estoppel doctrine in Kansas

2012The Klepper court had already noted its reliance on Rex v. Warner, 183 Kan. 763, 771 , 332 P.2d 572 (1958), a case that applied equitable estoppel principles, not accrual rules.

2012The Klepper court had already noted its reliance on Rex v. Warner, 183 Kan. 763, 771 , 332 P.2d 572 (1958), a case that applied equitable estoppel principles, not accrual rules.

1921The opinion quotes with approval the following from The people v. Brown et al., 67 Ill. 435 : “ ‘It is a familiar doctrine, that the State is not embraced within the Statute of Limitations, unless specially named, and by analogy, would not fall within the doctrine of estoppel.

1917Without going more at large into this question, we are of opinion, that the mere laches of the public officers constitutes no ground of discharge in the present case.” (pp, 735, 736, 737.) In The People v. Brown et al., 67 Ill. 435 , it is said : “It is a familiar doctrine, that the State is not embraced 'within the Statute of Limitations, unless specially named,' and by analogy, would not fall within the doctrine of estoppel.

2012“One cannot take advantage of. . . estoppel and the statute of limitations where his own concealment is the basis for the delay.” 224 Kan. at 516. 1979 Coffey v. Stephens, 3 Kan.

2012For tolling to occur and the doctrine of estoppel to apply, the court stated that there must be “an element of deception upon which tire plaintiff acted in good faith in reliance thereon to his prejudice whereby he failed to commence the action within the statutory period.” Klepper, 193 Kan. at 222 .

1995Lawhorn v. Atlantic Refining Co., 5 Cir., 1962, 299 F.2d 353 ; Dow Chemical Co. v. Metlon Corp., 4 Cir., 1960, 281 F.2d 292 .

1995Lawhorn v. Atlantic Refining Co., 5 Cir., 1962, 299 F.2d 353 ; Dow Chemical Co. v. Metlon Corp., 4 Cir., 1960, 281 F.2d 292 .

1993D’Oench, Duhme, 315 U.S. at 458-60 .

1991“A decision squarely on point is In Re Perkins’ Trust Estate, 314 Pa. 49 , 170 A. 255 (1934).

1991“A decision squarely on point is In Re Perkins’ Trust Estate, 314 Pa. 49 , 170 A. 255 (1934).

1988See Lines v. City of Topeka, 223 Kan. 772 , 577 P.2d 42 (1978); Benson v. City of DeSoto, 212 Kan. 415 , 510 P.2d 1281 (1973); Derby Oil Co. v. City of Oxford, 134 Kan. 59 , 4 P.2d 435 (1931).

1988See Lines v. City of Topeka, 223 Kan. 772 , 577 P.2d 42 (1978); Benson v. City of DeSoto, 212 Kan. 415 , 510 P.2d 1281 (1973); Derby Oil Co. v. City of Oxford, 134 Kan. 59 , 4 P.2d 435 (1931).

1988See Lines v. City of Topeka, 223 Kan. 772 , 577 P.2d 42 (1978); Benson v. City of DeSoto, 212 Kan. 415 , 510 P.2d 1281 (1973); Derby Oil Co. v. City of Oxford, 134 Kan. 59 , 4 P.2d 435 (1931).

1988See Lines v. City of Topeka, 223 Kan. 772 , 577 P.2d 42 (1978); Benson v. City of DeSoto, 212 Kan. 415 , 510 P.2d 1281 (1973); Derby Oil Co. v. City of Oxford, 134 Kan. 59 , 4 P.2d 435 (1931).

1983Lantz v. City of Lawrence, 232 Kan. 492, 500 , 657 P.2d 539 (1983).

1983Lantz v. City of Lawrence, 232 Kan. 492, 500 , 657 P.2d 539 (1983).

1976In Wollard v. Peterson, 145 Kan. 631 , 66 P. 2d 375 , we hold: “Where a judgment rendered against the defendant consists of two or more separate and distinct parts, the acquiescence in and the payment of one of those separate parts by the defendant, except costs, will not ordinarily *555 constitute an estoppel or waiver of his right to appeal as to other separate parts.” (Syl. ¶1.) (See also 4 C.

1976In Wollard v. Peterson, 145 Kan. 631 , 66 P. 2d 375 , we hold: “Where a judgment rendered against the defendant consists of two or more separate and distinct parts, the acquiescence in and the payment of one of those separate parts by the defendant, except costs, will not ordinarily *555 constitute an estoppel or waiver of his right to appeal as to other separate parts.” (Syl. ¶1.) (See also 4 C.

