55 Washington opinions name it 2 courts 1895–2020 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Washington courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Cooper v. Baergreen2 sentences2020See Cooper v. Baer, 59 Wn.2d 763, 763 , 370 P.2d 871 (1962) (illegal contracts may not be enforced by estoppel) (citing State v. Nw. 2020See Cooper v. Baer, 59 Wn.2d 763, 763 , 370 P.2d 871 (1962) (illegal contracts may not be enforced by estoppel) (citing State v. Nw. | 2 | 2 |
SEATTLE PROFESSIONAL ENGINEERING EMP'S ASS'N v. Boeing Co.green2 sentences2007See Cannon v. Miller, 22 Wn.2d 227, 238-39 , 155 P.2d 500 (1945), overruled on other grounds by Seattle Prof’l Eng’g Employees Ass’n v. Boeing Co., 139 Wn.2d 824 , 991 P.2d 1126 , 1 P.3d 578 (2000) (fact that employees accepted checks for lesser amounts did not preclude them from collecting amounts due them for overtime under the federal labor standards act, and employer could not assert an estoppel defense because it would permit the employer to relieve itself of liability imposed on the employer because of its violation of the law). 2007See Cannon v. Miller, 22 Wash.2d 227, 238-39 , 155 P.2d 500 (1945), overruled on other grounds, Seattle Prof'l Eng'g Employees Ass'n v. Boeing Co., 139 Wash.2d 824 , 991 P.2d 1126 , 1 P.3d 578 (2000) (fact that employees accepted checks for lesser amounts did not preclude them from collecting amounts due them for overtime under the federal Labor Standards Act, and employer could not assert an estoppel defense because it would permit the employer to relieve itself of liability imposed on the employer because of its violation of the law). | 2 | 2 |
Seattle Professional Engineering Employees Ass'n v. Boeing Co.green2 sentences2007See Cannon v. Miller, 22 Wn.2d 227, 238-39 , 155 P.2d 500 (1945), overruled on other grounds by Seattle Prof’l Eng’g Employees Ass’n v. Boeing Co., 139 Wn.2d 824 , 991 P.2d 1126 , 1 P.3d 578 (2000) (fact that employees accepted checks for lesser amounts did not preclude them from collecting amounts due them for overtime under the federal labor standards act, and employer could not assert an estoppel defense because it would permit the employer to relieve itself of liability imposed on the employer because of its violation of the law). 2007See Cannon v. Miller, 22 Wash.2d 227, 238-39 , 155 P.2d 500 (1945), overruled on other grounds, Seattle Prof'l Eng'g Employees Ass'n v. Boeing Co., 139 Wash.2d 824 , 991 P.2d 1126 , 1 P.3d 578 (2000) (fact that employees accepted checks for lesser amounts did not preclude them from collecting amounts due them for overtime under the federal Labor Standards Act, and employer could not assert an estoppel defense because it would permit the employer to relieve itself of liability imposed on the employer because of its violation of the law). | 2 | 2 |
SPEEA v. Boeing Co.green2 sentences2007See Cannon v. Miller, 22 Wn.2d 227, 238-39 , 155 P.2d 500 (1945), overruled on other grounds by Seattle Prof’l Eng’g Employees Ass’n v. Boeing Co., 139 Wn.2d 824 , 991 P.2d 1126 , 1 P.3d 578 (2000) (fact that employees accepted checks for lesser amounts did not preclude them from collecting amounts due them for overtime under the federal labor standards act, and employer could not assert an estoppel defense because it would permit the employer to relieve itself of liability imposed on the employer because of its violation of the law). 2007See Cannon v. Miller, 22 Wash.2d 227, 238-39 , 155 P.2d 500 (1945), overruled on other grounds, Seattle Prof'l Eng'g Employees Ass'n v. Boeing Co., 139 Wash.2d 824 , 991 P.2d 1126 , 1 P.3d 578 (2000) (fact that employees accepted checks for lesser amounts did not preclude them from collecting amounts due them for overtime under the federal Labor Standards Act, and employer could not assert an estoppel defense because it would permit the employer to relieve itself of liability imposed on the employer because of its violation of the law). | 2 | 2 |
