63 Alabama opinions name it 4 courts 1846–2023 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Alabama courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Edwards v. McCordgreen2 sentences2010See Edwards, 461 So.2d at 1320 (“It is essential, in order to invoke the operation of the legal doctrine of estoppel, that the inconsistent position first asserted must have been successfully maintained.”). 2010See Edwards, 461 So.2d at 1320 ("It is essential, in order to invoke the operation of the legal doctrine of estoppel, that the inconsistent position first asserted must have been successfully maintained ."). | 2 | 2 |
Porter v. Jollygreen2 sentences2002However, this court has recognized a number of limitations upon the rule against asserting inconsistent positions in judicial proceedings. “ ‘ “[T]he following have been enumerated as essentials to the establishment of an estoppel under the rule that a position taken in an earlier action estops the one taking such position from assuming an inconsistent position in a later action: (1) The inconsistent position first asserted must have been successfully maintained; (2) a judgment must have been rendered; (3) the positions must be clearly inconsistent; (4) the parties and questions must be the sa 2000Our supreme court, however, has recognized a number of limitations upon the doctrine: *Page 803 "`[T]he following have been enumerated as essentials to the establishment of an estoppel under the rule that a position taken in an earlier action estops the one taking such position from assuming an inconsistent position in a later action: (1) The inconsistent position first asserted must have been successfully maintained; (2) a judgment must have been rendered; (3) the positions must be clearly inconsistent; (4) the parties and questions must be the same; (5) the party claiming estoppel must have | 1 | 6 |
Washington Nat. Ins. Co. v. Scottgreen2 sentences2004The law charges the insurer with intent to waive under the doctrine of estoppel." 231 Ala. at 132 , 164 So. at 304 (emphasis added). 2004The law charges the insurer with intent to waive under the doctrine of estoppel." 231 Ala. at 132 , 164 So. at 304 (emphasis added). | 1 | 3 |
Alford v. City of Gadsdengreen2 sentences2007In so holding, the court reaffirmed the holding of Maintenance Inc. v. Houston County , supra, noting that in that case the court had "expressly limited the use of the estoppel doctrine against a municipality to a situation where the contract was void as a result of a failure to comply with the formalities of execution, such as the situations in Alford [v. City of Gadsden , 349 So.2d 1132 (Ala. 1977),] and [ City of Guntersville v.] Alred [, 495 So.2d 566 (Ala. 1986)]." Ex parte Ballew , 771 So.2d at 1042 . 1995Although the doctrine of estoppel may be applied in a proper case (see, Alford v. City of Gadsden , 349 So.2d 1132 , 1135 (Ala. 1977) (a case cited by the majority and relied on substantially by the majority in reaching its result)), I can find no case in which the doctrine has been applied unless there was some statutory or other legal authority for the municipality to act. | 1 | 2 |
City of Guntersville v. Alredgreen2 sentences2007In so holding, the court reaffirmed the holding of Maintenance Inc. v. Houston County , supra, noting that in that case the court had "expressly limited the use of the estoppel doctrine against a municipality to a situation where the contract was void as a result of a failure to comply with the formalities of execution, such as the situations in Alford [v. City of Gadsden , 349 So.2d 1132 (Ala. 1977),] and [ City of Guntersville v.] Alred [, 495 So.2d 566 (Ala. 1986)]." Ex parte Ballew , 771 So.2d at 1042 . 1997In City of Guntersville v. Alred , 495 So.2d 566 , 568 (Ala. 1986), this Court stated that '[t]he doctrine of estoppel *Page 124 may apply against a municipal corporation when justice and fair play demand it.' See also Alabama Farm Bureau Mutual Casualty Insurance Co. v. Board of Adjustment , 470 So.2d 1234 (Ala.[Civ.App.]1985)." 661 So.2d at 1161-62 . | 1 | 2 |
