estoppel doctrine (Ohio) · Go Syfert
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estoppel doctrine in Ohio

53 Ohio opinions name it 9 courts 1897–2026 6 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by Ohio courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (17)

CaseFollowedCited
Mason City School District Board of Education v. Warren County Board of Revisiongreen
ohio · 2014 · cited in 2 Ohio opinions naming this issue, 2024–2024
2 sentences

2024See Mason, 2014-Ohio-104, at ¶ 38 (observing that the proponent of an argument had effectively waived it by failing to cite any relevant caselaw in support). ii.

2024See Mason, 2014-Ohio-104, at ¶ 38 (observing that the proponent of an argument had effectively waived it by failing to cite any relevant caselaw in support). ii.

22
Javitch v. First Union Securities, Inc.green
ca1 · 2003 · cited in 2 Ohio opinions naming this issue, 2009–2016
2 sentences

2016Further, Appellees argue that DRI cannot separately pursue its claims against Scherzer because E&Y is a necessary and indispensable party to those claims. {¶23} As the Magistrate’s decision notes, the “application of equitable estoppel is warranted . . . when the signatory [to the contract containing the arbitration clause] raises allegations of . . . substantially interdependent and concerted misconduct by both the nonsignatory and one or more of the signatories to the contract.” (Internal quotations and citations omitted.) Liedtke v. Frank, 437 F.Supp.2d 696, 699 (N.D.Ohio 2006); see Javitch

2009See also Javitch v. First Union Secs., Inc. (C.A.6, 2003), 315 F.3d 619, 629 .

22
Cohen v. Cowles Media Co.green
minn · 1992 · cited in 1 Ohio opinions naming this issue, 2026–2026
2 sentences

2026Perhaps more importantly, Gayhart never accepted the offer to purchase the equipment, and thus the original contract was never altered or modified by a subsequent agreement. {¶ 31} Next, Gayhart asserts an estoppel defense, arguing that he relied on BND to perform its promise in providing him with a purchase quote; that he waited to his detriment on that promise because BND took too long to provide him with a quote, which resulted in additional past-due payments and increased the amount owed to BND under the rental contract; and that he suffered the loss of the equipment when it was sold to an

2026Perhaps more importantly, Gayhart never accepted the offer to purchase the equipment, and thus the original contract was never altered or modified by a subsequent agreement. {¶ 31} Next, Gayhart asserts an estoppel defense, arguing that he relied on BND to perform its promise in providing him with a purchase quote; that he waited to his detriment on that promise because BND took too long to provide him with a quote, which resulted in additional past-due payments and increased the amount owed to BND under the rental contract; and that he suffered the loss of the equipment when it was sold to an

11
Ohio State Board of Pharmacy v. Frantzgreen
ohio · 1990 · cited in 1 Ohio opinions naming this issue, 2026–2026
1 sentence

2026Perhaps more importantly, Gayhart never accepted the offer to purchase the equipment, and thus the original contract was never altered or modified by a subsequent agreement. {¶ 31} Next, Gayhart asserts an estoppel defense, arguing that he relied on BND to perform its promise in providing him with a purchase quote; that he waited to his detriment on that promise because BND took too long to provide him with a quote, which resulted in additional past-due payments and increased the amount owed to BND under the rental contract; and that he suffered the loss of the equipment when it was sold to an

11
Doe v. Univision Television Group, Inc.green
fladistctapp · 1998 · cited in 1 Ohio opinions naming this issue, 2026–2026
1 sentence

2026Perhaps more importantly, Gayhart never accepted the offer to purchase the equipment, and thus the original contract was never altered or modified by a subsequent agreement. {¶ 31} Next, Gayhart asserts an estoppel defense, arguing that he relied on BND to perform its promise in providing him with a purchase quote; that he waited to his detriment on that promise because BND took too long to provide him with a quote, which resulted in additional past-due payments and increased the amount owed to BND under the rental contract; and that he suffered the loss of the equipment when it was sold to an

11
Heckler v. Community Health Services of Crawford County, Inc.green
scotus · 1984 · cited in 1 Ohio opinions naming this issue, 2026–2026
1 sentence

2026Perhaps more importantly, Gayhart never accepted the offer to purchase the equipment, and thus the original contract was never altered or modified by a subsequent agreement. {¶ 31} Next, Gayhart asserts an estoppel defense, arguing that he relied on BND to perform its promise in providing him with a purchase quote; that he waited to his detriment on that promise because BND took too long to provide him with a quote, which resulted in additional past-due payments and increased the amount owed to BND under the rental contract; and that he suffered the loss of the equipment when it was sold to an

