estoppel doctrine in Michigan

2022In other words, by invoking the doctrine of estoppel and waiver it is sought to bring into existence a contract not made by the parties, to create a liability contrary to the express provisions of the contract the parties did make. [Ruddock, 209 Mich at 653-654 .] -6- coverage to protect an insured against risks not included in the policy or expressly excluded from the policy”).

2015The Supreme Court rejected use of the estoppel and waiver doctrines because to do so “ ‘would make this contract of insurance cover a loss it never covered by its terms, to create a liability not created by the contract . . . .’ ” Lee, 151 Mich App at 286 , quoting Ruddock, 209 Mich at 654 .

2026Additionally, we are mindful that we should “exercise caution in evaluating an estoppel claim and should apply the doctrine only where the facts are unquestionable and the wrong to be prevented undoubted.” Id.

2023A court must “exercise caution in evaluating an estoppel claim and should apply the doctrine only where the facts are unquestionable and the wrong to be prevented undoubted.” Id.

2015The Supreme Court rejected use of the estoppel and waiver doctrines because to do so “ ‘would make this contract of insurance cover a loss it never covered by its terms, to create a liability not created by the contract . . . .’ ” Lee, 151 Mich App at 286 , quoting Ruddock, 209 Mich at 654 .

1999Smit, supra at 679-683 ; Lee, supra at 286-287 .

1984See Whipple v Parker, 29 Mich 369 (1874), and Ordon v Johnson, 346 Mich 38 ; 77 NW2d 377 (1956). [5] Cf. McLaughlin v Ford Motor Co, 269 F2d 120 (CA 6, 1959); Gudenau v Farm Crest Bakeries, Inc, 268 Mich 399 ; 256 NW 462 (1934); Lynas v Maxwell Farms, 279 Mich 684 ; 273 NW 315 (1937); Adolph v Cookware Co of America, 283 Mich 561 ; 278 NW 687 (1938).

1984See Whipple v Parker, 29 Mich 369 (1874), and Ordon v Johnson, 346 Mich 38 ; 77 NW2d 377 (1956). [5] Cf. McLaughlin v Ford Motor Co, 269 F2d 120 (CA 6, 1959); Gudenau v Farm Crest Bakeries, Inc, 268 Mich 399 ; 256 NW 462 (1934); Lynas v Maxwell Farms, 279 Mich 684 ; 273 NW 315 (1937); Adolph v Cookware Co of America, 283 Mich 561 ; 278 NW 687 (1938).

1984See Whipple v Parker, 29 Mich 369 (1874), and Ordon v Johnson, 346 Mich 38 ; 77 NW2d 377 (1956). [5] Cf. McLaughlin v Ford Motor Co, 269 F2d 120 (CA 6, 1959); Gudenau v Farm Crest Bakeries, Inc, 268 Mich 399 ; 256 NW 462 (1934); Lynas v Maxwell Farms, 279 Mich 684 ; 273 NW 315 (1937); Adolph v Cookware Co of America, 283 Mich 561 ; 278 NW 687 (1938).

1984See Whipple v Parker, 29 Mich 369 (1874), and Ordon v Johnson, 346 Mich 38 ; 77 NW2d 377 (1956). [5] Cf. McLaughlin v Ford Motor Co, 269 F2d 120 (CA 6, 1959); Gudenau v Farm Crest Bakeries, Inc, 268 Mich 399 ; 256 NW 462 (1934); Lynas v Maxwell Farms, 279 Mich 684 ; 273 NW 315 (1937); Adolph v Cookware Co of America, 283 Mich 561 ; 278 NW 687 (1938).

1999Marrero, supra at 442-443 .

1993Marrero, supra at 442 .

1983The circumstances of each case will determine whether estoppel is to be applied against a local government, and: " Tf under all the circumstances, the acts of the *29 public body have created a situation where it would be inequitable and unjust to permit it to deny what it has done or permitted to be done, the doctrine of estoppel will be applied to the municipality.’ 2 Antieau, Municipal Corporation Law, § 16A.01, p 16A-6.” Parker v West Bloomfield Twp, 60 Mich App 583, 591-592 ; 231 NW2d 424 (1975).

1983The circumstances of each case will determine whether estoppel is to be applied against a local government, and: " Tf under all the circumstances, the acts of the *29 public body have created a situation where it would be inequitable and unjust to permit it to deny what it has done or permitted to be done, the doctrine of estoppel will be applied to the municipality.’ 2 Antieau, Municipal Corporation Law, § 16A.01, p 16A-6.” Parker v West Bloomfield Twp, 60 Mich App 583, 591-592 ; 231 NW2d 424 (1975).

1963In other words, by invoking the doctrine of estoppel and waiver it is sought to bring into existence a contract not made by the parties, to create a liability contrary to the express provisions of the contract the parties did make." *611 The Court further referred to the opinion of the supreme court of Wisconsin in McCoy v. Northwestern Mutual Relief Ass'n, 92 Wis 577 ( 66 NW 697 , 47 LRA 681), in which the action was based on an insurance policy that by its terms excluded liability if death resulted from suicide.

1963In other words, by invoking the doctrine of estoppel and waiver it is sought to bring into existence a contract not made by the parties, to create a liability contrary to the express provisions of the contract the parties did make.” The Court further referred to the opinion of the supreme court of Wisconsin in McCoy v. Northwestern Mutual Relief Ass’n, 92 Wis 577 ( 66 NW 697 , 47 LRA 681), in which the action was based on an insurance policy that by its terms excluded liability if death resulted from suicide.

