flexible standard in Florida

2005Mr. Arroyo’s reasonable suspicion was not based on a whim or “mere hunch” but was the result of his perception of S.V.J.’s furtive'movements to conceal her purse and startled look through the lens of his eighteen years of experience dealing with troubled students. “[S]chool authorities have a layman’s familiarity with the types of crimes that occur frequently in our schools: the distribution and use of drugs, theft, and even violence against teachers as well as fellow students.” T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 350 n. 1, 105 S.Ct. 733 (Powell, J., concurring).

2005Mr. Arroyo’s reasonable suspicion was not based on a whim or “mere hunch” but was the result of his perception of S.V.J.’s furtive'movements to conceal her purse and startled look through the lens of his eighteen years of experience dealing with troubled students. “[S]chool authorities have a layman’s familiarity with the types of crimes that occur frequently in our schools: the distribution and use of drugs, theft, and even violence against teachers as well as fellow students.” T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 350 n. 1, 105 S.Ct. 733 (Powell, J., concurring).

1986In Gates , the United States Supreme Court abandoned the rigid "two-pronged test" established in Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 , 84 S.Ct. 1509 , 12 L.Ed.2d 703 (1964), and Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 , 89 S.Ct. 584 , 21 L.Ed.2d 637 (1969), and substituted, in its place, a more flexible standard.

1986In Gates , the United States Supreme Court abandoned the rigid "two-pronged test" established in Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 , 84 S.Ct. 1509 , 12 L.Ed.2d 703 (1964), and Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 , 89 S.Ct. 584 , 21 L.Ed.2d 637 (1969), and substituted, in its place, a more flexible standard.

1986In Gates , the United States Supreme Court abandoned the rigid "two-pronged test" established in Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 , 84 S.Ct. 1509 , 12 L.Ed.2d 703 (1964), and Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 , 89 S.Ct. 584 , 21 L.Ed.2d 637 (1969), and substituted, in its place, a more flexible standard.

1986In Gates , the United States Supreme Court abandoned the rigid "two-pronged test" established in Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 , 84 S.Ct. 1509 , 12 L.Ed.2d 703 (1964), and Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 , 89 S.Ct. 584 , 21 L.Ed.2d 637 (1969), and substituted, in its place, a more flexible standard.

2025Carroll, 267 U.S. at 162 .

2023“The combination of the medical proof presented here coupled with the other evidence received by the judge was legally sufficient to support the award in this case.” Id. at 54 . 8 The Glinski panel indeed acknowledged that this approach followed on the flexible analysis taken by a prior panel, in Bill’s Equip. & Rentals v. Teel, 498 So. 2d 536, 537 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986).

2019A more flexible standard is appropriate because “[l]imiting the trial court's discretion to a determination of the fair market value of the property involved at the time of the crime does not further its ability to serve the goals of the restitution program.” Id.

2017In response to these changes, the requirements for personal jurisdiction over nonresidents have evolved from the rigid rule of Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 [, 24 L.Ed. 565 ] [ (1877) ], to the flexible standard of International Shoe Co. v. [Washington, 326 U.S. 310 , 66 S.Ct. 154 , 90 L.Ed. 95 (1945) ].

2017In response to these changes, the requirements for personal jurisdiction over nonresidents have evolved from the rigid rule of Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 [, 24 L.Ed. 565 ] [ (1877) ], to the flexible standard of International Shoe Co. v. [Washington, 326 U.S. 310 , 66 S.Ct. 154 , 90 L.Ed. 95 (1945) ].

2017In response to these changes, the requirements for personal jurisdiction over nonresidents have evolved from the rigid rule of Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 [, 24 L.Ed. 565 ] [ (1877) ], to the flexible standard of International Shoe Co. v. [Washington, 326 U.S. 310 , 66 S.Ct. 154 , 90 L.Ed. 95 (1945) ].

2017In response to these changes, the requirements for personal jurisdiction over nonresidents have evolved from the rigid rule of Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 [, 24 L.Ed. 565 ] [ (1877) ], to the flexible standard of International Shoe Co. v. [Washington, 326 U.S. 310 , 66 S.Ct. 154 , 90 L.Ed. 95 (1945) ].

2009This Court, in Warren, 498 So.2d at 472 , employs a more flexible standard to conclude that the trial court committed fundamental error.

2008The thirty-day period identified in Hamelmann and discussed in Rodriguez and its progeny is at most a "rule of thumb." In this regard, the First District sought in Montgomery to identify certain factors to consider in determining whether the information in an affidavit is sufficiently "fresh" to support probable cause, including: whether there was evidence of a pattern of ongoing criminal activity; the nature of the object sought; the nature of the criminal activity involved; whether there was a continuing flow of information or an ongoing investigation; and the size or supply of the contraban

2000This would allow the State to invoke the more flexible standard announced in Saffor v. State, 660 So.2d 668 (Fla.1995), for determining admissibility of Williams rule evidence.

1993Iglehart v. Phillips, 383 So.2d at 616-18 .

1993As pointed out by the third district in Bierer v. State, 582 So.2d 1230 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991), this district in Stricklen v. State, 504 So.2d 1248, 1250 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986), set forth a broad definition of the term "familial" in order to effectuate the statutory purpose of protecting minor children "from predatory influences of older persons who establish close family ties with them." Additional cases have also eased the burden of proof under such circumstances.

1988Collier Medical Center v HRS, 462 So.2d 83 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985).

1988Id. (emphasis added).

1985Cf. Bain v. State, 440 So.2d 454 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983); Brazil v. State, 429 So.2d 1339 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983).

1985Cf. Bain v. State, 440 So.2d 454 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983); Brazil v. State, 429 So.2d 1339 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983).

1981DCA), cert. denied, 146 So.2d 374 (Fla. 1962).

1981If we were free to choose, I would prefer the more flexible framework of State Board of Control v. Clutter Construction Corp., 139 So.2d 153 (Fla. 1st.

1980The court noted that the "state where injury occurred may have little actual significance for the cause of action." The court in Johnson v. Auto-Owners Insurance Co., 289 So.2d 748 (Fla. 1st DCA 1974), employed similar reasoning in applying Florida law to allow coverage under the uninsured motorist provision of a policy issued in Alabama to an Alabama resident.

1979They urge that the court in that case expressed a decided preference for the rule's abandonment in favor of what is sometimes termed the "center of gravity" approach, [3] a more flexible rule which permits a choice of law based upon an analysis of the "policies underlying and the purpose of the conflicting laws and of the relationship of the occurrence and of the parties to such policies and purpose" ( Hopkins, supra, at 747 ).