282 Illinois opinions name it 3 courts 1877–2025 15 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Illinois courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Employers Insurance v. Ehlco Liquidating Trustgreen2 sentences2025If the insurer fails to take either of these steps and is later found to have wrongfully denied coverage, the insurer is estopped from raising policy defenses to coverage.” Employers Insurance of Wausau v. Ehlco Liquidating Trust, 186 Ill. 2d 127, 150-51 (1999). - 22 - 1-23-0787 ¶ 87 “The estoppel doctrine applies only where an insurer has breached its duty to defend.” Id. at 151 . 2025If the insurer fails to take either of these steps and is later found to have wrongfully denied coverage, the insurer is estopped from raising policy defenses to coverage.” Employers Insurance of Wausau v. Ehlco Liquidating Trust, 186 Ill. 2d 127, 150-51 (1999). - 22 - 1-23-0787 ¶ 87 “The estoppel doctrine applies only where an insurer has breached its duty to defend.” Id. at 151 . | 33 | 75 |
Murphy v. Ursogreen2 sentences2008Our supreme court has recognized a narrow exception to the estoppel doctrine for “a serious conflict of interest that precludes the insurer from assuming the insured’s defense.” Ehlco Liquidating Trust, 186 Ill. 2d at 156 , 708 N.E.2d at 1137 , citing Murphy, 88 Ill. 2d at 451-58 , 430 N.E.2d at 1082-86 ; Thornton v. Paul, 74 Ill. 2d 132, 152, 159 , 384 N.E.2d 335, 343, 346 (1978), overruled on other grounds by American Family Mutual Insurance Co. v. Savickas, 193 Ill. 2d 378, 387 , 739 N.E.2d 445, 450-51 (2000). 2008Our supreme court has recognized a narrow exception to the estoppel doctrine for “a serious conflict of interest that precludes the insurer from assuming the insured’s defense.” Ehlco Liquidating Trust, 186 Ill. 2d at 156 , 708 N.E.2d at 1137 , citing Murphy, 88 Ill. 2d at 451-58 , 430 N.E.2d at 1082-86 ; Thornton v. Paul, 74 Ill. 2d 132, 152, 159 , 384 N.E.2d 335, 343, 346 (1978), overruled on other grounds by American Family Mutual Insurance Co. v. Savickas, 193 Ill. 2d 378, 387 , 739 N.E.2d 445, 450-51 (2000). | 6 | 8 |
ISMIE Mutual Insurance v. Michaelis Jackson & Associates, LLCgreen2 sentences2020“In other words, the estoppel doctrine cannot create coverage where none existed in the first place.” Bartkowiak, 2015 IL App (1st) 133549, ¶ 48 (citing ISMIE Mutual Insurance Co. v. Michaelis Jackson & Associates, LLC, 397 Ill. 2020“In other words, the estoppel doctrine cannot create coverage where none existed in the first place.” Bartkowiak, 2015 IL App (1st) 133549, ¶ 48 (citing ISMIE Mutual Insurance Co. v. Michaelis Jackson & Associates, LLC, 397 Ill. | 4 | 4 |
Clemmons v. Travelers Insurance Co.green2 sentences2015The estate is relying on the equitable principle that "an insurer's duty to defend under a liability insurance policy is so fundamental an obligation that a breach of that duty constitutes a repudiation of the contract." Employers Insurance of Wausau v. Ehlco Liquidating Trust, 186 Ill. 2d 127, 151 , 708 N.E.2d 1122, 1135 (1999); Clemmons v. Travelers Insurance Co., 88 Ill. 2d 469, 479 , 430 N.E.2d 1104, 1109 (1981) (indicating the estoppel doctrine is a rule of equity). ¶ 29 If the insurer owes and breaches a duty to defend, the estoppel doctrine bars the insurer from later enforcing another 2015The estate is relying on the equitable principle that "an insurer's duty to defend under a liability insurance policy is so fundamental an obligation that a breach of that duty constitutes a repudiation of the contract." Employers Insurance of Wausau v. Ehlco Liquidating Trust, 186 Ill. 2d 127, 151 , 708 N.E.2d 1122, 1135 (1999); Clemmons v. Travelers Insurance Co., 88 Ill. 2d 469, 479 , 430 N.E.2d 1104, 1109 (1981) (indicating the estoppel doctrine is a rule of equity). ¶ 29 If the insurer owes and breaches a duty to defend, the estoppel doctrine bars the insurer from later enforcing another | 4 | 4 |
