estoppel doctrine in Oklahoma

1916In Modern Woodmen of America v. Weekley, 42 Okla. 25 , 139 Pac. 1138 , the third paragraph of the syllabus reads : “An estoppel or waiver of the conditions in a benefit certificate, in order to be available to the beneficiary in an action thereon, must be specifically and distinctly pleaded, and, if not so pleaded, evidence of such estoppel or waiver is not admissible at the trial.” See, also, Holt v. Holt, 23 Okla. 639 , 102 Pac. 187 ; Blakemore v. Johnson, 24 Okla. 544 , 103 Pac. 554 ; American Jobbing Ass’n v. James, 24 Okla. 460 , 103 Pac. 670 ; Cooper v. Flesner, 24 Okla. 47 , 103 Pac. 10

1916In Modern Woodmen of America v. Weekley, 42 Okla. 25 , 139 Pac. 1138 , the third paragraph of the syllabus reads : “An estoppel or waiver of the conditions in a benefit certificate, in order to be available to the beneficiary in an action thereon, must be specifically and distinctly pleaded, and, if not so pleaded, evidence of such estoppel or waiver is not admissible at the trial.” See, also, Holt v. Holt, 23 Okla. 639 , 102 Pac. 187 ; Blakemore v. Johnson, 24 Okla. 544 , 103 Pac. 554 ; American Jobbing Ass’n v. James, 24 Okla. 460 , 103 Pac. 670 ; Cooper v. Flesner, 24 Okla. 47 , 103 Pac. 10

1916In Modern Woodmen of America v. Weekley, 42 Okla. 25 , 139 Pac. 1138 , the third paragraph of the syllabus reads : “An estoppel or waiver of the conditions in a benefit certificate, in order to be available to the beneficiary in an action thereon, must be specifically and distinctly pleaded, and, if not so pleaded, evidence of such estoppel or waiver is not admissible at the trial.” See, also, Holt v. Holt, 23 Okla. 639 , 102 Pac. 187 ; Blakemore v. Johnson, 24 Okla. 544 , 103 Pac. 554 ; American Jobbing Ass’n v. James, 24 Okla. 460 , 103 Pac. 670 ; Cooper v. Flesner, 24 Okla. 47 , 103 Pac. 10

1916In Modern Woodmen of America v. Weekley, 42 Okla. 25 , 139 Pac. 1138 , the third paragraph of the syllabus reads : “An estoppel or waiver of the conditions in a benefit certificate, in order to be available to the beneficiary in an action thereon, must be specifically and distinctly pleaded, and, if not so pleaded, evidence of such estoppel or waiver is not admissible at the trial.” See, also, Holt v. Holt, 23 Okla. 639 , 102 Pac. 187 ; Blakemore v. Johnson, 24 Okla. 544 , 103 Pac. 554 ; American Jobbing Ass’n v. James, 24 Okla. 460 , 103 Pac. 670 ; Cooper v. Flesner, 24 Okla. 47 , 103 Pac. 10

1925“A tenant, while remaining in possession, even after the expiration of his term, is precluded, on the doctrine of estoppel, from either setting up an adverse title to defeat an action of ejectment, or without first surrendering possession, making a contest with his landlord over the title held by him at the time of securing the right of entry.” Larney et al. v. Aldridge, 31 Okla. 447 , 122 Pac. 151 ; Miller v. Wood, 57 Okla. 172 , 155 Pac. 1178 .

1921In Larney et al. v. Aldridge. 31 Okla. 447 , 121 Pac. 151 , it is said: “A tenant, while remaining in possession, even after the expiration of his term, is precluded. on the doctrine of estoppel, from either setting up an adverse title to defeat an action of ejectment or. without first surrendering possession, making a contest with his landlord over' the tide held by him at the time of securing the right of entry.” In Pappe v. J.

2016We hold that it does. ¶11 In In re Estate of Allen, 1987 OK 45 , 738 P.2d 142 , this Court examined the multiple marriages of a couple who were married, divorced, remarried and then permanently separated, with no divorce.

2016We hold that it does. ¶11 In In re Estate of Allen, 1987 OK 45 , 738 P.2d 142 , this Court examined the multiple marriages of a couple who were married, divorced, remarried and then permanently separated, with no divorce.