Cannon v. Millergreen2 sentences2007See Cannon v. Miller, 22 Wn.2d 227, 238-39 , 155 P.2d 500 (1945), overruled on other grounds by Seattle Prof’l Eng’g Employees Ass’n v. Boeing Co., 139 Wn.2d 824 , 991 P.2d 1126 , 1 P.3d 578 (2000) (fact that employees accepted checks for lesser amounts did not preclude them from collecting amounts due them for overtime under the federal labor standards act, and employer could not assert an estoppel defense because it would permit the employer to relieve itself of liability imposed on the employer because of its violation of the law). 2007See Cannon v. Miller, 22 Wn.2d 227, 238-39 , 155 P.2d 500 (1945), overruled on other grounds by Seattle Prof’l Eng’g Employees Ass’n v. Boeing Co., 139 Wn.2d 824 , 991 P.2d 1126 , 1 P.3d 578 (2000) (fact that employees accepted checks for lesser amounts did not preclude them from collecting amounts due them for overtime under the federal labor standards act, and employer could not assert an estoppel defense because it would permit the employer to relieve itself of liability imposed on the employer because of its violation of the law). | 2 | 2 |
Gowdy v. Richtergreen2 sentences2006The sellers wished to defend by showing that the purchasers had sought rescission only after learning that the oil wells were not productive, but the court refused to allow the estoppel defense, reasoning that it "would tend to nullify and defeat the very purpose of the statute, which is clearly penal in nature." Id. at 585 ; see also Gowdy v. Richter, 20 Ill.App.3d 514, 525 , 314 N.E.2d 549 (1974) (concluding that the Illinois Blue Sky Law "is clear in allowing only statutory, not equitable, defenses" and observing that the Law's "penal character" forecloses the " in pari delicto or estoppel 2006The sellers wished to defend by showing that the purchasers had sought rescission only after learning that the oil wells were not productive, but the court refused to allow the estoppel defense, reasoning that it “would tend to nullify and defeat the very purpose of the statute, which is clearly penal in nature.” Id. at 585 ; see also Gowdy v. Richter, 20 Ill. | 2 | 2 |
Ranker v. Skyline Corp.green2 sentences2000We agree with Isuzu that the repair doctrine, which “is merely a particularized form of estoppel,” Ranker v. Skyline Corp., 342 Pa. Super. 510 , 493 A.2d 706, 709 (1985), is inconsistent with the estoppel principle in Del Guzzi Constr. 2000We agree with Isuzu that the repair doctrine, which “is merely a particularized form of estoppel,” Ranker v. Skyline Corp., 342 Pa. Super. 510 , 493 A.2d 706, 709 (1985), is inconsistent with the estoppel principle in Del Guzzi Constr. | 2 | 2 |
Thomas v. Harlangreen2 sentences2012Thus, Southview fails to establish the first element of the estoppel test: “an admission, statement, or act inconsistent with the claim afterwards asserted.” Thomas, 27 Wn.2d at 518 . *56 2. 1976See Thomas v. Harlan, 27 Wn.2d 512 , 178 P.2d 965 , 170 A.L.R. 1138 (1947). | 1 | 2 |
Department of Ecology v. Theodoratusgreen1 sentence2008See Dep’t of Ecology v. Theodoratus, 135 Wn.2d 582, 599 , 957 P.2d 1241 (1998) (citing Berschauer/ Phillips Constr. | 1 | 1 |
State, Dept. of Ecology v. Theodoratusgreen1 sentence2008See Dep’t of Ecology v. Theodoratus, 135 Wn.2d 582, 599 , 957 P.2d 1241 (1998) (citing Berschauer/ Phillips Constr. | 1 | 1 |
| Fred Tonniesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| New Hampshire v. Mainegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Buechel v. Department of Ecologygreen | 1 | 1 |
| John T. Kennedy v. United States of America, Third Party v. Harold C. Gatewood, Third Partygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Shufeldt v. Department of Labor & Industriesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Summers v. Superior Courtgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| Conway Import Company v. United Statesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Finch v. Matthews
green
2 sentences2005If a state agent lacks legal authority, "`no void act of theirs can be cured by aid of the doctrine of estoppel.'" Barendregt, 26 Wash.App. at 250 , 611 P.2d 1385 (quoting Finch, 74 Wash.2d at 172 , 443 P.2d 833 ). 2005If a state agent lacks legal authority, "`no void act of theirs can be cured by aid of the doctrine of estoppel.'" Barendregt, 26 Wash.App. at 250 , 611 P.2d 1385 (quoting Finch, 74 Wash.2d at 172 , 443 P.2d 833 ). | 4 | 1981–2008 |
Barendregt v. Walla Walla School District No. 140
neutral
