estoppel doctrine in Missouri

1997“Fundamental to an estoppel claim against the government is that in addition to satisfying elements of ordinary estoppel, governmental conduct complained of must amount to affirmative misconduct.” Farmers’ & Laborers’ Co-Operative Insurance Association v. Director of Revenue, State of Missouri, 742 S.W.2d 141, 143 (Mo. banc 1987).

1994“Fundamental to an estoppel claim against the government is that in addition to satisfying elements of ordinary estop-pel, governmental conduct complained of must amount to affirmative misconduct.” Id.

2012"The election of remedies doctrine, a doctrine of estoppel, originates upon the theory that where a party has the right to pursue one of two inconsistent remedies and he makes his election, institutes suit, and prosecutes it to final judgment, he cannot thereafter pursue another and inconsistent remedy." Whittom v. Alexander-Richardson P'ship, 851 S.W.2d 504, 506 (Mo. banc 1993) (internal quotations omitted).

2012“The election of remedies doctrine, a doctrine of estoppel, originates upon the theory that where a party has the right to pursue one of two inconsistent remedies and he makes his election, institutes suit, and prosecutes it to final judgment, he cannot thereafter pursue another and inconsistent remedy.” Whittom v. Alexander-Richardson P’ship, 851 S.W.2d 504, 506 (Mo. banc 1993) (internal quotations omitted).

2005The election of remedies doctrine, a doctrine of estoppel, originates from the theory that “where a party has the right to pursue one of two inconsistent remedies and he makes his election, institutes suit, and prosecutes it to final judgment, he cannot thereafter pursue another and inconsistent remedy.” Whittom v. Alexander-Richardson Partnership, 851 S.W.2d 504, 506 (Mo. banc 1993){quoting Tooker, et al., v. Missouri Power & Light Co., 336 Mo. 592 , 80 S.W.2d 691, 695 (1935)).

2005The election of remedies doctrine, a doctrine of estoppel, originates from the theory that “where a party has the right to pursue one of two inconsistent remedies and he makes his election, institutes suit, and prosecutes it to final judgment, he cannot thereafter pursue another and inconsistent remedy.” Whittom v. Alexander-Richardson Partnership, 851 S.W.2d 504, 506 (Mo. banc 1993){quoting Tooker, et al., v. Missouri Power & Light Co., 336 Mo. 592 , 80 S.W.2d 691, 695 (1935)).

2017If such an owner “conducts himself with 'a careless indifference to means of information reasonably at hand or ignores highly suspicious circumstances which should warn him of danger or loss he cannot invoke the doctrine of estoppel.” Id.

1995The burden of proof is on the party asserting the estoppel and that party must prove every element of the estoppel claim with “clear and satisfactory evidence.” Id.

1999The doctrine of estoppel does not apply. [1] Waiver, disfavored because it is rarely applicable in the context of a case such as this, is "the intentional relinquishment of a known right." Id. at 386-87 .

1999The doctrine of estoppel does not apply. 1 Waiver, disfavored because it is rarely applicable in the context of a case such as this, is “the intentional relinquishment of a known right.” Id. at 386-87 .

1993Van Hooser v. Banks, 816 S.W.2d 25, 27-29 (Mo.App.1991); Pashalian v. Big-4 Chevrolet Co., 348 S.W.2d 628, 634 [7] (Mo.App.1961); Seward v. Evrard, 240 Mo.App. 893 , 222 S.W.2d 509, 513 [2] (1949).

1991The court defined the “real question” to be which of two parties should suffer the loss and the court applied the equitable doctrine of estoppel “... that where one of two innocent persons must suffer by reason of the acts of a third party, the person whose act enabled the third party ...” or “... the one who permits himself to be deceived and thus puts it in the power of such third person to defraud another shall be the loser rather than the latter.” Id. at 634 .

1983The Coalition cites State v. Missouri Utilities Co., 339 Mo. 385 , 96 S.W.2d 607, 615-616 (1936), and extracts from that authority the declaration that, “Under the law of this state, as it has existed for many years, the doctrine of estoppel, as thus sketched in rough outline, applies, not only to natural persons and private corporations, but to municipalities as well, and that even though such municipalities are acting in a ‘governmental capacity.’ ” (citations omitted) With this quote, the Coalition would urge adoption of a rule that holds flatly that estoppel works against public entities r

1983The Coalition cites State v. Missouri Utilities Co., 339 Mo. 385 , 96 S.W.2d 607, 615-616 (1936), and extracts from that authority the declaration that, “Under the law of this state, as it has existed for many years, the doctrine of estoppel, as thus sketched in rough outline, applies, not only to natural persons and private corporations, but to municipalities as well, and that even though such municipalities are acting in a ‘governmental capacity.’ ” (citations omitted) With this quote, the Coalition would urge adoption of a rule that holds flatly that estoppel works against public entities r

2025Parking Sys. of Mo., LLC v. Tucker Parking Holdings, LLC, 519 S.W.3d 485, 495 (Mo. App. E.D. 2017) (quoting Brown v. State Farm Mut.

2009I fail to see any reason why a biological parent cannot assert an estoppel claim in her own right, where that parent alleges that she chose to conceive, give birth to, and retain custody of a child, with the attendant substantial and long-term financial obligations, in reliance on a third party's representations and conduct. [2] Norber v. Marcotte, 134 S.W.3d 651, 657 (Mo.App.

2009Norber v. Marcotte, 134 S.W.3d 651, 657 (Mo.App.

2009E.D.2004). [3] Richardson v. Richardson, 218 S.W.3d 426, 428 (Mo. banc 2007) (internal quotation marks omitted). [4] For similar reasons I also conclude, contrary to the majority, that Leslea adequately pled a claim for child support for Z.A.W. based on the express contractual assumption doctrine.

2004Altmann v. Altmann, 978 S.W.2d 356, 362 (Mo.App.

2002See Choate v. Hides, 983 S.W.2d 611, 613 (Mo.App.

1999Because this case involved supervisory sexual harassment, the trial court correctly applied 8 C.S.R. 60-3.04(17)(c) and held Defendant strictly liable regardless of whether it knew or should have known of DriskilTs harassment. 3 Defendant next claims that even if it is strictly hable for the harassing acts of its supervisors, it is entitled to assert various affirmative defenses, namely the estoppel defense outlined in Torris v. Pisano, 116 F.3d 625, 631 (2nd Cir.1997) as well as the affirmative defense set forth in Faragher and Burlington, as there is nothing in 8 C.S.R. 60-3.04(17)(c) prohib