1926This court, in passing upon Ihe doctrine of estoppel, in the case of Williamson-Halsell-Frazier Co. v. King, 58 Okla. 120 , 158 Pac. 1142 , said: “It is the very essence of an estoppel that the person claiming the benefits thereof was induced thereby to do the things which he did; and one who has not altered his situation in reliance upon the conduct or statement urged cannot predicate an estop-pel thereon.’' See, also, Condit v. Condit, 66 Okla. 215 , 168 Pac. 456 ; Hughes v. Sparks, 98 Okla. 208 , 224 Pac. 957 ; Rosen v. Martin, 102 Okla. 65 , 226 Pac. 577 , which cases are to the same effec

1926This court, in passing upon Ihe doctrine of estoppel, in the case of Williamson-Halsell-Frazier Co. v. King, 58 Okla. 120 , 158 Pac. 1142 , said: “It is the very essence of an estoppel that the person claiming the benefits thereof was induced thereby to do the things which he did; and one who has not altered his situation in reliance upon the conduct or statement urged cannot predicate an estop-pel thereon.’' See, also, Condit v. Condit, 66 Okla. 215 , 168 Pac. 456 ; Hughes v. Sparks, 98 Okla. 208 , 224 Pac. 957 ; Rosen v. Martin, 102 Okla. 65 , 226 Pac. 577 , which cases are to the same effec

1917The citizen of the modern municipality and property owner thereof take notice of such necessities. * * * No man can expect to have property in cities, abutting on public thoroughfares and streets, without bearing the burdens of special taxation ; * * * and he acquires his property with tlie full knowledge of the fact that the legislative power of the state can be exercised to levy and provide for an assessment or special tax for such improvements. * * *” In the City of Bartlesville et al. v. Holm et al., 40 Okla. 473 , 139 Pac. 273 , Mr. Justice Kane, in delivering the opinion- of the court, s

1916In City of Bartlesville v. Holm, 40 Okla. 473 , 139 Pac. 273 , Justice Kane, in delivering the opinion of the court, says: “The great weight of authority leans toward a rather strict and technical application of the doctrine of estoppel, and is to the effect that, where there is jurisdiction, one who stands idly by while a public work is being prosecuted, with full knowledge, by himself or agent, that large expenditures are being made for such public improvement *235 which will benefit his property, or fails to appear at the proper time and present his objections, will not, after the work is c

2024MS Dealer Service Corp. v. Franklin , 177 F.3d 942 (11th Cir. 1999), focuses on the estoppel exception to the general rule.

2024Id. at 947 . ¶14 Morgan Stanley relies on the estoppel, also referred to as the equitable estoppel, exception.

2021NAICO argues that Tedford lacked the authority to make binding statements on its behalf, that Harrison's statements to Tedford could not form the basis of an estoppel claim because they were not false, and that New Dominion could not have reasonably relied on the statements of either in believing it had coverage for earthquake-related incidents. ¶44 "Equitable estoppel is a legal concept which bars a party from alleging or denying certain rights which might otherwise have existed because of the party's voluntary conduct." Sullivan v. Buckhorn Ranch P'ship , 2005 OK 41 , ¶ 30, 119 P.3d 192, 2

2021NAICO argues that Tedford lacked the authority to make binding statements on its behalf, that Harrison's statements to Tedford could not form the basis of an estoppel claim because they were not false, and that New Dominion could not have reasonably relied on the statements of either in believing it had coverage for earthquake-related incidents. ¶44 "Equitable estoppel is a legal concept which bars a party from alleging or denying certain rights which might otherwise have existed because of the party's voluntary conduct." Sullivan v. Buckhorn Ranch P'ship , 2005 OK 41 , ¶ 30, 119 P.3d 192, 2

2018Spencer v. Wyrick , 2017 OK 19, ¶ 1 , 392 P.3d 290 . 17 The estoppel doctrine's purpose is "to protect the integrity of the judicial process" by "prohibiting parties from deliberately changing positions according to the exigencies of the moment." Bank of the Wichitas v. Ledford , 2006 OK 73, ¶ 23 , 151 P.3d 103 . 18 "Recovery of damages for slander of title, in such a case, will be dependent upon proof of the malicious recording of an unfounded claim against the property." Ruggles at ¶ 13 (citing Misco Leasing, Inc. v. Keller , 10th Cir., 490 F.2d 545 ; McKown v. Haught , 130 Okl. 253 , 267 P.