Readco, Inc., R.D.P. Associates, Lan Associates Xii and Antonio Reale v. Marine Midland Bank Eagle Rock Holding, Inc., a New York Corp.green1 sentence2023See United States v. Rosario, 237 F. Supp. 2d 242, 245 (E.D.N.Y. 2002) (noting that the party claiming immunity by estoppel has the burden of proving that there was "a 'clear and unambiguous' promise" of immunity (quoting Readco, Inc. v. Marine Midland Bank, 81 F.3d 295, 301 (2d Cir. 1996))); and United States v. Short, 387 F. App'x 308, 313 (4th Cir. 2010) (not selected for publication in the Federal Reporter) (noting that, for the doctrine of " 'equitable immunity' " to apply, "the defendant bears the burden of proving the existence of an equitable immunity agreement"). | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Shortgreen1 sentence2023See United States v. Rosario, 237 F. Supp. 2d 242, 245 (E.D.N.Y. 2002) (noting that the party claiming immunity by estoppel has the burden of proving that there was "a 'clear and unambiguous' promise" of immunity (quoting Readco, Inc. v. Marine Midland Bank, 81 F.3d 295, 301 (2d Cir. 1996))); and United States v. Short, 387 F. App'x 308, 313 (4th Cir. 2010) (not selected for publication in the Federal Reporter) (noting that, for the doctrine of " 'equitable immunity' " to apply, "the defendant bears the burden of proving the existence of an equitable immunity agreement"). | 1 | 1 |
Mayberry v. Stategreen2 sentences2023Of course, that is not to say that we cannot embrace the estoppel doctrine now, but this Court has previously noted that application of "the estoppel theory" would require proof that the accused had acted to his detriment based on "an explicit" and 16 CR-2022-0521 "unambiguous offer of immunity." Mayberry, 419 So. 2d at 265 (emphasis added). 2023See Mayberry, 419 So. 2d at 265 (holding that the State was not estopped from prosecuting the appellant, who believed that the district attorney had granted him immunity, because, although the district attorney had made statements implying that the appellant might obtain immunity in return for his cooperation, the district attorney had not made "an unambiguous offer of immunity" (emphasis added)). | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Rosariogreen1 sentence2023See United States v. Rosario, 237 F. Supp. 2d 242, 245 (E.D.N.Y. 2002) (noting that the party claiming immunity by estoppel has the burden of proving that there was "a 'clear and unambiguous' promise" of immunity (quoting Readco, Inc. v. Marine Midland Bank, 81 F.3d 295, 301 (2d Cir. 1996))); and United States v. Short, 387 F. App'x 308, 313 (4th Cir. 2010) (not selected for publication in the Federal Reporter) (noting that, for the doctrine of " 'equitable immunity' " to apply, "the defendant bears the burden of proving the existence of an equitable immunity agreement"). | 1 | 1 |
Ellis v. City of Birminghamgreen1 sentence2009The distinction between the two claims does not alter our analysis, because "[a] contract implied in fact requires the same elements as an express contract, and differs only in the `method of expressing mutual assent.'" Ellis v. City of Birmingham, 576 So.2d 156, 157 (Ala.1991) (quoting Berry v. Druid City Hosp. | 1 | 1 |
Brown v. Richardsongreen1 sentence2007To allow the RPA’s candidates access to the ballot now would be unfair to this class of potential candidates.”); and Brown, 395 F.Supp. at 189 (“Public policy demands that the mandate of the law should override any doctrine of estoppel. | 1 | 1 |
