estoppel doctrine in Colorado

2008We also reject respondents' collateral contention that Piz authorizes a court to preclude abandonment even in the absence of reliance because the doctrine of estoppel "is founded upon principles of fair dealing and is designed to aid the law in the administration of justice where without its aid injustice might result." Piz 182 Colo. at 463, 289 P.2d at 908 (quoting Johnson v. Neel, 123 Colo. 377, 387 , 229 P.2d 989 , 944 (1951)).

1977Any other rule would render lien waivers valueless." Lien claimants argue that the doctrine of estoppel may not be applied in this jurisdiction because § 38-22-119, C.R.S. 1973, which provides that "[n]o agreement to waive . . . any lien . . . shall be binding except as between the parties to such contract," and because of § 38-22-123, C.R.S.1973, which mandates that "[n]o payment made by any owner to any contractor for the purpose of avoiding any anticipated lien . . . shall be valid." Even assuming that the landowners in this case were not deemed to be parties to the release executed by lien

1996See Crawford v. McLaughlin, 172 Colo. 366 , 473 P.2d 725 (1970) (right may vest based on substantial expenditure in reliance on initial permit despite need for additional permits); Cline v. Boulder, 168 Colo. 112 , 450 P.2d 335 (1969) (absent reliance, possession of a building permit does not vest a property right in the owner); City and County of Denver v. Stackhouse, 135 Colo. 289 , 310 P.2d 296 (1957) (reliance on invalid building permit sufficient to invoke doctrine of estoppel); see also Aspen v. Marshall, 912 P.2d 56 (Colo.1996) (building regulations in effect at time of submission of co

1996See Crawford v. McLaughlin, 172 Colo. 366 , 473 P.2d 725 (1970) (right may vest based on substantial expenditure in reliance on initial permit despite need for additional permits); Cline v. Boulder, 168 Colo. 112 , 450 P.2d 335 (1969) (absent reliance, possession of a building permit does not vest a property right in the owner); City and County of Denver v. Stackhouse, 135 Colo. 289 , 310 P.2d 296 (1957) (reliance on invalid building permit sufficient to invoke doctrine of estoppel); see also Aspen v. Marshall, 912 P.2d 56 (Colo.1996) (building regulations in effect at time of submission of co

1912We do, however, instruct you that any and all statements and admissions, made by the defendant elsewhere, contrary to his evidence given upon the witness stand in this case, go to his credibility, and are so to be considered by you in making up your verdict. ’ ’ In Nicholson v. Snyder, 97 Md., 415 , discussing the doctrine of estoppel, the court said: “In the case before us, nothing was actually decided in the former suit, that being dismissed by plaintiff upon his own admission of inability to prosecute it to a successful termination, and it follows from the authorities we have cited that the

1912We do, however, instruct you that any and all statements and admissions, made by the defendant elsewhere, contrary to his evidence given upon the witness stand in this case, go to his credibility, and are so to be considered by you in making up your verdict. ’ ’ In Nicholson v. Snyder, 97 Md., 415 , discussing the doctrine of estoppel, the court said: “In the case before us, nothing was actually decided in the former suit, that being dismissed by plaintiff upon his own admission of inability to prosecute it to a successful termination, and it follows from the authorities we have cited that the

1912Com. v. Rollins, 173 U. S.; Dixon Co. v. Field, was said to be a leading case on the subject and the following language therein approved: "The estoppel does not arise, except upon matters of fact which the corporate officers had authority by law to determine and to certify.” The court there quotes and approves the extract heretofore set out from Dixon v. Field, supra. The reason for a denial of the doctrine of estoppel ‘in case of public officers acting without authority is well stated in Chisholm v. City of Montgomery, 2 Woods, 584 , as follows : "Finally the plea that the plaintiffs are bona

