estoppel rule in District of Columbia

2015See also 4 Rathkopf’s The Law of Zoning and Planning (hereinafter, "Rathkopf”) § 65:29 (2014) ("A basic formulation of estoppel elements states that a local government exercising its zoning powers will be estopped when a property owner (1) relying in good faith, (2) upon some act or omission of the government, (3) has made such extensive obligations and incurred such extensive expenses that it would be highly inequitable and unjust to destroy the rights which the owner has ostensibly acquired.”); Interdo-nato v. District of Columbia Bd. of Zoning Adjustment, 429 A.2d 1000, 1003 (D.C.1981) ("On

1995While the latter act may be assumed to have established one factor in the estoppel analysis (an “affirmative act[ ] of the District government”), Interdonato, 429 A.2d at 1003, it does not answer the question whether petitioners justifiably and reasonably relied upon it, id. — a question the Commission, in all the circumstances, properly answered against them. 2 Petitioners’ reliance on Saah v. District of Columbia Bd. of Zoning Adjustment, 433 A.2d 1114 (D.C.1981), is misplaced.

2015See Rafferty v. District of Columbia Zoning Comm’n, 583 A.2d 169, 176 (D.C. 1990) ("This court has never determined whether the District’s erroneous issuance of a permit may operate to estop other interested persons from enforcing their rights under the zoning laws.”); Saah v. District of Columbia Bd. of Zoning Adjustment, 433 A.2d 1114 , 1117 n. 3 (D.C.1981) (holding BZA estopped from denying a variance where, inter alia, injury to the public would be "minimal,” but not ”reach[ing] the question of the effect of the estoppel on a claim made by a neighboring landowner”); Goto v. District of Col

2008The Economides argue, however, that we “appear to recognize that the estoppel defense may be asserted on appeal after the Board issues a ruling.” In support of this interpretation they cite Goto, supra, 423 A.2d 917 .

1990“The doctrine of equitable estoppel is judicially disfavored in zoning cases because of the important public interest in the integrity and enforcement of the zoning regulations.” Interdonato v. District of Columbia Board of Zoning Adjustment, 429 A.2d 1000, 1003 (D.C.1981); Wieck v. District of Columbia Board of Zoning Adjustment, 383 A.2d 7, 10 (D.C.1978). 5 As we explained in Interdonato, supra, 429 A.2d at 1003 , [ojnly by showing each of the following elements could petitioners successfully invoke an estoppel claim: (1) expensive and permanent improvements, (2) made in good faith, (3) in j

1981While the remand order instructed the BZA to determine whether it was equitably estopped from reversing the Zoning Administrator’s decision, petitioners argued that because “[ljaches is a species of estop-pel,” Wieck, supra, the Board should have considered their laches argument as part of the estoppel defense.

2015See Rafferty v. District of Columbia Zoning Comm’n, 583 A.2d 169, 176 (D.C. 1990) ("This court has never determined whether the District’s erroneous issuance of a permit may operate to estop other interested persons from enforcing their rights under the zoning laws.”); Saah v. District of Columbia Bd. of Zoning Adjustment, 433 A.2d 1114 , 1117 n. 3 (D.C.1981) (holding BZA estopped from denying a variance where, inter alia, injury to the public would be "minimal,” but not ”reach[ing] the question of the effect of the estoppel on a claim made by a neighboring landowner”); Goto v. District of Col

1993We do not think, in light of Porter , that any protection which the District may enjoy from the application of the doctrine of estoppel, see, e.g., Rafferty v. District of Columbia Zoning Comm’n, 583 A.2d 169 , 175 & n. 3 (D.C.1990), excuses it from the obligation to preserve its grounds for appeal.

1994Indeed, many of the decisions the court cites in support of the estoppel rule we adopt explicitly reject the rule of White. " Id., 442 A.2d at 610 (Farrell, J., concurring). .

1994Indeed, many of the decisions the court cites in support of the estoppel rule we adopt explicitly reject the rule of White. " Id., 442 A.2d at 610 (Farrell, J., concurring). [10] Unlike my dissenting colleague, I am not convinced that this court's recent opinion in Howard Univ. v. Baten, 632 A.2d 389 (D.C.1993), requires a different result.

1988In Copening , we stated that the "application of the collateral estoppel doctrine requires the concurrence in different proceedings of the three circumstances of (1) a common factual issue necessary to both adjudications, (2) a prior determination of that issue in litigation between the same parties, and (3) a showing that the determination was in favor of the party seeking to raise the estoppel bar. 353 A.2d at 309 ; accord Jackson, supra, 528 A.2d 1211 .

