19 Idaho opinions name it 2 courts 1895–2022 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Idaho courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Lewis v. Continental Life and Accident Co.green2 sentences2013The district court did not allow Mr. Shapley to amend his complaint to add an estoppel claim because “[w]ithout the existence of a contract, the legal theory of estoppel cannot apply.” The district court based its conclusion on this Court’s language that the “purpose of the doctrine of estoppel in insurance cases is to enforce the contract as originally agreed upon by the parties.” Lewis v. Cont’l Life & Acc. Co., 93 Idaho 348, 353 , 461 P.2d 243, 248 (1969). 2013The district court did not allow Mr. Shapley to amend his complaint to add an estoppel claim because “[w]ithout the existence of a contract, the legal theory of estoppel cannot apply.” The district court based its conclusion on this Court’s language that the “purpose of the doctrine of estoppel in insurance cases is to enforce the contract as originally agreed upon by the parties.” Lewis v. Cont’l Life & Acc. Co., 93 Idaho 348, 353 , 461 P.2d 243, 248 (1969). | 1 | 2 |
Foster v. Johnstonegreen2 sentences2005Foster, 107 Idaho at 67 , 685 P.2d at 808 (stating that the estoppel test in Lewis is used for insurance contract cases). 2005Foster, 107 Idaho at 67 , 685 P.2d at 808 (stating that the estoppel test in Lewis is used for insurance contract cases). | 1 | 2 |
Tommerup v. Albertson's, Inc.green2 sentences1985Unlike the more traditional estoppel doctrine (called estoppel in pais) “no concealment or misrepresentation of existing facts on the one side, no ignorance or reliance on the other, is a necessary ingredient.” Clontz v. Fortner, 88 Idaho 355, 364-65 , 399 P.2d 949, 954 (1965), quoted in KTVB, Inc. v. Boise City, supra. Instead, quasi-estoppel requires that “the person against whom the estoppel is sought must have gained some advantage for himself ...; in addition it must be unconscionable to allow the person against whom the estoppel is sought to maintain a position which is inconsistent with 1985Unlike the more traditional estoppel doctrine (called estoppel in pais) “no concealment or misrepresentation of existing facts on the one side, no ignorance or reliance on the other, is a necessary ingredient.” Clontz v. Fortner, 88 Idaho 355, 364-65 , 399 P.2d 949, 954 (1965), quoted in KTVB, Inc. v. Boise City, supra. Instead, quasi-estoppel requires that “the person against whom the estoppel is sought must have gained some advantage for himself ...; in addition it must be unconscionable to allow the person against whom the estoppel is sought to maintain a position which is inconsistent with | 1 | 2 |
Shapley v. Centurion Life Insurancegreen2 sentences2022Co., 154 Idaho 875, 881 , 303 P.3d 234, 240 (2013). 2022Co., 154 Idaho 875, 881 , 303 P.3d 234, 240 (2013). | 1 | 1 |
Sagewillow, Inc. v. Idaho Department of Water Resourcesgreen2 sentences2012Generally, quasi-estoppel applies to situations wherein “it would be unconscionable to allow a party to assert a right that is inconsistent with a prior position.” Sagewillow, Inc. v. Idaho Dep’t of Water Res., 138 Idaho 831, 845 , 70 P.3d 669, 683 (2003) (citing Willig v. Idaho Dep’t of Health & Welfare, 127 Idaho 259 , 899 P.2d 969 (1995)). 2012Generally, quasi-estoppel applies to situations wherein “it would be unconscionable to allow a party to assert a right that is inconsistent with a prior position.” Sagewillow, Inc. v. Idaho Dep’t of Water Res., 138 Idaho 831, 845 , 70 P.3d 669, 683 (2003) (citing Willig v. Idaho Dep’t of Health & Welfare, 127 Idaho 259 , 899 P.2d 969 (1995)). | 1 | 1 |
Rich v. Burdickgreen2 sentences2006As we stated in Rich v. Burdick, 83 Idaho 335, 345 , 362 P.2d 1088, 1094 (1961): Possession and use of an unused portion of a highway by an abutting owner is not adverse to the public and cannot ripen into a right or title by lapse of time no matter how long continued. 2006As we stated in Rich v. Burdick, 83 Idaho 335, 345 , 362 P.2d 1088, 1094 (1961): Possession and use of an unused portion of a highway by an abutting owner is not adverse to the public and cannot ripen into a right or title by lapse of time no matter how long continued. | 1 | 1 |
