estoppel doctrine in New York

2015An estoppel defense may also be invoked where the failure to promptly assert a right has given rise to circumstances rendering it inequitable to permit the exercise of that right (Matter of John Robert P. v Vito C., 23 AD3d 659, 661 [2d Dept 2005], citing Matter of Ettore I. v Angela D., 127 AD2d 6, 12 [2d Dept 1987]).

2014An estoppel defense may be invoked “where the failure to promptly assert a right has given rise to circumstances rendering it inequitable to permit the exercise of the right after a lapse of time” (Matter of Ettore I. v Angela D., 127 AD2d 6, 12 [1987]).

2019In this paternity proceeding under article 5 of the Family Court Act, respondent failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence that the mother's husband acted as the child's father to such an extent that a biological paternity test "is not in the best interests of the child on the basis of . . . equitable estoppel" (Family Court Act § 532; see Matter of Juanita A. v Kenneth Mark N. , 15 NY3d 1 [2010]; Matter of Cecil R. v Rachel A. , 102 AD3d 545 [1st Dept 2013]).

2018"The paramount concern in applying equitable estoppel in paternity cases is the best interests of the subject child" ( Matter of Smythe v Worley, 72 AD3d 977, 978 ; see Matter of Juanita A. v Kenneth Mark N., 15 NY3d at 6 ; Matter of Felix O. v Janette M., 89 AD3d at 1090 ; Matter of Juan A. v Rosemarie N., 55 AD3d at 827-828 ; Matter of John Robert P. v Vito C., 23 AD3d at 661 ).

2011Contrary to plaintiffs contention, defendants are not equitably estopped from asserting the statute of limitations for those portions of his claim that predate November 2003 (six years before he commenced this action). “[E]quitable estoppel does not apply where the misrepresentation or act of concealment underlying the estoppel claim is the same act which forms the basis of plaintiffs underlying substantive cause of action” (Kaufman v Cohen, 307 AD2d 113, 122 [2003]).

2011However, “ ‘equitable estoppel does not apply where the misrepresentation or act of concealment underlying the estoppel claim is the same act which forms the basis of [the] plaintiffs underlying substantive cause[s] of action’ ” (Robare v Fortune Brands, Inc., 39 AD3d 1045, 1046 [2007], lv denied 9 NY3d 810 [2007], quoting Kaufman v Cohen, 307 AD2d 113, 122 [2003]).

2018An estoppel defense may be invoked "where the failure to promptly assert a right has given rise to circumstances rendering it inequitable to permit the exercise of that right" ( Matter of John Robert P. v Vito C., 23 AD3d at 661 ; see Matter of Shondel J. v Mark D., 7 NY3d at 327 ).

2018An estoppel defense may be invoked "where the failure to promptly assert a right has given rise to circumstances rendering it inequitable to permit the exercise of that right" ( Matter of John Robert P. v Vito C., 23 AD3d at 661 ; see Matter of Shondel J. v Mark D., 7 NY3d at 327 ).

2007Plaintiff may not avail herself of the doctrine of equitable estoppel to preclude assertion of a statute of limitations defense because the alleged misrepresentation underlying the estoppel claim is one and the same as that forming the basis of the underlying substantive cause of action for negligence (see Rizk v Cohen, 73 NY2d 98, 105-106 [1989]; Transport Workers Union of Am.

2006Equitable estoppel does not apply, however, where the misrepresentation or act of concealment underlying the estoppel claim is the same act forming the basis of the underlying substantive cause of action (see Rizk v Cohen, 73 NY2d 98, 105-106 [1989]).

2025Nevertheless, as plaintiff concedes, equitable estoppel is not applicable to that portion of plaintiff's breach of contract claim premised on defendant's alleged breaches of its fiduciary duty to disclose ( see Schwartz , 32 AD3d at 714 ["Equitable estoppel does not apply . . . where the misrepresentation or act of concealment underlying the estoppel claim is the same act forming the basis of the underlying substantive cause of action"]).