1912Com. v. Rollins, 173 U. S.; Dixon Co. v. Field, was said to be a leading case on the subject and the following language therein approved: "The estoppel does not arise, except upon matters of fact which the corporate officers had authority by law to determine and to certify.” The court there quotes and approves the extract heretofore set out from Dixon v. Field, supra. The reason for a denial of the doctrine of estoppel ‘in case of public officers acting without authority is well stated in Chisholm v. City of Montgomery, 2 Woods, 584 , as follows : "Finally the plea that the plaintiffs are bona

1912We do, however, instruct you that any and all statements and admissions, made by the defendant elsewhere, contrary to his evidence given upon the witness stand in this case, go to his credibility, and are so to be considered by you in making up your verdict. ’ ’ In Nicholson v. Snyder, 97 Md., 415 , discussing the doctrine of estoppel, the court said: “In the case before us, nothing was actually decided in the former suit, that being dismissed by plaintiff upon his own admission of inability to prosecute it to a successful termination, and it follows from the authorities we have cited that the

1912We do, however, instruct you that any and all statements and admissions, made by the defendant elsewhere, contrary to his evidence given upon the witness stand in this case, go to his credibility, and are so to be considered by you in making up your verdict. ’ ’ In Nicholson v. Snyder, 97 Md., 415 , discussing the doctrine of estoppel, the court said: “In the case before us, nothing was actually decided in the former suit, that being dismissed by plaintiff upon his own admission of inability to prosecute it to a successful termination, and it follows from the authorities we have cited that the

1912We do, however, instruct you that any and all statements and admissions, made by the defendant elsewhere, contrary to his evidence given upon the witness stand in this case, go to his credibility, and are so to be considered by you in making up your verdict. ’ ’ In Nicholson v. Snyder, 97 Md., 415 , discussing the doctrine of estoppel, the court said: “In the case before us, nothing was actually decided in the former suit, that being dismissed by plaintiff upon his own admission of inability to prosecute it to a successful termination, and it follows from the authorities we have cited that the

1912We do, however, instruct you that any and all statements and admissions, made by the defendant elsewhere, contrary to his evidence given upon the witness stand in this case, go to his credibility, and are so to be considered by you in making up your verdict. ’ ’ In Nicholson v. Snyder, 97 Md., 415 , discussing the doctrine of estoppel, the court said: “In the case before us, nothing was actually decided in the former suit, that being dismissed by plaintiff upon his own admission of inability to prosecute it to a successful termination, and it follows from the authorities we have cited that the

1912Com. v. Rollins, 173 U. S.; Dixon Co. v. Field, was said to be a leading case on the subject and the following language therein approved: "The estoppel does not arise, except upon matters of fact which the corporate officers had authority by law to determine and to certify.” The court there quotes and approves the extract heretofore set out from Dixon v. Field, supra. The reason for a denial of the doctrine of estoppel ‘in case of public officers acting without authority is well stated in Chisholm v. City of Montgomery, 2 Woods, 584 , as follows : "Finally the plea that the plaintiffs are bona

1912Com. v. Rollins, 173 U. S.; Dixon Co. v. Field, was said to be a leading case on the subject and the following language therein approved: "The estoppel does not arise, except upon matters of fact which the corporate officers had authority by law to determine and to certify.” The court there quotes and approves the extract heretofore set out from Dixon v. Field, supra. The reason for a denial of the doctrine of estoppel ‘in case of public officers acting without authority is well stated in Chisholm v. City of Montgomery, 2 Woods, 584 , as follows : "Finally the plea that the plaintiffs are bona

1912In the case of Young et al. v. Wittenmyre, supra, cited by counsel for appellant, the court recognized the proper application of the doctrine of estoppel, but refused to apply it for the reason only that the heirs were not instrumental in having the distribution made, knowing that an unpaid debt remained, and that the action of the administratrix in making such distribution was of her own free will and without being required either by the heirs or by the court, she voluntarily paid over money to the heirs which she ought to have retained for the payment of debts.

