estoppel doctrine in South Carolina

1993Powell v. Board of Commissioners of Police Insurance & Annuity Fund, 210 S.C. 136 , 41 S.E. (2d) 780 , 1 A.L.R. (2d) 330 [(1947)].

1993Powell v. Board of Commissioners of Police Insurance & Annuity Fund, 210 S.C. 136 , 41 S.E. (2d) 780 , 1 A.L.R. (2d) 330 [(1947)].

2003Though governmental bodies are not immune from the estoppel doctrine where its officers or agents act within the proper scope of their authority, the government “cannot be estopped . . . by the unauthorized or erroneous conduct or statements of its officers or agents.” South Carolina Coastal Council v. Vogel , 292 S.C. 449, 453 , 357 S.E.2d 187, 189 (Ct. App. 1987), appeal dismissed , 292 S.C. 449 , 362 S.E.2d 646 .

2003Though governmental bodies are not immune from the estoppel doctrine where its officers or agents act within the proper scope of their authority, the government “cannot be estopped . . . by the unauthorized or erroneous conduct or statements of its officers or agents.” South Carolina Coastal Council v. Vogel , 292 S.C. 449, 453 , 357 S.E.2d 187, 189 (Ct. App. 1987), appeal dismissed , 292 S.C. 449 , 362 S.E.2d 646 .

1993In Heyward v. South Carolina Tax Comm’n, 240 S.C. 347, 351, 126 S.E. (2d) 15, 17 (1962), the Supreme Court of South Carolina recognized that the doctrine of estoppel may be applied in contractual matters, but further that Court said: However, the doctrine of estoppel will not be applied to deprive the government of the due exercise of its police power, or to effect (sic) public revenues or property rights, or to frustrate the purpose of its laws or thwart its public policy.

1993In Heyward v. South Carolina Tax Comm’n, 240 S.C. 347, 351, 126 S.E. (2d) 15, 17 (1962), the Supreme Court of South Carolina recognized that the doctrine of estoppel may be applied in contractual matters, but further that Court said: However, the doctrine of estoppel will not be applied to deprive the government of the due exercise of its police power, or to effect (sic) public revenues or property rights, or to frustrate the purpose of its laws or thwart its public policy.

2011Id.

2011Id.

2022However, the circuit court only ruled on the matter of promissory estoppel and that is the only cause of action still being pursued by Appellants. 2 Bishop v. City of Columbia, 401 S.C. 651, 667-68 , 738 S.E.2d 255, 263 (Ct. App. 2013). the promises made by City representatives—supervisors and human resource officers—could be sufficient to give rise to an estoppel claim even though the City's representative's statements were not legally sufficient to create a contract between the City and the plaintiffs.

2022However, the circuit court only ruled on the matter of promissory estoppel and that is the only cause of action still being pursued by Appellants. 2 Bishop v. City of Columbia, 401 S.C. 651, 667-68 , 738 S.E.2d 255, 263 (Ct. App. 2013). the promises made by City representatives—supervisors and human resource officers—could be sufficient to give rise to an estoppel claim even though the City's representative's statements were not legally sufficient to create a contract between the City and the plaintiffs.

2019"Equitable estoppel occurs where a party is denied the right to plead or prove an otherwise important fact because of something which he has done or failed to do." Parker v. Parker, 313 S.C. 482, 487 , 443 S.E.2d 388, 391 (1994).

2019"Equitable estoppel occurs where a party is denied the right to plead or prove an otherwise important fact because of something which he has done or failed to do." Parker v. Parker, 313 S.C. 482, 487 , 443 S.E.2d 388, 391 (1994).

2017See Langdale v. Carpets, 395 S.C. 194, 205 , 717 S.E.2d 80, 85 (Ct. App. 2011) ("To successfully assert the doctrine of estoppel, a party must show a (1) lack of knowledge and of the means of knowledge of the truth as to the facts in question, (2) reliance upon the conduct of the party estopped, and (3) prejudicial change in position.").