Clontz v. Fortnergreen2 sentences1985Unlike the more traditional estoppel doctrine (called estoppel in pais) “no concealment or misrepresentation of existing facts on the one side, no ignorance or reliance on the other, is a necessary ingredient.” Clontz v. Fortner, 88 Idaho 355, 364-65 , 399 P.2d 949, 954 (1965), quoted in KTVB, Inc. v. Boise City, supra. Instead, quasi-estoppel requires that “the person against whom the estoppel is sought must have gained some advantage for himself ...; in addition it must be unconscionable to allow the person against whom the estoppel is sought to maintain a position which is inconsistent with 1985Unlike the more traditional estoppel doctrine (called estoppel in pais) “no concealment or misrepresentation of existing facts on the one side, no ignorance or reliance on the other, is a necessary ingredient.” Clontz v. Fortner, 88 Idaho 355, 364-65 , 399 P.2d 949, 954 (1965), quoted in KTVB, Inc. v. Boise City, supra. Instead, quasi-estoppel requires that “the person against whom the estoppel is sought must have gained some advantage for himself ...; in addition it must be unconscionable to allow the person against whom the estoppel is sought to maintain a position which is inconsistent with | 1 | 1 |
McCoy v. Wesley Hospital & Nurse Training Schoolgreen2 sentences1983See McCoy v. Wesley Hospital & Nurse Training School, 188 Kan. 325 , 362 P.2d 841 (1961); Central Heat, Inc. v. Daily Olympian, Inc., 74 Wash.2d 126 , 443 P.2d 544 (1968). 1983See McCoy v. Wesley Hospital & Nurse Training School, 188 Kan. 325 , 362 P.2d 841 (1961); Central Heat, Inc. v. Daily Olympian, Inc., 74 Wash.2d 126 , 443 P.2d 544 (1968). | 1 | 1 |
Palovik v. Abshergreen2 sentences1980If the facts constituting the estoppel or waiver are in any way sufficiently pleaded, he is entitled to the benefit of the law arising therefrom.” (Emphasis added.) Palovik v. Absher, 198 Okl. 671 , 181 P.2d 989, 990 (1947). 1980If the facts constituting the estoppel or waiver are in any way sufficiently pleaded, he is entitled to the benefit of the law arising therefrom.” (Emphasis added.) Palovik v. Absher, 198 Okl. 671 , 181 P.2d 989, 990 (1947). | 1 | 1 |
Palmer v. Crews Lumber Co., Inc.green2 sentences1980Accord, Palmer v. Crews Lumber Co., Inc., 510 P.2d 269 (Okl. 1973). 1980Accord, Palmer v. Crews Lumber Co., Inc., 510 P.2d 269 (Okl. 1973). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Idaho. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Saunders v. Lloyd's of London
green
1 sentence2022Id. at 256 . | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Willig v. State, Department of Health & Welfare
green
2 sentences2012Generally, quasi-estoppel applies to situations wherein “it would be unconscionable to allow a party to assert a right that is inconsistent with a prior position.” Sagewillow, Inc. v. Idaho Dep’t of Water Res., 138 Idaho 831, 845 , 70 P.3d 669, 683 (2003) (citing Willig v. Idaho Dep’t of Health & Welfare, 127 Idaho 259 , 899 P.2d 969 (1995)). 2012Generally, quasi-estoppel applies to situations wherein “it would be unconscionable to allow a party to assert a right that is inconsistent with a prior position.” Sagewillow, Inc. v. Idaho Dep’t of Water Res., 138 Idaho 831, 845 , 70 P.3d 669, 683 (2003) (citing Willig v. Idaho Dep’t of Health & Welfare, 127 Idaho 259 , 899 P.2d 969 (1995)). | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Landgraf v. USI Film Products
green
2 sentences1995We decline to address SGA’s contentions that the rezoning violates the contracts clause in Article I, § 10 of the U.S. Constitution, and that the rezoning is retroactive legislation forbidden under Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., — U.S. —, 114 S.Ct. 1483 , 128 L.Ed.2d 229 (1994), because SGA did not raise these issues below. 1995We decline to address SGA’s contentions that the rezoning violates the contracts clause in Article I, § 10 of the U.S. Constitution, and that the rezoning is retroactive legislation forbidden under Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., — U.S. —, 114 S.Ct. 1483 , 128 L.Ed.2d 229 (1994), because SGA did not raise these issues below. | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Tristram's Landing, Inc. v. Wait
green
2 sentences1984In Tristram’s Landing, Inc. v. Wait, 367 Mass. 622 , 327 N.E.2d 727 (1975), the purchaser produced by the broker failed to appear at the closing. 1984In Tristram’s Landing, Inc. v. Wait, 367 Mass. 622 , 327 N.E.2d 727 (1975), the purchaser produced by the broker failed to appear at the closing. | 1 | 1984–1984 |
Central Heat, Inc. v. Daily Olympian, Inc.
