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127 Texas opinions name it 3 courts 1973–2025 17 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Texas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
University of Texas Medical School at Houston v. Thangreen2 sentences2021But determining “[w]hat process is due is measured by a flexible standard that depends on the practical requirements of the circumstances.” Than, 901 S.W.2d at 930 (citing Mathews, 424 U.S. at 334 ). 2016This flexible standard includes: “(1) the private interest that will be affected by the official action; (2) the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and (3) the government’s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.” Than, 901 S.W.2d at 930 , citing Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335 , 96 S.Ct. at 903 . | 15 | 39 |
Mathews v. Eldridgegreen2 sentences2022But “what process is due in any given situation is measured by a flexible standard that depends on the practical requirements of the circumstances.” R.M.T., 352 S.W.3d at 17 ; see Mathews, 424 U.S. at 349 , 96 S. Ct. at 909 . 2022But “what process is due in any given situation is measured by a flexible standard that depends on the practical requirements of the circumstances.” R.M.T., 352 S.W.3d at 17 ; see Mathews, 424 U.S. at 349 , 96 S. Ct. at 909 . | 13 | 56 |
Goss v. Lopezgreen2 sentences2020Mathews, 424 U.S. at 334 , 96 S.Ct. at 902 ; Goss [v. Lopez], 419 U.S. [565,] 578, 95 S.Ct. [729,] 738-39[, 42 L.Ed.2d 725 (1975)]. 2004Mathews , 424 U.S. at 334 , 96 S. Ct. at 902 ; see also Goss v. Lopez , 419 U.S. 565, 575-77 , 95 S. Ct. 729, 738-39 (1975). | 5 | 10 |
Rhodes v. Stategreen2 sentences2015The State argues that since appellant insisted on going forward with the first revocation proceeding with full awareness that a second motion to revoke based on the purported drug and alcohol violations was likely to be filed, he acquiesced in how the two proceedings unfolded, and he is therefore es-topped from complaining (and/or has waived the right to complain) after the fact. ”[E]s-toppel is a flexible doctrine that manifests itself in various forms that are not limited to unilateral requests.” See Rhodes v. State, 240 S.W.3d 882, 891 (Tex.Crim.App.2007). 2015Written Notice of the Claimed Violations of Probation The record from the first revocation proceeding reflects that appellant had written notice of the State’s allegations that appellant had failed to report to his probation officer, that 15 The State argues that since appellant insisted on going forward with the first revocation proceeding with full awareness that a second motion to revoke based on the purported drug and alcohol violations was likely to be filed, he acquiesced in how the two proceedings unfolded, and he is therefore estopped from complaining (and/or has waived the right to co | 4 | 5 |
Nenno v. Stategreen2 sentences2019“Soft” sciences, such as psychology, are reviewed under a more flexible standard set out in Nenno v. State, 970 S.W.2d 549, 561 (Tex.Crim.App. 1998), overruled on other grounds by State v. Terrazas, 4 S.W.3d 720, 727 (Tex.Crim.App. 1999) (en banc); see Weatherred v. State, 15 S.W.3d 540, 542 (Tex.Crim.App. 2000); Holcombe, 2018 WL 6629700 , at *5 (applying the Nenno standard to expert testimony in the area of psychology). 2018Given that methods of proving reliability vary depending on the field of expertise, proffered testimony from experts in “soft” sciences such as psychology is reviewed under a more flexible standard set out in Nenno v. State, 970 S.W.2d 549, 561 (Tex. Crim. | 3 | 3 |
State v. Crankgreen2 sentences2015Sch. v. Than, 901 S.W.2d 926, 930 (Tex. 1995) (“What process is due is measured by a flexible standard that depends on the practical requirements of the circumstances.”); State v. Crank, 666 S.W.2d 91, 94 (Tex. 1984) (“[T]he ultimate test of due process of law in an administrative hearing is the presence of rudiments of fair play long known to our law.”). 2015“What process is due is measured by a flexible standard that depends on the practical requirements of the circumstances.” Than, 901 S.W.2d at 930 . “[T]he ultimate test of due process of law in an administrative hearing is the presence of rudiments of fair play long known to our law.” State v. Crank, 666 S.W.2d 91, 94 (Tex. 1984). | 3 | 3 |
Rodarte v. Coxgreen2 sentences2008See Rodarte v. Cox , 828 S.W.2d 65 , 69–70 (Tex. App.—Tyler 1991, writ denied). 2006See Rodarte v. Cox, 828 S.W.2d 65, 69-70 (Tex.App.-Tyler 1991, writ denied). | 3 | 3 |
