estoppel doctrine in Louisiana

1964Co. v. New Harbor Protection Co. et al., 37 La.Ann. 233 . "`* * * the courts * * * recognize the doctrine that estoppel cannot be invoked to impair the force and effect of a prohibitory law.' Rhodes v. Miller, 189 La. 288 , 179 So. 430, 432 . "`A contract malum in se or against public policy cannot be made valid by ratification; and the same is generally true of contracts forbidden by statute.' 17 C.J.S., Contracts, § 279, page 668. "`* * * The doctrine of estoppel by conduct or by laches has no application to an agreement or instrument which is illegal because it violates an express mandate o

1964Co. v. New Harbor Protection Co. et al., 37 La.Ann. 233 . "`* * * the courts * * * recognize the doctrine that estoppel cannot be invoked to impair the force and effect of a prohibitory law.' Rhodes v. Miller, 189 La. 288 , 179 So. 430, 432 . "`A contract malum in se or against public policy cannot be made valid by ratification; and the same is generally true of contracts forbidden by statute.' 17 C.J.S., Contracts, § 279, page 668. "`* * * The doctrine of estoppel by conduct or by laches has no application to an agreement or instrument which is illegal because it violates an express mandate o

2018Causby v. Perque Floor Covering , 97-1235, p. 10 (La.1/21/98), 707 So.2d 23 , 28 ; see also Millican [ v. General Motors Corp. ,], 34,207 at p. 2, [ (La.App. 2 Cir. 11/1/00) ], 771 So.2d [234,] 235-36 ; Dupaquier v. City of New Orleans , 260 La. 728 , 734, 257 So.2d 385 , 387-88 (1972).

2016Causby v. Perque Floor Covering, 97-1235, p. 10 (La.01/21/98), 707 So.2d 23, 28 ; see also Millican, 34,207 at p. 2, 771 So.2d at 235-36 ; Dupaquier v. City of New Orleans, 260 La. 728, 734 , 257 So.2d 385, 387-88 (1972).

1994Moreau v. Falgout, 304 So.2d 429 (La.App. 1st Cir.1974); Davis v. Contorno, 234 So.2d 470 (La.App. 1st Cir.1970); Goldstein v. Goldstein, 409 So.2d 1245 (La.App. 4th Cir.1982).

1983Moreau v. Falgout, 304 So.2d 429 (La.App. 1st Cir.1974); Davis v. Contorno, 234 So.2d 470 (La.App. 1st Cir. 1970); Goldstein v. Goldstein, 409 So.2d 1245 (La.App. 4th Cir.1982).

1994Moreau v. Falgout, 304 So.2d 429 (La.App. 1st Cir.1974); Davis v. Contorno, 234 So.2d 470 (La.App. 1st Cir.1970); Goldstein v. Goldstein, 409 So.2d 1245 (La.App. 4th Cir.1982).

1983Moreau v. Falgout, 304 So.2d 429 (La.App. 1st Cir.1974); Davis v. Contorno, 234 So.2d 470 (La.App. 1st Cir. 1970); Goldstein v. Goldstein, 409 So.2d 1245 (La.App. 4th Cir.1982).

1994Moreau v. Falgout, 304 So.2d 429 (La.App. 1st Cir.1974); Davis v. Contorno, 234 So.2d 470 (La.App. 1st Cir.1970); Goldstein v. Goldstein, 409 So.2d 1245 (La.App. 4th Cir.1982).

1983Moreau v. Falgout, 304 So.2d 429 (La.App. 1st Cir.1974); Davis v. Contorno, 234 So.2d 470 (La.App. 1st Cir. 1970); Goldstein v. Goldstein, 409 So.2d 1245 (La.App. 4th Cir.1982).

1964Co. v. New Harbor Protection Co. et al., 37 La.Ann. 233 . "`* * * the courts * * * recognize the doctrine that estoppel cannot be invoked to impair the force and effect of a prohibitory law.' Rhodes v. Miller, 189 La. 288 , 179 So. 430, 432 . "`A contract malum in se or against public policy cannot be made valid by ratification; and the same is generally true of contracts forbidden by statute.' 17 C.J.S., Contracts, § 279, page 668. "`* * * The doctrine of estoppel by conduct or by laches has no application to an agreement or instrument which is illegal because it violates an express mandate o

1964Co. v. New Harbor Protection Co. et al., 37 La.Ann. 233 . "`* * * the courts * * * recognize the doctrine that estoppel cannot be invoked to impair the force and effect of a prohibitory law.' Rhodes v. Miller, 189 La. 288 , 179 So. 430, 432 . * * * * * * "We do not know upon what grounds the trial judge sustained the exception of no cause or right of action and dismissed plaintiff's suit, as the record contains no written reasons for judgment.

1954It has been said that the efficacy of parol agreements and acts of the parties pursuant thereto conclusively to establish a boundary line rests upon the doctrine of estoppel.’ “In Harper v. Learned, 199 La. 398 -417, 6 So.2d 326, 332 , the court specifically held: ‘Parol evidence is admissible to prove a visible 'boundary recognized by the parties.’ Blanc v. Duplessis, 13 La. 334 , is cited.” See also: Griffin v. Mahoney, La.App. 1951, 56 So.2d 208, 212, 213 , in which opinion Judge Taliaferro, referring to the above •quotation from 8 Am.Jur. page 797, Section 73, commented: “Of course, the qu

1947It has been said that the efficacy of parol agreements and acts of the parties pursuant thereto conclusively to establish a boundary line rests upon the doctrine of estoppel." In Harper v. Learned et al., 199 La. 398 -417, 6 So.2d 326 , 332, the court specifically held: "Parol evidence is admissible to prove a visible boundary recognized by the parties." Blanc v. Duplessis, 13 La. 334 , is cited.

