estoppel doctrine in Virginia

2015The Department cites in its brief and in its oral argument several opinions that are factually distinguishable from the case in chief, Lawrence v. Jenkins, 258 Va. 598 (1999) (Code section not timely cited regarding redacted information), and Main v. Department of Highways, 206 Va. 143 (1965) (doctrine of estoppel and waiver do not apply to state when acting in a governmental capacity).

1996In Main v. Dept. of Highways, 206 Va. 143, 150 (1965), the Supreme Court of Virginia made a broad pronouncement on the subject of estoppel: [I]t is well settled that the doctrine of estoppel does not apply to the rights of a state when acting in its sovereign or governmental capacity.

2003See Westminster-Canterbury of Hampton Rds., Inc. v. Virginia Beach, 238 Va. 493, 503 , 385 S.E.2d 561, 566 (1989) (holding that the doctrine of estoppel does not apply to the Commonwealth “when acting in a governmental capacity”).

2003See Westminster-Canterbury of Hampton Rds., Inc. v. Virginia Beach, 238 Va. 493, 503 , 385 S.E.2d 561, 566 (1989) (holding that the doctrine of estoppel does not apply to the Commonwealth “when acting in a governmental capacity”).

2025“Constructive trusts have been said to arise through the application of the doctrine of estoppel, or under the broad doctrine that equity regards and treats as done what in good conscience ought to be done.” Sundin v. Klein, 221 Va. 232, 240 (1980) (quoting Patterson’s Ex’rs v. Patterson, 144 Va. 113, 123 (1926)).

1980We believe that the question answers itself and that the remedy lies in the imposition of a constructive trust upon the property in dispute. “ ‘Constructive trusts have been said to arise through the application of the doctrine of estoppel, or under the broad doctrine that equity regards and treats as done what in good conscience ought to be done.*** Their forms and varieties are practically without limit, being raised by courts of equity whenever it becomes necessary to prevent a failure of justice.’ 39 Cyc. 169-170, and cases cited.” Patterson’s Ex’rs v. Patterson, 144 Va. 113, 123 , 131 S.E

2006See 2005 Acts, cc. 622 and 694. 3 But see Standefer v. United States, 447 U.S. 10 , 23 n.18 (1980) (“The estoppel doctrine . . . is premised upon an underlying confidence that the result achieved in the initial litigation was substantially correct.

2002See Standefer, 447 U.S. at 23 , 100 S.Ct. at 2007 (“The estoppel doctrine ... is premised upon an underlying confidence that the result achieved in the initial litigation was substantially correct.

2015In addressing this argument, “we are guided by the principle that ‘where a party seeks to invoke the doctrine of estoppel, [that party] has the burden of proving it by clear, precise and unequivocal evidence.’” Cibula v. Allied Fibers & Plastics, 14 Va. App. 319, 325 , 416 S.E.2d 708, 711 (1992) (alterations in original) (quoting Rose v. Red’s Hitch & Trailer Serv., 11 Va. App. 55, 59-60 , 396 S.E.2d 392, 395 (1990)).

2015In addressing this argument, “we are guided by the principle that ‘where a party seeks to invoke the doctrine of estoppel, [that party] has the burden of proving it by clear, precise and unequivocal evidence.’” Cibula v. Allied Fibers & Plastics, 14 Va. App. 319, 325 , 416 S.E.2d 708, 711 (1992) (alterations in original) (quoting Rose v. Red’s Hitch & Trailer Serv., 11 Va. App. 55, 59-60 , 396 S.E.2d 392, 395 (1990)).

2005There, we said that “[w]hen the contract is once declared ultra vires, the fact that it is executed dos not validate it, nor can it be ratified so as to make the basis of suit or action, nor does the doctrine of estoppel apply,” Id. at 81, 149 S.E. at 635 (emphasis added).

1989There, we said that "[w]hen the contract is once declared ultra vires, the fact that it is executed does not validate it, nor can it be ratified so as to make it the basis of suit or action, nor does the doctrine of estoppel apply. " Id. at 81 , 149 S.E. at 635 (emphasis added).

1928Co. v. Richmond, etc., Connec tion Co., 145 Va. 266 , 133 S. E. 888 , said: “When the contract is once declared ultra vires, the fact that it is executed does not validate it, nor can it be ratified so as to make it the basis of suit or action, nor does the doctrine of estoppel apply.” So much for ultra v'fires contracts.

1928Co. v. Richmond, etc., Connec tion Co., 145 Va. 266 , 133 S. E. 888 , said: “When the contract is once declared ultra vires, the fact that it is executed does not validate it, nor can it be ratified so as to make it the basis of suit or action, nor does the doctrine of estoppel apply.” So much for ultra v'fires contracts.

