estoppel doctrine in Indiana

1981As stated by this court in Kendall Lumber & Coal Co. v. Roman (1950), 120 Ind.App. 368, 376 , 91 N.E.2d 187 , 190-191: ‘In 36 Am.Jur. p. 168, § 275, it is stated: “‘While there are some cases to the effect that the use of the materials must be shown, the indirect implication of which seems to be that evidence of mere delivery is not sufficient to show their use, the cases which have directly passed upon the question are inclined to the view that delivery of materials at the place of use prima facie establishes the fact of their use, and places the burden of showing the contrary upon the owner

1981As stated by this court in Kendall Lumber & Coal Co. v. Roman (1950), 120 Ind.App. 368, 376 , 91 N.E.2d 187 , 190-191: ‘In 36 Am.Jur. p. 168, § 275, it is stated: “‘While there are some cases to the effect that the use of the materials must be shown, the indirect implication of which seems to be that evidence of mere delivery is not sufficient to show their use, the cases which have directly passed upon the question are inclined to the view that delivery of materials at the place of use prima facie establishes the fact of their use, and places the burden of showing the contrary upon the owner

1993However, as stated in Pickett, supra, an estoppel defense will not bar a party from asserting a claim for child support.

1993However, as stated in Pickett, supra, an estoppel defense will not bar a party from asserting a claim for child support.

1981We quote Van Wells, supra at 341 N.E.2d 202 to explain the exception: “Similar to the estoppel exception is the rule that materials actually delivered are presumed to have been used in the building.

1980We quote Van Wells, supra at 341 N.E.2d 202 to explain the exception: Similar to the estoppel exception is the rule that materials actually delivered are presumed to have been used in the building.

1981We quote Van Wells, supra at 341 N.E.2d 202 to explain the exception: “Similar to the estoppel exception is the rule that materials actually delivered are presumed to have been used in the building.

1980We quote Van Wells, supra at 341 N.E.2d 202 to explain the exception: Similar to the estoppel exception is the rule that materials actually delivered are presumed to have been used in the building.

1932There is a well defined distinction between public and private corporations, and the general doctrine of estoppel does not apply to the former class of corporations.” Platter v. Board of Commissioners of Elkhart County (1885), 103 Ind. 360 , 2 N. E. 544 ; Angola, etc., Tile Co. v. Millgrove School Township (1920), 73 Ind. App. 557 , 127 N. E. 855 ; Frank v. City of Decatur, supra; §1266, McQuillin, supra. *102 *101 The burden was upon appellant to allege and prove *102 that the notes and coupons sued upon were issued in accordance with the tax law of 1919 as amended, for if not so issued they

1932There is a well defined distinction between public and private corporations, and the general doctrine of estoppel does not apply to the former class of corporations.” Platter v. Board of Commissioners of Elkhart County (1885), 103 Ind. 360 , 2 N. E. 544 ; Angola, etc., Tile Co. v. Millgrove School Township (1920), 73 Ind. App. 557 , 127 N. E. 855 ; Frank v. City of Decatur, supra; §1266, McQuillin, supra. *102 *101 The burden was upon appellant to allege and prove *102 that the notes and coupons sued upon were issued in accordance with the tax law of 1919 as amended, for if not so issued they

1904Co. [1882], 83 Ind. 121 . * * * There is a. well-defined distinction between public and private corporations, and the general doctrine of estoppel does not apply to the former class of corporations.

1894Union School Tp. v. First Nat’l Bank, 102 Ind. 464 ; Reeve School Tp. v. Dodson, 98 Ind. 497 ; Axt v. Jackson School Tp., 90 Ind. 101 ; Pine Civil Tp. v. Huber, etc., Co., 83 Ind. 121 . * * * There is a well defined distinction between public and private corporations, and the general doctrine of estoppel does not apply to the former class of corporations.

1894Union School Tp. v. First Nat’l Bank, supra; Cummins v. City of Seymour, 79 Ind. 491 ; Driftwood, etc., Turnpike Co. v. Board, etc., 72 Ind. 226 .” See, also, Baumgartner v. Hasty, 100 Ind. 575 ; Strosser v. City of Fort Wayne, 100 Ind. 443 ; City of Valparaiso v. Gardner, 97 Ind. 1 ; Summers v. Board, etc., 103 Ind. 262 ; Bloomington School Tp., etc., v. Nat’l School Furnishing Co., 107 Ind. 43 .

1885Union School Tp. v. First Nat’l Bank, supra; Cummins v. City of Seymour, 79 Ind. 491 ; Driftwood, etc., T.

2023In rejecting the plaintiff’s estoppel claim, we noted that “[c]ourts are reluctant to apply estoppel against the government where a party claiming to have been ignorant of the facts had access to the correct information.” Id. at 1290 (citing U.S. Outdoor Advert.

