estoppel doctrine in Oregon

2006When the court again considered an estoppel claim against a taxing authority in Pilgrim Turkey it again made no reference to the law’s accessibility. 261 Or at 310 .

1980The hearing officer concluded that even under petitioner’s version of the facts the blame should be "apportioned.” However, in Pilgrim Turkey Packers v. Dept. of Rev., supra, the Supreme Court stated that the doctrine of estoppel would apply "where the taxing authorities were in part responsible for misleading the taxpayer into relying on a tax form which was superseded by an amended form.” (Emphasis supplied.) 261 Or at 310 .

2010(Stip Facts, Ex I at 6.) GTFs vary from .20 FTE to .49 FTE. ( Id. ) Greater time obligations are reflected by greater salaries. ( Id. ) 2 Taxpayer does not make an estoppel claim against the department based on the email Morgan Brown, of the Oregon Department of Revenue, sent to taxpayer's colleague regarding whether a GTF qualifies as a scholarship for purposes of ORS 316.846. 3 All references to the Oregon Revised Statutes (ORS) are to 2007. 4 Unless otherwise noted, all references to the Internal Revenue Code (IRC) are to 2006. 5 Any excess or "unqualified" scholarship funds are included in

2010(Stip Facts, Ex I at 6.) GTFs vary from .20 FTE to .49 FTE. ( Id. ) Greater time obligations are reflected by greater salaries. ( Id. ) 2 Taxpayer does not make an estoppel claim against the department based on the email Morgan Brown, of the Oregon Department of Revenue, sent to taxpayer's colleague regarding whether a GTF qualifies as a scholarship for purposes of ORS 316.846. 3 All references to the Oregon Revised Statutes (ORS) are to 2007. 4 Unless otherwise noted, all references to the Internal Revenue Code (IRC) are to 2006. 5 Any excess or "unqualified" scholarship funds are included in

2006Wilkinson in turn cited the Supreme Court’s decision in Wiggins v. Barrett & Associates, Inc., 295 Or 679, 697 , 669 P2d 1132 (1983), in which the Supreme Court allowed an estoppel claim, in part, because the agencys statement “was intra vires, i.e., it was within the lawful powers of the District.” See also Hewett, 321 Or at 126 (citing Wiggins for a similar proposition).

2006Wilkinson in turn cited the Supreme Court’s decision in Wiggins v. Barrett & Associates, Inc., 295 Or 679, 697 , 669 P2d 1132 (1983), in which the Supreme Court allowed an estoppel claim, in part, because the agencys statement “was intra vires, i.e., it was within the lawful powers of the District.” See also Hewett, 321 Or at 126 (citing Wiggins for a similar proposition).

1996The elements of estoppel are set out in Lyden v. Goldberg, 260 Or 301, 304 , 490 P2d 181 (1971): “ ‘[T]here must (1) be a false representation; (2), it must be made with knowledge of the facts; (3) the other party must have been ignorant of the truth; (4) it must have been made with the intention that it should be acted upon by the other *134 party; and (5) the other party must have been induced to act upon it.’ * % * * “To invoke the doctrine of estoppel, the * * * insurance company[] must have done something that amounted to an affirmative inducement that would cause plaintiff to delay bring

1996The elements of estoppel are set out in Lyden v. Goldberg, 260 Or 301, 304 , 490 P2d 181 (1971): “ ‘[T]here must (1) be a false representation; (2), it must be made with knowledge of the facts; (3) the other party must have been ignorant of the truth; (4) it must have been made with the intention that it should be acted upon by the other *134 party; and (5) the other party must have been induced to act upon it.’ * % * * “To invoke the doctrine of estoppel, the * * * insurance company[] must have done something that amounted to an affirmative inducement that would cause plaintiff to delay bring

1984In the absence of appellate review, or of similar procedures, such confidence is often unwarranted.” 447 US at 23 n 18.

1982“In short, this criminal case involves ‘competing policy considerations’ that outweigh the economy concerns that undergird the estoppel doctrine. [Citations omitted.]” 447 US at 24-25 .