Thornton v. Paulgreen2 sentences2008Our supreme court has recognized a narrow exception to the estoppel doctrine for “a serious conflict of interest that precludes the insurer from assuming the insured’s defense.” Ehlco Liquidating Trust, 186 Ill. 2d at 156 , 708 N.E.2d at 1137 , citing Murphy, 88 Ill. 2d at 451-58 , 430 N.E.2d at 1082-86 ; Thornton v. Paul, 74 Ill. 2d 132, 152, 159 , 384 N.E.2d 335, 343, 346 (1978), overruled on other grounds by American Family Mutual Insurance Co. v. Savickas, 193 Ill. 2d 378, 387 , 739 N.E.2d 445, 450-51 (2000). 2008Our supreme court has recognized a narrow exception to the estoppel doctrine for “a serious conflict of interest that precludes the insurer from assuming the insured’s defense.” Ehlco Liquidating Trust, 186 Ill. 2d at 156 , 708 N.E.2d at 1137 , citing Murphy, 88 Ill. 2d at 451-58 , 430 N.E.2d at 1082-86 ; Thornton v. Paul, 74 Ill. 2d 132, 152, 159 , 384 N.E.2d 335, 343, 346 (1978), overruled on other grounds by American Family Mutual Insurance Co. v. Savickas, 193 Ill. 2d 378, 387 , 739 N.E.2d 445, 450-51 (2000). | 4 | 4 |
American Family Mutual Insurance v. Savickasgreen2 sentences2008Our supreme court has recognized a narrow exception to the estoppel doctrine for “a serious conflict of interest that precludes the insurer from assuming the insured’s defense.” Ehlco Liquidating Trust, 186 Ill. 2d at 156 , 708 N.E.2d at 1137 , citing Murphy, 88 Ill. 2d at 451-58 , 430 N.E.2d at 1082-86 ; Thornton v. Paul, 74 Ill. 2d 132, 152, 159 , 384 N.E.2d 335, 343, 346 (1978), overruled on other grounds by American Family Mutual Insurance Co. v. Savickas, 193 Ill. 2d 378, 387 , 739 N.E.2d 445, 450-51 (2000). 2008Our supreme court has recognized a narrow exception to the estoppel doctrine for “a serious conflict of interest that precludes the insurer from assuming the insured’s defense.” Ehlco Liquidating Trust, 186 Ill. 2d at 156 , 708 N.E.2d at 1137 , citing Murphy, 88 Ill. 2d at 451-58 , 430 N.E.2d at 1082-86 ; Thornton v. Paul, 74 Ill. 2d 132, 152, 159 , 384 N.E.2d 335, 343, 346 (1978), overruled on other grounds by American Family Mutual Insurance Co. v. Savickas, 193 Ill. 2d 378, 387 , 739 N.E.2d 445, 450-51 (2000). | 4 | 4 |
Korte Construction Co. v. American States Insurancegreen2 sentences2014App. 3d at 458 , 750 N.E.2d at 767-68 (affirming application of the estoppel doctrine and the entry of statutory penalties for unreasonable and vexatious claim handling where an insured repeatedly asked the insured to provide a defense, but the insurer repeatedly refused, “abandoned its insured,” “did absolutely nothing,” and “wait[ed] for the insured to institute litigation”). 2014App. 3d at 458 , 750 N.E.2d at 767-68 (affirming application of the estoppel doctrine and the entry of statutory penalties for unreasonable and vexatious claim handling where an insured repeatedly asked the insured to provide a defense, but the insurer repeatedly refused, "abandoned its insured," "did absolutely nothing," and "wait[ed] for the insured to institute litigation"). | 2 | 4 |
Bartkowiak v. Underwriters at Lloyd's Londongreen2 sentences2020Bartkowiak v. Underwriters at Lloyd’s, London, 2015 IL App (1st) 133549, ¶ 47 ; Employers - 16 - No. 1-19-1648 Insurance of Wausau v. Ehlco Liquidating Trust, 186 Ill. 2d 127, 151 (1999) (“Application of the estoppel doctrine is not appropriate if the insurer had no duty to defend, or if the insurer’s duty to defend was not properly triggered.”). 2020“In other words, the estoppel doctrine cannot create coverage where none existed in the first place.” Bartkowiak, 2015 IL App (1st) 133549, ¶ 48 (citing ISMIE Mutual Insurance Co. v. Michaelis Jackson & Associates, LLC, 397 Ill. | 2 | 3 |
