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58 Connecticut opinions name it 3 courts 1896–2024 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Connecticut courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Vito v. Town of Simsburygreen2 sentences1992"Where the contract is one which the municipality had the power to make, [however,] it is possible for a court to hold that the municipality has, by taking the benefit of the contract, ratified it, or estoppel itself from claiming it was not properly executed according to law." Bridgeport Brass Co. v. Drew, 102 Conn. 206 , 215 , 128 A. 413 (1925); see Vito v. Simsbury, 87 Conn. 261 , 265 , 87 A. 722 (1913); Rocky Hill v. Hollister, 59 Conn. 434 447 , 22 A. 290 (1890); see also John J. 1992"Where the contract is one which the municipality had the power to make, [however,] it is possible for a court to hold that the municipality has, by taking the benefit of the contract, ratified it, or estoppel itself from claiming it was not properly executed according to law." Bridgeport Brass Co. v. Drew, 102 Conn. 206 , 215 , 128 A. 413 (1925); see Vito v. Simsbury, 87 Conn. 261 , 265 , 87 A. 722 (1913); Rocky Hill v. Hollister, 59 Conn. 434 447 , 22 A. 290 (1890); see also John J. | 2 | 2 |
Zoning Commission v. Lescynskigreen2 sentences2002For the doctrine of estoppel to apply, "the party against whom estoppel is claimed must do or say something calculated or intended to induce another party to believe that certain facts exist and to act on that belief; and the other party must change its position in reliance on those facts, thereby incurring some injury." Connecticut National Bank v. Voog, 233 Conn. 352 , 366 (1995); Zoning Commission v. Lescynski, 188 Conn. 724 , 731 (1982); Bozzi v. Bozzi, 177 Conn. 232 , 242 (1979); Dupuis v. Submarine Base Credit Union, Inc., 170 Conn. 344 , 353 (1976). 2002For the doctrine of estoppel to apply, "the party against whom estoppel is claimed must do or say something calculated or intended to induce another party to believe that certain facts exist and to act on that belief; and the other party must change its position in reliance on those facts, thereby incurring some injury." Zoning Commission v. Lescynski, 188 Conn. 724 , 731 (1982); Bozzi v. Bozzi, 177 Conn. 232 , 242 (1979); Dupuis v. Submarine Base Credit Union, Inc., 170 Conn. 344 , 353 (1976). | 1 | 7 |
Town of West Hartford v. Rechelgreen2 sentences2007See generally West Hartford v. Rechel, 190 Conn. 114, 122 , 459 A.2d 1015 (1983). 2007See generally West Hartford v. Rechel, 190 Conn. 114, 122 , 459 A.2d 1015 (1983). | 1 | 3 |
Guddo v. Guddogreen2 sentences2022See Guddo v. Guddo, 185 Conn. App. 283, 286 , 196 A.3d 1246 (2018) (our appellate courts generally will not review claims raised for first time on appeal). 3 The agreement required the plaintiffs to exercise due diligence in pursuit of a commitment and to provide timely notice to the defendant of their inability to secure a commitment. 2022See Guddo v. Guddo, 185 Conn. App. 283, 286 , 196 A.3d 1246 (2018) (our appellate courts generally will not review claims raised for first time on appeal). 3 The agreement required the plaintiffs to exercise due diligence in pursuit of a commitment and to provide timely notice to the defendant of their inability to secure a commitment. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Jonesgreen2 sentences2018See State v. Jones , 98 Conn. App. 695 , 696, 911 A.2d 353 (2006) ("[b]ecause we conclude that the defendant's claim is barred by the doctrine of res judicata, we do not review the merits of his claim"), cert. denied, 281 Conn. 916 , 917 A.2d 1000 (2007). 2018See State v. Jones , 98 Conn. App. 695 , 696, 911 A.2d 353 (2006) ("[b]ecause we conclude that the defendant's claim is barred by the doctrine of res judicata, we do not review the merits of his claim"), cert. denied, 281 Conn. 916 , 917 A.2d 1000 (2007). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Jonesgreen2 sentences2018See State v. Jones , 98 Conn. App. 695 , 696, 911 A.2d 353 (2006) ("[b]ecause we conclude that the defendant's claim is barred by the doctrine of res judicata, we do not review the merits of his claim"), cert. denied, 281 Conn. 916 , 917 A.2d 1000 (2007). 2018See State v. Jones , 98 Conn. App. 695 , 696, 911 A.2d 353 (2006) ("[b]ecause we conclude that the defendant's claim is barred by the doctrine of res judicata, we do not review the merits of his claim"), cert. denied, 281 Conn. 916 , 917 A.2d 1000 (2007). | 1 | 1 |
