estoppel doctrine in Florida

2017Servs., 988 So.2d 1192, 1193 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008) (explaining that the party moving for summary judgment must conclusively show the absence of any genuine issue of material fact and the trial court must draw every possible inference in favor of the nonmoving party); Parker v. Dinsmore Co., 443 So.2d 356, 358 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983) (“Summary judgment is párticularly unsuitable in those cases where ‘the facts and circumstances indicate a possibility of an estoppel or a waiver.’ ” (Citation omitted)).

2003"Summary judgment is particularly unsuitable in those cases where `the facts and circumstances indicate a possibility of an estoppel or a waiver.'" Id. at 358 (quoting 22 Fla. Jur.2d Estoppel and Waiver § 9 (1980)).

2023Necessarily, ‘the particular matter must be fully litigated and determined in a contest that results in a final decision of a court of competent jurisdiction.’” (quoting Bradenton Group, Inc. v. State, 970 So. 2d 403, 408 (Fla. 5th DCA 2007))); Bistline v. Rogers, 215 So. 3d 607, 611 (Fla. 4th DCA 2017) (“[Section 768.72, Florida Statutes] requires the trial court to act as a gatekeeper and precludes a claim for punitive damages where there is no reasonable evidentiary basis for recovery.”). 2

2023Necessarily, ‘the particular matter must be fully litigated and determined in a contest that results in a final decision of a court of competent jurisdiction.’” (quoting Bradenton Group, Inc. v. State, 970 So. 2d 403, 408 (Fla. 5th DCA 2007))); Bistline v. Rogers, 215 So. 3d 607, 611 (Fla. 4th DCA 2017) (“[Section 768.72, Florida Statutes] requires the trial court to act as a gatekeeper and precludes a claim for punitive damages where there is no reasonable evidentiary basis for recovery.”). 2

2023Necessarily, ‘the particular matter must be fully litigated and determined in a contest that results in a final decision of a court of competent jurisdiction.’” (quoting Bradenton Group, Inc. v. State, 970 So. 2d 403, 408 (Fla. 5th DCA 2007))); Bistline v. Rogers, 215 So. 3d 607, 611 (Fla. 4th DCA 2017) (“[Section 768.72, Florida Statutes] requires the trial court to act as a gatekeeper and precludes a claim for punitive damages where there is no reasonable evidentiary basis for recovery.”). 2

2023Necessarily, ‘the particular matter must be fully litigated and determined in a contest that results in a final decision of a court of competent jurisdiction.’” (quoting Bradenton Group, Inc. v. State, 970 So. 2d 403, 408 (Fla. 5th DCA 2007))); Bistline v. Rogers, 215 So. 3d 607, 611 (Fla. 4th DCA 2017) (“[Section 768.72, Florida Statutes] requires the trial court to act as a gatekeeper and precludes a claim for punitive damages where there is no reasonable evidentiary basis for recovery.”). 2

2013In South Investment Corp. v. Norton, 57 So.2d 1, 3 (Fla.1952), we quoted favorably the following statement from the New York Court of Appeals: The doctrine of estoppel, when invoked for the purpose of working a change in the title to land, is to be applied with great caution.

1988Further, "The doctrine of estoppel, when invoked for the purpose of working a change in the title to land, is to be applied with great caution." South Investment Corp. v. Norton, 57 So.2d 1, 3 (Fla. 1952) (quoting Lyon v. Morgan, 143 N.Y. 505, 509 , 38 N.E. 960, 961 (1894)). *115 In any event, the doctrine of promissory estoppel should not be applied if injustice can otherwise be avoided.

2002These defenses raised genuine issues of material fact...."); Dusich v. Horley, 525 So.2d 507, 509 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988); Parker *576 v. Dinsmore Co., 443 So.2d 356, 358 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983) ("Summary judgment is particularly unsuitable in those cases where `the facts and circumstances indicate a possibility of an estoppel or a waiver.'") (quoting 22 Fla. Jur.2d Estoppel and Waiver § 9 (1980) (emphasis supplied)) (citing Macina v. Magurno, 100 So.2d 369, 373 (Fla.1958)).

1983Summary judgment is particularly unsuitable in those cases where "the facts and circumstances indicate a possibility of an estoppel or a waiver." 22 Fla.Jur.2d Estoppel and Waiver § 9 (1980) (e.s.); Macina v. Magurno, 100 So.2d 369, 373 (Fla. 1958).