Cooper Tire & Rubber Co. v. Mendezgreen2 sentences2014The Supreme Court in Mendez listed the Robinson factors that trial courts may consider in determining whether expert testimony is reliable but made clear that “these factors are non-exclusive and that Rule 702 contemplates a flexible inquiry.” 204 S.W.3d at 801 (citing Robinson, 923 S.W.2d at 557 ). 2010“We emphasized in Robinson that these factors are non-exclusive and that [Texas] Rule [of Evidence] 702 contemplates a flexible inquiry.” Cooper Tire & Rubber Co. v. Mendez, 204 S.W.3d 797, 801 (Tex.2006). . ”[T]emporal proximity alone does not meet standards of scientific reliability and does not, by itself, support an inference of medical causation. ... | 2 | 4 |
Gammill v. Jack Williams Chevrolet, Inc.green2 sentences2006However, the role of the trial court "is not to determine whether an expert's conclusions are *131 correct, but only whether the analysis used to reach them is reliable." Gammill, 972 S.W.2d at 728 ; see also Robinson, 923 S.W.2d at 557 ("Rule 702 envisions a flexible inquiry focusing solely on the underlying principles and methodology, not on the conclusions that they generate."). 2006However, the role of the trial court “is not to determine whether an expert’s conclusions are correct, but only whether the analysis used to reach them is reliable.” Gammill, 972 S.W.2d at 728 ; see also Robinson, 928 S.W.2d at 557 (“Rule 702 envisions a flexible inquiry focusing solely on the underlying principles and methodology, not on the conclusions that they generate.”). | 2 | 3 |
Burdick v. Takushigreen2 sentences2020Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 434 (1992) (quoting Tashjian v. Republican Party of Conn., 479 U.S. 208, 213-14 (1986) and Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 789 (1983)). b. 2020Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 434 (1992) (quoting Tashjian v. Republican Party of Conn., 479 U.S. 208, 213-14 (1986) and Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 789 (1983)). b. | 2 | 3 |
Texas Department of Transportation v. Sefzikgreen2 sentences2020Comm’n, 478 S.W.3d at 875 -76 (citing Tex. Dep’t of Transp. v. Sefzik, 355 S.W.3d 618, 622 (Tex. 2011) (per curiam); Tex. Nat. 2020Comm’n, 478 S.W.3d at 875 -76 (citing Tex. Dep’t of Transp. v. Sefzik, 355 S.W.3d 618, 622 (Tex. 2011) (per curiam); Tex. Nat. | 2 | 2 |
Tashjian v. Republican Party of Connecticutgreen2 sentences2020Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 434 (1992) (quoting Tashjian v. Republican Party of Conn., 479 U.S. 208, 213-14 (1986) and Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 789 (1983)). b. 2020Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 434 (1992) (quoting Tashjian v. Republican Party of Conn., 479 U.S. 208, 213-14 (1986) and Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 789 (1983)). b. | 2 | 2 |
State v. Terrazasgreen2 sentences2019“Soft” sciences, such as psychology, are reviewed under a more flexible standard set out in Nenno v. State, 970 S.W.2d 549, 561 (Tex.Crim.App. 1998), overruled on other grounds by State v. Terrazas, 4 S.W.3d 720, 727 (Tex.Crim.App. 1999) (en banc); see Weatherred v. State, 15 S.W.3d 540, 542 (Tex.Crim.App. 2000); Holcombe, 2018 WL 6629700 , at *5 (applying the Nenno standard to expert testimony in the area of psychology). 2018App. 1998), overruled on other grounds by State v. Terrazas, 4 S.W.3d 720, 727 (Tex. Crim. | 2 | 2 |
In Re SKAgreen2 sentences2011Id. at 334 ; Than, 901 S.W.2d at 930 . ―When the State moves to destroy weakened familial bonds, it must provide the parents with fundamentally fair procedures.‖ Santosky, 455 U.S. at 753–54. ―[T]he process due in parental rights termination proceedings turns on a balancing of the ‗three distinct factors‘ specified in Mathews. . . .‖ Id. at 754; In re S.K.A., 236 S.W.3d 875, 892 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2007, pet. denied). 2008Id. at 334 ; Than , 901 S.W.2d at 930 . “When the State moves to destroy weakened familial bonds, it must provide the parents with fundamentally fair procedures.” Santosky , 455 U.S. at 753–54. “[T]he process due in parental rights termination proceedings turns on a balancing of the ‘three distinct factors’ specified in Mathews . . . .” Id . at 754; In re S.K.A ., 236 S.W.3d 875, 892 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2007, pet. denied). | 2 | 2 |
National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Yeogreen2 sentences2004NCAA v. Yeo , 114 S.W.3d 584, 598 (Tex. App.--Austin 2003, pet. filed) (citing Mathews , 424 U.S. at 334 ; Goss v. Lopez , 419 U.S. 565, 578 (1975)). 2004NCAA v. Yeo, 114 S.W.3d 584, 598 (Tex. App.—Austin 2003, pet. filed) (citing Mathews, 424 U.S. at 334 ; Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 578 (1975)). | 2 | 2 |