1983In Lyden v. Goldberg, 260 Or 301, 304-305 , 490 P2d 181 (1971), the court considered an estoppel claim and quoted with approval Kimball v. Horticultural Fire Relief, 79 Or 133, 142-43 , 154 P 578 (1916): “An estoppel always implies a party has been misled to his prejudice, or into an altered position which he would not have taken except for representations relied upon; and, as the estoppel may arise without an intent to guide astray * * The court in Lyden observed: “[To] invoke the doctrine of estoppel, the defendant or her agent, the insurance company, must have done something that amounts to

1983In Lyden v. Goldberg, 260 Or 301, 304-305 , 490 P2d 181 (1971), the court considered an estoppel claim and quoted with approval Kimball v. Horticultural Fire Relief, 79 Or 133, 142-43 , 154 P 578 (1916): “An estoppel always implies a party has been misled to his prejudice, or into an altered position which he would not have taken except for representations relied upon; and, as the estoppel may arise without an intent to guide astray * * The court in Lyden observed: “[To] invoke the doctrine of estoppel, the defendant or her agent, the insurance company, must have done something that amounts to

1982The one invoking such doctrine must show that he was entitled to rely upon such conduct, action or silence, that he acted thereupon and would be prejudiced if the doctrine of estoppel were not applied.” Marshall v. Wilson, 175 Or 506, 518 , 154 P2d 547 (1944).

1982The one invoking such doctrine must show that he was entitled to rely upon such conduct, action or silence, that he acted thereupon and would be prejudiced if the doctrine of estoppel were not applied.” Marshall v. Wilson, 175 Or 506, 518 , 154 P2d 547 (1944).

1923The doctrine of estoppel, therefore, was purely academic as applied in the charge, and the giving of the instruction on that subject was a pure abstraction which a long list of precedents in this state declares to be erroneous, requiring a reversal of the judgment : Morris v. Perkins, 6 Or. 350 ; Glenn v. Savage, 14 Or. 567 ( 13 Pac. 442 ); Bailey v. Davis, 19 Or. 217 ( 23 Pac. 881 ); Bowen v. Clarke, 22 Or. 566 ( 30 Pac. 430 , 29 Am.

1923The doctrine of estoppel, therefore, was purely academic as applied in the charge, and the giving of the instruction on that subject was a pure abstraction which a long list of precedents in this state declares to be erroneous, requiring a reversal of the judgment : Morris v. Perkins, 6 Or. 350 ; Glenn v. Savage, 14 Or. 567 ( 13 Pac. 442 ); Bailey v. Davis, 19 Or. 217 ( 23 Pac. 881 ); Bowen v. Clarke, 22 Or. 566 ( 30 Pac. 430 , 29 Am.

2022Copeland Yards v. Sheridan et al., 136 Or 37, 42 , 296 P 838 (1931) (A “default judgment is a complete adjudi- cation of all the rights of the parties embraced in the prayer for relief and arising from the facts stated in the plead- ings[,]” so it “is as conclusive either as an estoppel or bar as a judgment in a contested case.”).3 We therefore reject the “actually litigated” argument in Grandmontagne’s reply brief without further discussion.

2022Copeland Yards v. Sheridan et al., 136 Or 37, 42 , 296 P 838 (1931) (A “default judgment is a complete adjudi- cation of all the rights of the parties embraced in the prayer for relief and arising from the facts stated in the plead- ings[,]” so it “is as conclusive either as an estoppel or bar as a judgment in a contested case.”).3 We therefore reject the “actually litigated” argument in Grandmontagne’s reply brief without further discussion.

2021Here, defendant argues that Gaige should not con- trol because of the estoppel rule that, “[W]here a party assumes a certain position in a legal proceeding, and suc- ceeds in maintaining that position, he may not thereafter, simply because his interests have changed, assume a con- trary position, especially if it be to the prejudice of the party who has acquiesced in the position formerly taken by him.” Zedner v. United States, 547 US 489, 504 , 126 S Ct 1976 , 164 L Ed 2d 749 (2006) (internal quotation marks omitted).

2021Here, defendant argues that Gaige should not con- trol because of the estoppel rule that, “[W]here a party assumes a certain position in a legal proceeding, and suc- ceeds in maintaining that position, he may not thereafter, simply because his interests have changed, assume a con- trary position, especially if it be to the prejudice of the party who has acquiesced in the position formerly taken by him.” Zedner v. United States, 547 US 489, 504 , 126 S Ct 1976 , 164 L Ed 2d 749 (2006) (internal quotation marks omitted).

2021Oregon Occupational Safety & Health Div. v. CBI Servs., Inc., 356 Or 577 , 584-85 341 P3d 701 (2014) (the meaning of a statute is ultimately a question of law although an agency’s construction of a statute may be ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND DENYING PLAINTIFFS’ CROSS-MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT TC- MD 200363G; 200367N 17 entitled to “a measure of deference.”) Plaintiffs have not raised an estoppel claim or otherwise alleged that they were misled by Defendant as to the appeal process.

