11 Delaware opinions name it 4 courts 1947–2024 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Delaware courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Principal Life Insurance v. Locker Groupgreen1 sentence2024Co. v. Locker Grp., 869 F. Supp. 2d 359, 366 (E.D.N.Y. 2012) (rejecting ratification defense raised at summary judgment phase where defendant failed to plead the affirmative defense in its answer); 2A William Meade Fletcher et al., Fletcher Cyclopedia of the Law of Corporations § 777, at 626–27 (perm. ed., rev. vol. 2024) (“A failure to plead affirmatively ratification and estoppel may be waived, as by proceeding with the trial without objection. | 1 | 1 |
Petras v. State Board of Pension Trusteesgreen1 sentence2017Ba'. of Pension Trustees, 464 A.2d 894, 895-96 (Del. 1983). 19 Because of this determination, we need not address the reasonable-expectation and avoidance- of-injustice prongs of the estoppel analysis 8 the trier of its merit.”20 For the reasons previously stated, the Board’s rejection of Richardson’s testimony relating to reliance Was not an abuse of discretion and was well Within the bounds of reason. | 1 | 1 |
Waggoner v. Lastergreen1 sentence1994Id; Waggoner v. Laster, Del.Supr., 581 A.2d 1127, 1136 (1990). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Delaware. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Abdi v. NVR, INC.
green
1 sentence2024To prevail on an estoppel theory, a party must show that it: “(i) lacked knowledge or the means of obtaining knowledge of the truth of the facts in question; (ii) reasonably relied on the conduct of the party against whom estoppel is claimed; and (iii) suffered a prejudicial change of position as a result of [its] reliance.”179 How DWAC and the Director Defendants lacked knowledge of the facts needed to calculate the 175 Cf. Abdi v. NVR, Inc., 945 A.2d 1167 (Del. 2008) (TABLE) (holding that the failure to plead an affirmative defense in the answer to a complaint constitutes a waiver of the rig | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Haveg Corporation v. Guyer
green
1 sentence2015I discuss those exceptions next. i. Part performance Part performance is a well-recognized exception to the Statute of Frauds for contracts involving interests in land.84 “Part performance may be deemed to take a contract out of the provisions of the statute of frauds on the theory that acts of performance, even if incomplete, constitute substantial evidence that a contract actually 82 Guyer, 211 A.2d at 912 . 83 See, e.g., Hendry v. Hendry, 2006 WL 4804019 , at *7 (Del. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Aveta Inc. v. Cavallieri
green
1 sentence2015Rather, Plaintiff’s interest as a former stockholder of the Company remains subject to all the Company’s bylaws as of the effective time of the Reverse Stock Split—which did not include the 38 23 A.3d 157 (Del. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Burge v. Fidelity Bond and Mortg. Co.
green
1 sentence1998"For an estoppel claim to prevail, it must be shown that the party claiming estoppel lacked knowledge or the means of obtaining knowledge of the truth of the facts in question_" Id. at 420 . | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Alderson v. Alderson
green
2 sentences1986The above cited cases were not overruled by Alderson v. Alderson, Ind.Supr., 258 Ind. 328 , 281 N.E.2d 82 (1972), where the Supreme Court held that the principle of indivisibility was no longer viable as this principle, when applied with the doctrine of estoppel, would prevent a party who had remarried after a decree of divorce was entered from challenging any part of the divorce decree on appeal, thereby producing “... severe results which border on absurdity.” Id. 281 N.E. at 83. 1986The above cited cases were not overruled by Alderson v. Alderson, Ind.Supr., 258 Ind. 328 , 281 N.E.2d 82 (1972), where the Supreme Court held that the principle of indivisibility was no longer viable as this principle, when applied with the doctrine of estoppel, would prevent a party who had remarried after a decree of divorce was entered from challenging any part of the divorce decree on appeal, thereby producing “... severe results which border on absurdity.” Id. 281 N.E. at 83. | 1 | 1986–1986 |
Ottendorfer v. Aetna Insurance Company
green
1 sentence1983Ottendorfer v. Aetna Insurance Company, Del.Supr., 231 A.2d 263 (1967). | 1 | 1983–1983 |
United States Steel Corp. v. Mason
neutral
2 sentences1973The claimant relies upon Tate v. Industrial Accident Commission, 120 Cal.App.2d 657 , 261 P.2d 759 (1953); Henderson v. Sherwood Motor Hotel, Inc., 105 N.H. 443 , 201 A.2d 891 (1964); and United States Steel Corp. v. Mason, 141 Ind.App. 336 , 227 N.E.2d 694 (1967). 1973The claimant relies upon Tate v. Industrial Accident Commission, 120 Cal.App.2d 657 , 261 P.2d 759 (1953); Henderson v. Sherwood Motor Hotel, Inc., 105 N.H. 443 , 201 A.2d 891 (1964); and United States Steel Corp. v. Mason, 141 Ind.App. 336 , 227 N.E.2d 694 (1967). | 1 | 1973–1973 |
Tate v. Industrial Accident Commission
green
2 sentences1973The claimant relies upon Tate v. Industrial Accident Commission, 120 Cal.App.2d 657 , 261 P.2d 759 (1953); Henderson v. Sherwood Motor Hotel, Inc., 105 N.H. 443 , 201 A.2d 891 (1964); and United States Steel Corp. v. Mason, 141 Ind.App. 336 , 227 N.E.2d 694 (1967). 1973The claimant relies upon Tate v. Industrial Accident Commission, 120 Cal.App.2d 657 , 261 P.2d 759 (1953); Henderson v. Sherwood Motor Hotel, Inc., 105 N.H. 443 , 201 A.2d 891 (1964); and United States Steel Corp. v. Mason, 141 Ind.App. 336 , 227 N.E.2d 694 (1967). | 1 | 1973–1973 |
Henderson v. Sherwood Motor Hotel, Inc.
green
2 sentences1973The claimant relies upon Tate v. Industrial Accident Commission, 120 Cal.App.2d 657 , 261 P.2d 759 (1953); Henderson v. Sherwood Motor Hotel, Inc., 105 N.H. 443 , 201 A.2d 891 (1964); and United States Steel Corp. v. Mason, 141 Ind.App. 336 , 227 N.E.2d 694 (1967). 1973The claimant relies upon Tate v. Industrial Accident Commission, 120 Cal.App.2d 657 , 261 P.2d 759 (1953); Henderson v. Sherwood Motor Hotel, Inc., 105 N.H. 443 , 201 A.2d 891 (1964); and United States Steel Corp. v. Mason, 141 Ind.App. 336 , 227 N.E.2d 694 (1967). | 1 | 1973–1973 |
Sola Electric Co. v. Jefferson Electric Co.
green
2 sentences1947Probably the earliest instance in which the United States Supreme Court refused to follow the estoppel doctrine is Sola Electric Co. v. Jefferson Electric Co., 1942, 317 U. S. 173 , 63 S. Ct. 172, 174 , 87 L. 1947Probably the earliest instance in which the United States Supreme Court refused to follow the estoppel doctrine is Sola Electric Co. v. Jefferson Electric Co., 1942, 317 U. S. 173 , 63 S. Ct. 172, 174 , 87 L. | 1 | 1947–1947 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.