McGann v. Stategreen2 sentences2001McGann v. State, 30 S.W.3d 540, 546 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2000, pet. ref'd); Forte, 935 S.W.2d at 177 . 2001McGann v. State, 30 S.W.3d 540, 546 (Tex.App.—Fort Worth 2000, pet. ref'd); Forte, 935 S.W.2d at 177 . | 2 | 2 |
| Christophersen v. Allied-Signal Corporationgreen | 2 | 2 |
| Miller v. United Statesgreen | 2 | 2 |
| Christophersen v. Allied-Signal Corp.green | 2 | 2 |
EI Du Pont De Nemours & Co. v. Robinsongreen2 sentences2021However, it emphasized in Robinson that “these factors are non-exclusive and that Rule 702 contemplates a flexible inquiry.” Id. 2014The Supreme Court in Mendez listed the Robinson factors that trial courts may consider in determining whether expert testimony is reliable but made clear that “these factors are non-exclusive and that Rule 702 contemplates a flexible inquiry.” 204 S.W.3d at 801 (citing Robinson, 923 S.W.2d at 557 ). | 1 | 9 |
Forte v. Stategreen2 sentences2001McGann v. State, 30 S.W.3d 540, 546 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2000, pet. ref'd); Forte, 935 S.W.2d at 177 . 2001McGann v. State, 30 S.W.3d 540, 546 (Tex.App.—Fort Worth 2000, pet. ref'd); Forte, 935 S.W.2d at 177 . | 1 | 3 |
Transcontinental Insurance Co. v. Crumpgreen2 sentences2022Transcontinental Ins., 330 S.W.3d at 216 . –12– An expert’s testimony must not suffer from an analytical gap that renders it unreliable. 2019See Crump, 330 S.W.3d at 215 n.2 (citing Mendez, 204 S.W.3d at 801 ). | 1 | 2 |
Santosky v. Kramergreen2 sentences2011Id. at 334 ; Than, 901 S.W.2d at 930 . ―When the State moves to destroy weakened familial bonds, it must provide the parents with fundamentally fair procedures.‖ Santosky, 455 U.S. at 753–54. ―[T]he process due in parental rights termination proceedings turns on a balancing of the ‗three distinct factors‘ specified in Mathews. . . .‖ Id. at 754; In re S.K.A., 236 S.W.3d 875, 892 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2007, pet. denied). 2011Id. at 334 ; Than, 901 S.W.2d at 930 . ―When the State moves to destroy weakened familial bonds, it must provide the parents with fundamentally fair procedures.‖ Santosky, 455 U.S. at 753–54. ―[T]he process due in parental rights termination proceedings turns on a balancing of the ‗three distinct factors‘ specified in Mathews. . . .‖ Id. at 754; In re S.K.A., 236 S.W.3d 875, 892 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2007, pet. denied). | 1 | 2 |
| Hanson v. Dencklagreen | 1 | 2 |
| Deen v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| in Re Interest of N.G., a Childgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Arroyo v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Weatherred v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Tillman, Larry Joseph Jr.green | 1 | 1 |
| Robinson MacHinery Inc. v. Davisgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Burns v. Lambgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Sherman Gas & Electric Co. v. Beldengreen | 1 | 1 |
| Personal Care Products, Inc. v. Albert Hawkgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Richardson v. City of Pasadenagreen | 1 | 1 |
| Murray, Raymond Desmondgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Coble v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Allison v. Fire Insurance Exchangegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Guevara v. Ferrergreen | 1 | 1 |
| Guaglieri v. New Jerseygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Riggins v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Texas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Wilson v. Arkansas
green
2 sentences2003Id. 2003Id. | 5 | 2003–2003 |
International Shoe Co. v. Washington
green
2 sentences2014In response to these changes, the requirements for personal jurisdiction over nonresidents have evolved from the rigid rule of Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 , to the flexible standard of International Shoe Co. v. State of Washington, 326 U.S. 310 . 1979In response to these changes, the requirements for personal jurisdiction over nonresidents have evolved from the rigid rule of Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 , 24 L.Ed. 565 , to the flexible standard of International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 , 66 S.Ct. 154 , 90 L.Ed. 95 , 161 A.L.R. 1057 . 3 . | 3 | 1973–2014 |
In Re Rmt
green
2 sentences2023Id. 2022But “what process is due in any given situation is measured by a flexible standard that depends on the practical requirements of the circumstances.” R.M.T., 352 S.W.3d at 17 ; see Mathews, 424 U.S. at 349 , 96 S. Ct. at 909 . | 2 | 2022–2023 |