2023Co. v. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-EX-377 | July 13, 2023 Page 9 of 16 Ind. Dep’t of Transp., 714 N.E.2d 1244 , 1260 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999), trans. denied).

2019In Ludwig, our Court of Appeals rejected application of the estoppel doctrine to a seller’s attempts to repair or replace defective goods, holding that such efforts “did not toll the statute of limitations.” 510 N.E.2d at 699 .

2017In sum, Doed contends that it is entitled to have the tax sale set aside both under “the doctrine of estoppel,” id., and under Indiana Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 27A02-1609-MI-2062 | February 27, 2017 Page 4 of 6 Code Section 6-1.1-25-16(1) (2016), which provides that a person may move to set aside a tax sale if the “real property described in the deed was not subject to the taxes for which it was sold.” [7] We do not reach the merits of this appeal because Doed did not timely file its motion to set aside the tax sale.

2017In Gupta v. Jay County Auditor, 910 N.E.2d 796 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009), Gupta, a tax sale purchaser, moved to set aside the tax sale because, he alleged, “the real property described in the deed was not subject to the taxes for which it was sold.” Id. at 801 .

2017In Gupta v. Jay County Auditor, 910 N.E.2d 796 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009), Gupta, a tax sale purchaser, moved to set aside the tax sale because, he alleged, “the real property described in the deed was not subject to the taxes for which it was sold.” Id. at 801 .

2016Id. at 262 . [21] We recognize that our Supreme Court previously held that an estoppel claim in the ITCA-notice context must be resolved by the trial court before trial.

2016See Spring Hill Developers, Inc. v. Arthur, 879 N.E.2d 1095, 1100 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (citation omitted). [25] A party asserting promissory estoppel must establish five elements: “(1) a promise by the promissor (2) made with the expectation that the promisee will rely thereon (3) which induces reasonable reliance by the promisee (4) of a definite and substantial nature and (5) injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise.” Biddle v. BAA Indianapolis, LLC, 860 N.E.2d 570 , Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 45A03-1604-PL-862 | December 21, 2016 Page 11 of 19 581 (

2016Jail, 496 N.E.2d 412 , 415 n.3 (Ind.Ct.App.1986), reh’g denied. 3 *1133 [14] Our Supreme Court recently explained that a plaintiff claiming estoppel in response to an ITCA-notice defense “must show its (1) lack of knowledge and of the means of knowledge as to the facts in question, (2) reliance upon the conduct of the party estopped, and (3) action based thereon of such a character as to change [its] position prejudicially.” Schoettmer, 992 N.E.2d at 709 .

2014The Court remanded the ease to the trial court to give the plaintiff an opportunity to “make out a case calling for application of the doctrine of estoppel” by proving he “was justifiably misled into a'good-faith belief that he could begin his action at any time within seven years after it had accrued.” Id. at 235 , 79 S.Ct. 760 .

2014The Court remanded the ease to the trial court to give the plaintiff an opportunity to “make out a case calling for application of the doctrine of estoppel” by proving he “was justifiably misled into a'good-faith belief that he could begin his action at any time within seven years after it had accrued.” Id. at 235 , 79 S.Ct. 760 .

2012Estoppel Finally, Schoettmers contend the trial court should have applied the doctrine of estoppel to South Central’s claim they did not comply with the notice provisions of the ITCA.3 An estoppel theory focuses on representations made by the defendant or its agents to the plaintiff that induce the plaintiff reasonably to believe formal notice is unnecessary. 2 We recognize that, in City of Tipton v. Baxter, 593 N.E.2d 1280 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992), another panel of this Court found substantial compliance in circumstances quite similar to those presented here where, although no notice was attempte

2012Estoppel Finally, Schoettmers contend the trial court should have applied the doctrine of estoppel to South Central’s claim they did not comply with the notice provisions of the ITCA.3 An estoppel theory focuses on representations made by the defendant or its agents to the plaintiff that induce the plaintiff reasonably to believe formal notice is unnecessary. 2 We recognize that, in City of Tipton v. Baxter, 593 N.E.2d 1280 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992), another panel of this Court found substantial compliance in circumstances quite similar to those presented here where, although no notice was attempte

2004Id.

2003Estoppel was at issue in the case, and the Seventh Cireuit noted that the doctrine of estoppel "is based upon the conduct of the true owner, whereby he has allowed another to appear as the owner, or as having full power of disposition over the *443 property, so that an innocent person is led into dealing with such apparent owner." Id. at 437 .

2003The court concluded that Pubs had notice of the security interest and was "chargeable with the knowledge of its officers and directors." Id. at 438 .

2003Id. at 421 ; see also Advisory Bd. of Zoning Appeals of City of Hammond v. Found.

1997In Paramo v. Edwards, 563 N.E.2d 595 (Ind.1990), our supreme court discussed what was required for an event to become an affirmative act for the purposes of equitable estoppel.