11
Donnell v. Parkcliffe Alzheimer's Communitygreen
ohioctapp · 2017 · cited in 1 Ohio opinions naming this issue, 2025–2025
1 sentence

2025Waiver is established by demonstrating “(1) that the party knew of its right to assert an argument or defense and (2) that the totality of the circumstances establish that the party acted inconsistently with that right.” Gembarski v. PartsSource, Inc., 2019-Ohio-3231, ¶ 25 , citing Donnell v. Parkcliffe Alzheimer’s Community, 2017-Ohio-7982, ¶ 21 (6th Dist.). {¶12} The doctrine of estoppel, on the other hand, “‘precludes a party from asserting certain facts where the party, by his conduct, has induced another to change his position in good faith reliance upon the party’s conduct.’” State Farm

11
London & Lancashire Indemnity Co. of America v. Fairbanks Steam Shovel Co.green
ohio · 1925 · cited in 1 Ohio opinions naming this issue, 2017–2017
1 sentence

2017See London & Lancashire Indemnity Co. of America v. Fairbanks Steam Shovel Co. , 112 Ohio St. 136 , 152, 147 N.E. 329 (1925).

11
Liedtke v. Frankgreen
ohnd · 2006 · cited in 1 Ohio opinions naming this issue, 2016–2016
1 sentence

2016Further, Appellees argue that DRI cannot separately pursue its claims against Scherzer because E&Y is a necessary and indispensable party to those claims. {¶23} As the Magistrate’s decision notes, the “application of equitable estoppel is warranted . . . when the signatory [to the contract containing the arbitration clause] raises allegations of . . . substantially interdependent and concerted misconduct by both the nonsignatory and one or more of the signatories to the contract.” (Internal quotations and citations omitted.) Liedtke v. Frank, 437 F.Supp.2d 696, 699 (N.D.Ohio 2006); see Javitch

11
Egan v. National Distillers & Chemical Corp.green
ohio · 1986 · cited in 1 Ohio opinions naming this issue, 2013–2013
2 sentences

2013Fourth, the relying party would suffer prejudice or pecuniary disadvantage if the party whose representation was relied upon were not estopped or precluded from asserting an otherwise valid right in contradiction to his earlier representation.” {¶ 24} Moreover, when determining whether the estoppel doctrine applies, a court must consider “the principle that ‘[t]he purpose of equitable estoppel is to prevent actual or WASHINGTON, 13CA12 11 constructive fraud and to promote the ends of justice.’” Doe v. Archdiocese of Cincinnati, supra. For this reason, “[n]o single formulation of the equitable

2013Fourth, the relying party would suffer prejudice or pecuniary disadvantage if the party whose representation was relied upon were not estopped or precluded from asserting an otherwise valid right in contradiction to his earlier representation.” {¶ 24} Moreover, when determining whether the estoppel doctrine applies, a court must consider “the principle that ‘[t]he purpose of equitable estoppel is to prevent actual or WASHINGTON, 13CA12 11 constructive fraud and to promote the ends of justice.’” Doe v. Archdiocese of Cincinnati, supra. For this reason, “[n]o single formulation of the equitable

11
Prymas v. Kassaigreen
ohioctapp · 2006 · cited in 1 Ohio opinions naming this issue, 2013–2013
2 sentences

2013See Prymas v. Kassai, 168 Ohio App.3d 123 , 2006-Ohio-3726 , 858 N.E.2d 1209, ¶ 27-28 (8th Dist.) (the evidence supported a finding of easement by estoppel when there were letters and other evidence of negotiations of an easement and the parties negotiated improvements that would be done in return for the right to the easement). 12 {¶41} Covert relied on these statements that the driveway would be perpetually his to use.

2013See Prymas v. Kassai, 168 Ohio App.3d 123 , 2006-Ohio-3726 , 858 N.E.2d 1209, ¶ 27-28 (8th Dist.) (the evidence supported a finding of easement by estoppel when there were letters and other evidence of negotiations of an easement and the parties negotiated improvements that would be done in return for the right to the easement). 12 {¶41} Covert relied on these statements that the driveway would be perpetually his to use.