Ayres v. Bituminous Insurance Co.green2 sentences2014App. 3d 33, 35 , 424 N.E.2d 1316, 1318 (1981) (indicating an insurer sought a favorable declaratory judgment by filing an answer to the insured’s declaratory judgment action and a third party complaint against the plaintiff in the personal injury action, and that by doing so the insurer had discharged its duty to pursue judicial declaration of its rights under the policy).When an insurer’s unreasonable delay, however, forces an insured to institute litigation to determine their rights and duties under the insurance contract, merely filing an answer will not stave off the estoppel doctrine. 2014App. 3d 33, 35 , 424 N.E.2d 1316, 1318 (1981) (indicating an insurer sought a favorable declaratory judgment by filing an answer to the insured's declaratory judgment action and a third party complaint against the plaintiff in the personal injury action, and that by doing so the insurer had discharged its duty to pursue judicial declaration of its rights under the policy).When an insurer's unreasonable delay, however, forces an insured to institute litigation to determine their rights and duties under the insurance contract, merely filing an answer will not stave off the estoppel doctrine. | 2 | 3 |
State Farm Insurance v. American Service Insurancegreen2 sentences2013Id. at 36 . ¶ 28 But, the appellate court reversed, finding the circuit court had acted prematurely in “invoking the estoppel doctrine prior to determining whether [the insured’s] insurance policy was in existence at the time of the accident.” Id. at 38 . 2013Id. at 36 . ¶ 28 But, the appellate court reversed, finding the circuit court had acted prematurely in “invoking the estoppel doctrine prior to determining whether [the insured’s] insurance policy was in existence at the time of the accident.” Id. at 38 . | 2 | 3 |
Hubble v. O'CONNORgreen2 sentences2007“The test used to evaluate an estoppel claim is whether, considering all the circumstances of the specific case, conscience and honest dealing require that a party be estopped.” Hubble v. O’Connor, 291 Ill. 2007"The test used to evaluate an estoppel claim is whether, considering all the circumstances of the specific case, conscience and honest dealing require that a party be estopped." Hubble v. O'Connor, 291 Ill.App.3d 974, 983-84 , 225 Ill.Dec. 825 , 684 N.E.2d 816 (1997). | 2 | 3 |
In Re Marriage of Pauliusgreen2 sentences2004See In re Marriage of Paulius, 131 Ill. 1986App. 3d 343, 345 , 475 N.E.2d 1006 .) This estoppel principle applies even when the divorce decree is attacked as being void for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. | 2 | 3 |
Corbin v. Schroedergreen2 sentences2021See Corbin v. Schroeder, 2021 IL App (2d) 210090 , ¶¶ 16-17 (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23). ¶ 22 Next, Corbin argues that, regardless of which election is chosen, Pope’s nominating papers lacked the minimum number of valid signatures and the Board erroneously allowed Pope to invoke an estoppel defense to prevent his removal from the ballot. 2021See Corbin v. Schroeder, 2021 IL App (2d) 210090 , ¶¶ 16-17 (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23). ¶ 22 Next, Corbin argues that, regardless of which election is chosen, Jackson’s nominating papers lacked the minimum number of valid signatures and the Board erroneously allowed Jackson to invoke an estoppel defense to prevent her removal from the ballot. | 2 | 2 |
Kyker v. Kykergreen2 sentences2017See Boyar II, 2013 IL 113655, ¶ 32 (stating exceptions to the doctrine of election); Kyker, 117 Ill. 2017Second, even though a person accepts a benefit under the will, she is not precluded from questioning the validity of any provisions that are contrary to the law or public policy. [Citations.]” Kyker, 117 Ill. | 2 | 2 |