2018Spencer v. Wyrick , 2017 OK 19, ¶ 1, 392 P.3d 290. 17 The estoppel doctrine's purpose is "to protect the integrity of the judicial process" by "prohibiting parties from deliberately changing positions according to the exigencies of the moment." Bank of the Wichitas v. Ledford , 2006 OK 73, ¶ 23, 151 P.3d 103. 18 "Recovery of damages for slander of title, in such a case, will be dependent upon proof of the malicious recording of an unfounded claim against the property." Ruggles at ¶ 13 (citing Misco Leasing, Inc. v. Keller , 10th Cir., 490 F.2d 545; McKown v. Haught , 130 Okl. 253, 267 P. 245.)

2018Spencer v. Wyrick , 2017 OK 19, ¶ 1 , 392 P.3d 290 . 17 The estoppel doctrine's purpose is "to protect the integrity of the judicial process" by "prohibiting parties from deliberately changing positions according to the exigencies of the moment." Bank of the Wichitas v. Ledford , 2006 OK 73, ¶ 23 , 151 P.3d 103 . 18 "Recovery of damages for slander of title, in such a case, will be dependent upon proof of the malicious recording of an unfounded claim against the property." Ruggles at ¶ 13 (citing Misco Leasing, Inc. v. Keller , 10th Cir., 490 F.2d 545 ; McKown v. Haught , 130 Okl. 253 , 267 P.

2018Spencer v. Wyrick , 2017 OK 19, ¶ 1, 392 P.3d 290. 17 The estoppel doctrine's purpose is "to protect the integrity of the judicial process" by "prohibiting parties from deliberately changing positions according to the exigencies of the moment." Bank of the Wichitas v. Ledford , 2006 OK 73, ¶ 23, 151 P.3d 103. 18 "Recovery of damages for slander of title, in such a case, will be dependent upon proof of the malicious recording of an unfounded claim against the property." Ruggles at ¶ 13 (citing Misco Leasing, Inc. v. Keller , 10th Cir., 490 F.2d 545; McKown v. Haught , 130 Okl. 253, 267 P. 245.)

2018Spencer v. Wyrick , 2017 OK 19, ¶ 1, 392 P.3d 290. 17 The estoppel doctrine's purpose is "to protect the integrity of the judicial process" by "prohibiting parties from deliberately changing positions according to the exigencies of the moment." Bank of the Wichitas v. Ledford , 2006 OK 73, ¶ 23, 151 P.3d 103. 18 "Recovery of damages for slander of title, in such a case, will be dependent upon proof of the malicious recording of an unfounded claim against the property." Ruggles at ¶ 13 (citing Misco Leasing, Inc. v. Keller , 10th Cir., 490 F.2d 545; McKown v. Haught , 130 Okl. 253, 267 P. 245.)

2018Spencer v. Wyrick , 2017 OK 19, ¶ 1, 392 P.3d 290. 17 The estoppel doctrine's purpose is "to protect the integrity of the judicial process" by "prohibiting parties from deliberately changing positions according to the exigencies of the moment." Bank of the Wichitas v. Ledford , 2006 OK 73, ¶ 23, 151 P.3d 103. 18 "Recovery of damages for slander of title, in such a case, will be dependent upon proof of the malicious recording of an unfounded claim against the property." Ruggles at ¶ 13 (citing Misco Leasing, Inc. v. Keller , 10th Cir., 490 F.2d 545; McKown v. Haught , 130 Okl. 253, 267 P. 245.)

2005Oklahoma Firefighters Pension & Retirement System, 2001 OK 24, ¶ 10 , 20 P.3d 818 , 17 we emphasized that a public entity dealing with retirement benefits was prohibited from acting contrary to legally prescribed standards. 18 Although the case did not deal with the estoppel doctrine, it did recognize that equity never requires a useless act 19 and that the courts will not order a party to act illegally. 20 ¶ 13 The allowance of payment of benefits would require us act as a super-legislature by ordering the Board to pay benefits clearly neither authorized by law nor anticipated by the Legislat

2005Oklahoma Firefighters Pension & Retirement System, 2001 OK 24, ¶ 10 , 20 P.3d 818 , 17 we emphasized that a public entity dealing with retirement benefits was prohibited from acting contrary to legally prescribed standards. 18 Although the case did not deal with the estoppel doctrine, it did recognize that equity never requires a useless act 19 and that the courts will not order a party to act illegally. 20 ¶ 13 The allowance of payment of benefits would require us act as a super-legislature by ordering the Board to pay benefits clearly neither authorized by law nor anticipated by the Legislat

1987Cf. Siler v. Siler, Okl., 350 P.2d 510, 512-513 [1960], See also Horn v. Cole, 51 N.H. 287 (1868), 12 Am.Rep. 111 [1871], a leading case on the origin and scope of the doctrine of estoppel, legal and equitable. .