1943The other acts of the municipality referred to are as different as the reported cases, but those acts most common to all the cases are the reception and use of the benefits of the contract, the enjoyment of the labor of others, failure to protest or to commence legal proceedings in apt time, the retention of the stock and general acquiescence in all proceedings until the contract becomes wholly executed.” (p. 98.) In Kneeland v. Gilman and Another, 24 Wis. 39 , the court, in speaking of municipal corporations, said: “As to matters within the scope of their powers, the doctrine of estoppel, and

1943The other acts of the municipality referred to are as different as the reported cases, but those acts most common to all the cases are the reception and use of the benefits of the contract, the enjoyment of the labor of others, failure to protest or to commence legal proceedings in apt time, the retention of the stock and general acquiescence in all proceedings until the contract becomes wholly executed.” (p. 98.) In Kneeland v. Gilman and Another, 24 Wis. 39 , the court, in speaking of municipal corporations, said: “As to matters within the scope of their powers, the doctrine of estoppel, and

1936(Clark v. Lindley Motor Co., 126 Kan. 419 , 268 Pac. 860 ; Lindberg v. Pence View Farming Co., 140 Kan. 138, 144-146 , 33 P. 2d 1102 .) Another point urged by the appellee to sustain the judgment is based on the doctrine of estoppel.

1936(Clark v. Lindley Motor Co., 126 Kan. 419 , 268 Pac. 860 ; Lindberg v. Pence View Farming Co., 140 Kan. 138, 144-146 , 33 P. 2d 1102 .) Another point urged by the appellee to sustain the judgment is based on the doctrine of estoppel.

1936(Clark v. Lindley Motor Co., 126 Kan. 419 , 268 Pac. 860 ; Lindberg v. Pence View Farming Co., 140 Kan. 138, 144-146 , 33 P. 2d 1102 .) Another point urged by the appellee to sustain the judgment is based on the doctrine of estoppel.

1936(Clark v. Lindley Motor Co., 126 Kan. 419 , 268 Pac. 860 ; Lindberg v. Pence View Farming Co., 140 Kan. 138, 144-146 , 33 P. 2d 1102 .) Another point urged by the appellee to sustain the judgment is based on the doctrine of estoppel.

1935In Benson v. Nyman, 136 Kan. 455 , 16 P. 2d 963 , this court held: “While a life tenant under a will may not develop an oil and gas property to the deprivation of remaindermen, such rule does not apply where all developments were made under and by virtue of the provisions of a lease made by the landowner in his lifetime with a third party as lessee.” (Syl. ff 2.) In an annotation in 43 A. L.

1935In Benson v. Nyman, 136 Kan. 455 , 16 P. 2d 963 , this court held: “While a life tenant under a will may not develop an oil and gas property to the deprivation of remaindermen, such rule does not apply where all developments were made under and by virtue of the provisions of a lease made by the landowner in his lifetime with a third party as lessee.” (Syl. ff 2.) In an annotation in 43 A. L.

1931J. 1111; Municipal Power Transmission Co. v. City of Lyndon, supra; O’Leary v. Street Railway Co., 87 Kan. 22 , 123 Pac. 746 .) The findings of fact by the trial court do not bring the appellant within this rule, and the doctrine of estoppel does not apply.

1931J. 1111; Municipal Power Transmission Co. v. City of Lyndon, supra; O’Leary v. Street Railway Co., 87 Kan. 22 , 123 Pac. 746 .) The findings of fact by the trial court do not bring the appellant within this rule, and the doctrine of estoppel does not apply.

1919(Crimmins v. Morrisey, 36 Kan. 447 , 13 Pac. 748 ; McCullough v. Finley, 69 Kan. 705 , 77 Pac. 696 ; Brown v. Baxter, 77 Kan. 97 , 94 Pac. 155, 574 ; Poole v. French, 83 Kan. 281 ; 111 Pac. 488 ; McCabe v. McCabe, 96 Kan. 702 , 153 Pac. 509 ; Freeman v. Peter, 97 Kan. 63 , 154 Pac. 270 .) It has been held that where the widow and each of the children make a division of an estate satisfactorily to themselves, in which all parties concerned have acquiesced and retained the shares so allotted for a long period of years, they will be estopped from thereafter objecting to the arrangement.