2025Nevertheless, as plaintiff concedes, equitable estoppel is not applicable to that portion of plaintiff's breach of contract claim premised on defendant's alleged breaches of its fiduciary duty to disclose ( see Schwartz , 32 AD3d at 714 ["Equitable estoppel does not apply . . . where the misrepresentation or act of concealment underlying the estoppel claim is the same act forming the basis of the underlying substantive cause of action"]).

2017However, “equitable estop-pel does not apply where the misrepresentation or act of concealment underlying the estoppel claim is the same act which forms the basis of the plaintiff’s underlying substantive causes of action” (Torrance Constr., Inc. v Jaques, 127 AD3d 1261, 1265 [2015] [internal quotation marks, brackets and citations omitted]; see Kosowsky v Willard Mtn., Inc., 90 AD3d at 1130-1131 ; Robare v Fortune Brands, Inc., 39 AD3d 1045, 1046 [2007], lv denied 9 NY3d 810 [2007]).

2015Although the doctrine precludes a defendant from relying on a “statute of limitations defense when the plaintiff was prevented from commencing a timely action by reasonable reliance on the defendant’s fraud, misrepresentation or other affirmative misconduct . . ., equitable estoppel does not apply where the misrepresentation or act of concealment underlying the estoppel claim is the same act which forms the basis of [the] plaintiffs underlying substantive cause [s] of action” (Kosowsky v Willard Mtn., Inc., 90 AD3d 1127, 1130-1131 [2011] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]).

2017However, “equitable estop-pel does not apply where the misrepresentation or act of concealment underlying the estoppel claim is the same act which forms the basis of the plaintiff’s underlying substantive causes of action” (Torrance Constr., Inc. v Jaques, 127 AD3d 1261, 1265 [2015] [internal quotation marks, brackets and citations omitted]; see Kosowsky v Willard Mtn., Inc., 90 AD3d at 1130-1131 ; Robare v Fortune Brands, Inc., 39 AD3d 1045, 1046 [2007], lv denied 9 NY3d 810 [2007]).

2011However, “ ‘equitable estoppel does not apply where the misrepresentation or act of concealment underlying the estoppel claim is the same act which forms the basis of [the] plaintiffs underlying substantive cause[s] of action’ ” (Robare v Fortune Brands, Inc., 39 AD3d 1045, 1046 [2007], lv denied 9 NY3d 810 [2007], quoting Kaufman v Cohen, 307 AD2d 113, 122 [2003]).

2016Preserv. & Dev., 78 AD3d 559, 559-560 [1st Dept 2010], quoting Matter of Schorr v New York City Dept. of Hous.

2011Preserv. & Dev., 78 AD3d 559, 559-560 [1st Dept 2010] [reiterating that “petitioners may not invoke the doctrine of estoppel to ‘prevent HPD from executing its statutory duty to provide Mitchell-Lama housing only to individuals who meet the specified eligibility requirements’ ”], quoting Schorr, 10 NY3d at 779 ; Edwards, 67 AD3d at 411 [asserting that “(fit would not avail petitioner even if respondent were aware of her occupancy” in NYCHA housing], citing Schorr, 10 NY3d at 776 .) Therefore, petitioners cannot obtain succession rights via NYCHA’s implicit approval.

2016Finding estoppel here due to the City's culpability would result in the estoppel exception swallowing the rule because virtually all similar illegal contracts involve wrongdoing on the part of a city agency. [FN9] See Gerzof , 16 NY2d at 208 ("once a contract is proved to have been awarded without the required competitive bidding, a waste of public funds is presumed and a taxpayer is entitled to have the contract set aside without showing that the municipality suffered any actual injury.").

2016Finding estoppel here due to the City’s culpability would result in the estoppel exception swallowing the rule because virtually all similar illegal contracts involve wrongdoing on the part of a city agency. 9 (See Gerzof, 16 NY2d at 208 [“once a contract is proved to have been awarded without the required competitive bidding, a waste of public funds is presumed and a taxpayer is entitled to have the contract set aside without showing that the municipality suffered any actual injury”].) Nor can the fact that ACS paid MRG approximately 66% of the amounts owed under the contracts constitute a ra

2015Further, “ ‘it is well established that erroneous advice given by an employee of a governmental agency is not considered to rise to the level of an unusual circumstance’ warranting invocation of the doctrine of estoppel” (Matter of Winners Garage, Inc. v Tax Appeals Trib. of the State of N.Y., 89 AD3d at 1169 , quoting Matter of Walsh v Tax Appeals Trib. of State of N.Y., 196 AD2d 367, 370-371 [1994]).