1954It has been said that the efficacy of parol agreements and acts of the parties pursuant thereto conclusively to establish a boundary line rests upon the doctrine of estoppel.’ “In Harper v. Learned, 199 La. 398 -417, 6 So.2d 326, 332 , the court specifically held: ‘Parol evidence is admissible to prove a visible 'boundary recognized by the parties.’ Blanc v. Duplessis, 13 La. 334 , is cited.” See also: Griffin v. Mahoney, La.App. 1951, 56 So.2d 208, 212, 213 , in which opinion Judge Taliaferro, referring to the above •quotation from 8 Am.Jur. page 797, Section 73, commented: “Of course, the qu

1954It has been said that the efficacy of parol agreements and acts of the parties pursuant thereto conclusively to establish a boundary line rests upon the doctrine of estoppel.’ “In Harper v. Learned, 199 La. 398 -417, 6 So.2d 326, 332 , the court specifically held: ‘Parol evidence is admissible to prove a visible 'boundary recognized by the parties.’ Blanc v. Duplessis, 13 La. 334 , is cited.” See also: Griffin v. Mahoney, La.App. 1951, 56 So.2d 208, 212, 213 , in which opinion Judge Taliaferro, referring to the above •quotation from 8 Am.Jur. page 797, Section 73, commented: “Of course, the qu

1950In Succession of Harris, 39 La.Ann. 443 , 2 So. 39 , 41, 4 Am.St.Rep. 269 , the Supreme Court quoted with approval the following observation made in Stockmeyer v. Oertling, 38 La.Ann. 100 : "* * * the doctrine of estoppel, however apparently emphatic, is full of exceptions, which vary according to circumstances, and was never designed to apply to a case like the instant one, in which the declaration made has led no one astray, and occasioned damages to nobody.' * * *" One who, in ignorance of his rights, acted as an expert or appraiser in a partition proceeding in which the property was divide

1932Succession of Harris, 39 La.

2018Rambin v. Shreveport Refrigeration, Inc. , 39,592, p. 9 (La.App. 2 Cir. 05/04/05), 902 So.2d 1129 , 1135 (quoting Millican , 34,207 at p. 4, 771 So.2d at 236 ); Norman v. BellSouth Telecommunications , 04-0797, p. 4 (La.App. 4 Cir. 10/27/04), 888 So.2d 340 , 343 (citing Millican, supra .).

2001In Independent Fire Insurance Co. v. Able Moving and Storage Co., Inc., 94-1982, p. 6, (La.2/20/95), 650 So.2d 750, 752 , the Louisiana Supreme Court further discussed the principle of apparent authority, as applicable prior to adoption of Acts 1997, No. 261, noting: Apparent authority is an estoppel principle which operates in favor of third persons seeking to bind a principal for unauthorized acts of an agent.

1997Estoppel and Waiver The doctrine of estoppel is stated in Looney v. Trimount Theatres, Inc., 282 Mass. 275 , 184 N.E. 683 (1933) as follows: In order to work an estoppel it must appear that one has been induced by the conduct of another to do something different from what otherwise would have been done and which has resulted to his harm and that the other knew or had reasonable cause to know that such consequence might follow.

1997Estoppel and Waiver The doctrine of estoppel is stated in Looney v. Trimount Theatres, Inc., 282 Mass. 275 , 184 N.E. 683 (1933) as follows: In order to work an estoppel it must appear that one has been induced by the conduct of another to do something different from what otherwise would have been done and which has resulted to his harm and that the other knew or had reasonable cause to know that such consequence might follow.

1995State v. Register of State Land Office, 193 La. 883 , 192 So. 519 (1939).

1995State v. Register of State Land Office, 193 La. 883 , 192 So. 519 (1939).

1995Kibbe v. Lege, 604 So.2d 1366 (La.App. 3rd Cir.1992), writs denied 606 So.2d 540 , 541 (La.1992).

1995Spataro, supra. It is well settled that the doctrine of estoppel applies to the State just as it does to individuals.

1995Kibbe v. Lege, 604 So.2d 1366 (La.App. 3rd Cir.1992), writs denied 606 So.2d 540 , 541 (La.1992).

1994Graham, 625 So.2d at 719-20 .

1993To grant the plea of estoppel as requested by the state would in effect be an extension of coverage of the Continental policies." 385 So.2d at 937-938 . (citations omitted).

1986Guillory v. Calcasieu Parish Police Jury, 410 So.2d 1213 (La.App.3d Cir.1982).

1986Dubroc v. Dubroc, supra. For an agreement modifying the amount of child support to be effective, the parties must clearly agree to such modification and the burden of proof is on the party relying on the agreement to prove its existence.

1982Article IV, Section 6 of the Farm Bureau bylaws provides that members "shall be entitled to the benefits and privileges of any affiliated or associated insurance company service." Although I do not necessarily subscribe to the argument at this time, it could be argued that one interpretation of this provision would deem to mandate coverage by a member upon request, absent a justified cause to refuse coverage. *821 For examples of the general proposition that summary judgment procedure should be used cautiously and sparingly and that any reasonable doubt concerning the existence of such should

1982Article IV, Section 6 of the Farm Bureau bylaws provides that members "shall be entitled to the benefits and privileges of any affiliated or associated insurance company service." Although I do not necessarily subscribe to the argument at this time, it could be argued that one interpretation of this provision would deem to mandate coverage by a member upon request, absent a justified cause to refuse coverage. *821 For examples of the general proposition that summary judgment procedure should be used cautiously and sparingly and that any reasonable doubt concerning the existence of such should

1982Wilkinson v. Wilkinson, 323 So.2d 120 (La. 1975).