11
Reynolds v. Budzikgreen
ohioctapp · 1999 · cited in 1 Ohio opinions naming this issue, 2012–2012
2 sentences

2012See, e.g., Reynolds v. Budzik, 134 Ohio App.3d 844, 846, fn.3 , 732 N.E.2d 485 (6th Dist. 1999) (noting that “when a trial court has stated an erroneous basis for its judgment, an appellate court must affirm the judgment if it is legally correct on other grounds, that is, it achieves the right result for the wrong reason, because such an error is not prejudicial.”) {¶ 53} “Equitable estoppel precludes a party from asserting certain facts where the party, by his conduct, has induced another to change his position in good-faith reliance upon 21 that conduct.

2012See, e.g., Reynolds v. Budzik, 134 Ohio App.3d 844, 846, fn.3 , 732 N.E.2d 485 (6th Dist. 1999) (noting that “when a trial court has stated an erroneous basis for its judgment, an appellate court must affirm the judgment if it is legally correct on other grounds, that is, it achieves the right result for the wrong reason, because such an error is not prejudicial.”) {¶ 53} “Equitable estoppel precludes a party from asserting certain facts where the party, by his conduct, has induced another to change his position in good-faith reliance upon 21 that conduct.

11
In re Estate of Ceceregreen
ohprobctbutler · 1968 · cited in 1 Ohio opinions naming this issue, 2006–2006
11
Connin v. Baileygreen
ohio · 1984 · cited in 1 Ohio opinions naming this issue, 2006–2006
11
City of Kettering v. Bergergreen
ohioctapp · 1982 · cited in 1 Ohio opinions naming this issue, 2006–2006
11
Smith v. Smithgreen
ohioctapp · 1957 · cited in 1 Ohio opinions naming this issue, 2006–2006
11
Knight v. Stickrathgreen
ohio · 1988 · cited in 1 Ohio opinions naming this issue, 1997–1997
11

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

CaseNegativeCited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Ohio. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (56)

CaseCitedYears
Chubb v. Ohio Bureau of Workers' Compensation green
ohio · 1998
2 sentences

2023The application of estoppel “prevents relief when one party induces another to believe certain facts exist and the other party changes his position in reasonable reliance on those facts to his detriment.” (Emphasis added.) Chubb v. Ohio Bur. of Workers' Comp., 81 Ohio St.3d 275, 279 , 690 N.E.2d 1267 (1998), quoting State ex rel.

2023The application of estoppel “prevents relief when one party induces another to believe certain facts exist and the other party changes his position in reasonable reliance on those facts to his detriment.” (Emphasis added.) Chubb v. Ohio Bur. of Workers' Comp., 81 Ohio St.3d 275, 279 , 690 N.E.2d 1267 (1998), quoting State ex rel.

42000–2023
Wright v. City of Lorain neutral
ohioctapp · 1942
2 sentences

2008"It is therefore fundamental to the application of equitable estoppel for plaintiffs to establish that * * * specific actions by defendants somehow kept them from timely bringing suit * * *." Doe v. Archdiocese of Cincinnati , 109 Ohio St.3d 491 , 2006-Ohio-2625 , ¶ 45 (citation omitted). {¶ 11} "Under Ohio law, the estoppel doctrine can be employed to prohibit inequitable use of the statute of limitations." Schrader v. Gillette (1988), 48 Ohio App.3d 181 , 183 , citing Wright v. Lorain (1942), 70 Ohio App. 337 , 342-343 .

2008"The basis for this principle is that `one cannot justly or equitably lull his adversary into a false sense of security, and thereby cause the adversary to subject a claim to the bar of the statute of limitations.'" Id., citing Markese v. Ellis (1967), 11 Ohio App.2d 160, 163 . {¶ 12} "The applicability of the doctrine of equitable estoppel is generally an issue to be determined by the trier of fact." Helman v. EBL Prolong, Inc. , 139 Ohio App.3d 231 , 246 , 2000-Ohio-2593 (citations omitted); JRC Holdings, Inc. v. Samsel Servs.