2011Although, as the ALJ noted, it is “somewhat disconcerting” that Ranees sent this form to petitioners given that a timely request for a conciliation conference cannot be made prior to a notice of determination, “it is well established that erroneous advice given by an employee of a governmental agency is not considered to rise to the level of an unusual circumstance” warranting invocation of the doctrine of estoppel (Matter of Walsh v Tax Appeals Trib. of State of N.Y., 196 AD2d 367, 370-371 [1994] [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]).

2018An estoppel defense may be invoked "where the failure to promptly assert a right has given rise to circumstances rendering it inequitable to permit the exercise of that right" ( Matter of John Robert P. v Vito C., 23 AD3d at 661 ; see Matter of Shondel J. v Mark D., 7 NY3d at 327 ).

2018An estoppel defense may be invoked "where the failure to promptly assert a right has given rise to circumstances rendering it inequitable to permit the exercise of that right" ( Matter of John Robert P. v Vito C., 23 AD3d at 661 ; see Matter of Shondel J. v Mark D., 7 NY3d at 327 ).

2011Preserv. & Dev., 78 AD3d 559, 559-560 [1st Dept 2010] [reiterating that “petitioners may not invoke the doctrine of estoppel to ‘prevent HPD from executing its statutory duty to provide Mitchell-Lama housing only to individuals who meet the specified eligibility requirements’ ”], quoting Schorr, 10 NY3d at 779 ; Edwards, 67 AD3d at 411 [asserting that “(fit would not avail petitioner even if respondent were aware of her occupancy” in NYCHA housing], citing Schorr, 10 NY3d at 776 .) Therefore, petitioners cannot obtain succession rights via NYCHA’s implicit approval.

2011Preserv. & Dev., 78 AD3d 559, 559-560 [1st Dept 2010] [reiterating that “petitioners may not invoke the doctrine of estoppel to ‘prevent HPD from executing its statutory duty to provide Mitchell-Lama housing only to individuals who meet the specified eligibility requirements’ ”], quoting Schorr, 10 NY3d at 779 ; Edwards, 67 AD3d at 411 [asserting that “(fit would not avail petitioner even if respondent were aware of her occupancy” in NYCHA housing], citing Schorr, 10 NY3d at 776 .) Therefore, petitioners cannot obtain succession rights via NYCHA’s implicit approval.

1997Defendant attempts to avoid the express lease requirements by invoking the doctrine of estoppel (see, e.g., Rose v Spa Realty Assocs., 42 NY2d 338, 344 ).

1988That doctrine is reserved for a limited class of cases where it is unconscionable to deny the promise upon which plaintiff has relied (Buddman Distribs. v Labatt Importers, 91 AD2d 838, 839 ; see also, Rose v Spa Realty Assocs., 42 NY2d 338, 344 ).

1988Inasmuch as the appellants did not proffer an incorrect address at the time of the accident and ordinarily have no obligation to keep potential plaintiffs apprised of their whereabouts, we find no basis upon which to invoke the doctrine of estoppel (see, Feinstein v Bergner, 48 NY2d 234, 241-242 ; Chiari v D’Angelo, 123 AD2d 655 ; cf., Kramer v Ryder Truck Rental, 112 AD2d 194 ; cf, McNeil v Tomlin, 82 AD2d 825 ).

1986Inasmuch as potential defendants ordinarily have no obligation to keep potential plaintiffs appraised of their whereabouts (see, Feinstein v Bergner, supra, at p 243; Community State Bank v Haakonson, 94 AD2d 838 ), we find no basis for invoking the estoppel doctrine here.

2025Footnote 5: Contrary to defendant's contention, we stated in Loeb v Willis that when an action is discontinued, "the adjudication therein . . . is not an estoppel or bar in any sense" ( 100 NY 231, 235 [1885] [emphasis added]; see also Brown v Cleveland Trust Co. , 233 NY 399, 406 [1922] ["The action having been discontinued, there was no adjudication in that action which bound any one"]).