McInerney v. Charter Golf, Inc.green2 sentences2017There is no documentary evidence to support the retirees’ claim for healthcare coverage for life on a contractual basis and its reliance on oral assurances is misplaced because lifetime contracts must be in writing (McInerney v. Charter Golf, Inc., 176 Ill. 2d 482, 490-91 (1997)). ¶ 51 As for the retirees’ estoppel claim, the allegations in the operative complaint itself are wholly insufficient. 2017There is no documentary evidence to support the retirees’ claim for - 11 - healthcare coverage for life on a contractual basis and its reliance on oral assurances is misplaced because lifetime contracts must be in writing (McInerney v. Charter Golf, Inc., 176 Ill. 2d 482, 490-91 (1997)). ¶ 51 As for the retirees’ estoppel claim, the allegations in the operative complaint itself are wholly insufficient. | 2 | 2 |
| Elmore v. Cartergreen | 2 | 2 |
In re Estate of Boyargreen2 sentences2017Boyar II, 2013 IL 113655, ¶ 38 . ¶ 49 The estoppel principle and the doctrine of election “are not identical” (id. ¶ 41); the former has broader application than the latter. 2017Boyar II, 2013 IL 113655, ¶ 38 . ¶ 49 The estoppel principle and the doctrine of election “are not identical” (id. ¶ 41); the former has broader application than the latter. | 2 | 2 |
| Board of Managers of the Townhomes of Woodland Hills Condominium Ass'n v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co.green | 2 | 2 |
| Robidoux v. Oliphantgreen | 2 | 2 |
| Household International, Inc. v. Liberty Mutual Insurancegreen | 2 | 2 |
| Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Middleportgreen | 2 | 2 |
| Meier v. Aetna Life & Casualty Standard Fire Insurancegreen | 2 | 2 |
| Northern Insurance Co. of New York v. City of Chicagogreen | 2 | 2 |
| Gursky v. Gurskygreen | 2 | 2 |
| In Re Marriage of Lms v. Slsgreen | 2 | 2 |
| Halleck v. County of Cookgreen | 2 | 2 |
| Maryland Casualty Co. v. Peppersgreen | 2 | 2 |
| cluster 472633green | 2 | 2 |
| Lowrey v. Malkowskigreen | 2 | 2 |
| Wilson v. Tromlygreen | 2 | 2 |
Federal Insurance v. Economy Fire & Casualty Co.green2 sentences2021In doing so, the circuit court cited to Federal Insurance Co. v. Economy Fire & Casualty Co., 189 Ill. 1994App. 3d 732 , 545 N.E.2d 541 .) It also follows that if there is no duty to defend, the estoppel rule is not applicable. | 1 | 4 |
| Indiana Insurance v. Hydra Corp.green | 1 | 2 |
| Kim v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co.green | 1 | 2 |
| Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. O'Rourke Bros., Inc.green | 1 | 2 |
| Lindahl v. City of Des Plainesgreen | 1 | 2 |
| Barratt v. Goldberggreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Illinois. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Cities Service Oil Co. v. City of Des Plaines
green
2 sentences1991In Cities Service Oil Co. v. City of Des Plaines (1961), 21 Ill. 2d 157 , 171 N.E.2d 605 , the Illinois Supreme Court stated that municipalities are estopped from enforcing their ordinances only “under special circumstances which would make it highly inequitable or oppressive to enforce such public rights.” (Cities Service Oil Co. v. City of Des Plaines (1961), 21 Ill. 2d 157, 161 , 171 N.E.2d 605, 607 , citing Melin v. Community Consolidated School District (1924), 312 Ill. 376 , 144 N.E. 13 .) To invoke the doctrine of estoppel, a party must show that he was induced by the conduct of municip 1991In Cities Service Oil Co. v. City of Des Plaines (1961), 21 Ill. 2d 157 , 171 N.E.2d 605 , the Illinois Supreme Court stated that municipalities are estopped from enforcing their ordinances only “under special circumstances which would make it highly inequitable or oppressive to enforce such public rights.” (Cities Service Oil Co. v. City of Des Plaines (1961), 21 Ill. 2d 157, 161 , 171 N.E.2d 605, 607 , citing Melin v. Community Consolidated School District (1924), 312 Ill. 376 , 144 N.E. 13 .) To invoke the doctrine of estoppel, a party must show that he was induced by the conduct of municip | 5 | 1969–1991 |
Ozier v. Haines
green