2 sentences2008If a state agent lacks legal authority, "no void act of theirs can be cured by aid of the doctrine of estoppel." Barendregt, 26 Wash.App. at 250 , 611 P.2d 1385 . ¶ 24 DSHS has statutory authority to negotiate settlements. 2008If a state agent lacks legal authority, “ ‘no void act of theirs can be cured by aid of the doctrine of estoppel.’ ” Barendregt, 26 Wn. | 4 | 2005–2008 |
Midwest Management Corp. v. Stephens
green
2 sentences2006The Iowa Supreme Court reversed the summary dismissal of Midwest's suit and held that the estoppel defense was available to stock seller Midwest, despite its violation of the registration requirements. 291 N.W.2d at 908 . 2006The Iowa Supreme Court reversed the summary dismissal of Midwest’s suit and held that the estoppel defense was available to stock seller Midwest, despite its violation of the registration requirements. 291 N.W.2d at 908 . | 2 | 2006–2006 |
Covert v. Cross
green
2 sentences2006The sellers wished to defend by showing that the purchasers had sought rescission only after learning that the oil wells were not productive, but the court refused to allow the estoppel defense, reasoning that it "would tend to nullify and defeat the very purpose of the statute, which is clearly penal in nature." Id. at 585 ; see also Gowdy v. Richter, 20 Ill.App.3d 514, 525 , 314 N.E.2d 549 (1974) (concluding that the Illinois Blue Sky Law "is clear in allowing only statutory, not equitable, defenses" and observing that the Law's "penal character" forecloses the " in pari delicto or estoppel 2006The sellers wished to defend by showing that the purchasers had sought rescission only after learning that the oil wells were not productive, but the court refused to allow the estoppel defense, reasoning that it “would tend to nullify and defeat the very purpose of the statute, which is clearly penal in nature.” Id. at 585 ; see also Gowdy v. Richter, 20 Ill. | 2 | 2006–2006 |
Logan v. Panuska
green
2 sentences2006The Minnesota Supreme Court held that the restaurant seller could assert an estoppel defense since the purchasers "were not induced to buy the stock through any misrepresentation of the defendant as to the financial condition of the restaurant ... [and had] actively participated in the management and control of the corporation during the course of their investment." 293 N.W.2d at 363-64 . ¶ 13 In sum, Midwest and Logan would be analogous to the present case only if Go2Net's basis for rescinding its purchase of FreeYellow had been the Act's registration requirement, RCW 21.20.140, rather than i 2006The Minnesota Supreme Court held that the restaurant seller could assert an estoppel defense since the purchasers “were not induced to buy the stock through any misrepresentation of the defendant as to the financial condition of the restaurant [and had] actively participated in the management and control of the corporation during the course of their investment.” 293 N.W.2d at 363-64 . ¶13 In sum, Midwest and Logan would be analogous to the present case only if Go2Net’s basis for rescinding its purchase of FreeYellow had been the Act’s registration requirement, RCW 21.20.140, rather than its an | 2 | 2006–2006 |
Standefer v. United States
green
2 sentences2003The Court held that these “ ‘competing policy considerations’ ” outweighed the “economy concerns that undergird the estoppel doctrine.” Standefer, 447 U.S. at 25 . 3 We agree with the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Standefer . 2003The Court held that these "`competing policy considerations'" outweighed the "economy concerns that undergird the estoppel doctrine." Standefer, 447 U.S. at 25 , 100 S.Ct. 1999 . [3] We agree with the Supreme Court's reasoning in Standefer . | 2 | 2003–2003 |
State v. Ager
green
2 sentences2002Ager, 128 Wn.2d at 96 . 2002Ager, 128 Wash.2d at 96 , 904 P.2d 715 . | 2 | 2002–2002 |
United States v. James Gordon Lansing
green
2 sentences2002Barker, 546 F.2d at 940 ; Lansing, 424 F.2d 225 . 2002Barker, 546 F.2d at 940 ; Lansing, 424 F.2d at 225 . | 2 | 2002–2002 |
United States v. Bernard L. Barker, United States of America v. Eugenio R. Martinez
green
2 sentences2002Barker, 546 F.2d at 940 ; Lansing, 424 F.2d 225 . 2002Barker, 546 F.2d at 940 ; Lansing, 424 F.2d at 225 . | 2 | 2002–2002 |
Raymond v. Ingram
green
