estoppel doctrine in Mississippi

2022An estoppel claim requires: “(1) Belief and reliance on some representation; (2) Change of position, as a result thereof; (3) Detriment or prejudice caused by the change of position.” Suggs v. Town of Caledonia, 470 So. 2d 1055, 1057 (Miss. 1985) (quoting Covington Cnty. v. Page, 456 So. 2d 739, 741 (Miss. 1984)). ¶48.

2011At the very least, “as an essential prerequisite to application of the doctrine of estoppel[,] the party to be estopped must have had knowledge of the situation.” Suggs v. Town of Caledonia, 470 So.2d 1055, 1058 (Miss.1985).

2005Robertson, citing Izard v. Mikell, 173 Miss. 770 , 163 So. 498 (1935) and Ezell v. Williams, 724 So.2d 396 (Miss.1998), maintains that the doctrine of estoppel can be applied to bar a defendant from raising the statute of limitations as a defense where the defendant’s actions lulled the plaintiff into not filing suit.

2005Robertson, citing Izard v. Mikell, 173 Miss. 770 , 163 So. 498 (1935) and Ezell v. Williams, 724 So.2d 396 (Miss.1998), maintains that the doctrine of estoppel can be applied to bar a defendant from raising the statute of limitations as a defense where the defendant’s actions lulled the plaintiff into not filing suit.

2005Robertson, citing Izard v. Mikell, 173 Miss. 770 , 163 So. 498 (1935) and Ezell v. Williams, 724 So.2d 396 (Miss.1998), maintains that the doctrine of estoppel can be applied to bar a defendant from raising the statute of limitations as a defense where the defendant’s actions lulled the plaintiff into not filing suit.

1999Ezell v. Williams, 724 So.2d 396, 397-98 (Miss.1998) (citing Izard v. Mikell, 173 Miss. 770, 775 , 163 So. 498, 499 (1935) (holding that doctrine of estoppel can be applied to bar a defendant from raising the statute of limitations as a defense where the defendant's actions lulled the plaintiff into not filing suit)).

1999Id. at 638-39 , 279 N.W.2d at 225-26 [,] 515 N.W.2d at 331 (some citations omitted). ¶ 13.

1996Id. at 638-39 , 279 N.W.2d at 225 -26 515 N.W. 2d at 331 (some citations omitted). ¶13.

1999He argues that according to the Ninth Circuit case of United States v. Lazy FC Ranch , the estoppel doctrine can be applied to the government "where justice and fair play require it" for example, where "the government's wrongful conduct threatens to work a serious injustice and if the public's interest would not be unduly damaged by the imposition of estoppel ..." United States v. Lazy FC Ranch, 481 F.2d 985, 988-989 (9th Cir. 1973).

1997He argues that according to the Ninth Circuit case of United States v. Lazy FC Ranch, the estoppel doctrine can be applied to the government "where justice and fair play require it" for example, where "the government's wrongful conduct threatens to work a serious injustice and if the public's interest would not be unduly damaged by the imposition of estoppel. . ." United States v. Lazy FC Ranch, 481 F.2d 985 , 988- 989 (9th Cir. 1973).

1999Id. at 638-39 , 279 N.W.2d at 225-26 [,] 515 N.W.2d at 331 (some citations omitted). ¶ 13.

1999Id. at 638-39 , 279 N.W.2d at 225-26 [,] 515 N.W.2d at 331 (some citations omitted). ¶ 13.

1977In Strain v. Gayden, 197 Miss. 353 , 20 So.2d 697 (1945), this Court said: It is true that the judgment here complained of was by default, but it is also true that a judgment by default, where personal jurisdiction of a defendant has been obtained, is as conclusive either as an estoppel or bar as a judgment in a contested case.

1977In Strain v. Gayden, 197 Miss. 353 , 20 So.2d 697 (1945), this Court said: It is true that the judgment here complained of was by default, but it is also true that a judgment by default, where personal jurisdiction of a defendant has been obtained, is as conclusive either as an estoppel or bar as a judgment in a contested case.

2022An estoppel claim requires: “(1) Belief and reliance on some representation; (2) Change of position, as a result thereof; (3) Detriment or prejudice caused by the change of position.” Suggs v. Town of Caledonia, 470 So. 2d 1055, 1057 (Miss. 1985) (quoting Covington Cnty. v. Page, 456 So. 2d 739, 741 (Miss. 1984)). ¶48.

2019“Equitable estoppel . . . prevents a party from embracing the benefits of a contract while simultaneously trying to avoid its burdens.” Cmty. Bank of Miss. v. Stuckey, 52 So. 3d 1179, 1183 (¶ 25) (Miss. 2010). ¶60.

2019"Equitable estoppel ... prevents a party from embracing the benefits of a contract while simultaneously trying to avoid its burdens." Cmty. Bank of Miss. v. Stuckey , 52 So. 3d 1179 , 1183 (¶ 25) (Miss. 2010). ¶60.

2019The doctrine of estoppel “is defined generally as the principle by which a party is precluded from denying any material fact, induced by his words or conduct upon which a person relied, whereby the person changed his position in such a way that injury would be suffered if such denial or contrary assertion was allowed.” Koval v. Koval, 576 So. 2d 134, 137 (Miss. 1991).

2019The doctrine of estoppel "is defined generally as the principle by which a party is precluded from denying any material fact, induced by his words or conduct upon which a person relied, whereby the person changed his position in such a way that injury would be suffered if such denial or contrary assertion was allowed." Koval v. Koval , 576 So. 2d 134 , 137 (Miss. 1991).

2018"A principal, having clothed his agent with the semblance of authority, will not be permitted, after others have been led to act in reliance of the appearances thus produced, to deny, to the prejudice of such others, what he has theretofore tacitly affirmed as to the agent's powers." Steen , 78 So.2d at 883 ; see also McPherson , 221 So.2d at 78 .

2015Id. at 158.

1997PMZ Oil Co. v. Lucroy, 449 So.2d 201, 206 (Miss. 1984).

1992Strain v. Gayden, 197 Miss. 353 , 20 So.2d 697, 700 (1945) (quoted in Martin v. Armstrong, 350 So.2d 1353, 1356 (Miss. 1977)).

1990Steen v. Andrews, 223 Miss. 694, 697-98 , 78 So.2d 881, 883 (1955). b.

1990Steen v. Andrews, 223 Miss. 694, 697-98 , 78 So.2d 881, 883 (1955). b.