2 sentences1987We also note that the supreme court in Ozier v. Haines (1952), 411 Ill. 160, 163 , held that the breach of a promise which the law does not regard as binding is not a fraud and does not justify the application of the doctrine of estoppel. 1964The Supreme Court in Ozier v. Haines, 411 Ill 160, 103 NE2d 485 , held that the breach of a promise which the law does not regard as binding is not a fraud and does not justify the application of the doctrine of estoppel. | 5 | 1961–1987 |
Merz v. Volberding
green
2 sentences2002Thus, in Merz , this court applied the doctrine of estoppel, even though it was "obvious that in distributing the information sheets containing information which was incorrect under our reading of the statute, the clerk's intention was not to undermine the statutory scheme, but rather to perform a meaningful public service." Merz , 94 Ill. 2002Thus, in Merz, this court applied the doctrine of estoppel, even though it was “obvious that in distributing the information sheets containing information which was incorrect under our reading of the statute, the clerk’s intention was not to undermine the statutory scheme, but rather to perform a meaningful public service.” Merz, 94 Ill. | 4 | 2002–2021 |
Milligan v. Miller
neutral
2 sentences1959It would be an act of fraud and injustice, and his conscience is bound by this equitable estoppel.” This principle was also set out in the early Illinois case of Donaldson v. Holmes, 23 Ill. 83 , and adopted in the later case of Milligan v. Miller, 253 Ill. 511 , where the court said: “A fraudulent intention is not essential to the doctrine of estoppel. 1929It is enough if a fraudulent effect would follow allowing a party to set up a claim inconsistent with his former declarations or conduct.” (Milligan v. Miller, 253 Ill. 511 .) If the answer is true, the complainant does not come into court with clean hands and is estopped from asserting the claim set up in its bill. | 4 | 1917–1959 |
Ks v. Gs
green
2 sentences2003See Gursky v. Gursky, 39 Misc.2d 1083 , 242 N.Y.S.2d 406 (1963) (husband held liable for support of a child conceived by artificial insemination under either the basis of implied consent to support or the application of the doctrine of estoppel); K.S. v. G.S., 182 N.J.Super. 102 , 440 A.2d 64 (1981) (oral consent of husband was effective at the time pregnancy occurs unless established by clear and convincing evidence that consent has been revoked or rescinded); In re Marriage of L.M.S., 105 Wis.2d 118, 122-23 , 312 N.W.2d 853, 855 (App.1981) (sterile man who suggested to his wife that she beco 2003See Gursky v. Gursky, 39 Misc.2d 1083 , 242 N.Y.S.2d 406 (1963) (husband held liable for support of a child conceived by artificial insemination under either the basis of implied consent to support or the application of the doctrine of estoppel); K.S. v. G.S., 182 N.J.Super. 102 , 440 A.2d 64 (1981) (oral consent of husband was effective at the time pregnancy occurs unless established by clear and convincing evidence that consent has been revoked or rescinded); In re Marriage of L.M.S., 105 Wis.2d 118, 122-23 , 312 N.W.2d 853, 855 (App.1981) (sterile man who suggested to his wife that she beco | 3 | 1988–2003 |
Marx v. State of Illinois
green
2 sentences1998Marx v. State Department of Revenue , 165 Ill. 1998Marx v. Illinois, 165 Ill. | 3 | 1994–1998 |
City of Quincy v. Sturhahn
green
2 sentences1984App. 3d 436, 439-40 , 289 N.E.2d 484 .) “In applying the doctrine of estoppel, the courts will not decide the question by mere lapse of time but by all the circumstances of the case, and will hold the public estopped or not as right or justice may require. [Citations.] The doctrine is invoked only to prevent fraud and injustice. [Citation.]” (City of Quincy v. Sturhahn (1960), 18 Ill. 2d 604, 614 , 165 N.E.2d 271 .) To equitably estop a municipality acting in its governmental capacity, the party raising the claim must prove that there were affirmative acts by the municipal officers which induc 1984App. 3d 436, 439-40 , 289 N.E.2d 484 .) “In applying the doctrine of estoppel, the courts will not decide the question by mere lapse of time but by all the circumstances of the case, and will hold the public estopped or not as right or justice may require. [Citations.] The doctrine is invoked only to prevent fraud and injustice. [Citation.]” (City of Quincy v. Sturhahn (1960), 18 Ill. 2d 604, 614 , 165 N.E.2d 271 .) To equitably estop a municipality acting in its governmental capacity, the party raising the claim must prove that there were affirmative acts by the municipal officers which induc | 3 | 1966–1984 |