31988–2008
First Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n of Toledo v. Perry's Landing, Inc. green
ohioctapp · 1983
2 sentences

2013Fourth, the relying party would suffer prejudice or pecuniary disadvantage if the party whose representation was relied upon were not estopped or precluded from asserting an otherwise valid right in contradiction to his earlier representation.” {¶ 24} Moreover, when determining whether the estoppel doctrine applies, a court must consider “the principle that ‘[t]he purpose of equitable estoppel is to prevent actual or WASHINGTON, 13CA12 11 constructive fraud and to promote the ends of justice.’” Doe v. Archdiocese of Cincinnati, supra. For this reason, “[n]o single formulation of the equitable

1990The rule of estoppel is: "***one party will not be permitted to deny that which ,by his words, his acts, or his silence when there is a duty to speak, he has induced a second party reasonably and in good faith to assume and rely upon that party's prejudice or pecuniary disadvantage.***." First Federal Savings and Loan Association v. Perry’s Landing, Inc. (1983), 11 Ohio App. 3d 135, 145 .

21990–2013
Wozniak v. Wozniak green
ohioctapp · 1993
2 sentences

2006Wozniak v. Wozniak (1993), 90 Ohio App.3d 400, 410 , 629 N.E.2d 500 . {¶ 7} The concept of estoppel in property law is said to work important functions: {¶ 8} “First, courts often invoke the estoppel doctrine to enforce promises or representations.

2006Wozniak v. Wozniak (1993), 90 Ohio App.3d 400, 410 , 629 N.E.2d 500 . {¶ 7} The concept of estoppel in property law is said to work important functions: {¶ 8} “First, courts often invoke the estoppel doctrine to enforce promises or representations.

22006–2006
Talley v. Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen, & Helpers, Local No. 377 green
ohio · 1976
2 sentences

1998Reliance to support an estoppel claim must be “of a sufficiently definite and substantial nature so that injustice will result if the ‘promise’ is not enforced.” Talley, 48 Ohio St.2d at 146 , 2 O.O.3d at 300 , 357 N.E.2d at 47 .

1998Reliance to support an estoppel claim must be “of a sufficiently definite and substantial nature so that injustice will result if the ‘promise’ is not enforced.” Talley, 48 Ohio St.2d at 146 , 2 O.O.3d at 300 , 357 N.E.2d at 47 .

21998–2000
Yarosh v. Becane green
ohio · 1980
2 sentences

1998Chubb relies on Yarosh v. Becane (1980), 63 Ohio St.2d 5 , 17 O.O.3d 3 , 406 N.E.2d 1355 , as support for her proposition that the state is precluded from advancing an estoppel defense.

1998Chubb relies on Yarosh v. Becane (1980), 63 Ohio St.2d 5 , 17 O.O.3d 3 , 406 N.E.2d 1355 , as support for her proposition that the state is precluded from advancing an estoppel defense.

21998–1998
Olympic Holding Co., L.L.C. v. ACE Ltd. green
ohio · 2009
1 sentence

2026Perhaps more importantly, Gayhart never accepted the offer to purchase the equipment, and thus the original contract was never altered or modified by a subsequent agreement. {¶ 31} Next, Gayhart asserts an estoppel defense, arguing that he relied on BND to perform its promise in providing him with a purchase quote; that he waited to his detriment on that promise because BND took too long to provide him with a quote, which resulted in additional past-due payments and increased the amount owed to BND under the rental contract; and that he suffered the loss of the equipment when it was sold to an

12026–2026
Gembarski v. PartsSource, Inc. (Slip Opinion) green
ohio · 2019
1 sentence

2025Waiver is established by demonstrating “(1) that the party knew of its right to assert an argument or defense and (2) that the totality of the circumstances establish that the party acted inconsistently with that right.” Gembarski v. PartsSource, Inc., 2019-Ohio-3231, ¶ 25 , citing Donnell v. Parkcliffe Alzheimer’s Community, 2017-Ohio-7982, ¶ 21 (6th Dist.). {¶12} The doctrine of estoppel, on the other hand, “‘precludes a party from asserting certain facts where the party, by his conduct, has induced another to change his position in good faith reliance upon the party’s conduct.’” State Farm

12025–2025
Trinity Health System v. Mdx Corp. green
ohioctapp · 2009
2 sentences

2022Here, a signatory is trying to bind non-signatories, which is “not a permissible use of the estoppel defense.” Id. {¶32} Further, appellant did not rely on the terms of the subcontract agreement with Welty to establish their claims against appellees.

2022Trinity Health System v. MDX Corp., 180 Ohio App.3d 815 , 2009-Ohio-417 , 907 N.E.2d 746 (7th Dist.

