flexible test in Wisconsin

2018Kumho Tire emphasized that the application of the Daubert factors is a flexible inquiry: "[T]he law grants a [trial] court the same broad latitude when it decides how to determine reliability as it enjoys in respect to its ultimate reliability determination." Kumho Tire , 526 U.S. at 142 , 119 S. Ct. 1167 .

2017A trial court conducts its reliability analysis with wide latitude.20 Kumho Tire emphasized that the application of the Daubert factors is a flexible inquiry: "[T]he law grants a district court the same broad latitude when it decides how to determine reliability as it enjoys in respect to its ultimate reliability determination." Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 142 . ¶65 Thus, the trial court may consider some, all, or none of the factors listed to determine whether the expert evidence is reliable.

2022Where that is the case the trial court must scrutinize the claimed exception, rather than whether the lawsuit caused the release, to determine whether a requesting party has prevailed[.21] See id., ¶¶26, 32 (quoting Portage Daily Reg., 19 308 Wis. 2d 357 , ¶8 and citing Young, 165 Wis. 2d at 286–91). 20 Id., ¶32. 21 Id., ¶33. 9 No. 2019ap96.rgb Applying this third factor——and seemingly only this factor——the court of appeals concluded: Here, there can be no question that the City withheld the draft contract on the claimed basis that a public records exception required nondisclosure; it later re

2022Where that is the case the trial court must scrutinize the claimed exception, rather than whether the lawsuit caused the release, to determine whether a requesting party has prevailed[.21] See id., ¶¶26, 32 (quoting Portage Daily Reg., 19 308 Wis. 2d 357 , ¶8 and citing Young, 165 Wis. 2d at 286–91). 20 Id., ¶32. 21 Id., ¶33. 9 No. 2019AP96.rgb Applying this third factor——and seemingly only this factor——the court of appeals concluded: Here, there can be no question that the City withheld the draft contract on the claimed basis that a public records exception required nondisclosure; it later re

2022Where that is the case the trial court must scrutinize the claimed exception, rather than whether the lawsuit caused the release, to determine whether a requesting party has prevailed[.21] See id., ¶¶26, 32 (quoting Portage Daily Reg., 19 308 Wis. 2d 357 , ¶8 and citing Young, 165 Wis. 2d at 286–91). 20 Id., ¶32. 21 Id., ¶33. 9 No. 2019ap96.rgb Applying this third factor——and seemingly only this factor——the court of appeals concluded: Here, there can be no question that the City withheld the draft contract on the claimed basis that a public records exception required nondisclosure; it later re

2022Where that is the case the trial court must scrutinize the claimed exception, rather than whether the lawsuit caused the release, to determine whether a requesting party has prevailed[.21] See id., ¶¶26, 32 (quoting Portage Daily Reg., 19 308 Wis. 2d 357 , ¶8 and citing Young, 165 Wis. 2d at 286–91). 20 Id., ¶32. 21 Id., ¶33. 9 No. 2019AP96.rgb Applying this third factor——and seemingly only this factor——the court of appeals concluded: Here, there can be no question that the City withheld the draft contract on the claimed basis that a public records exception required nondisclosure; it later re

2021Furthermore, “[o]ur review of the exigent circumstances is ‘directed by a flexible test of reasonableness under the totality of the circumstances.’” State v. Phillips, 2009 WI App 179, ¶8 , 322 Wis. 2d 576 , 778 N.W.2d 157 (quoting State v. Smith, 131 Wis. 2d 220, 229 , 388 N.W.2d 601 (1986)).

2021Furthermore, “[o]ur review of the exigent circumstances is ‘directed by a flexible test of reasonableness under the totality of the circumstances.’” State v. Phillips, 2009 WI App 179, ¶8 , 322 Wis. 2d 576 , 778 N.W.2d 157 (quoting State v. Smith, 131 Wis. 2d 220, 229 , 388 N.W.2d 601 (1986)).

2021“The State bears the burden of proving the existence of exigent circumstances.” Richter, 235 Wis. 2d 524, ¶29 . ¶16 The State argues that the circuit court properly denied the suppression motion because exigent circumstances made it reasonable for the officer to open the vehicle door.

2021Allegations of fact in a complaint are constitutionally sufficient if the allegations inform the defendant of the charges against him or her, as well as the underlying facts constituting the offense, including the time frame in which the crime allegedly occurred.7 See Fawcett, 145 Wis. 2d at 253 . ¶22 In child sexual assault cases, a “more flexible application of [the] notice requirements is required and permitted,” and under this more flexible standard the complaint need not set forth precise allegations regarding the date the child sexual assault was committed.

2021Hurley, 361 Wis. 2d 529, ¶34 (quoting Fawcett, 145 Wis. 2d at 254 ).

2018Seifert v. Balink , 2017 WI 2 , ¶ 64, 372 Wis. 2d 525 , 888 N.W.2d 816 (footnote omitted). 2.

2018Seifert v. Balink , 2017 WI 2 , ¶ 64, 372 Wis. 2d 525 , 888 N.W.2d 816 (footnote omitted). 2.