Kreisberg v. Scheyergreen2 sentences2016Although the lot owners in the previous cases could litigate their own prescriptive easement claims, they could not be expected to know the details of and adequately litigate the plaintiffs’ claims, such that the application of res judicata to them would not be unfair.22 As one court noted, ‘‘[e]ven if [the parties] share interests in some respect, if they are not in privity in all respects necessary to satisfy the court of the fairness of applying the estoppel doctrine, the court will not give res judicata effect . . . .’’ (Emphasis added.) Kreisberg v. Scheyer, 11 Misc. 3d 818, 823 , 808 N.Y 2016Although the lot owners in the previous cases could litigate their own prescriptive easement claims, they could not be expected to know the details of and adequately litigate the plaintiffs’ claims, such that the application of res judicata to them would not be unfair.22 As one court noted, ‘‘[e]ven if [the parties] share interests in some respect, if they are not in privity in all respects necessary to satisfy the court of the fairness of applying the estoppel doctrine, the court will not give res judicata effect . . . .’’ (Emphasis added.) Kreisberg v. Scheyer, 11 Misc. 3d 818, 823 , 808 N.Y | 1 | 1 |
Stewart v. Midanigreen2 sentences2016L.Rev. 697 ("the required change of position suggests that the estoppel doctrine will generally be inapplicable in the typical personal injury case"), citing Stewart v. Midani, 525 F.Supp. 843 , 851 (N.D.Ga.1981) ; Stewart v. Midani, supra, at 851 ("it cannot reasonably be contended that a motorist would be more likely to wish to collide with a truck bearing the insignia of [Texaco] than with one bearing any other insignia"). 19 Accordingly, we believe that it is appropriate for us to consider as a matter of first impression whether the Fireman's Fund Indemnity Co. standard, which derives from 2016L.Rev. 697 ("the required change of position suggests that the estoppel doctrine will generally be inapplicable in the typical personal injury case"), citing Stewart v. Midani, 525 F.Supp. 843 , 851 (N.D.Ga.1981) ; Stewart v. Midani, supra, at 851 ("it cannot reasonably be contended that a motorist would be more likely to wish to collide with a truck bearing the insignia of [Texaco] than with one bearing any other insignia"). 19 Accordingly, we believe that it is appropriate for us to consider as a matter of first impression whether the Fireman's Fund Indemnity Co. standard, which derives from | 1 | 1 |
SS-II, LLC v. Bridge Street Associatesgreen2 sentences2014Id., 60–63; see also SS-II, LLC v. Bridge Street Associates, 293 Conn. 287 , 294–95, 977 A.2d 189 (2009). ‘‘[T]he elements required for part performance are: (1) statements, acts or omis- sions that lead a party to act to his detriment in reliance on the contract; (2) knowledge or assent to the party’s actions in reliance on the contract; and (3) acts that unmistakably point to the contract. . . . 2014Id., 60–63; see also SS-II, LLC v. Bridge Street Associates, 293 Conn. 287 , 294–95, 977 A.2d 189 (2009). ‘‘[T]he elements required for part performance are: (1) statements, acts or omis- sions that lead a party to act to his detriment in reliance on the contract; (2) knowledge or assent to the party’s actions in reliance on the contract; and (3) acts that unmistakably point to the contract. . . . | 1 | 1 |