2017See Langdale v. Carpets, 395 S.C. 194, 205 , 717 S.E.2d 80, 85 (Ct. App. 2011) ("To successfully assert the doctrine of estoppel, a party must show a (1) lack of knowledge and of the means of knowledge of the truth as to the facts in question, (2) reliance upon the conduct of the party estopped, and (3) prejudicial change in position.").

2015See id., 407 S.C. at 498, 757 S.E.2d at 388 (finding a fact question existed, which precluded summary judgment on the Gamecock Club members' estoppel claim based on oral representations by USC).

2014Wholesale Co. v. Solondz, 283 S.C. 36, 40 , 320 S.E.2d 720, 723 (Ct.App.1984) (quotations and citations omitted).

2014Wholesale Co. v. Solondz, 283 S.C. 36, 40 , 320 S.E.2d 720, 723 (Ct.App.1984) (quotations and citations omitted).

2013Corp. v. City of Myrtle Beach, 285 S.C. 216, 221 , 329 S.E.2d 423, 426 (1985) (“Government agents, acting within the proper scope of their authority, can by their acts give rise to estoppel against a municipality.”); Abbeville Arms v. City of Abbeville, 273 S.C. 491, 493-94 , 257 S.E.2d 716, 718 (1979) (holding the city was not immune from an estoppel claim because a permit applicant bought property in reliance upon: (1) a zoning ordinance passed by the city council and a zoning map issued by the city pursuant to the ordinance that indicated the applicant’s property was zoned for the applicant

2013Corp. v. City of Myrtle Beach, 285 S.C. 216, 221 , 329 S.E.2d 423, 426 (1985) (“Government agents, acting within the proper scope of their authority, can by their acts give rise to estoppel against a municipality.”); Abbeville Arms v. City of Abbeville, 273 S.C. 491, 493-94 , 257 S.E.2d 716, 718 (1979) (holding the city was not immune from an estoppel claim because a permit applicant bought property in reliance upon: (1) a zoning ordinance passed by the city council and a zoning map issued by the city pursuant to the ordinance that indicated the applicant’s property was zoned for the applicant

2013Corp. v. City of Myrtle Beach, 285 S.C. 216, 221 , 329 S.E.2d 423, 426 (1985) (“Government agents, acting within the proper scope of their authority, can by their acts give rise to estoppel against a municipality.”); Abbeville Arms v. City of Abbeville, 273 S.C. 491, 493-94 , 257 S.E.2d 716, 718 (1979) (holding the city was not immune from an estoppel claim because a permit applicant bought property in reliance upon: (1) a zoning ordinance passed by the city council and a zoning map issued by the city pursuant to the ordinance that indicated the applicant’s property was zoned for the applicant

2013Corp. v. City of Myrtle Beach, 285 S.C. 216, 221 , 329 S.E.2d 423, 426 (1985) (“Government agents, acting within the proper scope of their authority, can by their acts give rise to estoppel against a municipality.”); Abbeville Arms v. City of Abbeville, 273 S.C. 491, 493-94 , 257 S.E.2d 716, 718 (1979) (holding the city was not immune from an estoppel claim because a permit applicant bought property in reliance upon: (1) a zoning ordinance passed by the city council and a zoning map issued by the city pursuant to the ordinance that indicated the applicant’s property was zoned for the applicant

2010See Futch v. McAllister Towing of Georgetown, Inc., 335 S.C. 598, 613 , 518 S.E.2d 591, 598 (1999) (stating an appellate court need not address remaining issues when a decision on a prior issue is dispositive).

2010See Futch v. McAllister Towing of Georgetown, Inc., 335 S.C. 598, 613 , 518 S.E.2d 591, 598 (1999) (stating an appellate court need not address remaining issues when a decision on a prior issue is dispositive).

2008ANDERSON, SHORT, and THOMAS JJ., concur. [1] See Strickland v. Strickland , 375 S.C. 76, 84-85 , 650 S.E.2d 465, 470 (2007) (listing the elements for establishing an estoppel defense).

2008ANDERSON, SHORT, and THOMAS JJ., concur. [1] See Strickland v. Strickland , 375 S.C. 76, 84-85 , 650 S.E.2d 465, 470 (2007) (listing the elements for establishing an estoppel defense).