2 sentences2001Thus, the following have been enumerated as essentials to the establishment of an estoppel under the rule that a position taken in an earlier action estops the one taking such position from assuming an inconsistent position in a later action: (1) The inconsistent position first asserted must have been successfully maintained; (2) a judgment must have been rendered; (3) the positions must be clearly inconsistent; (4) the parties and questions must be the same; (5) the party claiming estoppel must have been misled and have changed his position; (6) it must appear unjust to one party to permit th 2001Thus, the following have been enumerated as essentials to the establishment of an estoppel under the rule that a position taken in an earlier action estops the one taking such position from assuming an inconsistent position in a later action: (1) The inconsistent position first asserted must have been successfully maintained; (2) a judgment must have been rendered; (3) the positions must be clearly inconsistent; (4) the parties and questions must be the same; (5) the party claiming estoppel must have been misled and have changed his position; (6) it must appear unjust to one party to permit th | 2 | 2001–2001 |
Markley v. Markley
green
2 sentences2001Thus, the following have been enumerated as essentials to the establishment of an estoppel under the rule that a position taken in an earlier action estops the one taking such position from assuming an inconsistent position in a later action: (1) The inconsistent position first asserted must have been successfully maintained; (2) a judgment must have been rendered; (3) the positions must be clearly inconsistent; (4) the parties and questions must be the same; (5) the party claiming estoppel must have been misled and have changed his position; (6) it must appear unjust to one party to permit th 2001Thus, the following have been enumerated as essentials to the establishment of an estoppel under the rule that a position taken in an earlier action estops the one taking such position from assuming an inconsistent position in a later action: (1) The inconsistent position first asserted must have been successfully maintained; (2) a judgment must have been rendered; (3) the positions must be clearly inconsistent; (4) the parties and questions must be the same; (5) the party claiming estoppel must have been misled and have changed his position; (6) it must appear unjust to one party to permit th | 2 | 2001–2001 |
State v. City of Pullman
neutral
2 sentences1980If there is no authority vested by law in officers or agents, "no void act of theirs can be cured by aid of the doctrine of estoppel." Finch v. Matthews, supra at 172, quoting from State v. Pullman, 23 Wash. 583, 592 , 63 P. 265 (1900). 1980If there is no authority vested by law in officers or agents, "no void act of theirs can be cured by aid of the doctrine of estoppel." Finch v. Matthews, supra at 172, quoting from State v. Pullman, 23 Wash. 583, 592 , 63 P. 265 (1900). | 2 | 1968–1980 |
Vinneau v. Goede
green
2 sentences1975In Vinneau v. Goede, 50 Wn.2d 39 , 309 P.2d 376 (1957), we held that the question whether there was an intent to waive is one of fact. 1975In Vinneau v. Goede, 50 Wn.2d 39 , 309 P.2d 376 (1957), we held that the question whether there was an intent to waive is one of fact. | 2 | 1969–1975 |
Kessinger v. Anderson
green
2 sentences1975While reliance is not a requirement, as it is in the doctrine of estoppel (see Kessinger v. Anderson, 31 Wn.2d 157 , 196 P.2d 289 (1948) ), it is still necessary to show that the party who it is claimed has waived a right, did so intentionally and with full knowledge of his rights. 1975While reliance is not a requirement, as it is in the doctrine of estoppel (see Kessinger v. Anderson, 31 Wn.2d 157 , 196 P.2d 289 (1948) ), it is still necessary to show that the party who it is claimed has waived a right, did so intentionally and with full knowledge of his rights. | 2 | 1969–1975 |
Hamilton v. Home Fire Insurance
neutral
2 sentences1944Co., 42 Neb. 883 , 61 N. W. 93 , that knowledge of the existence of a right and the intention to relinquish it must concur to create an estoppel by waiver. 1944Co., 42 Neb. 883 , 61 N. W. 93 , that knowledge of the existence of a right and the intention to relinquish it must concur to create an estoppel by waiver. | 2 | 1906–1944 |
Lybbert v. Grant County, State of Wash.