1988In Copening , we stated that the “application of the collateral estoppel doctrine requires the concurrence in different proceedings of the three circumstances of (1) a common factual issue necessary to both adjudications, (2) a prior determination of that issue in litigation between the same parties, and (3) a showing that the determination was in favor of the party seeking to raise the estoppel bar. 353 A.2d at 309 ; accord Jackson, supra, 528 A.2d 1211 .

1978Furthermore, as stated in District of Columbia v. Stewart, D.C.App., 278 A.2d 117, 119 (1971): While estoppel may be applied to the District of Columbia in certain limited situations when the equities are strongly in favor of the party invoking the doctrine ( District of Columbia v. Cahill, 60 App.D.C. 342 , 54 F.2d 453 (1931), cited in footnote], the District of Columbia must first have authority to act before conduct of its employees can be the basis of an estoppel defense.

1978Furthermore, as stated in District of Columbia v. Stewart, D.C.App., 278 A.2d 117, 119 (1971): While estoppel may be applied to the District of Columbia in certain limited situations when the equities are strongly in favor of the party invoking the doctrine ( District of Columbia v. Cahill, 60 App.D.C. 342 , 54 F.2d 453 (1931), cited in footnote], the District of Columbia must first have authority to act before conduct of its employees can be the basis of an estoppel defense.

1978Furthermore, as stated in District of Columbia v. Stewart, D.C.App., 278 A.2d 117, 119 (1971): While estoppel may be applied to the District of Columbia in certain limited situations when the equities are strongly in favor of the party invoking the doctrine ( District of Columbia v. Cahill, 60 App.D.C. 342 , 54 F.2d 453 (1931), cited in footnote], the District of Columbia must first have authority to act before conduct of its employees can be the basis of an estoppel defense.

1978Furthermore, as stated in District of Columbia v. Stewart, D.C.App., 278 A.2d 117, 119 (1971): While estoppel may be applied to the District of Columbia in certain limited situations when the equities are strongly in favor of the party invoking the doctrine (District of Columbia v. Cahill, 60 App.D.C. 342 , 54 F.2d 453 (1931), cited in footnote], the District of Columbia must first have authority to act before conduct of its employees can be the basis of an estoppel defense.

2014We have recognized an estoppel exception to the Statute “where [the defendant’s] own fraud was responsible for the non-existence of the required signed memorandum.” Rallan, supra, 766 A.2d at 1007 -08 (quoting Hackney v. Morelite Constr., 418 A.2d 1062, 1066 (D.C.1980)).

2014We have recognized an estoppel exception to the Statute “where [the defendant‟s] own fraud was responsible for the non-existence of the required signed memorandum.” Railan, supra, 766 A.2d at 1007 -08 (quoting Hackney v. Morelite Constr., 418 A.2d 1062, 1066 (D.C. 23 1980)).

2007See Greenleaf-Johnson Lumber Co. v. Garrison, 237 U.S. 251, 265 , 35 S.Ct. 551 , 59 L.Ed. 939 (1915) (where the court noted its earlier decision in Lewis Blue Point Oyster Cultivation Co. v. Briggs, 229 U.S. 82, 89 , 33 S.Ct. 679 , 57 L.Ed. 1083 (1913), “as sustaining the view that the case rested upon estop-pel-rested upon the fact that the lock and dam had been constructed ‘at the instance and implied invitation of Congress’ ”); see also PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 , 83 n. 7, 100 S.Ct. 2035 , 64 L.Ed.2d 741 (1980); United States v. Rands, 389 U.S. 121, 126 , 88 S.Ct. 265 ,

2007See Greenleaf-Johnson Lumber Co. v. Garrison, 237 U.S. 251, 265 , 35 S.Ct. 551 , 59 L.Ed. 939 (1915) (where the court noted its earlier decision in Lewis Blue Point Oyster Cultivation Co. v. Briggs, 229 U.S. 82, 89 , 33 S.Ct. 679 , 57 L.Ed. 1083 (1913), “as sustaining the view that the case rested upon estop-pel-rested upon the fact that the lock and dam had been constructed ‘at the instance and implied invitation of Congress’ ”); see also PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 , 83 n. 7, 100 S.Ct. 2035 , 64 L.Ed.2d 741 (1980); United States v. Rands, 389 U.S. 121, 126 , 88 S.Ct. 265 ,