1919(Crimmins v. Morrisey, 36 Kan. 447 , 13 Pac. 748 ; McCullough v. Finley, 69 Kan. 705 , 77 Pac. 696 ; Brown v. Baxter, 77 Kan. 97 , 94 Pac. 155, 574 ; Poole v. French, 83 Kan. 281 ; 111 Pac. 488 ; McCabe v. McCabe, 96 Kan. 702 , 153 Pac. 509 ; Freeman v. Peter, 97 Kan. 63 , 154 Pac. 270 .) It has been held that where the widow and each of the children make a division of an estate satisfactorily to themselves, in which all parties concerned have acquiesced and retained the shares so allotted for a long period of years, they will be estopped from thereafter objecting to the arrangement.

1919(Crimmins v. Morrisey, 36 Kan. 447 , 13 Pac. 748 ; McCullough v. Finley, 69 Kan. 705 , 77 Pac. 696 ; Brown v. Baxter, 77 Kan. 97 , 94 Pac. 155, 574 ; Poole v. French, 83 Kan. 281 ; 111 Pac. 488 ; McCabe v. McCabe, 96 Kan. 702 , 153 Pac. 509 ; Freeman v. Peter, 97 Kan. 63 , 154 Pac. 270 .) It has been held that where the widow and each of the children make a division of an estate satisfactorily to themselves, in which all parties concerned have acquiesced and retained the shares so allotted for a long period of years, they will be estopped from thereafter objecting to the arrangement.

1919(Crimmins v. Morrisey, 36 Kan. 447 , 13 Pac. 748 ; McCullough v. Finley, 69 Kan. 705 , 77 Pac. 696 ; Brown v. Baxter, 77 Kan. 97 , 94 Pac. 155, 574 ; Poole v. French, 83 Kan. 281 ; 111 Pac. 488 ; McCabe v. McCabe, 96 Kan. 702 , 153 Pac. 509 ; Freeman v. Peter, 97 Kan. 63 , 154 Pac. 270 .) It has been held that where the widow and each of the children make a division of an estate satisfactorily to themselves, in which all parties concerned have acquiesced and retained the shares so allotted for a long period of years, they will be estopped from thereafter objecting to the arrangement.

1919(Crimmins v. Morrisey, 36 Kan. 447 , 13 Pac. 748 ; McCullough v. Finley, 69 Kan. 705 , 77 Pac. 696 ; Brown v. Baxter, 77 Kan. 97 , 94 Pac. 155, 574 ; Poole v. French, 83 Kan. 281 ; 111 Pac. 488 ; McCabe v. McCabe, 96 Kan. 702 , 153 Pac. 509 ; Freeman v. Peter, 97 Kan. 63 , 154 Pac. 270 .) It has been held that where the widow and each of the children make a division of an estate satisfactorily to themselves, in which all parties concerned have acquiesced and retained the shares so allotted for a long period of years, they will be estopped from thereafter objecting to the arrangement.

1919(Crimmins v. Morrisey, 36 Kan. 447 , 13 Pac. 748 ; McCullough v. Finley, 69 Kan. 705 , 77 Pac. 696 ; Brown v. Baxter, 77 Kan. 97 , 94 Pac. 155, 574 ; Poole v. French, 83 Kan. 281 ; 111 Pac. 488 ; McCabe v. McCabe, 96 Kan. 702 , 153 Pac. 509 ; Freeman v. Peter, 97 Kan. 63 , 154 Pac. 270 .) It has been held that where the widow and each of the children make a division of an estate satisfactorily to themselves, in which all parties concerned have acquiesced and retained the shares so allotted for a long period of years, they will be estopped from thereafter objecting to the arrangement.

1919(Crimmins v. Morrisey, 36 Kan. 447 , 13 Pac. 748 ; McCullough v. Finley, 69 Kan. 705 , 77 Pac. 696 ; Brown v. Baxter, 77 Kan. 97 , 94 Pac. 155, 574 ; Poole v. French, 83 Kan. 281 ; 111 Pac. 488 ; McCabe v. McCabe, 96 Kan. 702 , 153 Pac. 509 ; Freeman v. Peter, 97 Kan. 63 , 154 Pac. 270 .) It has been held that where the widow and each of the children make a division of an estate satisfactorily to themselves, in which all parties concerned have acquiesced and retained the shares so allotted for a long period of years, they will be estopped from thereafter objecting to the arrangement.