green
2 sentences1983See McCoy v. Wesley Hospital & Nurse Training School, 188 Kan. 325 , 362 P.2d 841 (1961); Central Heat, Inc. v. Daily Olympian, Inc., 74 Wash.2d 126 , 443 P.2d 544 (1968). 1983See McCoy v. Wesley Hospital & Nurse Training School, 188 Kan. 325 , 362 P.2d 841 (1961); Central Heat, Inc. v. Daily Olympian, Inc., 74 Wash.2d 126 , 443 P.2d 544 (1968). | 1 | 1983–1983 |
Bjornstad v. Perry
green
2 sentences1980Recently in Tommerup v. Albertson’s, Inc., 101 Idaho 1 , 607 P.2d 1055 (February, 1980), the court quoted from Bjornstad v. Perry, 92 Idaho 402 , 443 P.2d 999 (1968): “Equitable estoppel generally requires that a false representation or concealment of a material fact be made with actual or constructive knowledge of the true state of facts; that the party to whom the false representation was made was without knowledge or the means of acquiring knowledge of the real facts; that the false representation was made with the intent that it be acted upon, and that the party to whom it was made relied 1980Recently in Tommerup v. Albertson’s, Inc., 101 Idaho 1 , 607 P.2d 1055 (February, 1980), the court quoted from Bjornstad v. Perry, 92 Idaho 402 , 443 P.2d 999 (1968): “Equitable estoppel generally requires that a false representation or concealment of a material fact be made with actual or constructive knowledge of the true state of facts; that the party to whom the false representation was made was without knowledge or the means of acquiring knowledge of the real facts; that the false representation was made with the intent that it be acted upon, and that the party to whom it was made relied | 1 | 1980–1980 |
Rennie & Laughlin, Inc., a Corporation v. Chrysler Corporation, a Corporation
green
1 sentence1978Rennie and Laughlin, Inc. v. Chrysler Corp., 242 F.2d 208 (9th Cir. 1957); J. | 1 | 1978–1978 |
Harrell v. City of Lewiston
green
2 sentences1975Cf. Harrell v. City of Lewiston, 95 Idaho 243 , 506 P.2d 470 (1973). 1975Cf. Harrell v. City of Lewiston, 95 Idaho 243 , 506 P.2d 470 (1973). | 1 | 1975–1975 |
Hillman v. City of Pocatello
green
2 sentences1963In a comparable situation, Hillman v.City of Pocatello, 74 Idaho 69 , 256 P.2d 1072 , this Court, in refuting the application of the doctrine of estoppel (by laches), stated: “Subsequent to the enactment of the ordinance in question, there were no rights established or rights of third parties affected, or any detriment to others shown by the jurisdiction which the City exercised over the land in question. * * * “We conclude that the Mayor and City Council of the City of Pocatello did not have authority or power to pass the ordinance in question, hence the same is void. 1963In a comparable situation, Hillman v.City of Pocatello, 74 Idaho 69 , 256 P.2d 1072 , this Court, in refuting the application of the doctrine of estoppel (by laches), stated: “Subsequent to the enactment of the ordinance in question, there were no rights established or rights of third parties affected, or any detriment to others shown by the jurisdiction which the City exercised over the land in question. * * * “We conclude that the Mayor and City Council of the City of Pocatello did not have authority or power to pass the ordinance in question, hence the same is void. | 1 | 1963–1963 |
Rodgers v. Thomas
neutral