Hickey v. Illinois Central Railroad
green
2 sentences1984The court in Hickey emphasized the railroad’s reliance on the State’s position: “Meanwhile, numerous other lake shore boundary line agreements have been consummated and confirmed, conveyances made, leases executed and options granted; proposals for lake shore development were agreed upon and accepted whereby substantial construction obligations were apportioned as between the city, Park Commissioners and the railroad in reliance upon the assumption that the railroad was the fee owner of the lands it occupied ***.” ( 35 Ill. 2d 427, 450 .) Therefore, while the Hickey court reiterated that quali 1978Co., 35 Ill. 2d 427, 448-49 , 220 N.E.2d 415, 426 . “ ‘While situations may arise which justify invoking the doctrine of estoppel even against the State when acting in its governmental capacity, (citation) we have always adhered to the rule that mere nonaction of governmental officers is not sufficient to work an estoppel and that before the doctrine can be invoked against the State or a municipality there must have been some positive acts by the officials which may have induced the action of the adverse party under circumstances where it would be inequitable to permit the corporation to stult | 3 | 1978–1984 |
In Re Estate of Newcomb
green
2 sentences1981Ed. 2d 157 , 88 S. Ct. 165 ), and its application may neither be waived nor may the doctrine of estoppel be applied (In re Estate of Newcomb (1972), 6 Ill. 1977Ed. 2d 157 , 88 S. Ct. 165 ), and its application may neither be waived nor may the doctrine of estoppel be applied (In re Estate of Newcomb (1972), 6 Ill. | 3 | 1977–1981 |
People v. Brown
green
2 sentences1939We said in People v. Brown, 67 Ill. 435 : “It is a familiar doctrine, that the State is not embraced within the Statute of Limitations, unless specially named, and, by analogy, would not fall within the doctrine of estoppel. 1889The doctrine of estoppel, as held in The People v. Brown et al. 67 Ill. 435 , and, in numerous other cases, is, that where a person, by his words or conduct, voluntarily causes another to believe in the 'existence of a certain state of things, and induces him to act upon that belief, so as to change his previous position, he will be estopped to aver against the latter a different state of things. | 3 | 1889–1939 |
Centure Bank v. Voga
green
2 sentences2017We consider whether the estoppel principle, cited by Lois, is an independent bar to Lyle’s challenge to the - 18 - 2017 IL App (2d) 160690 POA and the Amendment. 2017He simply asks that the court obey the statute, and hold that the one bequest is void, as the law declares it shall be.” Id. ¶ 56 Schmidt’s Estate was cited with approval in Elmore v. Carter, 289 Ill. 560, 563 (1919), where the supreme court held that the estoppel principle did not bar the claim that a charitable bequest to a New York corporation was invalid because, contrary to New York law, the bequest was not made at least 60 days before the testator’s death and, moreover, the corporation ceased to exist before the testator died. - 20 - 2017 IL App (2d) 160690 ¶ 57 Lyle’s challenge to the A | 2 | 2017–2018 |
Schuknecht v. Schultz
green