Samperi v. Planning & Zoning Commissiongreen2 sentences2003See Samperi v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 40 Conn. App. 840, 851 , 674 A.2d 432 (1996). 2003See Samperi v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 40 Conn. App. 840, 851 , 674 A.2d 432 (1996). | 1 | 1 |
Jarmon v. Commissioner of Social Servicesgreen1 sentence2003See Jarmon v. Commissioner of Social Services, supra, 47 Conn. Sup. 492 . *589 ESTOPPEL The defendant also claims that the magistrate erred in finding that the state was not estopped from claiming a § 52-362d lien over the entire proceeds. | 1 | 1 |
Sawmill Brook Racing Ass'n v. Boston Realty Advisors, Inc.green2 sentences2002See Sawmill Brook Racing Assn., Inc. v. Boston Realty Advisors, Inc., 39 Conn. App. 444, 450 , 664 A.2d 819 (1995). 2002See Sawmill Brook Racing Assn., Inc. v. Boston Realty Advisors, Inc., 39 Conn. App. 444, 450 , 664 A.2d 819 (1995). | 1 | 1 |
Mendrala v. Crown Mortgage Companygreen1 sentence2002Id., 1140-42. | 1 | 1 |
| Resnik v. City of New Havengreen | 1 | 1 |
| Bianco v. Town of Dariengreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Ledo Financial Corporation v. Harry L. Summers Daniel W. Dierdorff Sun Savings and Loan Association David Eichten, and Does 1 Through 50, Inclusivegreen1 sentence2001Corp. v. McClanahan, 795 F.2d 512 , 514 n.l (5th Cir. 1986) (no reason to suppose that Congress intended to supplant common-law D’Oench, Duhme doctrine of estoppel with § 1823 [e]); accord Ledo Financial Corp. v. Summers, 122 F.3d 825 , 829 n.2 (9th Cir. 1997) (not reaching question of whether D’Oench, Duhme doctrine overruled by O’Melveny & Meyers and Atherton); Federal Deposit Ins. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Dupuis v. Submarine Base Credit Union, Inc.
green
2 sentences2002For the doctrine of estoppel to apply, "the party against whom estoppel is claimed must do or say something calculated or intended to induce another party to believe that certain facts exist and to act on that belief; and the other party must change its position in reliance on those facts, thereby incurring some injury." Connecticut National Bank v. Voog, 233 Conn. 352 , 366 (1995); Zoning Commission v. Lescynski, 188 Conn. 724 , 731 (1982); Bozzi v. Bozzi, 177 Conn. 232 , 242 (1979); Dupuis v. Submarine Base Credit Union, Inc., 170 Conn. 344 , 353 (1976). 2002For the doctrine of estoppel to apply, "the party against whom estoppel is claimed must do or say something calculated or intended to induce another party to believe that certain facts exist and to act on that belief; and the other party must change its position in reliance on those facts, thereby incurring some injury." Zoning Commission v. Lescynski, 188 Conn. 724 , 731 (1982); Bozzi v. Bozzi, 177 Conn. 232 , 242 (1979); Dupuis v. Submarine Base Credit Union, Inc., 170 Conn. 344 , 353 (1976). | 3 | 1995–2002 |
Bozzi v. Bozzi
green
2 sentences2002For the doctrine of estoppel to apply, "the party against whom estoppel is claimed must do or say something calculated or intended to induce another party to believe that certain facts exist and to act on that belief; and the other party must change its position in reliance on those facts, thereby incurring some injury." Connecticut National Bank v. Voog, 233 Conn. 352 , 366 (1995); Zoning Commission v. Lescynski, 188 Conn. 724 , 731 (1982); Bozzi v. Bozzi, 177 Conn. 232 , 242 (1979); Dupuis v. Submarine Base Credit Union, Inc., 170 Conn. 344 , 353 (1976). 2002For the doctrine of estoppel to apply, "the party against whom estoppel is claimed must do or say something calculated or intended to induce another party to believe that certain facts exist and to act on that belief; and the other party must change its position in reliance on those facts, thereby incurring some injury." Zoning Commission v. Lescynski, 188 Conn. 724 , 731 (1982); Bozzi v. Bozzi, 177 Conn. 232 , 242 (1979); Dupuis v. Submarine Base Credit Union, Inc., 170 Conn. 344 , 353 (1976). | 3 | 1995–2002 |
Edwards v. City of Kirkwood
neutral