2007See Greenleaf-Johnson Lumber Co. v. Garrison, 237 U.S. 251, 265 , 35 S.Ct. 551 , 59 L.Ed. 939 (1915) (where the court noted its earlier decision in Lewis Blue Point Oyster Cultivation Co. v. Briggs, 229 U.S. 82, 89 , 33 S.Ct. 679 , 57 L.Ed. 1083 (1913), “as sustaining the view that the case rested upon estop-pel-rested upon the fact that the lock and dam had been constructed ‘at the instance and implied invitation of Congress’ ”); see also PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 , 83 n. 7, 100 S.Ct. 2035 , 64 L.Ed.2d 741 (1980); United States v. Rands, 389 U.S. 121, 126 , 88 S.Ct. 265 ,

2007See Greenleaf-Johnson Lumber Co. v. Garrison, 237 U.S. 251, 265 , 35 S.Ct. 551 , 59 L.Ed. 939 (1915) (where the court noted its earlier decision in Lewis Blue Point Oyster Cultivation Co. v. Briggs, 229 U.S. 82, 89 , 33 S.Ct. 679 , 57 L.Ed. 1083 (1913), “as sustaining the view that the case rested upon estop-pel-rested upon the fact that the lock and dam had been constructed ‘at the instance and implied invitation of Congress’ ”); see also PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 , 83 n. 7, 100 S.Ct. 2035 , 64 L.Ed.2d 741 (1980); United States v. Rands, 389 U.S. 121, 126 , 88 S.Ct. 265 ,

2007While Dr. Townsend’s proposed form would have eliminated the problem created here, the form actually used would also have been sufficient had the court asked in the Special Interrogatories, “Did Dr. Townsend breach the standard of care and thereby proximately cause the plaintiff's injuries by failing to [take the action that formed the basis for each breach of the standard of care]?” Cf. Nimetz v. Cappadona, 596 A.2d 603, 608 (D.C.1991) (Relying on the estoppel rule, the Court of Appeals held that “a defendant who fails to request a special verdict form in a civil case will be barred on appeal

2007See Greenleaf-Johnson Lumber Co. v. Garrison, 237 U.S. 251, 265 , 35 S.Ct. 551 , 59 L.Ed. 939 (1915) (where the court noted its earlier decision in Lewis Blue Point Oyster Cultivation Co. v. Briggs, 229 U.S. 82, 89 , 33 S.Ct. 679 , 57 L.Ed. 1083 (1913), “as sustaining the view that the case rested upon estop-pel-rested upon the fact that the lock and dam had been constructed ‘at the instance and implied invitation of Congress’ ”); see also PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 , 83 n. 7, 100 S.Ct. 2035 , 64 L.Ed.2d 741 (1980); United States v. Rands, 389 U.S. 121, 126 , 88 S.Ct. 265 ,

2007See Greenleaf-Johnson Lumber Co. v. Garrison, 237 U.S. 251, 265 , 35 S.Ct. 551 , 59 L.Ed. 939 (1915) (where the court noted its earlier decision in Lewis Blue Point Oyster Cultivation Co. v. Briggs, 229 U.S. 82, 89 , 33 S.Ct. 679 , 57 L.Ed. 1083 (1913), “as sustaining the view that the case rested upon estop-pel-rested upon the fact that the lock and dam had been constructed ‘at the instance and implied invitation of Congress’ ”); see also PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 , 83 n. 7, 100 S.Ct. 2035 , 64 L.Ed.2d 741 (1980); United States v. Rands, 389 U.S. 121, 126 , 88 S.Ct. 265 ,

2002Ass’n v. District of Columbia Bd. of Zoning Adjustment, 605 A.2d 22, 31 (D.C.1992) (quoting Levy v. District of Columbia Bd. of Zoning Adjustment, 570 A.2d 739, 746 (D.C.1990))) (other citations omitted).

2002Ass’n v. District of Columbia Bd. of Zoning Adjustment, 605 A.2d 22, 31 (D.C.1992) (quoting Levy v. District of Columbia Bd. of Zoning Adjustment, 570 A.2d 739, 746 (D.C.1990))) (other citations omitted).

1994Id. at 608-09 (discussing District of Columbia v. Bethel, 567 A.2d 1331, 1334 (D.C.1990); Sinai, supra, 498 A.2d at 523 n. 1; and Jackson, supra, 451 A.2d at 873-74 ).

1994Id. at 608-09 (discussing District of Columbia v. Bethel, 567 A.2d 1331, 1334 (D.C.1990); Sinai, supra, 498 A.2d at 523 n. 1; and Jackson, supra, 451 A.2d at 873-74 ).