2 sentences1914This doctrine is applied in favor of the tona fide holder of public securities and the courts have repeatedly held that where a public corporation fails to raise defenses which are open to it within a reasonable length of time, that it will thereafter be estopped by laches to question the validity of securities in the hands of tona fide holders in respect to irregularities and infirmities in their issue.” In applying the doctrine of estoppel in the case of Lent v. Tillson, 72 Cal. 404 , 14 Pac. 71 , the following language is used: “Under such circumstances, they could not remain silent, and pe 1914This doctrine is applied in favor of the tona fide holder of public securities and the courts have repeatedly held that where a public corporation fails to raise defenses which are open to it within a reasonable length of time, that it will thereafter be estopped by laches to question the validity of securities in the hands of tona fide holders in respect to irregularities and infirmities in their issue.” In applying the doctrine of estoppel in the case of Lent v. Tillson, 72 Cal. 404 , 14 Pac. 71 , the following language is used: “Under such circumstances, they could not remain silent, and pe | 1 | 1914–1914 |
Lent v. Tillson
green
2 sentences1914This doctrine is applied in favor of the tona fide holder of public securities and the courts have repeatedly held that where a public corporation fails to raise defenses which are open to it within a reasonable length of time, that it will thereafter be estopped by laches to question the validity of securities in the hands of tona fide holders in respect to irregularities and infirmities in their issue.” In applying the doctrine of estoppel in the case of Lent v. Tillson, 72 Cal. 404 , 14 Pac. 71 , the following language is used: “Under such circumstances, they could not remain silent, and pe 1914This doctrine is applied in favor of the tona fide holder of public securities and the courts have repeatedly held that where a public corporation fails to raise defenses which are open to it within a reasonable length of time, that it will thereafter be estopped by laches to question the validity of securities in the hands of tona fide holders in respect to irregularities and infirmities in their issue.” In applying the doctrine of estoppel in the case of Lent v. Tillson, 72 Cal. 404 , 14 Pac. 71 , the following language is used: “Under such circumstances, they could not remain silent, and pe | 1 | 1914–1914 |
Indiana v. Milk
green
2 sentences1913(State of Indiana v. Milk, 11 Fed. 389 , 11 Biss. 197 ; United States v. Wallamet Val. & C. 1913(State of Indiana v. Milk, 11 Fed. 389 , 11 Biss. 197 ; United States v. Wallamet Val. & C. | 1 | 1913–1913 |
Walling v. Bown
neutral
2 sentences1905(Walling v. Bown, 9 Idaho, 184 , 72 Pac. 960 ; Mills Novelty Co. v. Dunbar (Idaho), 83 Pac. 932 .) It is further contended by petitioner that it is not pretended that the list of taxable property furnished the assessor was the official statement which the assessor had a right to exact and which the law provides must be sworn to, and for that reason the doctrine of estoppel will not apply. 1905(Walling v. Bown, 9 Idaho, 184 , 72 Pac. 960 ; Mills Novelty Co. v. Dunbar (Idaho), 83 Pac. 932 .) It is further contended by petitioner that it is not pretended that the list of taxable property furnished the assessor was the official statement which the assessor had a right to exact and which the law provides must be sworn to, and for that reason the doctrine of estoppel will not apply. | 1 | 1905–1905 |
Mills Novelty Co. v. Dunbar
neutral
1 sentence1905(Walling v. Bown, 9 Idaho, 184 , 72 Pac. 960 ; Mills Novelty Co. v. Dunbar (Idaho), 83 Pac. 932 .) It is further contended by petitioner that it is not pretended that the list of taxable property furnished the assessor was the official statement which the assessor had a right to exact and which the law provides must be sworn to, and for that reason the doctrine of estoppel will not apply. | 1 | 1905–1905 |
Michigan State Insurance v. Lewis
green
1 sentence1895Note 1 to Insurance Co. v. Lewis, 30 Mich. 41 , contains a citation of numerous authorities illustrating the doctrine of estoppel and waiver through the acts of the agent of the insurance company. | 1 | 1895–1895 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.