Jinright v. Paulkgreen1 sentence2002Moreover, the party claiming the estoppel must have been misled by the conduct of the party against whom the estoppel is sought, and consequently changed its position to its prejudice. " 758 So.2d at 555 (emphasis added; citations omitted). | 1 | 1 |
Ex Parte Four Seasons, Ltd.green1 sentence1999See Ex parte Four Seasons, Ltd. , 450 So.2d at 111 . | 1 | 1 |
| Consolidated Stores, Inc. v. Gargisgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Garcia-Paz v. Swift Textiles, Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| Darby v. Johnsongreen | 1 | 1 |
| Durham v. Harbingreen | 1 | 1 |
| Casey v. Travelers Ins. Co.green | 1 | 1 |
| Johnson v. Allstate Ins. Co.green | 1 | 1 |
| Home Indem. Co. v. Reed Equipment Co., Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| McGee v. Guardian Life Ins. Co.green | 1 | 1 |
| Western Grain Company Casesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Floyd v. Rambogreen | 1 | 1 |
| McAllister v. Langford Investigators, Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| Auto-Plaza, Inc. v. Central Bank of Alabamagreen | 1 | 1 |
| Alabama Nursing Home Ass'n v. Califanogreen | 1 | 1 |
| Russell v. Russellgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Birmingham Water Works Co. v. Browngreen | 1 | 1 |
| Cawthorn v. City of Houstongreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Alabama. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Ellison v. Butler
green
2 sentences1995In applying the estoppel doctrine to the facts of that case, the Court said: "This court, in Ellison v. Butler , 271 Ala. 399 , 124 So.2d 88 , quoted 19 Am.Jur., Estoppel, § 34, wherein equitable estoppel is defined as the principle of law 'by which a party who knows or should know the truth is absolutely precluded, both in law and in equity, from denying, or asserting the contrary of, any material fact which, by his words or conduct, affirmative or negative, intentionally or through culpable negligence, he has induced another, who was excusably ignorant of the true facts and who had a right t 1995In applying the estoppel doctrine to the facts of that case, the Court said: "This court, in Ellison v. Butler , 271 Ala. 399 , 124 So.2d 88 , quoted 19 Am.Jur., Estoppel, § 34, wherein equitable estoppel is defined as the principle of law 'by which a party who knows or should know the truth is absolutely precluded, both in law and in equity, from denying, or asserting the contrary of, any material fact which, by his words or conduct, affirmative or negative, intentionally or through culpable negligence, he has induced another, who was excusably ignorant of the true facts and who had a right t | 2 | 1992–1995 |
City of Montgomery v. Weldon
green
2 sentences1995In applying the estoppel doctrine to the facts of that case, the Court said: "This court, in Ellison v. Butler , 271 Ala. 399 , 124 So.2d 88 , quoted 19 Am.Jur., Estoppel, § 34, wherein equitable estoppel is defined as the principle of law 'by which a party who knows or should know the truth is absolutely precluded, both in law and in equity, from denying, or asserting the contrary of, any material fact which, by his words or conduct, affirmative or negative, intentionally or through culpable negligence, he has induced another, who was excusably ignorant of the true facts and who had a right t 1995In applying the estoppel doctrine to the facts of that case, the Court said: "This court, in Ellison v. Butler , 271 Ala. 399 , 124 So.2d 88 , quoted 19 Am.Jur., Estoppel, § 34, wherein equitable estoppel is defined as the principle of law 'by which a party who knows or should know the truth is absolutely precluded, both in law and in equity, from denying, or asserting the contrary of, any material fact which, by his words or conduct, affirmative or negative, intentionally or through culpable negligence, he has induced another, who was excusably ignorant of the true facts and who had a right t | 2 | 1990–1995 |