1999See State Department of Revenue v. Anderson, 403 So.2d 397, 401 (Fla.1981); Rissman ex rel.

1986See State Department of Revenue v. Anderson, 403 So.2d 397, 400 (Fla. 1981); United Contractors, Inc. v. United Construction Corp., 187 So.2d 695, 702 (Fla. 2d DCA 1966).

2019Co. v. Oates, 192 So. 637, 641 (Fla. 1939) (recognizing that, subject to the doctrine of estoppel, the validity of the mortgage may be challenged where both spouses sign the mortgage but one spouse does not acknowledge the execution of the mortgage before a notary). 4 Attached to the mortgage is also a “Signature Exhibit,” where Mrs. Palmero and 5 At the trial, over the defendants’ objection, OneWest introduced a document the Palmeros signed, labeled “Non-Borrower Spouse Ownership Interest Certification.” Mrs. Palmero signed this document as the “Non-Borrower Spouse” directly below a statement

1954In the case of New York Life Insurance Co. v. Oates, 141 Fla. 164 , 192 So. 637, 642 , Oates v. New York Life Insurance Co., *664 314 U.S. 614 , 62 S.Ct. 56 , 86 L.Ed. 494 , Mrs. Oates, at the request of her husband, signed a mortgage to the home.

2005In Standefer, 447 U.S. at 24 , 100 S.Ct. 1999 , the Court recognized that "the important federal interest in the enforcement of the criminal law" may "outweigh the [judicial] economy concerns that undergird the estoppel doctrine." Based on that interest in the enforcement of the criminal law, the Court held that the acquittal of the named principal did not preclude the subsequent prosecution of the defendant for aiding and abetting.

2005In Standefer, 447 U.S. at 24 , 100 S.Ct. 1999 , the Court recognized that "the important federal interest in the enforcement of the criminal law" may "outweigh the [judicial] economy concerns that undergird the estoppel doctrine." Based on that interest in the enforcement of the criminal law, the Court held that the acquittal of the named principal did not preclude the subsequent prosecution of the defendant for aiding and abetting.

1998"A party asserting estoppel must show that: (1) the party to be estopped made a representation of material fact and later took a position contrary to that representation; (2) the party claiming estoppel relied upon this representation; and (3) that party suffered a detrimental change in position as a result of this reliance." Killearn Acres Homeowners Ass'n, Inc. v. Keever, 595 So.2d 1019, 1022 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992)(citing Enegren v. Marathon County Club Condominium West Ass'n, Inc., 525 So.2d 488, 489 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988)).

1990See Boulevard National Bank of Miami v. Gulf American Land Corp., 189 So.2d 628 (Fla. 1966), on remand, 190 So.2d 67 (Fla. 3d DCA 1966); Enegren v. Marathon Country Club Condominium West Association, Inc., 525 So.2d 488 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988).

1995We note that the doctrine of estoppel "is an equitable doctrine which is applied only where to refuse its application would be virtually to sanction the perpetration of a fraud." Brickell Bay Club Condominium Ass'n v. Hernstadt, 512 So.2d 994, 996 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987), review denied, 520 So.2d 584 (Fla. 1988); see also Pelican Island Property Owners Ass'n v. Murphy, 554 So.2d 1179, 1181 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989); Capital Bank v. Schuler, 421 So.2d 633, 638 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982); McAllister Enters. v. McAllister Hotel, Inc., 219 So.2d 114, 116 (Fla. 3d DCA 1969).

1993Estoppel is applied with great caution. "[I]f conduct is ambiguous and thus susceptible of two constructions, one of which is inconsistent with the right asserted by the party sought to be estopped, there is no estoppel." Capital Bank v. Schuler, 421 So.2d 633 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982).

1990See Boulevard National Bank of Miami v. Gulf American Land Corp., 189 So.2d 628 (Fla. 1966), on remand, 190 So.2d 67 (Fla. 3d DCA 1966); Enegren v. Marathon Country Club Condominium West Association, Inc., 525 So.2d 488 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988).

