 Ga. 817 (holding that the estoppel doctrine could not be applied in such a manner as to avoid the statutory ante litem notice arrangement imposed by former Code Ann. § 69-308 [currently OCGA § 36-33-5]); City of Atlanta v. Bull, 161 Ga. App. 648 ( 288 SE2d 335 ) (1982) (holding that an oral commitment made by an ad hoc committee chairman was not contractually binding on the city where its charter specifically required that all city contracts be signed by the mayor or his duly authorized designate); and City of J 1989Similarly distinguishable are such cases as City of Calhoun v. Holland, supra, 222 Ga. 817 (holding that the estoppel doctrine could not be applied in such a manner as to avoid the statutory ante litem notice arrangement imposed by former Code Ann. § 69-308 [currently OCGA § 36-33-5]); City of Atlanta v. Bull, 161 Ga. App. 648 ( 288 SE2d 335 ) (1982) (holding that an oral commitment made by an ad hoc committee chairman was not contractually binding on the city where its charter specifically required that all city contracts be signed by the mayor or his duly authorized designate); and City of J | 1 | 1989–1989 |
Corey Outdoor Advertising, Inc. v. Board of Zoning Adjustment
green
2 sentences1989In Corey Outdoor Advertising v. Bd. of Zoning Adjustment of Atlanta, 254 Ga. 221 (3) ( 327 SE2d 178 ) (1985), the issue before the Court was whether the estoppel doctrine could be employed to validate a sign permit which had been issued by a city official in direct contravention of restrictions appearing in the city’s zoning ordinance. 1989In Corey Outdoor Advertising v. Bd. of Zoning Adjustment of Atlanta, 254 Ga. 221 (3) ( 327 SE2d 178 ) (1985), the issue before the Court was whether the estoppel doctrine could be employed to validate a sign permit which had been issued by a city official in direct contravention of restrictions appearing in the city’s zoning ordinance. | 1 | 1989–1989 |
City of Calhoun v. Holland
green
1 sentence1989Similarly distinguishable are such cases as City of Calhoun v. Holland, supra, 222 Ga. 817 (holding that the estoppel doctrine could not be applied in such a manner as to avoid the statutory ante litem notice arrangement imposed by former Code Ann. § 69-308 [currently OCGA § 36-33-5]); City of Atlanta v. Bull, 161 Ga. App. 648 ( 288 SE2d 335 ) (1982) (holding that an oral commitment made by an ad hoc committee chairman was not contractually binding on the city where its charter specifically required that all city contracts be signed by the mayor or his duly authorized designate); and City of J | 1 | 1989–1989 |
City of Atlanta v. Bull
green
2 sentences1989Similarly distinguishable are such cases as City of Calhoun v. Holland, supra, 222 Ga. 817 (holding that the estoppel doctrine could not be applied in such a manner as to avoid the statutory ante litem notice arrangement imposed by former Code Ann. § 69-308 [currently OCGA § 36-33-5]); City of Atlanta v. Bull, 161 Ga. App. 648 ( 288 SE2d 335 ) (1982) (holding that an oral commitment made by an ad hoc committee chairman was not contractually binding on the city where its charter specifically required that all city contracts be signed by the mayor or his duly authorized designate); and City of J 1989Similarly distinguishable are such cases as City of Calhoun v. Holland, supra, 222 Ga. 817 (holding that the estoppel doctrine could not be applied in such a manner as to avoid the statutory ante litem notice arrangement imposed by former Code Ann. § 69-308 [currently OCGA § 36-33-5]); City of Atlanta v. Bull, 161 Ga. App. 648 ( 288 SE2d 335 ) (1982) (holding that an oral commitment made by an ad hoc committee chairman was not contractually binding on the city where its charter specifically required that all city contracts be signed by the mayor or his duly authorized designate); and City of J | 1 | 1989–1989 |
Kot v. Richard P. Rita Personnel System International, Inc.
green
1 sentence1988Kot v. Richard P. Rita Personnel System, 134 Ga. App. 438 , supra. Decided October 19, 1988 — Rehearing denied November 2, 1988. | 1 | 1988–1988 |
Burke v. First Peoples Bank of NJ
green
1 sentence1983Id.; Burke v. First Peoples Bank of N.J., 412 A2d 1089 (N.J. | 1 | 1983–1983 |
Spearman v. Jaudon
green
2 sentences1982Nor does the doctrine of res judicata apply: “Before a judgment in a former action will operate as res judicata it must appear that the former action was based on the same cause of action ...” (Emphasis supplied.) Spearman v. Jaudon, 145 Ga. App. 136 ( 243 SE2d 90 ). 3. 1982Nor does the doctrine of res judicata apply: “Before a judgment in a former action will operate as res judicata it must appear that the former action was based on the same cause of action ...” (Emphasis supplied.) Spearman v. Jaudon, 145 Ga. App. 136 ( 243 SE2d 90 ). 3. | 1 | 1982–1982 |
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance v. Wheeler
green
1 sentence1982Co. v. Wheeler, 160 Ga. App. 523, 527 , supra. Accordingly, there is no viability in an estoppel defense to the instant declaratory judgment action by virtue of the fact that the executed agreement is undated. | 1 | 1982–1982 |
Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. Woods
green
2 sentences1982For the same reason, there was no operation of the doctrine of estoppel, for “[e]stoppel by judgment occurs only when the issue determined in the prior proceeding is the same as that in the subsequent proceeding. [Cits.]” Delta Air Lines v. Woods, 137 Ga. App. 693 (1) ( 224 SE2d 763 ). 1982For the same reason, there was no operation of the doctrine of estoppel, for “[e]stoppel by judgment occurs only when the issue determined in the prior proceeding is the same as that in the subsequent proceeding. [Cits.]” Delta Air Lines v. Woods, 137 Ga. App. 693 (1) ( 224 SE2d 763 ). | 1 | 1982–1982 |
| General Communications Service, Inc. v. Georgia Public Service Commission neutral | 1 | 1979–1979 |
| Cheney v. Powell green | 1 | 1959–1959 |
| Tanner v. Rosser neutral | 1 | 1959–1959 |
| Lingo v. Swicord green | 1 | 1953–1953 |
| Andrews v. Meadow neutral | 1 | 1953–1953 |
| DeVore v. Baxter neutral | 1 | 1951–1951 |
| Worth County v. Crisp County green | 1 | 1949–1949 |
| Alford v. State green | 1 | 1946–1946 |
| Oatts v. Wilkins, Neely & Jones green | 1 | 1946–1946 |
| Barham v. Weems neutral | 1 | 1946–1946 |
| Hamilton v. State green | 1 | 1946–1946 |
| Wilson v. Stanford green | 1 | 1946–1946 |
| Whitney v. Central Georgia Power Co. green | 1 | 1946–1946 |
| Koppe & Steinichen v. Rylander neutral | 1 | 1945–1945 |
| Miller v. Desverges neutral | 1 | 1941–1941 |
| Osburn v. Pritchard green | 1 | 1941–1941 |
| Mansfield v. Calhoun green | 1 | 1941–1941 |
| Rogers v. Rigell green | 1 | 1941–1941 |
| Parsons v. Little neutral | 1 | 1941–1941 |
| Home Owners' Loan Corp. v. Guaranty Title Trust Co. green | 1 | 1941–1941 |
| Southern Marble Co. v. Darnell neutral | 1 | 1938–1938 |
| Barfield v. City of Atlanta green | 1 | 1938–1938 |
| Petty v. Kennon green | 1 | 1936–1936 |
| Moore v. State green | 1 | 1934–1934 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.