2002(Sink v. Commonwealth, 13 Va. App. 544 , 413 S.E.2d 658 (1992); Falls v. Virginia State Bar, 240 Va. 416 , 397 S.E.2d 671 (1990)).

2002(Sink v. Commonwealth, 13 Va. App. 544 , 413 S.E.2d 658 (1992); Falls v. Virginia State Bar, 240 Va. 416 , 397 S.E.2d 671 (1990)).

2026Auth., 303 Va. 259 , 267 (2024) (quoting Commonwealth v. Holman, 303 Va. 62 , 71-72 (2024)). “‘The approbate-reprobate doctrine is broader and more demanding than’ the rules of procedural default.” Holman, 303 Va. at 72 (quoting Alford v. Commonwealth, 56 Va. App. 706, 709 (2010)).

2025“Constructive trusts have been said to arise through the application of the doctrine of estoppel, or under the broad doctrine that equity regards and treats as done what in good conscience ought to be done.” Sundin v. Klein, 221 Va. 232, 240 (1980) (quoting Patterson’s Ex’rs v. Patterson, 144 Va. 113, 123 (1926)).

2024Wooten v. Bank of Am., N.A., 290 Va. 306 , 309- 10 (2015); see also Matthews v. Matthews, 277 Va. 522, 528 (2009).

2015Boykins Narrow Fabrics Corp. v. Weldon Roofing and Sheet Metal, Inc., 221 Va. 81, 86 , 266 S.E.2d 887, 890 (1980) (citing Coleman v. Nationwide Life Ins.

2015Boykins Narrow Fabrics Corp. v. Weldon Roofing and Sheet Metal, Inc., 221 Va. 81, 86 , 266 S.E.2d 887, 890 (1980) (citing Coleman v. Nationwide Life Ins.

2015In addressing this argument, “we are guided by the principle that ‘where a party seeks to invoke the doctrine of estoppel, [that party] has the burden of proving it by clear, precise and unequivocal evidence.’” Cibula v. Allied Fibers & Plastics, 14 Va. App. 319, 325 , 416 S.E.2d 708, 711 (1992) (alterations in original) (quoting Rose v. Red’s Hitch & Trailer Serv., 11 Va. App. 55, 59-60 , 396 S.E.2d 392, 395 (1990)).

2015In addressing this argument, “we are guided by the principle that ‘where a party seeks to invoke the doctrine of estoppel, [that party] has the burden of proving it by clear, precise and unequivocal evidence.’” Cibula v. Allied Fibers & Plastics, 14 Va. App. 319, 325 , 416 S.E.2d 708, 711 (1992) (alterations in original) (quoting Rose v. Red’s Hitch & Trailer Serv., 11 Va. App. 55, 59-60 , 396 S.E.2d 392, 395 (1990)).

2012See Keppler, 124 Va. at 611 , 98 S.E. at 753 (Where the doctrine of estoppel applies, “the law will imply the intent to dedicate . . . even against a contrary intent. [But i]n the case before us we cannot inquire or decide whether the doctrine of estoppel aforesaid is applicable” because the proper parties are not present.) It seems unlikely that estoppel would apply in this case because the City necessarily would have to allege it relied on conduct of the Condo Association to its detriment.

2012See Keppler, 124 Va. at 611 , 98 S.E. at 753 (Where the doctrine of estoppel applies, “the law will imply the intent to dedicate . . . even against a contrary intent. [But i]n the case before us we cannot inquire or decide whether the doctrine of estoppel aforesaid is applicable” because the proper parties are not present.) It seems unlikely that estoppel would apply in this case because the City necessarily would have to allege it relied on conduct of the Condo Association to its detriment.

2012Mulford, 282 Va. at 111 , 712 S.E.2d at 476 ; Waynesboro Village, L.L.C. v. BMC Props., 255 Va. 75, 82 , 496 S.E.2d 64, 68 (1998). 27 an “unequivocable act,” City of Hampton, 202 Va. at 784 , 120 S.E.2d at 365 , or “unmistakable in [its] purpose.” City of Staunton, 169 Va. at 433 , 193 S.E. at 698 .

2012Mulford, 282 Va. at 111 , 712 S.E.2d at 476 ; Waynesboro Village, L.L.C. v. BMC Props., 255 Va. 75, 82 , 496 S.E.2d 64, 68 (1998). 27 an “unequivocable act,” City of Hampton, 202 Va. at 784 , 120 S.E.2d at 365 , or “unmistakable in [its] purpose.” City of Staunton, 169 Va. at 433 , 193 S.E. at 698 .