City of Anniston v. Rosser
green
2 sentences1995With respect to (1) above, the cases of City of Bessemer v. Barnett , 212 Ala. 202 , 102 So. 23 ; Smith v. City of Birmingham , 243 Ala. 124 , 9 So.2d 299 ; City of Birmingham v. Young , 246 Ala. 650 , 22 So.2d 169 ; and City of Anniston v. Rosser , 275 Ala. 659 , 158 So.2d 99 , are authority that the purpose of § 504 is to apprise the city of the accident so it may investigate and determine the merit of the claim, and to adjust the same without the expense of litigation if the circumstances warrant. 1995With respect to (1) above, the cases of City of Bessemer v. Barnett , 212 Ala. 202 , 102 So. 23 ; Smith v. City of Birmingham , 243 Ala. 124 , 9 So.2d 299 ; City of Birmingham v. Young , 246 Ala. 650 , 22 So.2d 169 ; and City of Anniston v. Rosser , 275 Ala. 659 , 158 So.2d 99 , are authority that the purpose of § 504 is to apprise the city of the accident so it may investigate and determine the merit of the claim, and to adjust the same without the expense of litigation if the circumstances warrant. | 2 | 1967–1995 |
Smith v. City of Birmingham
neutral
2 sentences1995With respect to (1) above, the cases of City of Bessemer v. Barnett , 212 Ala. 202 , 102 So. 23 ; Smith v. City of Birmingham , 243 Ala. 124 , 9 So.2d 299 ; City of Birmingham v. Young , 246 Ala. 650 , 22 So.2d 169 ; and City of Anniston v. Rosser , 275 Ala. 659 , 158 So.2d 99 , are authority that the purpose of § 504 is to apprise the city of the accident so it may investigate and determine the merit of the claim, and to adjust the same without the expense of litigation if the circumstances warrant. 1995With respect to (1) above, the cases of City of Bessemer v. Barnett , 212 Ala. 202 , 102 So. 23 ; Smith v. City of Birmingham , 243 Ala. 124 , 9 So.2d 299 ; City of Birmingham v. Young , 246 Ala. 650 , 22 So.2d 169 ; and City of Anniston v. Rosser , 275 Ala. 659 , 158 So.2d 99 , are authority that the purpose of § 504 is to apprise the city of the accident so it may investigate and determine the merit of the claim, and to adjust the same without the expense of litigation if the circumstances warrant. | 2 | 1967–1995 |
City of Birmingham v. Young
neutral
2 sentences1995With respect to (1) above, the cases of City of Bessemer v. Barnett , 212 Ala. 202 , 102 So. 23 ; Smith v. City of Birmingham , 243 Ala. 124 , 9 So.2d 299 ; City of Birmingham v. Young , 246 Ala. 650 , 22 So.2d 169 ; and City of Anniston v. Rosser , 275 Ala. 659 , 158 So.2d 99 , are authority that the purpose of § 504 is to apprise the city of the accident so it may investigate and determine the merit of the claim, and to adjust the same without the expense of litigation if the circumstances warrant. 1995With respect to (1) above, the cases of City of Bessemer v. Barnett , 212 Ala. 202 , 102 So. 23 ; Smith v. City of Birmingham , 243 Ala. 124 , 9 So.2d 299 ; City of Birmingham v. Young , 246 Ala. 650 , 22 So.2d 169 ; and City of Anniston v. Rosser , 275 Ala. 659 , 158 So.2d 99 , are authority that the purpose of § 504 is to apprise the city of the accident so it may investigate and determine the merit of the claim, and to adjust the same without the expense of litigation if the circumstances warrant. | 2 | 1967–1995 |
City of Bessemer v. Barnett
neutral