2025Footnote 5: Contrary to defendant's contention, we stated in Loeb v Willis that when an action is discontinued, "the adjudication therein . . . is not an estoppel or bar in any sense" (100 NY 231, 235 [1885] [emphasis added]; see also Brown v Cleveland Trust Co. , 233 NY 399, 406 [1922] ["The action having been discontinued, there was no adjudication in that action which bound any one"]).

2025Footnote 5: Contrary to defendant's contention, we stated in Loeb v Willis that when an action is discontinued, "the adjudication therein . . . is not an estoppel or bar in any sense" ( 100 NY 231, 235 [1885] [emphasis added]; see also Brown v Cleveland Trust Co. , 233 NY 399, 406 [1922] ["The action having been discontinued, there was no adjudication in that action which bound any one"]).

2025Footnote 5: Contrary to defendant's contention, we stated in Loeb v Willis that when an action is discontinued, "the adjudication therein . . . is not an estoppel or bar in any sense" (100 NY 231, 235 [1885] [emphasis added]; see also Brown v Cleveland Trust Co. , 233 NY 399, 406 [1922] ["The action having been discontinued, there was no adjudication in that action which bound any one"]).

2019In this paternity proceeding under article 5 of the Family Court Act, respondent failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence that the mother's husband acted as the child's father to such an extent that a biological paternity test "is not in the best interests of the child on the basis of . . . equitable estoppel" (Family Court Act § 532; see Matter of Juanita A. v Kenneth Mark N. , 15 NY3d 1 [2010]; Matter of Cecil R. v Rachel A. , 102 AD3d 545 [1st Dept 2013]).

2018Furthermore, even if a petitioner claims he engaged in intimate relations with the mother during the period of conception, he may be estopped from asserting paternity if he waited too long to assert his paternity claim ( see Matter of Cecil R. v Rachel A. , 102 AD3d 545, 546 [1st Dept 2013]).

2019Ctr. v New York City Water Dept. , 164 AD3d 1342 ), here, the petitioners failed to demonstrate any such improper conduct that would warrant the application of the doctrine of estoppel ( see Matter of Concerned Port Residents Comm. v Incorporated Vil. of Sands Point , 291 AD2d 494, 496 ).

2004The conduct of the DEC did not warrant the application of the doctrine of estoppel (see Matter of Concerned Port Residents Comm. v Incorporated Vil. of Sands Point, 291 AD2d 494, 496 [2002]; Yassin v Sarabu, 284 AD2d 531 [2001]).

2018Thus, while it would have been a best practice to join JAC as a necessary party ( see Matter of Isaiah A.C. v Faith T. , 43 AD3d 1048, 1048-1049 [2d Dept 2007]), the record reveals that he was treated as a necessary party by the estoppel court.

2016The court should have joined Gerald in that proceeding or otherwise notified him before it ordered the test (see Isaiah A. C., 43 AD3d at 1048-1049 ).

2018Co. v Guthiel , 2 NY2d 584, 587-588 [1957]; Switzer v Aldrich , 307 NY 56, 59 [1954]; see also Vehicle and Traffic Law §§ 420 [1]; 2113).

1955The doctrine of estoppel, applied in the Switzer case ( 307 N. Y. 56 , supra), as to the injured person, does not expressly or in reason, apply to the claim over of defendant, Dorp Motors, Inc., against the defendants, Polimeni and DeLorenzo.

2015In the context of paternity and custody cases, the paramount concern in applying equitable estoppel is the best interests of the child (see Matter of Ruby M.M. v Moses K., 18 AD3d 471, 472 [2d Dept 2005]; Matter of Louise P. v Thomas R., 223 AD2d 592 , 593 [2d Dept 1996]).

2005In the context of paternity and custody, the doctrine of equitable estoppel should be applied only where its use furthers the best interests of the child who is the subject of the controversy (see Matter of Ruby M.M. v Moses K., 18 AD3d 471 [2005]; Matter of Charles v Charles, 296 AD2d 547 [2002]; Jean Maby H. v Joseph H., 246 AD2d 282 [1998]).