estoppel doctrine in Nebraska

1953We have held: “ ‘Public policy, to prevent loss to the state through the negligence of public officers, forbids the application of the doctrine of estoppel to the state, growing out of the conduct and representations of its officers.’ People v. Brown, 67 Ill. 435 .” Volker v. McDonald, 120 Neb. 508 , 233 N. W. 890 , 72 A. L.

1953We have held: "`Public policy, to prevent loss to the state through the negligence of public officers, forbids the application of the doctrine of estoppel to the state, growing out of the conduct and representations of its officers.' People v. Brown, 67 Ill. 435 ." Volker v. McDonald, 120 Neb. 508 , 233 N.W. 890, 891 , 72 A.L.R. 1267 .

2025SEBADE Cite as 320 Neb. 398 release defense was barred because “[t]he ledger transactions involved fraud, deceit, oppression, and unconscionable conduct by Rick and Sarah.” In denying the estoppel defense, the court found that Brent did not know of the false representations of brokerage losses as feed expenses, which were part of this annual accounting; Brent did not benefit from Sarah’s “math”; and Rick and Sarah failed to show reliance on Brent’s alleged acceptance of the annual accounting.

2022Muller v. Thaut, 230 Neb. 244 , 430 N.W.2d 884 (1988).

2022Muller v. Thaut, 230 Neb. 244 , 430 N.W.2d 884 (1988).

1998Id.

1998Id.

1998It is noteworthy that in rejecting an estoppel claim, the Willis court found it important that "[n]o one informed [the plaintiff] or his lawyer that proper filing of a claim was unnecessary [and that] the Political Subdivisions Tort Claims Act contains a clear procedure for filing a tort claim against a municipality...." Willis v. City of Lincoln, 232 Neb. at 541 , 441 N.W.2d at 851 .

1998It is noteworthy that in rejecting an estoppel claim, the Willis court found it important that "[n]o one informed [the plaintiff] or his lawyer that proper filing of a claim was unnecessary [and that] the Political Subdivisions Tort Claims Act contains a clear procedure for filing a tort claim against a municipality...." Willis v. City of Lincoln, 232 Neb. at 541 , 441 N.W.2d at 851 .

1994See, Kracl v. Loseke, 236 Neb. 290 , 461 N.W.2d 67 (1990); Hanthorn v. Hanthorn, 236 Neb. 225 , 460 N.W.2d 650 (1990).

1994See, Kracl v. Loseke, 236 Neb. 290 , 461 N.W.2d 67 (1990); Hanthorn v. Hanthorn, 236 Neb. 225 , 460 N.W.2d 650 (1990).

1994The Court noted that its decision did no more than manifest the "simple, if discomforting, reality that `different juries may reach different results under any criminal statute....'" Id., 447 U.S. at 25 , 100 S.Ct. at 2008 .

1994The Court noted that its decision did no more than manifest the "simple, if discomforting, reality that `different juries may reach different results under any criminal statute....'" Id., 447 U.S. at 25 , 100 S.Ct. at 2008 .

1993The operation of this equitable doctrine of estoppel, or estoppel in pais, was recently illustrated in Reifschneider v. Nebraska Methodist Hosp., 233 Neb. 695 , 447 N.W.2d 622 (1989).

1993The operation of this equitable doctrine of estoppel, or estoppel in pais, was recently illustrated in Reifschneider v. Nebraska Methodist Hosp., 233 Neb. 695 , 447 N.W.2d 622 (1989).

1960Such conjecture or surmise is not sufficient, in any event, to bring into play the equitable doctrine of estoppel.” And in Inslee v. City of Bridgeport, supra, we said by quoting from 1 Dillon on Municipal Corporations (5th Ed.), § 213, p. 430: “ ‘Inducements in the way of statements and representations made to influence a voter, although false and fraudulent, will not invalidate the election if it does not appear that by force and fraud the voter was compelled to vote in a way he did not desire to vote.’ ” It is true that in May v. City of Kearney, supra, we *196 said: “That the electorate ta

1959Co. v. Alameda County, 284 U. S. 463 , 52 S. Ct. 225 , 76 L.

1959Co. v. Alameda County, 284 U. S. 463 , 52 S. Ct. 225 , 76 L.

1959App.), 212 S. W. 2d 1018 , states: “Location of a public easement may be changed with express or implied consent of both interested parties, and an estoppel to claim a former location to be the true one arises from acquiescence in a change. * * * Landowner who has acquiesced in relocation of a road over such land and stood by while public authorities expended public funds on improvement of road as thus located cannot question the identity of the *826 line of travel. * * * A change of location of road made by owner of land for his own convenience after the right of public in the road has become

1959App.), 212 S. W. 2d 1018 , states: “Location of a public easement may be changed with express or implied consent of both interested parties, and an estoppel to claim a former location to be the true one arises from acquiescence in a change. * * * Landowner who has acquiesced in relocation of a road over such land and stood by while public authorities expended public funds on improvement of road as thus located cannot question the identity of the *826 line of travel. * * * A change of location of road made by owner of land for his own convenience after the right of public in the road has become

1959App.), 212 S. W. 2d 1018 , states: “Location of a public easement may be changed with express or implied consent of both interested parties, and an estoppel to claim a former location to be the true one arises from acquiescence in a change. * * * Landowner who has acquiesced in relocation of a road over such land and stood by while public authorities expended public funds on improvement of road as thus located cannot question the identity of the *826 line of travel. * * * A change of location of road made by owner of land for his own convenience after the right of public in the road has become

1956Co., 125 Neb. 329 , 250 N.W. 75, 79 .

