estoppel doctrine in Arkansas

1994App. 257 , 630 S.W.2d 50 (1982), as authority to apply the doctrine of estoppel, but that case is readily distinguished.

1990Co., 4 Ark.

2012Brockert v. Skornicka, 711 F.2d 1376 (7th Cir.1983).

2012Another view is found in Helbig v. Zoning Comm’n, 185 Conn. 294 , 440 A.2d 940 (1981).

2012Another view is found in Helbig v. Zoning Comm’n, 185 Conn. 294 , 440 A.2d 940 (1981).

2010The Doe court went on, however, to note that agreements not to prosecute "may be enforced if they are duly consummated and comply with the requirements of due process," and also drawing upon "general equitable principles." Id. (citing Hammers v. State, 261 Ark. 585 , 550 S.W.2d 432 (1977)). [5] Although the Hammers court did not expressly mention or require detrimental reliance on the agreement, we later characterized Hammers as, "in effect, appl[ying] the doctrine of estoppel," which of course requires the presence of detrimental reliance.

2010The Doe court went on, however, to note that agreements not to prosecute "may be enforced if they are duly consummated and comply with the requirements of due process," and also drawing upon "general equitable principles." Id. (citing Hammers v. State, 261 Ark. 585 , 550 S.W.2d 432 (1977)). [5] Although the Hammers court did not expressly mention or require detrimental reliance on the agreement, we later characterized Hammers as, "in effect, appl[ying] the doctrine of estoppel," which of course requires the presence of detrimental reliance.

2010The Doe court went on, however, to note that agreements not to prosecute "may be enforced if they are duly consummated and comply with the requirements of due process," and also drawing upon "general equitable principles." Id. (citing Hammers v. State, 261 Ark. 585 , 550 S.W.2d 432 (1977)). [5] Although the Hammers court did not expressly mention or require detrimental reliance on the agreement, we later characterized Hammers as, "in effect, appl[ying] the doctrine of estoppel," which of course requires the presence of detrimental reliance.

1997Although the Commission did not expressly state that it was applying the doctrine of estoppel, it is implicit in its opinion that it did so. 1 See Southern Hospitalities v. Britain, 54 Ark.

1997Although the Commission did not expressly state that it was applying the doctrine of estoppel, it is implicit in its opinion that it did so. [1] See Southern Hospitalities v. Britain, 54 Ark.App. 318 , 925 S.W.2d 810 (1996).

1997However, because estoppel is ordinarily a question of fact, see Dickson v. Delhi Seed Co., 26 Ark.App. 83 , 760 S.W.2d 382 (1988), and because the Commission did not make a specific determination that the employer was estopped, we reverse and remand on this point for the Commission to make findings sufficient for us to determine whether this issue was resolved in conformity with the law.

1997However, because estoppel is ordinarily a question of fact, see Dickson v. Delhi Seed Co., 26 Ark.App. 83 , 760 S.W.2d 382 (1988), and because the Commission did not make a specific determination that the employer was estopped, we reverse and remand on this point for the Commission to make findings sufficient for us to determine whether this issue was resolved in conformity with the law.

1997U.S. v. Nickens, 856 F.Supp. 72 (1994).

1996In Snow v. Alcoa, 15 Ark.

1991If he does not obey the law, he may not have his deficiency judgment." First State Bank of Morrilton v. Hallett, 291 Ark. 37, 41 , 722 S.W.2d 555, 557 (1987); quoting Atlas Thrift Co. v. Horan, 27 Cal.App.3d 999 , 104 Cal.Rptr. 315 (1972). *918 There is, finally, the issue of whether the Walkers waived notice requirements under the Commercial Code by their actions or whether the doctrine of estoppel applies.

1991If he does not obey the law, he may not have his deficiency judgment." First State Bank of Morrilton v. Hallett, 291 Ark. 37, 41 , 722 S.W.2d 555, 557 (1987); quoting Atlas Thrift Co. v. Horan, 27 Cal.App.3d 999 , 104 Cal.Rptr. 315 (1972). *918 There is, finally, the issue of whether the Walkers waived notice requirements under the Commercial Code by their actions or whether the doctrine of estoppel applies.

1990The appellee argues that an estoppel instruction was not appropriate because the appellant failed to prove the four central elements of estoppel. 2 The Texas Court of Appeals answered this concern in Aetna Life Insurance Company v. Bocanegra, supra, explaining the consistency principle.

1990The appellee argues that an estoppel instruction was not appropriate because the appellant failed to prove the four central elements of estoppel. 2 The Texas Court of Appeals answered this concern in Aetna Life Insurance Company v. Bocanegra, supra, explaining the consistency principle.

1989Kern v. City of Flint, 15 Mich. App., 24 , 355 N.W.2d 708 (1983).