1912In the case of Young et al. v. Wittenmyre, supra, cited by counsel for appellant, the court recognized the proper application of the doctrine of estoppel, but refused to apply it for the reason only that the heirs were not instrumental in having the distribution made, knowing that an unpaid debt remained, and that the action of the administratrix in making such distribution was of her own free will and without being required either by the heirs or by the court, she voluntarily paid over money to the heirs which she ought to have retained for the payment of debts.

1897Speaking upon the subject of definitions of the doctrine of estoppel, essayed by courts, the supreme court of New Hampshire, in Horn v. Cole, 51 N. H. 287, said: “ In the much and well considered case of Preston v. Mann, 25 Conn. 118, 128 , Storrs, J., delivering the opinion of the court says, ‘ The doctrine of estoppel in pais, notwithstanding the great number of cases which have turned upon it and are reported in the books, cannot be said even yet to rest upon any determinate legal test which will reconcile the decisions, or will embrace all transactions to which the general principles of eq

1897Speaking upon the subject of definitions of the doctrine of estoppel, essayed by courts, the supreme court of New Hampshire, in Horn v. Cole, 51 N. H. 287, said: “ In the much and well considered case of Preston v. Mann, 25 Conn. 118, 128 , Storrs, J., delivering the opinion of the court says, ‘ The doctrine of estoppel in pais, notwithstanding the great number of cases which have turned upon it and are reported in the books, cannot be said even yet to rest upon any determinate legal test which will reconcile the decisions, or will embrace all transactions to which the general principles of eq

2009Id. at 450 .

2008We also reject respondents' collateral contention that Piz authorizes a court to preclude abandonment even in the absence of reliance because the doctrine of estoppel "is founded upon principles of fair dealing and is designed to aid the law in the administration of justice where without its aid injustice might result." Piz 182 Colo. at 463, 289 P.2d at 908 (quoting Johnson v. Neel, 123 Colo. 377, 387 , 229 P.2d 989 , 944 (1951)).

1996See Crawford v. McLaughlin, 172 Colo. 366 , 473 P.2d 725 (1970) (right may vest based on substantial expenditure in reliance on initial permit despite need for additional permits); Cline v. Boulder, 168 Colo. 112 , 450 P.2d 335 (1969) (absent reliance, possession of a building permit does not vest a property right in the owner); City and County of Denver v. Stackhouse, 135 Colo. 289 , 310 P.2d 296 (1957) (reliance on invalid building permit sufficient to invoke doctrine of estoppel); see also Aspen v. Marshall, 912 P.2d 56 (Colo.1996) (building regulations in effect at time of submission of co

1996See Crawford v. McLaughlin, 172 Colo. 366 , 473 P.2d 725 (1970) (right may vest based on substantial expenditure in reliance on initial permit despite need for additional permits); Cline v. Boulder, 168 Colo. 112 , 450 P.2d 335 (1969) (absent reliance, possession of a building permit does not vest a property right in the owner); City and County of Denver v. Stackhouse, 135 Colo. 289 , 310 P.2d 296 (1957) (reliance on invalid building permit sufficient to invoke doctrine of estoppel); see also Aspen v. Marshall, 912 P.2d 56 (Colo.1996) (building regulations in effect at time of submission of co

1990“The doctrine is founded upon principles of fair dealing and is designed to aid the law in the administration of justice where, without its aid, injustice might result.” Colorado Water Quality Control Comm. v. Town of Frederick, 641 P.2d 958 , (Colo.1982); Denver v. Stackhouse, 135 Colo. 289 , 310 P.2d 296 (1957); Crawford v. McLaughlin, 172 Colo. 366, 376 , 473 P.2d 725, 730 (1970).

1990"The doctrine is founded upon principles of fair dealing and is designed to aid the law in the administration of justice where, without its aid, injustice might result." Colorado Water Quality Control Comm. v. Town of Frederick, 641 P.2d 958 , (Colo.1982); Denver v. Stackhouse, 135 Colo. 289 , 310 P.2d 296 (1957); Crawford v. McLaughlin, 172 Colo. 366, 376 , 473 *253 P.2d 725, 730 (1970).