2 sentences1995With respect to (1) above, the cases of City of Bessemer v. Barnett , 212 Ala. 202 , 102 So. 23 ; Smith v. City of Birmingham , 243 Ala. 124 , 9 So.2d 299 ; City of Birmingham v. Young , 246 Ala. 650 , 22 So.2d 169 ; and City of Anniston v. Rosser , 275 Ala. 659 , 158 So.2d 99 , are authority that the purpose of § 504 is to apprise the city of the accident so it may investigate and determine the merit of the claim, and to adjust the same without the expense of litigation if the circumstances warrant. 1995With respect to (1) above, the cases of City of Bessemer v. Barnett , 212 Ala. 202 , 102 So. 23 ; Smith v. City of Birmingham , 243 Ala. 124 , 9 So.2d 299 ; City of Birmingham v. Young , 246 Ala. 650 , 22 So.2d 169 ; and City of Anniston v. Rosser , 275 Ala. 659 , 158 So.2d 99 , are authority that the purpose of § 504 is to apprise the city of the accident so it may investigate and determine the merit of the claim, and to adjust the same without the expense of litigation if the circumstances warrant. | 2 | 1967–1995 |
Alabama Farm Bureau Mutual Casualty Insurance v. Hicks
green
2 sentences1989Co. v. Hicks , 272 Ala. 574 , 133 So.2d 221 (1961). 1989Co. v. Hicks , 272 Ala. 574 , 133 So.2d 221 (1961). | 2 | 1975–1989 |
Bradford Funeral Service, Inc. v. Burks
neutral
2 sentences1960The law charges the insurer with the intent to waive under the doctrine of estoppel.” See Bradford Funeral Service v. Burks, 38 Ala.App. 111 , 76 So.2d 783 ; Southern States Life Ins. 1960The law charges the insurer with the intent to waive under the doctrine of estoppel.” See Bradford Funeral Service v. Burks, 38 Ala.App. 111 , 76 So.2d 783 ; Southern States Life Ins. | 2 | 1960–1960 |
Coleman v. BAC Servicing
green
1 sentence2016Id. | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Ex Parte Napier
green
1 sentence2009In First American Title Insurance Corp. v. Silvernell, 744 So.2d 883 (Ala.1999), this Court explained why the doctrine of estoppel did not apply to the arbitration provision at issue there, contrasting the provision with the arbitration agreement in Ex parte Napier, 723 So.2d 49 (Ala.1998), an earlier case in which this Court had found the doctrine of estoppel applicable: “The arbitration provision in the Sil-vernell-First American contract provided: “ T4. | 1 | 2009–2009 |
FIRST AMER. TITLE INS. CORP. v. Silvernell
green
1 sentence2009In First American Title Insurance Corp. v. Silvernell, 744 So.2d 883 (Ala.1999), this Court explained why the doctrine of estoppel did not apply to the arbitration provision at issue there, contrasting the provision with the arbitration agreement in Ex parte Napier, 723 So.2d 49 (Ala.1998), an earlier case in which this Court had found the doctrine of estoppel applicable: “The arbitration provision in the Sil-vernell-First American contract provided: “ T4. | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Ex Parte Ballew
green
1 sentence2007In so holding, the court reaffirmed the holding of Maintenance Inc. v. Houston County , supra, noting that in that case the court had "expressly limited the use of the estoppel doctrine against a municipality to a situation where the contract was void as a result of a failure to comply with the formalities of execution, such as the situations in Alford [v. City of Gadsden , 349 So.2d 1132 (Ala. 1977),] and [ City of Guntersville v.] Alred [, 495 So.2d 566 (Ala. 1986)]." Ex parte Ballew , 771 So.2d at 1042 . | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Marlin v. Wetzel County Board of Education
green
2 sentences2006NABERS, C.J., and WOODALL, SMITH, and PARKER, JJ., concur. 1 Black's Law Dictionary 240 (8th ed.2004) defines a certificate of insurance as: "A document acknowledging that an insurance policy has been written, and setting forth in general terms what the policy covers." 2 We do not reach the question of the effect of a request for access to an insurance policy and a subsequent refusal of access. 3 See Marlin v. Wetzel County Bd. of Educ. , 212 W.Va. 215 , 569 S.E.2d 462 (2002) (the court did not enforce the disclaimer in a certificate of insurance in an action against the insurer, relying on We 2006NABERS, C.J., and WOODALL, SMITH, and PARKER, JJ., concur. 1 Black's Law Dictionary 240 (8th ed.2004) defines a certificate of insurance as: "A document acknowledging that an insurance policy has been written, and setting forth in general terms what the policy covers." 2 We do not reach the question of the effect of a request for access to an insurance policy and a subsequent refusal of access. 3 See Marlin v. Wetzel County Bd. of Educ. , 212 W.Va. 215 , 569 S.E.2d 462 (2002) (the court did not enforce the disclaimer in a certificate of insurance in an action against the insurer, relying on We | 1 | 2006–2006 |