2013As Sobczak acknowledges, the power to give consent turns on "widely shared social expectations" and "commonly held understanding about the authority that co- inhabitants may exercise in ways that affect each other's interests." Randolph, 547 U.S. at 111 .

2013As Sobczak acknowledges, the power to give consent turns on "widely shared social expectations" and "commonly held understanding about the authority that co-inhabitants may exercise in ways that affect each other's interests." Randolph, 547 U.S. at 111 .

2013Or. 2012) (quoting Matlock's repudiation of property law in the third-party consent context and not mentioning Jones); People v. Fernandez, 145 Cal. Rptr. 3d 51, 59 (Ct. App. 2012) (same), cert. granted, 569 U.S. __ , __ S. Ct. __, 2013 WL 2149804 (2013); Pryor v. City of Clearlake, 877 F. Supp. 2d 929 , 944 10 No. 2010AP3034-CR ¶15 Resisting this inevitable conclusion, Sobczak insists that the strict weekend guest/co-occupant dichotomy he constructs to delineate who has authority to consent can be maintained within the more flexible framework established by the U.S. Supreme Court.

2013Or. 2012) (quoting Matlock's repudiation of property law in the third-party consent context and not mentioning Jones); People v. Fernandez, 145 Cal. Rptr. 3d 51, 59 (Ct. App. 2012) (same), cert. granted, 569 U.S. __ , __ S. Ct. __, 2013 WL 2149804 (2013); Pryor v. City of Clearlake, 877 F. Supp. 2d 929 , 944 10 No. 2010AP3034-CR ¶15 Resisting this inevitable conclusion, Sobczak insists that the strict weekend guest/co-occupant dichotomy he constructs to delineate who has authority to consent can be maintained within the more flexible framework established by the U.S. Supreme Court.

2011The court noted that "courts are moving toward a more flexible analysis under Mosley," Turner, 136 Wis. 2d at 357-58 , and "[i]t is not determinative, absent other evidence of police overbearing or coercive tactics, that all of the Mosley factors [be] satisfied," Turner, 136 Wis. 2d at 360 .

2011The court noted that "courts are moving toward a more flexible analysis under Mosley," Turner, 136 Wis. 2d at 357-58 , and "[i]t is not determinative, absent other evidence of police overbearing or coercive tactics, that all of the Mosley factors [be] satisfied," Turner, 136 Wis. 2d at 360 .

2009The court in Rayburn ultimately concluded that a pastoral care associate at a Seventh-day Adventist Church was "so significant in the expression and realization of Seventh-day Adventist beliefs that state intervention in the appointment process would excessively inhibit religious liberty." Id. at 1168 . ¶ 43 This test for determining whether a position is ministerial has subsequently been called the "primary duties test." In practice, the primary duties test has proved to be a flexible test without an answer key and has not yielded predictable results.

2009"However, the government cannot justify a search on the basis of exigent circumstances that are of the law enforcement officers' own making." Kiekhefer, 212 Wis.2d at 476 , 569 N.W.2d 316 ; see also Hughes, 233 Wis.2d 280 , ¶ 28 n. 7, 607 N.W.2d 621 .

2009"However, the government cannot justify a search on the basis of exigent circumstances that are of the law enforcement officers' own making." Kiekhefer, 212 Wis. 2d at 476 ; see also Hughes, 233 Wis. 2d 280 , ¶ 28 n.7.

2004"The Fourth Amendment does not require police officers to delay in the course of an investigation if to do so would gravely endanger their lives or the lives of others." Id. (citation omitted.) Our review of exigent circumstances is directed by a flexible test of reasonableness under the totality of the circumstances.

1987State v. Denter, 121 Wis. 2d 118, 123 , 357 N.W.2d 555 (1984), Aparacor, Inc. v. I.L.H.R.

1987State v. Denter, 121 Wis. 2d 118, 123 , 357 N.W.2d 555 (1984), Aparacor, Inc. v. I.L.H.R.

1987It seems apparent that a wide range of time gaps between interrogations may satisfy Mosley, see, Jackson, 730 F.2d at 1180 ; Finch 557 F.2d at 1236 ; and Mosley, 423 U.S. at 106 .

1987It seems apparent that a wide range of time gaps between interrogations may satisfy Mosley, see, Jackson, 730 F.2d at 1180 ; Finch 557 F.2d at 1236 ; and Mosley, 423 U.S. at 106 .

1987It seems apparent that a wide range of time gaps between interrogations may satisfy Mosley, see, Jackson, 730 F.2d at 1180 ; Finch 557 F.2d at 1236 ; and Mosley, 423 U.S. at 106 .

1987It seems apparent that a wide range of time gaps between interrogations may satisfy Mosley, see, Jackson, 730 F.2d at 1180 ; Finch 557 F.2d at 1236 ; and Mosley, 423 U.S. at 106 .

1987It seems apparent that a wide range of time gaps between interrogations may satisfy Mosley, see, Jackson, 730 F.2d at 1180 ; Finch 557 F.2d at 1236 ; and Mosley, 423 U.S. at 106 .

1987It seems apparent that a wide range of time gaps between interrogations may satisfy Mosley, see, Jackson, 730 F.2d at 1180 ; Finch 557 F.2d at 1236 ; and Mosley, 423 U.S. at 106 .