2 sentences2017This principle does not, the court explained, prevent a party from alleging that a provision in the will is “illegal and void” and “must be treated as though never made and constituting no part of the will.” Id. at 48-49 . ¶ 55 Similar reasoning was employed by the Supreme Court of Montana in In re Schmidt’s Estate, 38 P. 547 (Mont. 1894), which held that the estoppel principle did not bar a challenge that a charitable bequest contravened a statutory requirement that such a bequest is void unless executed at least 30 days prior to the death of the testator. 2017This principle does not, the court explained, prevent a party from alleging that a provision in the will is “illegal and void” and “must be treated as though never made and constituting no part of the will.” Id. at 48-49 . ¶ 55 Similar reasoning was employed by the Supreme Court of Montana in In re Schmidt’s Estate, 38 P. 547 (1894), which held that the estoppel principle did not bar a challenge that a charitable bequest contravened a statutory requirement that such a bequest is void unless executed at least 30 days prior to the death of the testator. | 2 | 2017–2017 |
Longshore Printing Co. v. Howell
green
2 sentences2017This principle does not, the court explained, prevent a party from alleging that a provision in the will is “illegal and void” and “must be treated as though never made and constituting no part of the will.” Id. at 48-49 . ¶ 55 Similar reasoning was employed by the Supreme Court of Montana in In re Schmidt’s Estate, 38 P. 547 (1894), which held that the estoppel principle did not bar a challenge that a charitable bequest contravened a statutory requirement that such a bequest is void unless executed at least 30 days prior to the death of the testator. 2017He simply asks that the court obey the statute, and hold that the one bequest is void, as the law declares it shall be.” Id. ¶ 56 Schmidt’s Estate was cited with approval in Elmore v. Carter, 289 Ill. 560, 563 (1919), where the supreme court held that the estoppel principle did not bar the claim that a charitable bequest to a New York corporation was invalid because, contrary to New York law, the bequest was not made at least 60 days before the testator’s death and, moreover, the corporation ceased to exist before the testator died. - 20 - 2017 IL App (2d) 160690 ¶ 57 Lyle’s challenge to the A | 2 | 2017–2017 |
| Standard Mutual Insurance Co. v. Lay green | 2 | 2014–2015 |
| Maniez v. Citibank, F.S.B. green | 2 | 2014–2014 |
| Department of Transportation v. Grawe green | 2 | 2012–2012 |
| Coulter v. American Employers' Insurance green | 2 | 2011–2011 |
| McDonald v. Neale green | 2 | 1992–2004 |
| Bratkovich v. Bratkovich green | 2 | 2004–2004 |
| In Re Marriage of Adams green | 2 | 2003–2003 |
| American National Bank & Trust Co. v. Village of Arlington Heights green | 2 | 1989–2003 |
| In Re Baby Doe green | 2 | 2003–2003 |
| Crum & Forster Managers Corp. v. Resolution Trust Corp. green | 2 | 2002–2002 |
| Sears, Roebuck and Co. v. Seneca Ins. Co. green | 2 | 2002–2002 |
| Louis Marsch, Inc. v. Pekin Insurance Co. green | 2 | 2001–2001 |
| Chandler v. Doherty green | 2 | 2001–2001 |
| Victor Maneikis v. St. Paul Insurance Company of Illinois green | 2 | 1983–2000 |
| Metromedia, Inc. v. Kramer green | 2 | 1999–1999 |
| Tim Thompson, Inc. v. Village of Hinsdale green | 2 | 1999–1999 |
| M/A COM, INC. v. Perricone green | 2 | 1997–1997 |
| Carey v. City of Rockford green | 2 | 1997–1997 |
| Evans v. Benjamin School District No. 25 green | 2 | 1988–1996 |
| Melin v. Community Consolidated School District No. 76 green | 2 | 1966–1991 |
| Lowenberg v. Booth green | 2 | 1964–1988 |
| New-Mark Builders, Inc. v. City of Aurora green | 2 | 1969–1988 |
| Hoffman v. Department of Registration & Education green | 2 | 1988–1988 |
| Hickey v. Illinois Central Railroad green | 2 | 1984–1984 |
| Cessna v. Montgomery green | 2 | 1978–1981 |
| Pratt v. Baker green | 2 | 1972–1977 |
| Malloy v. City of Chicago green | 2 | 1948–1955 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.