SouthTrust Bank v. Ford
green
1 sentence2003SouthTrust Bank v. Ford, supra; Ex parte Tony's Towing, Inc., supra. In Ex parte Tony's Towing, Inc., supra, the plaintiff sued five defendants including Tony's Towing, Inc., regarding a dispute over the purchase and installation of her mobile home. | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Dean v. Myers
green
2 sentences2002This case is not the first occasion to deal with the effect of overly broad language in Dean v. Myers , 466 So.2d 952 (Ala. 1985). 2002This case is not the first occasion to deal with the effect of overly broad language in Dean v. Myers, 466 So.2d 952 (Ala.1985). | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Luna v. Dominion Bank
green
1 sentence1999Consistent with that fundamental principle, both Luna v. Dominion Bank of Middle Tennessee, Inc., 631 So.2d 917 (Ala.1993), and Bertrand v. Handley, 646 So.2d 16 (Ala.1994), applied the doctrine of judicial es-toppel to claims that should have been listed as assets in bankruptcy proceedings so as to bar their assertion after the debt- or/plaintiffs had been discharged, i.e., after the bankruptcy court had granted relief to the debtor/plaintiffs based, in part, upon their asset disclosures. | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Bertrand v. Handley
green
1 sentence1999Consistent with that fundamental principle, both Luna v. Dominion Bank of Middle Tennessee, Inc., 631 So.2d 917 (Ala.1993), and Bertrand v. Handley, 646 So.2d 16 (Ala.1994), applied the doctrine of judicial es-toppel to claims that should have been listed as assets in bankruptcy proceedings so as to bar their assertion after the debt- or/plaintiffs had been discharged, i.e., after the bankruptcy court had granted relief to the debtor/plaintiffs based, in part, upon their asset disclosures. | 1 | 1999–1999 |
| Thomson-Csf, S.A. v. American Arbitration Association, Evans & Sutherland Computer Corporation green | 1 | 1998–1998 |
| City of Prattville v. Joyner green | 1 | 1997–1997 |
| Ala. Farm Bur. Mut. Cas. Ins. v. Bd. of Adjust. green | 1 | 1997–1997 |
| Ott v. Fox green | 1 | 1992–1992 |
| Mooradian v. Canal Insurance Company green | 1 | 1992–1992 |
| Large v. City of Birmingham green | 1 | 1990–1990 |
| Williams v. FNBC Acceptance Corp. green | 1 | 1990–1990 |
| Dominex, Inc. v. Key green | 1 | 1990–1990 |
| Le Furgey v. Beck green | 1 | 1990–1990 |
| Maintenance, Inc. v. HOUSTON CTY. ALA. green | 1 | 1989–1989 |
| Hale v. Ford Motor Credit Co. green | 1 | 1988–1988 |
| Leonor Rodriguez v. Raymond W. Vowell, Antonia A. Aguirre, Intervenors-Appellants green | 1 | 1985–1985 |
| Board Of Directors And Officers, Forbes Federal Credit Union v. National Credit Union Administration green | 1 | 1985–1985 |
| Davis v. Wakelee green | 1 | 1984–1984 |
| Tonsmeire v. Tonsmeire green | 1 | 1984–1984 |
| Wright v. Fannin green | 1 | 1984–1984 |
| Bromberg v. First Nat. Bank of Mobile neutral | 1 | 1984–1984 |
| Hendricks v. Blake green | 1 | 1983–1983 |
| Scooper Dooper, Inc. v. Kraftco Corp. green | 1 | 1980–1980 |
| Shore v. Parklane Hosiery Company, Inc. green | 1 | 1980–1980 |
| Mike Oldham, Charles J. Oldham and Rona Oldham v. Margaret Ann Pritchett green | 1 | 1980–1980 |
| Rabinowitz v. Town of Bay Harbor Islands green | 1 | 1967–1967 |
| Simpson v. City of Abilene green | 1 | 1967–1967 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.