1919(Crimmins v. Morrisey, 36 Kan. 447 , 13 Pac. 748 ; McCullough v. Finley, 69 Kan. 705 , 77 Pac. 696 ; Brown v. Baxter, 77 Kan. 97 , 94 Pac. 155, 574 ; Poole v. French, 83 Kan. 281 ; 111 Pac. 488 ; McCabe v. McCabe, 96 Kan. 702 , 153 Pac. 509 ; Freeman v. Peter, 97 Kan. 63 , 154 Pac. 270 .) It has been held that where the widow and each of the children make a division of an estate satisfactorily to themselves, in which all parties concerned have acquiesced and retained the shares so allotted for a long period of years, they will be estopped from thereafter objecting to the arrangement.

1919(Crimmins v. Morrisey, 36 Kan. 447 , 13 Pac. 748 ; McCullough v. Finley, 69 Kan. 705 , 77 Pac. 696 ; Brown v. Baxter, 77 Kan. 97 , 94 Pac. 155, 574 ; Poole v. French, 83 Kan. 281 ; 111 Pac. 488 ; McCabe v. McCabe, 96 Kan. 702 , 153 Pac. 509 ; Freeman v. Peter, 97 Kan. 63 , 154 Pac. 270 .) It has been held that where the widow and each of the children make a division of an estate satisfactorily to themselves, in which all parties concerned have acquiesced and retained the shares so allotted for a long period of years, they will be estopped from thereafter objecting to the arrangement.

1919(Crimmins v. Morrisey, 36 Kan. 447 , 13 Pac. 748 ; McCullough v. Finley, 69 Kan. 705 , 77 Pac. 696 ; Brown v. Baxter, 77 Kan. 97 , 94 Pac. 155, 574 ; Poole v. French, 83 Kan. 281 ; 111 Pac. 488 ; McCabe v. McCabe, 96 Kan. 702 , 153 Pac. 509 ; Freeman v. Peter, 97 Kan. 63 , 154 Pac. 270 .) It has been held that where the widow and each of the children make a division of an estate satisfactorily to themselves, in which all parties concerned have acquiesced and retained the shares so allotted for a long period of years, they will be estopped from thereafter objecting to the arrangement.

1919(Crimmins v. Morrisey, 36 Kan. 447 , 13 Pac. 748 ; McCullough v. Finley, 69 Kan. 705 , 77 Pac. 696 ; Brown v. Baxter, 77 Kan. 97 , 94 Pac. 155, 574 ; Poole v. French, 83 Kan. 281 ; 111 Pac. 488 ; McCabe v. McCabe, 96 Kan. 702 , 153 Pac. 509 ; Freeman v. Peter, 97 Kan. 63 , 154 Pac. 270 .) It has been held that where the widow and each of the children make a division of an estate satisfactorily to themselves, in which all parties concerned have acquiesced and retained the shares so allotted for a long period of years, they will be estopped from thereafter objecting to the arrangement.

1907Ed. 218 , where the court remarked: “As the time within which a removal must be applied for is not jurisdictional, but modal and formal, (Ayers v. Watson, 113 U. S. 594, 598 , 5 Sup. Ct. 641, 28 L.

1907Ed. 218 , where the court remarked: “As the time within which a removal must be applied for is not jurisdictional, but modal and formal, (Ayers v. Watson, 113 U. S. 594, 598 , 5 Sup. Ct. 641, 28 L.

1907In speaking of the time of application for a removal Mr. Justice Bradley said that “it does not belong to the essence of the thing; it is not, in its nature, a jurisdictional mat ter, but a mere rule of limitation” (p. 599); and so the doctrine of estoppel was applied.' The subject was again considered in Northern Pacific Railroad Co. v. Austin, 135 U. S. 315 , 10 Sup. Ct. 758, 34 L.

1907In speaking of the time of application for a removal Mr. Justice Bradley said that “it does not belong to the essence of the thing; it is not, in its nature, a jurisdictional mat ter, but a mere rule of limitation” (p. 599); and so the doctrine of estoppel was applied.' The subject was again considered in Northern Pacific Railroad Co. v. Austin, 135 U. S. 315 , 10 Sup. Ct. 758, 34 L.

1900(Plow Co. v. Rodgers, 53 Kan. 743 , 37 Pac. 111 ; City of Larned v. Jordan, 55 id. 124, 39 Pac. 1030 ; National Bank v. National Bank, 57 id. 115 , 45 Pac. 79 ; Blaker v. Morse, 60 id. 24, 55 Pac. 274 .) An estoppel to claim property as belonging to one's self has been frequently enforced when, by signing bonds in judicial proceedings, the right of property in another has been impliedly admitted.