2 sentences1992The reasons is the city "cannot do indirectly what [it] cannot [do] directly, and [if] no power or authority [is] vested by law . . . no [ultra vires act of the city, or its officers or agents,] can be cured by aid of the doctrine of estoppel." Edwards v. Kirkwood, 147 Mo. App. 599 , 615 , 127 S.W. 378 (1910). 1992The reasons is the city "cannot do indirectly what [it] cannot [do] directly, and [if] no power or authority [is] vested by law . . . no [ultra vires act of the city, or its officers or agents,] can be cured by aid of the doctrine of estoppel." Edwards v. Kirkwood, 147 Mo. App. 599 , 615 , 127 S.W. 378 (1910). | 3 | 1987–2000 |
Kimberly-Clark Corp. v. Dubno
green
2 sentences1995Insofar as the defendants seek to raise an estoppel defense, it does not comply with the requirements of Kimberly Clark Corp. v. Dubno, 204 Conn. 137 , 148 (1987). 1994An estoppel claim is predicated on proof of two essential elements: "`the party against whom estoppel is claimed must do or say something calculated or intended to induce another party to believe that certain facts exist and to act on that belief; and the other party must change its position in reliance on those facts, thereby incurring some injury. . . ."' (Citations omitted.) Id., 148 , quoting Zoning Commission v. Lescynski, supra. "In addition, estoppel against a public agency is limited and may be invoked: (1) only with great caution; (2) only when the action in question has been induced | 3 | 1993–1995 |
Fadner v. Commissioner of Revenue Services
green
2 sentences2024Moreover, ‘‘estoppel against a public agency is limited and may be invoked: (1) only with great caution; (2) 0, 0 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 13 0 Conn. 1 ,0 15 Whitnum Baker v. Secretary of the State only when the action in question has been induced by an agent having authority in such matters; and (3) only when special circumstances make it highly inequitable or oppressive not to estop the agency.’’ (Internal quota- tion marks omitted.) Fadner v. Commissioner of Reve- nue Services, 281 Conn. 719, 726 , 917 A.2d 540 (2007). ‘‘A party seeking to justify the application of the estoppel doctrin 2024Moreover, ‘‘estoppel against a public agency is limited and may be invoked: (1) only with great caution; (2) 0, 0 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 13 0 Conn. 1 ,0 15 Whitnum Baker v. Secretary of the State only when the action in question has been induced by an agent having authority in such matters; and (3) only when special circumstances make it highly inequitable or oppressive not to estop the agency.’’ (Internal quota- tion marks omitted.) Fadner v. Commissioner of Reve- nue Services, 281 Conn. 719, 726 , 917 A.2d 540 (2007). ‘‘A party seeking to justify the application of the estoppel doctrin | 2 | 2011–2024 |
River Forest State Bank v. Village of Hillside
green
2 sentences1996Such a "substantial loss" has been found to have occurred, for example, where an owner made j permanent improvements to and expended large sums of money in construction of real property "in good faith reliance on [a building] permit and apparent acquiescence by city officials." See River Forest State Bank v. Hillside, 6 Ill.2d 451 , 454-55 , 129 N.E.2d 171 (1955), cited in Dornfried v. October Twenty-Four, Inc., supra, 639-640. 15 "Cases where the estoppel defense has succeeded are ones in which town officials acted to issue approvals when they were fully aware of the intended [use] to which a 1996Such a "substantial loss" has been found to have occurred, for example, where an owner made j permanent improvements to and expended large sums of money in construction of real property "in good faith reliance on [a building] permit and apparent acquiescence by city officials." See River Forest State Bank v. Hillside, 6 Ill.2d 451 , 454-55 , 129 N.E.2d 171 (1955), cited in Dornfried v. October Twenty-Four, Inc., supra, 639-640. 15 "Cases where the estoppel defense has succeeded are ones in which town officials acted to issue approvals when they were fully aware of the intended [use] to which a | 2 | 1996–1996 |