1984In Chaney v. State, 612 P.2d 269 (Okl.Cr.1980), defendant Chaney was charged by separate informations with the murder of Mrs. Kendal Ashmore and the murder of Ms. Kathy Brown.

1966In King v. Stroup, 22 N.M. 241 , 160 P. 367 , after quoting a definition of the general doctrine of estoppel, we further quoted from 10 R.C.L. p. 289, as follows: ‘Equitable estoppels operate as effectually as technical estoppels.

1966In King v. Stroup, 22 N.M. 241 , 160 P. 367 , after quoting a definition of the general doctrine of estoppel, we further quoted from 10 R.C.L. p. 289, as follows: ‘Equitable estoppels operate as effectually as technical estoppels.

1962In Decker v. Ponca City, Okl., 361 P.2d 195 , we stated: “Where jurisdiction is conferred upon a municipal body to provide for paving its streets, and charge the cost thereof against the property benefited, according to the method provided by law, a property owner who stands by while such work is being prosecuted, with full knowledge that large expenditures are being made for such im *873 provement which will benefit his property, will not, after the work is completed, be afforded relief by injunction against assessments levied against the property benefited to pay for such work.” The judgment

1961Stevens v. Pierce, 109 Okl. 106 , 235 P. 174 .

1961Stevens v. Pierce, 109 Okl. 106 , 235 P. 174 .

1960The insurer contended in Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Maryland v. Friedlander, 6 Cir., 101 F.2d 106 , that insured’s loss from robbery of his jewelry store was not covered by an insurance policy which provided in part that such losses were only covered if a custodian of the store and an employee thereof were present at the time of the robbery.

1956But if it is only void at the election of such creditors as choose to avoid it, and they assent to it, either expressly or by implication, then, as to such assenting creditors, the assignment will be sustained.” As, under the decisions and statute here-inbefore cited, the assignment involved here was, as to plaintiff and in this jurisdiction, merely voidable, ratification by said company subjected it to the estoppel rule asserted by defendant, which, in Sec. *707 166 of 4 Am.Jur., supra, is stated as follows : “Creditors who have acted in a manner implying acceptance of the assignment, or who

1956But if it is only void at the election of such creditors as choose to avoid it, and they assent to it, either expressly or by implication, then, as to such assenting creditors, the assignment will be sustained.” As, under the decisions and statute here-inbefore cited, the assignment involved here was, as to plaintiff and in this jurisdiction, merely voidable, ratification by said company subjected it to the estoppel rule asserted by defendant, which, in Sec. *707 166 of 4 Am.Jur., supra, is stated as follows : “Creditors who have acted in a manner implying acceptance of the assignment, or who

1956But if it is only void at the election of such creditors as choose to avoid it, and they assent to it, either expressly or by implication, then, as to such assenting creditors, the assignment will be sustained.” As, under the decisions and statute here-inbefore cited, the assignment involved here was, as to plaintiff and in this jurisdiction, merely voidable, ratification by said company subjected it to the estoppel rule asserted by defendant, which, in Sec. *707 166 of 4 Am.Jur., supra, is stated as follows : “Creditors who have acted in a manner implying acceptance of the assignment, or who

1956But if it is only void at the election of such creditors as choose to avoid it, and they assent to it, either expressly or by implication, then, as to such assenting creditors, the assignment will be sustained.” As, under the decisions and statute here-inbefore cited, the assignment involved here was, as to plaintiff and in this jurisdiction, merely voidable, ratification by said company subjected it to the estoppel rule asserted by defendant, which, in Sec. *707 166 of 4 Am.Jur., supra, is stated as follows : “Creditors who have acted in a manner implying acceptance of the assignment, or who