1987In DeSoto Life Insurance Co. v. Johnson, 208 Ark. 795, 800 , 187 S.W.2d 883 (1945), the court said: The majority rule has long been followed by this court.

1987In DeSoto Life Insurance Co. v. Johnson, 208 Ark. 795, 800 , 187 S.W.2d 883 (1945), the court said: The majority rule has long been followed by this court.

1983Coristo v. Twin City Bank, 257 Ark. 554 , 520 S.W.2d 218 (1975).

1983Coristo v. Twin City Bank, 257 Ark. 554 , 520 S.W.2d 218 (1975).

1980In Gestuvo v. District Director of the United States Immigration and Naturalization Service, 337 F. Supp. 1093 (C.D.

1972In the recent case Branch v. Standard Title Company, 252 Ark. 737 , 480 S.W. 2d 568 (1972), we recognized the equitable maxim that where one of two innocent persons must suffer a loss it is better that it be borne by one whose conduct could have prevented the loss or situation.

1972In the recent case Branch v. Standard Title Company, 252 Ark. 737 , 480 S.W. 2d 568 (1972), we recognized the equitable maxim that where one of two innocent persons must suffer a loss it is better that it be borne by one whose conduct could have prevented the loss or situation.

1971In Nall v. Scott, 233 Ark. 21 , 342 S. W. 2d 418 , we said that no particular form was necessary to constitute a release, so long as the contract is complete, the intention to release manifest and the parties sufficiendy described to identify them.

1971In Nall v. Scott, 233 Ark. 21 , 342 S. W. 2d 418 , we said that no particular form was necessary to constitute a release, so long as the contract is complete, the intention to release manifest and the parties sufficiendy described to identify them.

1970Rankin v. Chancery Court, 221 Ark. 110 , 252 S. W. 2d 551 , cert. denied, 345 U. S. 956 , 73 S. Ct. 938 , 97 L.

1970Rankin v. Chancery Court, 221 Ark. 110 , 252 S. W. 2d 551 , cert. denied, 345 U. S. 956 , 73 S. Ct. 938 , 97 L.

1970Rankin v. Chancery Court, 221 Ark. 110 , 252 S. W. 2d 551 , cert. denied, 345 U. S. 956 , 73 S. Ct. 938 , 97 L.

1970Rankin v. Chancery Court, 221 Ark. 110 , 252 S. W. 2d 551 , cert. denied, 345 U. S. 956 , 73 S. Ct. 938 , 97 L.

1970Rankin v. Chancery Court, 221 Ark. 110 , 252 S. W. 2d 551 , cert. denied, 345 U. S. 956 , 73 S. Ct. 938 , 97 L.

1970Rankin v. Chancery Court, 221 Ark. 110 , 252 S. W. 2d 551 , cert. denied, 345 U. S. 956 , 73 S. Ct. 938 , 97 L.

1970Rankin v. Chancery Court, 221 Ark. 110 , 252 S. W. 2d 551 , cert. denied, 345 U. S. 956 , 73 S. Ct. 938 , 97 L.

1970Rankin v. Chancery Court, 221 Ark. 110 , 252 S. W. 2d 551 , cert. denied, 345 U. S. 956 , 73 S. Ct. 938 , 97 L.

1927It was there further said: “Ludlam was in possession of the property as a mortgagor, and had an alienable interest upon which he could create a lien, therefore his construction of the building and the creation of a lien for labor and material was referable to his own interest in the property, and acquiescence on the part of appellants las mortgagees did not constitute such an affirmative act as would operate as an estoppel to the claim of a superior lien. ’ ’ The doctrine of that case was reaffirmed in the casé of Judd v. Rieff, 174 Ark. 362 , 295 S. W. 370 , which is also similar to the insta

1927It was there further said: “Ludlam was in possession of the property as a mortgagor, and had an alienable interest upon which he could create a lien, therefore his construction of the building and the creation of a lien for labor and material was referable to his own interest in the property, and acquiescence on the part of appellants las mortgagees did not constitute such an affirmative act as would operate as an estoppel to the claim of a superior lien. ’ ’ The doctrine of that case was reaffirmed in the casé of Judd v. Rieff, 174 Ark. 362 , 295 S. W. 370 , which is also similar to the insta

1924J., § 451, p. 506, that “a party to an illegal contract cannot, either at the time of the execution of the contract or afterward, waive his right to set up the defense of illegality in any action thereon by the other party.” And at § 453 of the same authority it is said: “An agreement void as against public policy cannot be rendered valid by involdng the doctrine of estoppel.” It was said in the case of Embrey v. Jemison, 131 U. S. 336 , that contracts made in violation of the law were not rendered valid by renewals or by subsequent promises to perform, and that this defense was not for the be