12022–2022
Buckeye Check Cashing v. Madison, 90861 (10-2-2008) green
ohioctapp · 2008
1 sentence

2015Cuyahoga No. 90861, 2008-Ohio-5124, ¶ 12 . {¶ 14} As explained by the Eighth District Court of Appeals, A release ordinarily operates to extinguish a right in exchange for some consideration and effectively operates as an estoppel or a defense to an action by the releasor.

12015–2015
Monroe Bowling Lanes v. Woodsfield Livestock Sales green
ohioctapp · 1969
1 sentence

2013“The party claiming the easement must show that he was misled or was caused to change position to his prejudice.” Id. {¶40} In the present matter, Lahner signed a document, attached to the Deed and recorded, in which she agreed that Covert would have a “perpetual right” to use the driveway located on her property and that this right would run with the parcel to the parties’ “successors, transferees and assigns forever.” Lahner also signed the Agreement of Purchase, which stated that the buyer and seller “shall have executed an Easement Agreement for the mutual use of the driveway.” These were

12013–2013
Dicken v. Statutory Agent for Allstate Ins. Co. neutral
ohioctapp · 2013
1 sentence

2013Co., 2013-Ohio-3103 .] Gwin, P.J. {¶1} Appellant appeals the August 31, 2011 judgment entry of the Fairfield County Common Pleas Court denying her motion for summary judgment and the October 25, 2012 judgment entry finding appellee was not in breach of contract and finding for appellee on an estoppel claim.

12013–2013
HealthSouth Corp. v. Levin green
ohio · 2009
2 sentences

2012In HealthSouth Corp. v. Levin, 121 Ohio St.3d 282 , 2009-Ohio-584 , 903 N.E.2d 1179 , we rejected the tax commissioner’s primary claim that because HealthSouth’s value-reduction claim arose from its own accounting fraud, that claim was barred either by the statute or by the doctrine of estoppel.

2012In HealthSouth Corp. v. Levin, 121 Ohio St.3d 282 , 2009-Ohio-584 , 903 N.E.2d 1179 , we rejected the tax commissioner’s primary claim that because HealthSouth’s value-reduction claim arose from its own accounting fraud, that claim was barred either by the statute or by the doctrine of estoppel.

12012–2012
Intergen N v. v. Grina green
ca1 · 2003
1 sentence

2009This doctrine “precludes a party from enjoying rights and benefits under a contract while at the same time avoiding its burdens and obligations.” InterGen N.V. v. Grina (C.A.1, 2003), 344 F.3d 134, 145 . {¶ 16} The Thomson-CSF court’s estoppel analysis turned on whether the nonsignatory derived a direct benefit from the contract containing the arbitration clause such that acceptance of the benefit would also require acceptance of a contractual obligation.

12009–2009
Helman v. Epl Prolong, Inc. green
ohioctapp · 2000
1 sentence

2008"The basis for this principle is that `one cannot justly or equitably lull his adversary into a false sense of security, and thereby cause the adversary to subject a claim to the bar of the statute of limitations.'" Id., citing Markese v. Ellis (1967), 11 Ohio App.2d 160, 163 . {¶ 12} "The applicability of the doctrine of equitable estoppel is generally an issue to be determined by the trier of fact." Helman v. EBL Prolong, Inc. , 139 Ohio App.3d 231 , 246 , 2000-Ohio-2593 (citations omitted); JRC Holdings, Inc. v. Samsel Servs.

12008–2008
Doe v. Archdiocese of Cincinnati green
ohio · 2006
1 sentence

2008"It is therefore fundamental to the application of equitable estoppel for plaintiffs to establish that * * * specific actions by defendants somehow kept them from timely bringing suit * * *." Doe v. Archdiocese of Cincinnati , 109 Ohio St.3d 491 , 2006-Ohio-2625 , ¶ 45 (citation omitted). {¶ 11} "Under Ohio law, the estoppel doctrine can be employed to prohibit inequitable use of the statute of limitations." Schrader v. Gillette (1988), 48 Ohio App.3d 181 , 183 , citing Wright v. Lorain (1942), 70 Ohio App. 337 , 342-343 .

12008–2008
Schrader v. Gillette green
ohioctapp · 1988
1 sentence

2008"It is therefore fundamental to the application of equitable estoppel for plaintiffs to establish that * * * specific actions by defendants somehow kept them from timely bringing suit * * *." Doe v. Archdiocese of Cincinnati , 109 Ohio St.3d 491 , 2006-Ohio-2625 , ¶ 45 (citation omitted). {¶ 11} "Under Ohio law, the estoppel doctrine can be employed to prohibit inequitable use of the statute of limitations." Schrader v. Gillette (1988), 48 Ohio App.3d 181 , 183 , citing Wright v. Lorain (1942), 70 Ohio App. 337 , 342-343 .