green
1 sentence2015Lybbert v. Grant County, 141 Wn.2d 29, 35 , 1 P. 3d 1124 ( 2000). | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Lybbert v. Grant County
green
2 sentences2015Lybbert v. Grant County, 141 Wn.2d 29, 35 , 1 P. 3d 1124 ( 2000). 2015Lybbert, 141 Wn.2d at 35 . | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Ash v. Department of Labor & Industries
neutral
1 sentence2015App. 559, 566-67 , 294 P.3d 834 (2013). -18- NO. 71114-8-1/19 But a party seeking damages based on an estoppel claim must assert a promissory estoppel claim, not a claim for equitable estoppel.40 While at least one Washington case recasts a claim for equitable estoppel as one for promissory estoppel,41 we decline to do so here. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Niemann v. Vaughn Community Church
green
1 sentence2014Niemann v. Vaughn Cmty. Church, 154 Wn.2d 365, 374 , 113 P.3d 463 (2005). ¶105 The Club’s estoppel defense is not viable because the County’s enforcement of its Code and nuisance law is not inconsistent with its earlier position. | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Niemann v. Vaughn Community Church
green
1 sentence2014Niemann v. Vaughn Cmty. Church, 154 Wn.2d 365, 374 , 113 P.3d 463 (2005). ¶105 The Club’s estoppel defense is not viable because the County’s enforcement of its Code and nuisance law is not inconsistent with its earlier position. | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| State v. O'CONNELL green | 1 | 2005–2005 |
| State v. Ager green | 1 | 2002–2002 |
| Del Guzzi Constr. Co. v. Global Northwest Ltd., Inc. green | 1 | 2000–2000 |
| Hillis Homes, Inc. v. Snohomish County green | 1 | 1992–1992 |
| Shafer v. State green | 1 | 1991–1991 |
| Saunders v. Lloyd's of London green | 1 | 1991–1991 |
| McDaniels v. Carlson green | 1 | 1991–1991 |
| Group Health Cooperative of Puget Sound, Inc. v. Department of Revenue green | 1 | 1987–1987 |
| Harbor Air Service, Inc. v. Board of Tax Appeals green | 1 | 1987–1987 |
| Wilson Simmons v. United States green | 1 | 1983–1983 |
| Wahler v. Department of Social & Health Services green | 1 | 1982–1982 |
| State v. Charlton green | 1 | 1981–1981 |
| Lloyd Hammerstad, Inc. v. Saunders green | 1 | 1974–1974 |
| Clients' Service, Inc. v. Pupo green | 1 | 1974–1974 |
| In Re the Puget Sound Pilots Ass'n green | 1 | 1974–1974 |
| Miles v. Chinto Mining Co. green | 1 | 1974–1974 |
| Whiting v. Johnson green | 1 | 1974–1974 |
| State v. Northwest Magnesite Co. green | 1 | 1957–1957 |
| Carpenter v. Okanogan County neutral | 1 | 1953–1953 |
| Mottin v. Board of County Commissioners green | 1 | 1947–1947 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.