1956Co., 125 Neb. 329 , 250 N. W. 75 .

1956While the general rule is not exclusively predicated on the doctrine of estoppel, this court in City of Grand Island v. Willis, 142 Neb. 686 , 7 N. W. 2d 457 , held that estoppel applies to controversies between public bodies such as between a city and a school district, or the state.

1956While the general rule is not exclusively predicated on the doctrine of estoppel, this court in City of Grand Island v. Willis, 142 Neb. 686 , 7 N. W. 2d 457 , held that estoppel applies to controversies between public bodies such as between a city and a school district, or the state.

1956Co., 125 Neb. 329 , 250 N.W. 75, 79 .

1956Co., 125 Neb. 329 , 250 N. W. 75 .

1955“Taxation and the collection of taxes are strictly governmental activities as distinguished from private and proprietary activities, and the public as to such activities cannot be estopped.” Further, in Flansburg v. Shumway, 117 Neb. 125 , 219 N. W. 956 , this court held: “The lien of taxes regularly levied on real estate is, ordinarily, .perpetual and can be divested only by payment or in some manner authorized by statute.” *663 For reasons heretofore stated, we conclude that plaintiff could not maintain his cause of action.

1955Rather, in Omaha National Bank v. Jensen, 157 Neb. 22 , 58 N. W. 2d 582 , after concluding that: “Statutory provisions for the levy of a tax are imperative,” we held: “Public policy, to prevent loss to< the state through the negligence of public officers, forbids the application of the doctrine of estoppel to the state, growing out of the conduct and representation of its officers.

1955Rather, in Omaha National Bank v. Jensen, 157 Neb. 22 , 58 N. W. 2d 582 , after concluding that: “Statutory provisions for the levy of a tax are imperative,” we held: “Public policy, to prevent loss to< the state through the negligence of public officers, forbids the application of the doctrine of estoppel to the state, growing out of the conduct and representation of its officers.

1955“Taxation and the collection of taxes are strictly governmental activities as distinguished from private and proprietary activities, and the public as to such activities cannot be estopped.” Further, in Flansburg v. Shumway, 117 Neb. 125 , 219 N. W. 956 , this court held: “The lien of taxes regularly levied on real estate is, ordinarily, .perpetual and can be divested only by payment or in some manner authorized by statute.” *663 For reasons heretofore stated, we conclude that plaintiff could not maintain his cause of action.

1954We have said: “Ordinarily the doctrine of equitable estoppel cannot be invoked against a municipal corporation in the exercise of governmental functions but exceptions are made where right and justice so demand, particularly where the controversy is between one class of the public as against another class.” May v. City of Kearney, 145 Neb. 475 , 17 N. W. 2d 448 .

1954We have said: “Ordinarily the doctrine of equitable estoppel cannot be invoked against a municipal corporation in the exercise of governmental functions but exceptions are made where right and justice so demand, particularly where the controversy is between one class of the public as against another class.” May v. City of Kearney, 145 Neb. 475 , 17 N. W. 2d 448 .

1953We have held: “ ‘Public policy, to prevent loss to the state through the negligence of public officers, forbids the application of the doctrine of estoppel to the state, growing out of the conduct and representations of its officers.’ People v. Brown, 67 Ill. 435 .” Volker v. McDonald, 120 Neb. 508 , 233 N. W. 890 , 72 A. L.

1953We have held: “ ‘Public policy, to prevent loss to the state through the negligence of public officers, forbids the application of the doctrine of estoppel to the state, growing out of the conduct and representations of its officers.’ People v. Brown, 67 Ill. 435 .” Volker v. McDonald, 120 Neb. 508 , 233 N. W. 890 , 72 A. L.

1953We followed this rule in Goble v. Zolot, 144 Neb. 70 , 12 N.W.2d 311, 312 .

1953We followed this rule in Goble v. Zolot, 144 Neb. 70 , 12 N.W.2d 311, 312 .

1927The holding does not in the least go contra to the doctrine of Hopper v. Elkhorn Valley Drainage District, 108 Neb. 550 , to the effect that recovery may be had by the party injured through the negligent construction and maintenance of a ditch or cut-off; it proceeds wholly upon the doctrine of estoppel.

1925Our court said in Campbell v. Nesbitt, 7 Neb. 300 : “Generally, whether acts or admissions of a party shall operate by way of estoppel, or not, must depend upon the circumstances of each case, and therefore there can be no fixed and settled rules of general application to regulate estoppel in pais, as in technical estoppels.” And in a later case, Burke v. Utah Nat.

1923McClelland v. Scroggin, supra. Such being the case, the defendants who took mortgages-on the property described and afterward seized and sold it under such mortgages were required to prove, in order to successfully defend upon the' doctrine of estoppel, the existence of facts in connection with the holding of Shaffer,, other than that of mere possession, sufficient to mislead them in the exercise of ordinary care as to the true ownership, and also that they relied upon said facts.

1906But no such exception is made in this court in Green v. Gross, supra, and we think such a one would be impracticable.