12008–2008
Markese v. Ellis green
ohioctapp · 1967
1 sentence

2008"The basis for this principle is that `one cannot justly or equitably lull his adversary into a false sense of security, and thereby cause the adversary to subject a claim to the bar of the statute of limitations.'" Id., citing Markese v. Ellis (1967), 11 Ohio App.2d 160, 163 . {¶ 12} "The applicability of the doctrine of equitable estoppel is generally an issue to be determined by the trier of fact." Helman v. EBL Prolong, Inc. , 139 Ohio App.3d 231 , 246 , 2000-Ohio-2593 (citations omitted); JRC Holdings, Inc. v. Samsel Servs.

12008–2008
E.S. Gallon Co., L.P.A. v. Deutsch neutral
ohioctapp · 2001
12006–2006
Bates v. Midland Title of Ashtabula Co., Unpublished Decision (11-26-2004) green
ohioctapp · 2004
12005–2005
Kilko v. Cleveland neutral
ohioctapp · 1951
12004–2004
Bean v. Bean green
ohioctapp · 1983
12004–2004
Blakemore v. Blakemore green
ohio · 1983
12004–2004
State ex rel. Cities Service Oil Co. v. Orteca green
ohio · 1980
12003–2003
State v. Williams green
ohio · 1996
12003–2003
State ex rel. Spiccia v. Abate neutral
ohio · 1965
12000–2000
Whitler v. McFaul green
ohioctapp · 1997
11999–1999
West v. Village of Bentleyville green
ohioctapp · 1987
11996–1996
Kimbrell v. Village of Seven Mile green
ohioctapp · 1984
11996–1996
Anderson v. Anderson green
ohioctapp · 1984
11995–1995
State ex rel. Cater v. City of North Olmsted green
ohio · 1994
11994–1994
Cotton States Insurance v. Rutledge green
gactapp · 1976
11990–1990
Akron Metropolitan Housing Authority v. Myers neutral
ohioctapp · 1986
11987–1987
State v. Williams green
ohio · 1977
11986–1986
City of Henderson v. Lieber's green
kyctapp · 1917
11968–1968
Clark v. United States green
scotus · 1933
11951–1951
Bennecke v. Insurance Co. neutral
· 1882
11934–1934
Jennings v. Hare neutral
sc · 1896
11929–1929
Martin v. Elwood green
minn · 1886
11921–1921
Brown v. Hoag green
minn · 1886
11921–1921

Statutes the citing opinions construe

OH § Ohio Rev. Code § 124.34 (3) OH § Ohio Rev. Code § 5717.02 (3)

Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.

Where else courts name it

CA 370 (1890–2026) IL 282 (1877–2025) TX 227 (1881–2025) NY 226 (1828–2025) PA 136 (1849–2025) FL 84 (1904–2024) MI 73 (1871–2026) NJ 71 (1881–2026) MO 67 (1877–2025) AL 63 (1846–2023) TN 60 (1895–2024) CT 58 (1896–2024) WI 58 (1869–2023) WA 55 (1895–2020) IN 54 (1861–2023) OR 54 (1897–2026) OH 53 (1897–2026) SC 49 (1846–2022) MA 47 (1889–2025) GA 46 (1914–2021) MD 45 (1907–2024) VA 44 (1877–2026) OK 40 (1901–2024) NC 39 (1887–2017) MN 38 (1894–2016) AZ 36 (1924–2024) KY 35 (1876–2024) IA 35 (1864–2024) LA 33 (1910–2016) CO 33 (1891–2025) MS 30 (1893–2024) NE 28 (1884–2025) WV 27 (1888–2020) DC 26 (1953–2015) AR 26 (1896–2012) RI 25 (1877–2011) NM 24 (1912–2022) UT 23 (1921–2025) ND 23 (1912–2023) MT 20 (1924–2019) ID 19 (1895–2022) SD 19 (1894–2021) KS 18 (1900–2012) HI 17 (1952–2015) ME 17 (1889–2021) VT 14 (1902–2024) WY 12 (1923–2008) DE 11 (1947–2024) NH 10 (1932–2019) AK 9 (1983–2015) NV 9 (1947–2017) PR 2 (1916–2003)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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