Bridgeport Brass Co. v. Drew
green
2 sentences1992"Where the contract is one which the municipality had the power to make, [however,] it is possible for a court to hold that the municipality has, by taking the benefit of the contract, ratified it, or estoppel itself from claiming it was not properly executed according to law." Bridgeport Brass Co. v. Drew, 102 Conn. 206 , 215 , 128 A. 413 (1925); see Vito v. Simsbury, 87 Conn. 261 , 265 , 87 A. 722 (1913); Rocky Hill v. Hollister, 59 Conn. 434 447 , 22 A. 290 (1890); see also John J. 1992"Where the contract is one which the municipality had the power to make, [however,] it is possible for a court to hold that the municipality has, by taking the benefit of the contract, ratified it, or estoppel itself from claiming it was not properly executed according to law." Bridgeport Brass Co. v. Drew, 102 Conn. 206 , 215 , 128 A. 413 (1925); see Vito v. Simsbury, 87 Conn. 261 , 265 , 87 A. 722 (1913); Rocky Hill v. Hollister, 59 Conn. 434 447 , 22 A. 290 (1890); see also John J. | 2 | 1987–1992 |
Town of Rocky Hill v. Hollister
neutral
2 sentences1992"Where the contract is one which the municipality had the power to make, [however,] it is possible for a court to hold that the municipality has, by taking the benefit of the contract, ratified it, or estoppel itself from claiming it was not properly executed according to law." Bridgeport Brass Co. v. Drew, 102 Conn. 206 , 215 , 128 A. 413 (1925); see Vito v. Simsbury, 87 Conn. 261 , 265 , 87 A. 722 (1913); Rocky Hill v. Hollister, 59 Conn. 434 447 , 22 A. 290 (1890); see also John J. 1992"Where the contract is one which the municipality had the power to make, [however,] it is possible for a court to hold that the municipality has, by taking the benefit of the contract, ratified it, or estoppel itself from claiming it was not properly executed according to law." Bridgeport Brass Co. v. Drew, 102 Conn. 206 , 215 , 128 A. 413 (1925); see Vito v. Simsbury, 87 Conn. 261 , 265 , 87 A. 722 (1913); Rocky Hill v. Hollister, 59 Conn. 434 447 , 22 A. 290 (1890); see also John J. | 2 | 1987–1992 |
Ajadi v. Commissioner of Correction
green
2 sentences2017That omission does not preclude us from doing so on appeal, however, because defects in subject matter jurisdiction "may be raised by a party, or by the court sua sponte, at any stage of the proceedings, including on appeal." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Ajadi v. Commissioner of Correction , 280 Conn. 514 , 533, 911 A.2d 712 (2006). 11 We note that the plaintiffs in the present cases could have availed themselves of § 52-599 during the underlying administrative proceedings. 2017That omission does not preclude us from doing so on appeal, however, because defects in subject matter jurisdiction "may be raised by a party, or by the court sua sponte, at any stage of the proceedings, including on appeal." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Ajadi v. Commissioner of Correction , 280 Conn. 514 , 533, 911 A.2d 712 (2006). 11 We note that the plaintiffs in the present cases could have availed themselves of § 52-599 during the underlying administrative proceedings. | 1 | 2017–2017 |
cluster 781246
green
1 sentence2016Although the lot owners in the previous cases could litigate their own prescriptive easement claims, they could not be expected to know the details of and adequately litigate the plaintiffs’ claims, such that the application of res judicata to them would not be unfair.22 As one court noted, ‘‘[e]ven if [the parties] share interests in some respect, if they are not in privity in all respects necessary to satisfy the court of the fairness of applying the estoppel doctrine, the court will not give res judicata effect . . . .’’ (Emphasis added.) Kreisberg v. Scheyer, 11 Misc. 3d 818, 823 , 808 N.Y | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Glazer v. Dress Barn, Inc.