2021Oregon Occupational Safety & Health Div. v. CBI Servs., Inc., 356 Or 577 , 584-85 341 P3d 701 (2014) (the meaning of a statute is ultimately a question of law although an agency’s construction of a statute may be ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND DENYING PLAINTIFFS’ CROSS-MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT TC- MD 200363G; 200367N 17 entitled to “a measure of deference.”) Plaintiffs have not raised an estoppel claim or otherwise alleged that they were misled by Defendant as to the appeal process.

2007A fact is material only when "under applicable law, [it] might affect the outcome of a case." Zygar v. Johnson , 169 Or App 638 , 646 , 10 P3d 326 (2000).

2007A fact is material only when "under applicable law, [it] might affect the outcome of a case." Zygar v. Johnson , 169 Or App 638 , 646 , 10 P3d 326 (2000).

2006The court rejected Hewett’s estoppel claim, holding that Hewett could not reasonably have relied on ODOT’s statements “[g]iven the publication of the relevant law.” 321 Or at 127 .

2006Wilkinson in turn cited the Supreme Court’s decision in Wiggins v. Barrett & Associates, Inc., 295 Or 679, 697 , 669 P2d 1132 (1983), in which the Supreme Court allowed an estoppel claim, in part, because the agencys statement “was intra vires, i.e., it was within the lawful powers of the District.” See also Hewett, 321 Or at 126 (citing Wiggins for a similar proposition).

2006As such, they could not be the basis of an estoppel claim, Welch, 314 Or at 717 -18 , even if they were less qualified and noncommittal than they are. *Page 37

2000Thorn, 125 Or App at 262 n 3. 6 The court in Valley Motor discussed the application of a similar estoppel defense in the context of stock certificates.

2000Seattle, the plaintiff, who operated an auto auction, entered into an arrangement with Anderson, a mechanic, under which Anderson was to buy used cars in Oregon, clean and repair them, and then transport them for sale at the plaintiffs auction in Seattle. 230 Or at 353-57 .

2000It recited the rule that “[iln order to cut off the rights of the owner * * * there must be sufficient negligence or voluntary conduct on the owner’s part to constitute an estoppel” and noted that “the bearer of an indorsed stock certificate * * * can cut off equities of an owner whose only negligence was in failing to safeguard the indorsed paper.” 224 Or at 298 (emphasis added). 7 In Richardson , the original owner of a car gave a wrongdoer possession of the car and a copy of the conditional sales agreement, in exchange for a bank draft for the down payment. 193 Or at 354-58 .

1997Luckey et ux v. Deatsman, 217 Or 628, 634 , 343 P2d 723 (1959).

1997Luckey et ux v. Deatsman, 217 Or 628, 634 , 343 P2d 723 (1959).

1996The elements of estoppel are set out in Lyden v. Goldberg, 260 Or 301, 304 , 490 P2d 181 (1971): “ ‘[T]here must (1) be a false representation; (2), it must be made with knowledge of the facts; (3) the other party must have been ignorant of the truth; (4) it must have been made with the intention that it should be acted upon by the other *134 party; and (5) the other party must have been induced to act upon it.’ * % * * “To invoke the doctrine of estoppel, the * * * insurance company[] must have done something that amounted to an affirmative inducement that would cause plaintiff to delay bring

1996The elements of estoppel are set out in Lyden v. Goldberg, 260 Or 301, 304 , 490 P2d 181 (1971): “ ‘[T]here must (1) be a false representation; (2), it must be made with knowledge of the facts; (3) the other party must have been ignorant of the truth; (4) it must have been made with the intention that it should be acted upon by the other *134 party; and (5) the other party must have been induced to act upon it.’ * % * * “To invoke the doctrine of estoppel, the * * * insurance company[] must have done something that amounted to an affirmative inducement that would cause plaintiff to delay bring

1996“There must, however, be a justifiable reliance by the party seeking to invoke estoppel, and that reliance must be reasonable.” Johnson v. Kentner, 71 Or App 61, 72 , 691 P2d 499 (1984), rev den 299 Or 31 (1985).

1996“There must, however, be a justifiable reliance by the party seeking to invoke estoppel, and that reliance must be reasonable.” Johnson v. Kentner, 71 Or App 61, 72 , 691 P2d 499 (1984), rev den 299 Or 31 (1985).

1995Portland Adventist Hospital v. Dept. of Rev., 8 OTR 381 (1980). *334 Taxpayer has not met this burden.