1968Bank of Miami v. Gulf American Land Corp., Fla.App. 1965, 179 So.2d 584 , holding: "The evidence not being sufficient to establish an equitable estoppel, we find that the trial judge was correct in finding that there was no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." In Boulevard National Bank of Miami v. Gulf American Land Corporation, Fla. 1966, 189 So.2d 628 , the Supreme Court of Florida quashed the decision of this court, holding: "It is not necessary to weigh the injury in order to determine the applicability of the doctrine o

1988Further, "The doctrine of estoppel, when invoked for the purpose of working a change in the title to land, is to be applied with great caution." South Investment Corp. v. Norton, 57 So.2d 1, 3 (Fla. 1952) (quoting Lyon v. Morgan, 143 N.Y. 505, 509 , 38 N.E. 960, 961 (1894)). *115 In any event, the doctrine of promissory estoppel should not be applied if injustice can otherwise be avoided.

1988Further, "The doctrine of estoppel, when invoked for the purpose of working a change in the title to land, is to be applied with great caution." South Investment Corp. v. Norton, 57 So.2d 1, 3 (Fla. 1952) (quoting Lyon v. Morgan, 143 N.Y. 505, 509 , 38 N.E. 960, 961 (1894)). *115 In any event, the doctrine of promissory estoppel should not be applied if injustice can otherwise be avoided.

2022See DK Arena, Inc. v. EB Acquisitions I, LLC, 112 So. 3d 85 (Fla. 2013); see also Wharfside at Boca Pointe, Inc. v. Superior Bank, 741 So. 2d 542 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999).

2022“The doctrine of collateral estoppel, also known as issue preclusion and estoppel by judgment, ‘bars relitigation of the same issues between the same parties in connection with a different cause of action.’” Criner v. State, 138 So. 3d 557, 558 (Fla. 5th DCA 2014) (quoting Topps v. State, 865 So.2d 1253, 1255 (Fla.2004)).

2022See DK Arena, Inc. v. EB Acquisitions I, LLC, 112 So. 3d 85 (Fla. 2013); see also Wharfside at Boca Pointe, Inc. v. Superior Bank, 741 So. 2d 542 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999).

2022“The doctrine of collateral estoppel, also known as issue preclusion and estoppel by judgment, ‘bars relitigation of the same issues between the same parties in connection with a different cause of action.’” Criner v. State, 138 So. 3d 557, 558 (Fla. 5th DCA 2014) (quoting Topps v. State, 865 So.2d 1253, 1255 (Fla.2004)).

2017Servs., 988 So.2d 1192, 1193 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008) (explaining that the party moving for summary judgment must conclusively show the absence of any genuine issue of material fact and the trial court must draw every possible inference in favor of the nonmoving party); Parker v. Dinsmore Co., 443 So.2d 356, 358 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983) (“Summary judgment is párticularly unsuitable in those cases where ‘the facts and circumstances indicate a possibility of an estoppel or a waiver.’ ” (Citation omitted)).

2013Generally, the doctrine of estoppel holds “that a person should not be permitted to unfairly assert, assume or maintain inconsistent positions.” Head v. Lane, 495 So.2d 821, 824 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986) (emphasis added).

2013One “form of estoppel occurs where a person attempts to repudiate the obligations and validity of a transaction after accepting the benefits resulting from it.” Id.

2010In Hood v. Coldway Carriers, Inc., the court held that an insurer was not permitted to deny liability under the doctrine of estoppel, noting that the insurer "knew the circumstances that gave rise to the accident as well as the provision of its policy upon which it could have denied liability," that the insurer defended the insured without obtaining a reservation of its rights, and that "[the loss of a right to control and manage one's own case is itself a prejudice." 405 S.W.2d 672, 673 (Ky.1965).

2010See also The Western Casualty & Surety Co. v. Frankfort, 516 S.W.2d 859, 861 (Ky.1974) (recognizing the holding in Shely but noting that the insurer's action of "simply filing an answer did not deprive the [insured] of any substantial right to manage the defense of the suit"); Universal Underwriters Ins.

2008See Specialty Employee Leasing v. Davis, 737 So.2d 1170 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999).

2005See Baptist Hosp. of Miami, Inc. v. Carter, 658 So.2d 560, 562-63 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995) (finding a triable issue as to the estate’s estoppel to claim the limitations defense where the decedent’s surviv- or actively misled a hospital into believing that the decedent left no estate from which to collect outstanding bills), abrogated by May v. Illinois Nat’l Ins.

2005Co., 771 So.2d 1143 (Fla.2000); Alachua County v. Cheshire, 603 So.2d 1334, 1337 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992) (applying equitable estoppel where the federal government, by continual assurances of payment, induced the plaintiff not to sue on a lien against government-seized property within the limitations period); Jaszay v. H.B.