2006In the absence of appellate review, or of similar procedures, such confidence is often unwarranted.”); AKAK, Corp. v. Commonwealth, 38 Va. App. 634, 639 , 567 S.E.2d 589, 591 (2002) (“[C]ollateral estoppel does not apply where ‘the party against whom preclusion is sought could not, as a matter of law, have obtained review of the judgment in the initial action.’” (citations omitted)); see also S.W. v. State, 703 So. 2d 427, 429-30 (Ala. Crim.

2006In the absence of appellate review, or of similar procedures, such confidence is often unwarranted.”); AKAK, Corp. v. Commonwealth, 38 Va. App. 634, 639 , 567 S.E.2d 589, 591 (2002) (“[C]ollateral estoppel does not apply where ‘the party against whom preclusion is sought could not, as a matter of law, have obtained review of the judgment in the initial action.’” (citations omitted)); see also S.W. v. State, 703 So. 2d 427, 429-30 (Ala. Crim.

2006In the absence of appellate review, or of similar procedures, such confidence is often unwarranted.”); AKAK, Corp. v. Commonwealth, 38 Va. App. 634, 639 , 567 S.E.2d 589, 591 (2002) (“[C]ollateral estoppel does not apply where ‘the party against whom preclusion is sought could not, as a matter of law, have obtained review of the judgment in the initial action.’” (citations omitted)); see also S.W. v. State, 703 So. 2d 427, 429-30 (Ala. Crim.

2000“When the contract is once declared ultra vires, the fact that it is executed does not validate it, nor can it be ratified so as to make it the basis of suit or action, nor does the doctrine of estoppel apply.” 224 Va. at 623 (citations omitted).

2000Calling the result “offensive and unfair,” id., the Court nevertheless refused to enforce the arbitrator’s award.

1998See Bristol Newspapers, Inc. v. Shaffer, 16 Va.App. 703, 708 , 432 S.E.2d 23, 26 (1993) (holding, under doctrine of estoppel, that mere “failure by the employer to report the accident in accordance with Code § 65.2-900 neither tolls the statute [of limitations] nor precludes the defense [of its expiration]”); see also Alderson, 223 Va. at 208 , 288 S.E.2d at 447 (rejecting allegation that employer’s failure to notify commission of payments, which would have triggered commission’s notice to her to file claim, proved estoppel).

1998See Bristol Newspapers, Inc. v. Shaffer, 16 Va.App. 703, 708 , 432 S.E.2d 23, 26 (1993) (holding, under doctrine of estoppel, that mere “failure by the employer to report the accident in accordance with Code § 65.2-900 neither tolls the statute [of limitations] nor precludes the defense [of its expiration]”); see also Alderson, 223 Va. at 208 , 288 S.E.2d at 447 (rejecting allegation that employer’s failure to notify commission of payments, which would have triggered commission’s notice to her to file claim, proved estoppel).

1998See Bristol Newspapers, Inc. v. Shaffer, 16 Va.App. 703, 708 , 432 S.E.2d 23, 26 (1993) (holding, under doctrine of estoppel, that mere “failure by the employer to report the accident in accordance with Code § 65.2-900 neither tolls the statute [of limitations] nor precludes the defense [of its expiration]”); see also Alderson, 223 Va. at 208 , 288 S.E.2d at 447 (rejecting allegation that employer’s failure to notify commission of payments, which would have triggered commission’s notice to her to file claim, proved estoppel).

1998See Bristol Newspapers, Inc. v. Shaffer, 16 Va.App. 703, 708 , 432 S.E.2d 23, 26 (1993) (holding, under doctrine of estoppel, that mere “failure by the employer to report the accident in accordance with Code § 65.2-900 neither tolls the statute [of limitations] nor precludes the defense [of its expiration]”); see also Alderson, 223 Va. at 208 , 288 S.E.2d at 447 (rejecting allegation that employer’s failure to notify commission of payments, which would have triggered commission’s notice to her to file claim, proved estoppel).

1996Monument Associates v. Arlington County Board, 242 Va. 145, 151 , 408 S.E.2d 889, 892 (1991) (citing Westminster-Canterbury v. City of Virginia Beach, 238 Va. 493, 503 , 385 S.E.2d 561, 566 (1989)).

1996Monument Associates v. Arlington County Board, 242 Va. 145, 151 , 408 S.E.2d 889, 892 (1991) (citing Westminster-Canterbury v. City of Virginia Beach, 238 Va. 493, 503 , 385 S.E.2d 561, 566 (1989)).

1995Wagoner v. Jack’s Creek Coal Corp., 199 Va. 741, 746 , 101 S.E.2d 627, 630 (1958).

1995Wagoner v. Jack’s Creek Coal Corp., 199 Va. 741, 746 , 101 S.E.2d 627, 630 (1958).