green
1 sentence2014Id., 60–63; see also SS-II, LLC v. Bridge Street Associates, 293 Conn. 287 , 294–95, 977 A.2d 189 (2009). ‘‘[T]he elements required for part performance are: (1) statements, acts or omis- sions that lead a party to act to his detriment in reliance on the contract; (2) knowledge or assent to the party’s actions in reliance on the contract; and (3) acts that unmistakably point to the contract. . . . | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Connecticut National Bank v. Voog
green
1 sentence2002For the doctrine of estoppel to apply, "the party against whom estoppel is claimed must do or say something calculated or intended to induce another party to believe that certain facts exist and to act on that belief; and the other party must change its position in reliance on those facts, thereby incurring some injury." Connecticut National Bank v. Voog, 233 Conn. 352 , 366 (1995); Zoning Commission v. Lescynski, 188 Conn. 724 , 731 (1982); Bozzi v. Bozzi, 177 Conn. 232 , 242 (1979); Dupuis v. Submarine Base Credit Union, Inc., 170 Conn. 344 , 353 (1976). | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Pagliaro v. Jones, No. Fa 98 0412430 (Nov. 22, 1999)
neutral
1 sentence2002FA98-0412430, 1999 Ct. Sup. 14901 ( McLachlan, J ., Nov. 22, 1999). | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. v. Henry E. McClanahan
green
1 sentence2001Corp. v. McClanahan, 795 F.2d 512 , 514 n.l (5th Cir. 1986) (no reason to suppose that Congress intended to supplant common-law D’Oench, Duhme doctrine of estoppel with § 1823 [e]); accord Ledo Financial Corp. v. Summers, 122 F.3d 825 , 829 n.2 (9th Cir. 1997) (not reaching question of whether D’Oench, Duhme doctrine overruled by O’Melveny & Meyers and Atherton); Federal Deposit Ins. | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Boyce v. Allstate Insurance
green
1 sentence2000Boyce v. Allstate Inc. Co. , 236 Conn. 375 , 383 (1996). | 1 | 2000–2000 |
Allied Grocers Cooperative, Inc. v. Caplan
green
1 sentence1998"The striking of this unnecessarily pleaded special defense , whether erroneous or not, is not reversible error because it caused no harm to the defendant." (Emphasis added.) Id., 279 . | 1 | 1998–1998 |
| In Re Marriage of Hinman green | 1 | 1998–1998 |
| Town of Windsor v. Bedortha neutral | 1 | 1997–1997 |
| Union School District v. Bishop neutral | 1 | 1997–1997 |
| Chotkowski v. State green | 1 | 1997–1997 |
| Heyman Associates No. 1 v. Insurance Co. of Pennsylvania green | 1 | 1996–1996 |
| Wadia Enterprises, Inc. v. Hirschfeld green | 1 | 1996–1996 |
| Nicholaus v. City of Bridgeport green | 1 | 1995–1995 |
| Aronson v. Foohey green | 1 | 1995–1995 |
| State v. Gilchrist green | 1 | 1994–1994 |
| First Connecticut Small Business Investment Co. v. Arba, Inc. green | 1 | 1994–1994 |
| O'Sullivan v. Bergenty green | 1 | 1994–1994 |
| Shields v. School of Law of Hofstra University green | 1 | 1994–1994 |
| Currie v. Marano green | 1 | 1994–1994 |
| Robb v. Sutton green | 1 | 1994–1994 |
| Swerdloff v. AEG Design/Build, Inc. green | 1 | 1993–1993 |
| Roban Realty, Inc. v. Faile green | 1 | 1993–1993 |
| Novella v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. green | 1 | 1993–1993 |
| Remkiewicz v. Remkiewicz green | 1 | 1992–1992 |
| Duhaime v. American Reserve Life Insurance green | 1 | 1991–1991 |
| Rokalor, Inc. v. Connecticut Eating Enterprises, Inc. green | 1 | 1990–1990 |
| Strain v. Zoning Board of Appeals green | 1 | 1985–1985 |
| Prisk v. State green | 1 | 1985–1985 |
| Holley v. Sunderland green | 1 | 1985–1985 |
| Florentine v. Town of Darien green | 1 | 1985–1985 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.