Texas Transportation Commission and Ted Houghton, in His Official Capacity as Chair of the Texas Transportation Commission v. City of Jersey Village
green
2 sentences2020Comm’n, 478 S.W.3d at 875 -76 (citing Tex. Dep’t of Transp. v. Sefzik, 355 S.W.3d 618, 622 (Tex. 2011) (per curiam); Tex. Nat. 2020Comm’n, 478 S.W.3d at 875 -76 (citing Tex. Dep’t of Transp. v. Sefzik, 355 S.W.3d 618, 622 (Tex. 2011) (per curiam); Tex. Nat. | 2 | 2020–2020 |
Anderson v. Celebrezze
green
2 sentences2020Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 434 (1992) (quoting Tashjian v. Republican Party of Conn., 479 U.S. 208, 213-14 (1986) and Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 789 (1983)). b. 2020Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 434 (1992) (quoting Tashjian v. Republican Party of Conn., 479 U.S. 208, 213-14 (1986) and Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 789 (1983)). b. | 2 | 2020–2020 |
Anthony v. State
green
2 sentences2013Likewise, we overrule this point of error. 14 Typically, we determine what process is due using “a flexible standard that depends on the practical requirements of the circumstances.” Anthony, 209 S.W.3d at 307 . 2013“This flexible standard includes three factors: (1) the private interest that will be affected by the official action; (2) the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and (3) the government’s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.” Id. (quoting Univ. of Tex. Med. | 2 | 2013–2015 |
Pennoyer v. Neff
red
2 sentences2014In response to these changes, the requirements for personal jurisdiction over nonresidents have evolved from the rigid rule of Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 , to the flexible standard of International Shoe Co. v. State of Washington, 326 U.S. 310 . 1979In response to these changes, the requirements for personal jurisdiction over nonresidents have evolved from the rigid rule of Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 , 24 L.Ed. 565 , to the flexible standard of International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 , 66 S.Ct. 154 , 90 L.Ed. 95 , 161 A.L.R. 1057 . 3 . | 2 | 1979–2014 |
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.
green
2 sentences2012“Rule 702 envisions a flexible inquiry focusing solely on the underlying principles and methodology, not on the conclusions they generate.” Robinson, 923 S.W.2d at 557 (citing Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593–94, 113 S. Ct. at 2797 ); see also Allison v. Fire Ins. 2012“Rule 702 envisions a flexible inquiry focusing solely on the underlying principles and methodology, not on the conclusions they generate.” Robinson, 923 S.W.2d at 557 (citing Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593–94, 113 S. Ct. at 2797 ); see also Allison v. Fire Ins. | 2 | 1996–2012 |
Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno
green
2 sentences2011Piper Aircraft , 454 U.S. at 249–50, 102 S. Ct. at 263 . 2011Piper Aircraft , 454 U.S. at 249–50, 102 S. Ct. at 263 . | 2 | 2010–2011 |
White v. Independence Bank, N.A.
green
2 sentences2005An abuse of discretion standard is a flexible standard, see id. , meaning trial courts are given significant leeway to determine whether to grant leave to file an untimely response. 2005An abuse of discretion standard is a flexible standard, see id., meaning trial courts are given significant leeway to determine whether to grant leave to file an untimely response. | 2 | 2005–2005 |
| Abilene Independent School District v. Marks green | 1 | 2024–2024 |
| Kelly v. State green | 1 | 2023–2023 |
| in the Interest of A. J., a Child green | 1 | 2021–2021 |
| Ex Parte Ellis green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| Collins v. Texas Natural Resource Conservation Commission green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| Davidson v. Great National Life Insurance green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| Turner v. Perry green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| City of Arlington v. Centerfolds, Inc. green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| Martinez v. Texas Department of Protective & Regulatory Services green | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| Zinermon v. Burch green | 1 | 2012–2012 |
| Longwell Transfer v. Elliott neutral | 1 | 1985–1985 |
| Travelers Insurance Company v. Miller green | 1 | 1980–1980 |
| O'Brien v. Lanpar Company green | 1 | 1973–1973 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.