1906State v. Railroad Co., 89 Mich. 481 ; Michigan v. Railroad Co., 69 Fed. 116 . • ‘ ‘ Resolute good faith should characterize the conduct of States in their dealings with individuals, and there is no reason in morals or law that will exempt them from the' doctrine of estoppel.” Indiana v. Milk, 11 Fed. 389 .

1895In State v. Railroad Co., 89 Mich. 481 , it was held that the State was not exempt from the doctrine of estoppel; and, if so, I fail to see why, upon principle, the rule referred to is not applicable as to payments made by the State.

2020The insured has a duty to read its insurance policy and to question the agent if concerns about coverage emerge.” Zaremba Equip, 280 Mich App at 36 . “[T]he law applied in Michigan leaves no room to doubt that as a general rule, an insured must read his or her insurance policy.” Id. at 29 .

2020The insured has a duty to read its insurance policy and to question the agent if concerns about coverage emerge.” Zaremba Equip, 280 Mich App at 36 . “[T]he law applied in Michigan leaves no room to doubt that as a general rule, an insured must read his or her insurance policy.” Id. at 29 .

2019The Michigan Supreme Court reaffirmed these principles in Kirschner v Process Design Assoc, Inc, 459 Mich 587, 593-594 ; 592 NW2d 707 (1999).2 Equitable estoppel simply cannot be applied to broaden Safeco’s UM coverage to cover damages sustained by plaintiff in the accident that involved Sovis’s insured vehicle.

2019The Michigan Supreme Court reaffirmed these principles in Kirschner v Process Design Assoc, Inc, 459 Mich 587, 593-594 ; 592 NW2d 707 (1999).2 Equitable estoppel simply cannot be applied to broaden Safeco’s UM coverage to cover damages sustained by plaintiff in the accident that involved Sovis’s insured vehicle.

2018“While silence or inaction, in certain situations, may invoke the doctrine of estoppel, silence does not invoke the doctrine unless the party remaining silent has a duty or obligation to disclose.” Lumber Vill, Inc, 135 Mich App at 698–699(emphasis in original).

2018“Unless there has been some fiduciary relationship or other direct dealings between the parties, mere silence is not enough to overcome the applicable period of limitation.” Id. at 699 .

2017Id.3 The Sixth Circuit pointed to our Supreme Court’s opinion in Taylor v Supreme Lodge of Columbian League, 135 Mich 231, 232 ; 97 NW 680 (1903).

2017Id.3 The Sixth Circuit pointed to our Supreme Court’s opinion in Taylor v Supreme Lodge of Columbian League, 135 Mich 231, 232 ; 97 NW 680 (1903).

2016In reliance on United States v Levin, 973 F 2d 463 (CA 5, 1992), defendant next argues that the doctrine of estoppel should bar his prosecution for felony possession of a firearm.

2015The Supreme Court held that sanctions were not warranted, because the issue “was not easily resolved,” and there was “no authority in Michigan that clearly and unequivocally addresses whether an oral license can become irrevocable by estoppel.” Id. at 662 . -12- We are not persuaded that Kitchen is irreconcilable with Weisel.

2003However, our Supreme Court has recently refused to apply the absurd result rule of statutory construction, describing it as “ ‘nothing but an invitation to judicial lawmaking.’ ” People v McIntire, 461 Mich 147, 166 ; 599 NW2d 102 (1999), quoting Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation: Federal Courts and the Law (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1997), p 21, while reproducing and adopting the partial dissenting opinion of Young, P.J., in People v McIntire, 232 Mich App 71, 122, n 2 ; 591 NW2d 231 (1998).

2003However, our Supreme Court has recently refused to apply the absurd result rule of statutory construction, describing it as “ ‘nothing but an invitation to judicial lawmaking.’ ” People v McIntire, 461 Mich 147, 166 ; 599 NW2d 102 (1999), quoting Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation: Federal Courts and the Law (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1997), p 21, while reproducing and adopting the partial dissenting opinion of Young, P.J., in People v McIntire, 232 Mich App 71, 122, n 2 ; 591 NW2d 231 (1998).

1999Smit, supra at 679-683 ; Lee, supra at 286-287 .

1999Smit, supra at 679-683 , 525 N.W.2d 528 ; Lee, supra at 286-287 , 390 N.W.2d 183 .

1997Co., 124 Mich. 303 , 82 N.W. 1068 (1900), where the Supreme Court held that *847 the insurer's delay of eight days did not establish an estoppel claim.

1997Co., 124 Mich. 303 , 82 N.W. 1068 (1900), where the Supreme Court held that *847 the insurer's delay of eight days did not establish an estoppel claim.

1996This is the doctrine of estoppel. [Kelly v Allegan Circuit Judge, 382 Mich 425, 427 ; 169 NW2d 916 (1969).] We also note that the record in this case contains a copy of the one-year medical authorization signed by Mr. Rafko.

1996This is the doctrine of estoppel. [Kelly v Allegan Circuit Judge, 382 Mich 425, 427 ; 169 NW2d 916 (1969).] We also note that the record in this case contains a copy of the one-year medical authorization signed by Mr. Rafko.

1994Graham, supra at 764 ; Fletcher, § 861.1, p 287; see also Phoenix Airline Serv v Metro Airlines, 194 Ga App 120, 124; 390 SE2d 219 (1990), rev’d on other grounds 260 Ga 584; 397 SE2d 699 (1990).

1994Graham, supra at 764 ; Fletcher, § 861.1, p 287; see also Phoenix Airline Serv v Metro Airlines, 194 Ga App 120, 124; 390 SE2d 219 (1990), rev’d on other grounds 260 Ga 584; 397 SE2d 699 (1990).

1993Kamalnath, supra at 552 .