2006Laches The circuit court alternatively found that laches bars Queen’s Grant’s declaratory judgment cause of action seeking only prospective relief. “ ‘Laches’ is defined as ‘neglect for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, under circumstances affording opportunity for diligence, to do what in law should have been done.’ ” Gordon v. Drews, 858 S.C. 598 , 612, 595 S.E.2d 864, 871 (Ct.App.2004) (quoting Muir v. C.R.

2006Servs. v. Parker , 275 S.C. 176 , 178, 268 S.E.2d 282 , 283 (1980) (holding the doctrine of estoppel “will not be applied to deprive [SCDSS] of the due exercise of its police power or to thwart its application of public policy.”); cf. Henderson v. Henderson , 298 S.C. 190, 196 , 379 S.E.2d 125, 129 (1989) (“Family courts are empowered to modify child support upon a proper showing of a change in either the child’s needs or the supporting parent’s financial ability.”); Walker v. Walker , 306 S.E.2d 485, 486 (N.C.

2006Servs. v. Parker , 275 S.C. 176 , 178, 268 S.E.2d 282 , 283 (1980) (holding the doctrine of estoppel “will not be applied to deprive [SCDSS] of the due exercise of its police power or to thwart its application of public policy.”); cf. Henderson v. Henderson , 298 S.C. 190, 196 , 379 S.E.2d 125, 129 (1989) (“Family courts are empowered to modify child support upon a proper showing of a change in either the child’s needs or the supporting parent’s financial ability.”); Walker v. Walker , 306 S.E.2d 485, 486 (N.C.

2006Servs. v. Parker , 275 S.C. 176 , 178, 268 S.E.2d 282 , 283 (1980) (holding the doctrine of estoppel “will not be applied to deprive [SCDSS] of the due exercise of its police power or to thwart its application of public policy.”); cf. Henderson v. Henderson , 298 S.C. 190, 196 , 379 S.E.2d 125, 129 (1989) (“Family courts are empowered to modify child support upon a proper showing of a change in either the child’s needs or the supporting parent’s financial ability.”); Walker v. Walker , 306 S.E.2d 485, 486 (N.C.

1997Co., 223 S.C. 150, 157 , 74 S.E.2d 828, 831 (1953), our supreme court held where “all of the facts necessary to prove the material elements in [the second] action would be essentially the same” as those in the first action, the doctrine of estoppel would bar the second action even though the plaintiff brought the second action upon a different claim or demand.

1997Co., 223 S.C. 150, 157 , 74 S.E.2d 828, 831 (1953), our supreme court held where “all of the facts necessary to prove the material elements in [the second] action would be essentially the same” as those in the first action, the doctrine of estoppel would bar the second action even though the plaintiff brought the second action upon a different claim or demand.

1995See Vines v. Self Memorial Hosp., ___ S.C. ___, 443 S.E.2d 909 (1994).

1995See Vines v. Self Memorial Hosp., 314 S.C. 305 , 443 S.E. (2d) 909 (1994).

1991See Adams v. Adams, 220 S.C. 131 , 66 S.E. (2d) 809 (1951) (true status of property could be ascertained by reference to public records).

1991See Adams v. Adams, 220 S.C. 131 , 66 S.E. (2d) 809 (1951) (true status of property could be ascertained by reference to public records).

1989A governmental body is not immune from the estoppel doctrine where its officers or agents act within the proper scope of their authority but “[t]he public cannot be estopped ... by the unauthorized or erroneous conduct or statements of its officers or agent which have been relied on by a third party to his detriment.” South Carolina Coastal Council v. Vogel, 292 S. C. 449, 453, 357 S. E. (2d) 187, 189 (Ct. App. 1987); See Oswald v. County of Aiken, 281 S. C. 298, 315 S. E. (2d) 146 (Ct. App. 1984).

1985“Estoppel is an equitable doctrine, essentially flexible, and therefore to be applied or denied as equities between the parties may preponderate.” Pitts v. New York Life Insurance Co., 247 S. C. 545, 148 S. E. (2d) 369, 371-72 (1966).